

Augustine, Julian of Aeclanum and E. Pagels' *Adam, Eve, and the Serpent**)

Except for the sixth and final chapter, E. Pagels' new book is a compilation of articles which have previously been published elsewhere. Pagels discusses Augustine and Julian particularly in chapters five and six, which are entitled "The Politics of Paradise" (p. 98-126) and "The Nature of Nature" (p. 127-150) respectively.

The object of our contribution is to enter into dialogue with these articles and to indicate a number of points which we believe should be further nuanced. Indeed, we have the impression that Pagels has not always done justice to the multicolored mosaic of Augustine's thought among other things. Also, there are a number of points where we think Pagels has erred. By means of our reflections, we do not intend to summarize Pagels' articles. Rather, on the basis of some of her statements, we hope to offer a modest contribution with regard to a few themes from an interesting dispute.

Our first reflection concerns *Rom.* 5,12. According to Pagels, Augustine based himself on an "idiosyncratic interpretation of Romans 5:12" in his observation that human nature became evil as punishment for the sin of the first people. The reason for his faulty interpretation, Pagels claims, lay in the fact that he "read the passage in Latin, and so either ignored or was unaware of the connotation of the Greek original; thus he misread the last phrase as referring to Adam"¹). Yet the list of studies, which she mentions with regard to Augustine's interpretation of *Rom.* 5,12, does not include those articles which negate this widespread view. S. Lyonnet²) indeed has convincingly proved that the interpretation of *Rom.* 5,12 did not play an important role in Augustine's development of this theory of original sin. Lyonnet pointed out that Augustine did not appeal to *Rom.* 5,12 but that he referred to 1 *Cor.*

* New York, Random House, 1988, XXVIII + 189 p.

¹) See Pagels, p. 109; cf. also p. 143.

²) *Rom. V,12 chez saint Augustin. Note sur l'élaboration de la doctrine Augustinienne du péché originel*, in *L'Homme devant Dieu. Mélanges offerts au père Henri de Lubac* (Théologie 56), Lyon, 1963, p. 327-339; cf. also *id.*, *A propos de Romains 5,12 dans l'œuvre de S. Augustin. Note complémentaire*, in *Biblica* 45 (1964) 541-542; *id.*, *Augustin et Rm. 5,12 avant la controverse pélagienne*, in *Nouvelle Revue Théologique* 89 (1967) 842-849.

15,22 as proof of all humanity's incorporation into Adam, when he definitively shaped the main lines of his view on original sin in 396/397³). In Adam, all of us die because in him lies the source of God's resentment. Because of Adam, we all belong to the *massa peccati* which, in light of divine justice, deserved to be punished⁴). Up until the beginning of the Pelagian controversy, it is conspicuous that *Rom.* 5,12 was never referred to as an argument to prove this view which compelled Lyonnet to duly remark: "On ne saurait affirmer, et aussi bien nul ne le prétend, qu'avant 412 saint Augustin ignorait le dogme du péché originel. Or le moins qu'on puisse dire est que jusqu'alors le rôle joué par *Rom.* 5,12 n'apparaît guère!"⁵).

However, Augustine's specific references to 1 *Cor.* 15,22 are quite numerous. Moreover, in his work *De peccatorum meritis et remissione*, in which he explicitly opposed the Pelagian view of Adam as *exemplum* for the first time, Augustine once again introduced his exegesis of *Rom.* 5,12a-b by means of 1 *Cor.* 15,21-22⁶). Already this should sufficiently prove that Augustine's interpretation of *Rom.* 5,12 cannot be referred to in order to portray his concept of original sin as being a theory based on a faulty reading of the text. Clearly, Augustine developed his opinion without the aid of *Rom.* 5,12d.

In passing, we need to point out that Augustine dealt more elaborately with the *in quo* of *Rom.* 5,12 in his work *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV, 77). In his exposition, he explicitly referred to the Greek text. According to Augustine, *in quo* could not point to *mors* because then the text would have read *in qua* since *mors* is feminine. Moreover, Augustine considered a concept such as *in morte peccaverunt omnes* rather meaningless. Death follows sinfulness and not vice versa. This left Augustine with two options: *in quo* referred either to Adam or to *peccatum*. The former option, which Augustine preferred, implied that all were in Adam when he sinned. In the latter case, all

³) *Rom.* V,12 chez saint Augustin, p. 329. On this topic, see *De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum* I,2,16-20, CCL 44, p. 41-53; here as in *De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII*, q. 68,3, CCL 44A, p. 177-179, *Rom.* 9,11-21 plays an important role.

⁴) "Sint igitur omnes homines — quando quidem, ut apostolus ait 'in Adam omnes moriuntur', a quo in universum genus humanum origo ducitur offensionis Dei — una quaedam massa peccati supplicium debens divinae summaeque iustitiae, quod sive exigatur sive donetur, nulla est iniquitas."; *De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum* I,2,16, CCL 44, p. 41-42; see also I,2,17, CCL 44, p. 43.

⁵) *Rom.* V,12 chez saint Augustin, p. 331.

⁶) See *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* I,8, CSEL 60, p. 9-10.

⁷) CSEL 60, p. 527-528.

sinned in Adam's sin because his sin has, in general (*generaliter*), become the sin of all of us. For Augustine, this possibility offered no satisfactory solution since the Greek word for sin ἁμαρτία is feminine and thus, ἐφ' ᾧ could not be used as a relative pronoun pointing to it⁸). Finally, Augustine referred to a text by Ambrosiaster which he mistakenly ascribed to Hilary. This text also related *in quo* to Adam⁹). It is definitely true that Augustine did not assume that *in quo* could have a causal meaning as well (i.e. 'because' or 'insofar as').

Besides all of this, we consider it unfortunate that, with regard to *Rom.* 5,12, Pagels posits that "Augustine insisted that it meant that death came upon all men in whom all sinned: that the sin of that 'one man' Adam brought upon humanity not only universal death, but also universal, and inevitable, sin"¹⁰). Statements such as this can be misleading. Indeed, on the basis of our seminal presence in Adam, we are born with guilt. Augustine, however, always stressed that this sin was not ours. In other words, it is not a personal sin, and thus not a sin in the full sense of the word, but rather the sin of our forefather¹¹). *Peccatum originale* is certainly not the same as *peccatum* as such.

⁸) "Non enim movere debet, quia non dixit 'in qua', sed 'in quo omnes peccaverunt'; mors quippe in graeca lingua generis masculini est. Quodlibet ergo eligant, aut enim 'in illo homine peccaverunt omnes' ideo dictum est, quando ille peccavit, in illo erant omnes; aut in illo peccato peccaverunt omnes, quia generaliter omnium factum est, quod nascentes tracturi erant omnes; aut restat, ut dicant, quod in illa morte peccaverint omnes. Sed hoc quemadmodum possit intellegi non plane video. In peccato enim moriuntur homines, non in morte peccant; nam peccato praecedente mors sequitur, non morte praecedente peccatum. 'Aculeus' quippe 'mortis est peccatum', id est aculeus, cuius punctione fit mors, non aculeus, quo pingit mors, sicut venenum, si bibitur, appellatur poculum mortis, quod eo poculo facta sit mors, non quod morte sit poculum factum aut a morte sit datum. Quodsi propterea non potest illis verbis apostoli peccatum intellegi, in quo omnes peccaverunt, quia in graeco, unde translata est epistula, peccatum femino genere positum est, restat, ut in illo primo homine peccasse omnes intellegantur, quia in illo fuerunt omnes quando ille peccavit, unde peccatum nascendo trahitur, quod nisi renascendo non solvitur."; *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,7, CSEL 60, p. 527-528. See also G. Bonner, *Augustine on Romans* 5,12, in *Studia Evangelica* V, Berlin, 1968, p. 242-247, esp. p. 242-244.

⁹) *Ibidem*; cf. also Ambrosiaster, *Ad Romanos* V,12, CSEL 81,1, p. 165. See also A. de Veer, *Saint Augustin et l'Ambrosiaster*, in *BA* 23, p. 817-824; Bonner, *Augustine on Romans* 5,12, p. 243.

¹⁰) Pagels, p. 109.

¹¹) See e.g. *Contra Iulianum* VI,28, PL 44, 839; *Opus imperfectum* I,48, CSEL 85,1, p. 40; II,163, CSEL 85,1, p. 284; IV,104, PL 45, 1401. See also R. Jolivet, *Le problème du mal d'après saint Augustin*, Paris, 1936, p. 91-92; A. Solignac, *La condition de l'homme pécheur d'après saint Augustin*, in *Nouvelle Revue Théologique* 78 (1956) 359-387, esp. p. 375-379; 386-387.

Our second reflection concerns Pagels' presentation of Augustine's concept of freedom. According to Pagels, Augustine stated that, because of Adam's sin, humanity had irrevocably lost its freedom. "Instead of the freedom of the will and humanity's original royal dignity, Augustine emphasizes humanity's enslavement to sin. Humanity is sick, suffering and helpless, *irreparably* damaged by the fall, for that 'original sin', Augustine insists, involved nothing else than Adam's prideful attempt to establish his own autonomous self-government"¹²).

First of all, I would like to note that in Augustine's thinking in general there is a certain distinction between *libertas* and *liberum arbitrium*. The term *libertas* generally designates a freedom which implies a capability toward goodness. This sort of freedom encompasses both wanting to do good and actually doing what is good. On the basis of the absence of any interior or exterior obstacles, this freedom implies the *posse non peccare*¹³). Mankind lost this freedom because of Adam's fall and it can only be restored through the gift of Christ's grace. As far as we know, Augustine never stated that this *libertas boni* was irreparably lost. It is liberated by faith which of course implies that it has the capability of being liberated. Every person therefore remains potentially *capax boni* but the actualization of this initial capability can only be effected in the context of faith¹⁴).

¹²) Pagels, p. 99; see also e.g. p. 105; 107; 109; 120.

¹³) "Libertas quidem periit per peccatum, sed illa, quae in paradiso fuit, habendi plenam cum immortalitate iustitiam."; *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* I,5, CSEL 60, p. 425-426. Concerning Augustine's view of freedom and free will, see, among others, esp. M. Huftier, *Libre arbitre, liberté et péché chez saint Augustin*, in *Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale* 33 (1966) 187-281; F. Clodius, *El libre albedrio según el "Opus imperfectum" de san Agustín*, in *Annales de la Facultad de Teología* 13 (1961) 5-51. Very useful are also J. Ball, *Libre arbitre et liberté dans saint Augustin*, in *L'Année théologique* 6 (1945) 368-382; *id.*, *Les développements de la doctrine de liberté chez saint Augustin*, in *L'Année théologique* 7 (1946) 400-430; G. de Plinval, *Aspects du déterminisme et de la liberté dans la doctrine de saint Augustin*, in *Revue des Études augustiniennes* (REA) 1 (1955) 345-378; M.T. Clark, *Augustine, Philosopher of Freedom*, New York-Tournai-Rome-Paris, 1958, p. 83-116; F.-J. Thonnard, *La notion de liberté en philosophie augustiniennne*, in *REA* 16 (1970) 243-270; *id.*, *La vraie liberté selon saint Augustin*, in *BA* 23, p. 753-762; A. Trapè, *Libertà e grazia nella storia della salvezza*, in *Providenza e Storia. Atti della Settimana Agostiniana Pavese* 4, Pavia, 1974, p. 45-57; A. Mengarelli, *La libertà cristiana in Agostino e Pelagio*, in *Augustinianum* 15 (1975) 347-366; *id.*, *La libertà nelle opere antipelagiane di san Agostino*, in *Sapienza* 29 (1976), 73-87; J.A. Galindo, *Libertad y libre albedrio en san Agustín*, in *Augustinus* 31 (1986) 343-355; F.J. Weismann, *The Problematic of Freedom in St. Augustine: Towards a New Hermeneutics*, in *REA* 35 (1989) 104-119.

¹⁴) See Thonnard, *La notion de liberté en philosophie augustiniennne*, p. 255; *id.*, *La vraie liberté selon saint Augustin*, in *BA* 23, p. 757.

Besides this, Augustine also spoke of a *liberum arbitrium*, free will. During the Pelagian controversy, he vehemently protested against the criticism that he denied the existence of free will¹⁵). In Augustine's opinion, the essence of this truly inseparable free will was to be situated in every person's quest toward happiness¹⁶). As such, one can posit that Augustine's statements concerning free will and freedom reveal two aspects. On the one hand, there is the psychological quest for happiness. On the other hand, there is the freedom directed toward the highest good. These aspects interfere with each other. The person who wishes to be happy can find true happiness only insofar as he directs his striving for happiness toward God which in turn is only possible if God approaches the person in grace. In other words, it is only possible if God reveals himself to mankind as the source of happiness. Since in and with Adam, mankind has turned away from God, the restoration of the relationship duly belongs to the rejected party, God.

With regard to the loss of the *libertas boni*, we should keep in mind that Augustine was speaking about freedom *theologically*. In Augustine's thinking, the essence of the *libertas boni* could not be located in an absolute freedom of choice because, in that case, God himself would no longer be free. For God possesses the *non posse peccare*¹⁷). Augustine related the essence of true freedom to the invariable Good. God possesses a freedom which can be described as *beata necessitas*: a *non posse peccare* which is connected to *nolle peccare*, *feliciter vivere*, *non mori* and *in deterius non mutari*. It is a necessity which one enjoys¹⁸).

¹⁵) "Quis autem nostrum dicat, quod primi hominis peccato perierit liberum arbitrium de genere humano?"; *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* I,5, CSEL 60, p. 425; see also II,9, CSEL 60, p. 468; *De civitate Dei* XXII,30, CCL 48, 863-865.

¹⁶) "Hominis vero liberum arbitrium *congenitum* et omnino *inamissibile* si quaerimus, illud est quo omnes beati esse volunt, etiam hi qui ea nolunt, quae ad beatitudinem ducunt."; *Opus imperfectum* VI,11, PL 45, 1521; cf. also VI,12, PL 45, 1524; VI,26, PL 45, 1565-1566. This free will is a gift of God, a *munus Dei*; see V,38, PL 45, 1474. Cf. also H. Staffner, *Die Lehre des hl. Augustinus über das Wesen der Erbsünde*, in *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 79 (1957) 385-416, p. 397; F.-J. Thonnard, *La notion de nature chez saint Augustin. Ses progrès dans la polémique antipélagienne*, in *REA* 11 (1965) 239-265, p. 257-259; Huftier, *Libre arbitre, liberté et péché chez saint Augustin*, p. 197-199; 262-266; Mengarelli, *La libertà nelle opere antipelagiane di san Agostino*, p. 78.

¹⁷) "Si liberum non est nisi quod duo potest velle, id est bonum et malum, liber Deus non est, qui malum non potest velle"; *Opus imperfectum* I,100, CSEL 85,1, p. 118; see also e.g. I,103, CSEL 85,1, p. 120; V,38, PL 45, 1474; V,61-62, PL 45, 1496-1498; VI,10, PL 45, 1518; VI,11, PL 45, 1521; VI,19, PL 45, 1544; *De civitate Dei* XXII, 20, CCL 48, p. 863-864.

¹⁸) "Hac necessitate non premuntur sancti angeli sed fruuntur"; *Opus imperfectum*

For this reason, it would be rather futile to initiate an exposition on Augustine's concept of freedom based on the notion "freedom of choice", since God's freedom would be overlooked. On the contrary however, God's freedom should be the starting point. Moreover, every person can acquire such freedom in the life hereafter, in a state of definitive wholeness.

Compared to God's freedom, Adam's freedom is of a lower order. Adam possessed the *posse non peccare*, which is closely related to the *posse non mori*¹⁹). If Adam had remained faithful to God's command, he would have received the *non posse peccare* and the *non posse mori* as a reward. In other words, Adam's freedom implied a task. Living in God's presence, free of any obstacle or contingency, Adam's freedom was spontaneously directed toward the highest good, God. Adam was free before God. His choice against God led to his exile from paradise. Deprived of the Tree of Life, suffering and death became part of his life and, through him, part of our life.

We should also note here that, on the basis of *Gen.* 2-3, Augustine considered Adam as someone of extraordinary intelligence, free from all suffering and burdens and free to do what he had to do. Against this background, Augustine noted that contemporary man was no longer an "open book" to himself²⁰). This was not only an introspective statement but also an universal observation. Augustine's own experience proved that this freedom to do good was not without difficulty for the believer and, looking around him, he noticed that many people did not live as truly free people or, to put it differently, as people who lived for God.

To my knowledge, the observation that, even as a believer, it was not so easy to perform good deeds did not lead Augustine to conclude that the *libertas boni* was definitively lost. Augustine held the opinion that fallen mankind had lost the *libertas cum immortalitate*. The *bene vivere* no longer belonged to the proper natural capabilities of fallen humanity²¹). Mankind no longer had disposal of the *libertas non*

I,103, CSEL 85,1, p. 120; see also V,62, PL 45, 1499-1500; VI,26, PL 45, 1565-1566; cf. also Huftier, *Libre arbitre, liberté et péché chez saint Augustin*, p. 283f.

¹⁹) See e.g. *Opus imperfectum* I,71, CSEL 85,1, p. 83-84; IV,79, PL 45, 1384; VI,16, PL 45, 1536; VI,22, PL 45, 1553; VI,23, PL 45, 1555.

²⁰) See, among others, Huftier, *Libre arbitre, liberté et péché chez saint Augustin*, p. 202-206; Clodius, *El libre albedrío según el "Opus imperfectum" de san Agustín*, p. 10; Thonnard, *La notion de nature chez saint Augustin*, p. 252-253.

²¹) "Non dicimus hominum vanos haereticosque sermones, qui asserunt Deum

*peccandi*²²) and instead, a *necessitas peccandi* replaced it. I prefer to view this *necessitas* as the inevitability that people will sin no matter what. I do not mean to say that people can only sin but rather that every person *will* sin in intention and action during his or her lifetime.

With regard to this, one should also keep in mind that Adam's children have in a way lost their perspective. Their cognitive faculties have been obscured²³). Acting in freedom presupposes that one knows exactly what one should do. For Augustine, this implied that a correct perspective on faith preceded a correct perspective on knowledge. Subsequently, the person who did not know the truth, which was Christ, would inevitably sin since only *per fidem* could one come to know Christ and thus aim oneself in the right direction. If a person lived without knowing God, without a reference to God, he was definitely misdirected, according to Augustine²⁴).

Pagels does not seem to realize that *ignorantia* is essentially connected to *peccatum originale*. Such ignorance also flows from our relationship to Adam which causes us not to recognize God and thus to go our own way because we have turned from Him. For the unbaptized, this ignorance is moreover related to guilt since such people are not directed toward the aim of their existence which is God. The baptized, however, are granted forgiveness for this *reatus*. Nurtured by Scripture

iustum ad bonum opus liberum hominem condidisse. Talem quippe Adam condidit, in quo fuimus omnes; sed peccando perdidit se et omnes in se. Unde nunc non est in potestate filiorum hominis a malo liberari, nisi gratia Dei det potestatem filios Dei fieri.”; *Opus imperfectum* II,7, CSEL 85,1, p. 167-168; cf. also *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* I,5, CSEL 60, p. 425-426 and *Opus imperfectum* VI,12, PL 45, 1522. See also Ball, *Les développements de la doctrine de la liberté chez saint Augustin*, p. 410; Clodius, *El libre albedrío según el “Opus imperfectum” de san Agustín*, p. 11; Huftier, *Libre arbitre, liberté et péché chez saint Augustin*, p. 232; Clark, *Augustine*, p. 90.

²²) Cf. *Opus imperfectum* I,47, CSEL 85,1, p. 34; I,104, CSEL 85,1, p. 121; II,17, CSEL 85,1, p. 174; II,38, CSEL 85,1, p. 190; II,110, CSEL 85,1, p. 431; IV,90, PL 45, 1392; IV,96, PL 45, 1395; V,28, PL 45, 1407; V,51, PL 45, 1482; V,62, PL 45, 1499; VI,17, PL 45, 1539; VI,21, PL 45, 1550; *Retractationes* I,15, 3-4, CCL 57, p. 46-48; see also Huftier, *Libre arbitre, liberté et péché chez saint Augustin*, p. 220f.

²³) “Deinde cogitare te existimo, quid appetendum, quid vitandum sit in agenda vita, quanto labore discatur. Qui autem hoc nesciunt, ipsa boni appetendi malique vitandi ignorantia patiuntur peccandi necessitatem. Necesse est enim ut peccet, qui nesciendo quid facere debeat, quod non debet facit.”; *Opus imperfectum* I,105, CSEL 85,1, p. 122; cf. also VI,17, PL 45, 1539; VI,21, PL 45, 1550.

²⁴) See *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* I,7, CSEL 60, p. 428; *Opus imperfectum* I,106, CSEL 85,1, p. 124.

²⁵) Cf. *Opus imperfectum* I,47, CSEL 85,1, p. 36; VI,17, PL 45, 1539 and already *Contra Iulianum* V,8, PL 44, 787; V,12, PL 44, 790. See also J. Mausbach, *Die Ethik des heiligen Augustinus* II, Freiburg, 1929(2), p. 226-239.

and prayer, they slowly transcend their ignorance²⁶). Progress in the knowledge of truth leads a person to grow in doing that which is true. As a believer, a person is essentially ethical.

Concerning the non-believers, Augustine was of the opinion that, theologically speaking, they were sinning even when performing acts which were good in themselves. The reason for this was that, without faith, one could not please God (*Heb.* 11,6) and that which was not done in faith was to be qualified as sin²⁷). By this, Augustine meant that, from a moral point of view, the ethical actions of pagans were not performed against the background of a correct objective. Only when God is the aim of our ethical acts, can those acts be qualified as good acts from a theological point of view. Only in faith can a person lead a truly intelligent, brave, moderate and just life. The believer alone lives virtuously and wisely²⁸). One should therefore never claim that, according to Augustine, people can do no other than sin.

Further, it should be evident that, because of its reference to God, *peccatum* has a very broad meaning for Augustine. Every deed which was not performed *propter Deum* (either directly or indirectly) fell under this category. Augustine thus recognized that the deeds of charity performed by pagans were good as such but that, theologically speaking, one could not qualify pagans as *boni* precisely because of the lack of this reference to God²⁹). Augustine readily accepted that one could

²⁶) "Ignorantia minuitur veritate magis magisque lucente."; *Contra Iulianum* VI,50, PL 44, 851. See also F.-J. Thonnard, *Le péché d'ignorance selon saint Augustin*, in BA 23, p. 782-783.

²⁷) Augustine uses both verses often in his works against the Pelagians; see e.g. *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* I,4, CSEL 42, p. 214; I,5, CSEL 42, p. 216; *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* I,7, CSEL 60, p. 429; *Contra Iulianum* IV,24, PL 44, 750; IV,27, PL 44, 751-752; IV,30, PL 44, 754; IV,32, PL 44, 755; V,34, PL 44, 805. See also A. de Veer, *Rom. 14,23b dans l'œuvre de saint Augustin (Omne quod non est ex fide, peccatum est)*, in *Recherches augustiniennes* VIII (Etudes augustiniennes), Paris, 1972, p. 149-185, esp. 154-159 and 168-185; *id.*, *Le sens de Rom. XIV,23b*, in BA 23, p. 764-769; Anne-Marie La Bonnardière, *L'Épître aux Hébreux dans l'œuvre de saint Augustin*, in REA 3 (1957) 137-162, p. 157.

²⁸) "Ex hac enim fide prudenter, fortiter, temperanter et iuste, ac per his omnibus veris virtutibus recte sapienterque vivit, qui fideliter vivit"; *Contra Iulianum* IV,19, PL 44, 747. Concerning Pagels' impression of Augustine's attitude towards the Stoa, it is to be remarked that Augustine is an occasional writer. Therefore, his appreciation or depreciation of the Stoic philosophy depends on the situation and the context; see the study of Marcia L. Colish, *The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages. II. Stoicism in Christian Latin Thought through the Sixth Century* (Studies in the History of Christian Thought 35), Leiden, 1985, p. 142-238.

²⁹) See e.g. *Contra Iulianum* IV,21, PL 44, 749; IV,22, PL 44, 749; IV,26, PL 44,

observe a gradual difference in ethical living in the pagan world as well. Even though a non-believer would be punished, the person who lived according to true virtues would be punished less severely than the person whose lifestyle was further removed from this way of living³⁰).

The presence of the grace granted by God would therefore be the mark of distinction between believers and non-believers. The former would live according to God's love, the latter according to "wordly" inspiration³¹).

In passing, we should also stress that Augustine continuously stated that people sinned voluntarily³²) and that they were therefore fully responsible for their deeds³³). One cannot claim that, according to Augustine, people should stop trying to do good because they are "morally defenseless".

Moreover, I do not think we can stress enough that, for Augustine, a person was truly capable of performing good deeds in freedom when he was in God's grace. Pagels claims that Augustine denied that humanity possessed any capability to act in freedom³⁴). Admittedly, as far as salvation is concerned, God takes the first initiative but He does not undertake this against mankind's free consent. Augustine himself said that to claim otherwise would be an absurdity³⁵). The terminology which Augustine employed to indicate God's first initiative in people's hearts, clearly proves that this was not a mere lip service. Terms such as

751; IV,30, *PL* 44, 753-754; IV,32, *PL* 44, 754-755; for Augustine, not only an act but even the intention to sin is designated as *peccatum*; see *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* I,15, *CSEL* 60, p. 436; I,27, *CSEL* 60, p. 446; *Opus imperfectum* I,105, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 122.

³⁰) Cf. *Contra Iulianum* IV,24-25, *PL* 44, 750.

³¹) See e.g. *Opus imperfectum* I,84, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 96.

³²) See *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* I,5, *CSEL* 60, p. 426; I,6, *CSEL* 60, p. 428; I,7, *CSEL* 60, p. 428; I,27, *CSEL* 60, p. 446; cf. also Clodius, *El libre abedrio según el "Opus imperfectum" de san Agustín*, p. 17-18; G. Bonner, *Libido and Concupiscentia in St. Augustine*, in *Studia Patristica* 6 (TU 81), Berlin, 1962, p. 303-304; A. de Veer, *La théorie augustinienne de la "déléction victorieuse"*, in *BA* 23, p. 779-780.

³³) "Ex quo autem incipit uti voluntatis arbitrio, et peccare et non peccare potest; sed alterum horum non facit nisi ad intus ab eo, qui dixit: 'Sine me nihil potestis facere' (Joh. 15,5), alterum vere propria voluntate, sive a se ipso sive ab alio deceptore seductus, vel peccato sicut servus addictus."; *Opus imperfectum* I,98, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 116; see also *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* I,6, *CSEL* 60, p. 428; I,7, *CSEL* 60, p. 428; *Opus imperfectum* I,105, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 123.

³⁴) Pagels, p. 120.

³⁵) "Ammoneo, ut intelligatis, cui gratiae sitis inimici negando operari Deum voluntates in mentibus hominum, non ut nolentes credant, quod absurdissime dicitur, sed ut volentes ex nolentibus fiant"; *Opus imperfectum* II,157, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 279.

*delectatio*³⁶), *amor libens*³⁷), *inspiratio dilectionis*³⁸), *dilectio*³⁹), *excitare*⁴⁰), *accendere*⁴¹), *attrahere*⁴²), *cupiditas boni*⁴³), *tangere cor*⁴⁴), *dulcescere*⁴⁵), *inspirare*⁴⁶) or *adducere*⁴⁷) seem very revealing in this regard. No matter how much God took the initiative in people's conversion, it was obvious to Augustine that this conversion was the work of both God and the individual. The person who believed in God truly chose to believe in Him⁴⁸).

The same argument was valid with regard to people's actions. The person who wished to act correctly, did this freely, never against his own will. God again took the first initiative but no one followed Christ against his will. "Nemo ergo imitatur, nisi velit"⁴⁹). God forces no one

³⁶) So *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* I,33, CSEL 42, p. 245; *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* I,15, CSEL 60, p. 436; I,18, CSEL 60, p. 440; I,22, CSEL 60, p. 443; I,27, CSEL 60, p. 446; *Opus imperfectum* I,107, CSEL 85,1, p. 126; II,217, CSEL 85,1, p. 328; II,226, CSEL 85,1, p. 342.

³⁷) Cf. *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* I,33, CSEL 42, p. 245; *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* I,22, CSEL 60, p. 443 (*amore iustitiae*); II,21, CSEL 60, p. 483.

³⁸) Cf. *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,11, CSEL 60, p. 532.

³⁹) *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* I,15, CSEL 60, p. 436; III,14, CSEL 60, p. 503; *Opus imperfectum* III,122, CSEL 85,1, p. 439.

⁴⁰) *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* I,37, CSEL 60, p. 453.

⁴¹) So *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,13, CSEL 60, p. 534.

⁴²) Cf. *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* I,37, CSEL 60, p. 454; *Opus imperfectum* III,122, CSEL 85,1, p. 433.

⁴³) *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* II,17-18, CSEL 60, p. 479-480; II,21, CSEL 60, p. 482-483; *Opus imperfectum* VI,18, PL 45, 1542.

⁴⁴) *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* II,19, CSEL 60, p. 481.

⁴⁵) *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* II,21, CSEL 60, p. 483.

⁴⁶) *Opus imperfectum* I,84, CSEL 85,1, p. 97.

⁴⁷) *Opus imperfectum* II,146, CSEL 85,1, p. 269; concerning the relation between grace and free will, see esp. de Plinval, *Aspects du déterminisme et de la liberté dans la doctrine de saint Augustin*, p. 353; Clodius, *El libre albedrio según el "Opus imperfectum" de san Agustín*, p. 38-39; H. Rondet, *La liberté et la grâce dans la théologie augustinienne*, in *Saint Augustin parmi nous*, Le Puy-Paris, 1954, p. 212-215; R. Lorenz, *Gnade und Erkenntnis bei Augustinus*, in *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 75 (1964) 21-78, p. 31-32; R. Strauss, *Der neue Mensch innerhalb der Theologie Augustins*, Zürich, 1967, p. 119-125; Huftier, *Libre arbitre, liberté et péché originel chez saint Augustin*, p. 251-252; S. Iodice, *Legge e Grazia in S. Agostino*, Napoli, 1977, p. 111-113; J.P. Burns, *The Development of Augustine's Doctrine of Operative Grace* (Études augustinienes) Paris, 1980, p. 110-111.

⁴⁸) So e.g. *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* I,36, CSEL 60, p. 453; I,37, CSEL 60, p. 454; II,20, CSEL 60, p. 481-482; *Opus imperfectum* VI,10, PL 45, 1518.

⁴⁹) "Imitatio (Christi) quippe in voluntate est; sed cum bona est, praeparatur, sicut scriptum est, voluntas a Domino (Prov. 8, 35b). Nemo ergo imitatur, nisi velit."; *Opus imperfectum* VI,34, PL 45, 1588. See also A. Sage, *Praeparatur voluntas a Domino*, in *REA* 10 (1964) 1-20, p. 1-2. This verse plays an important role in Augustine's dispute with the Pelagians; cf. Anne-Marie La Bonnardière, *Biblia augustiniana. A.T. Le Livre des Proverbes* (Études augustinienes), Paris, 1975, p. 209-210.

to act either rightly or wrongly. The person who acts rightly, desires to act this way⁵⁰) on the grounds of his salvation by Christ, which gives his deeds a new fervor⁵¹). Such a person experiences himself as being truly free in that he no longer wishes to act rightly because of external pressure but because of a positive inner conviction⁵²). The new person sincerely consents to God's invitation⁵³).

Augustine's notion of the true existence of our free will *sub gratia* was essentially connected to a concrete and practical experience recognized in faith. Grace and the gift of grace were identified with love⁵⁴) which was the desire toward that which was good. This in turn led to the One who is good so that ultimately, the initiator in love becomes the aim of our love⁵⁵). This new freedom is, in other words, not due to an ontological transformation within the person but rather to a new relationship. The contours of our existence are reshaped so that God

⁵⁰) "Nec ex Dei potentia vel in malum vel in bonum invitum aliquem cogi, sed Deo deserente pro meritis ire in malum et Deo adiuvante sine meritis converti ad bonum. Non enim est homo bonus, si nolit, sed gratia Dei etiam ad hoc adiuvatur ut velit."; *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* I,36, CSEL 60, p. 453.

⁵¹) "Nemo nisi per gratiam Christi ad bonum quod vult agendum et ad malum quod odit non agendum potest habere liberum voluntatis arbitrium, non ut voluntas eius ad bonum sicut ad malum captiva rapiatur, sed ut a captivitate liberata ad liberatorem suum liberali suavitate amoris, non servili amaritudine timoris attrahatur."; *Opus imperfectum* III,112, CSEL 85,1, p. 433; cf. also *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* I,37, CSEL 60, p. 454; IV,13, CSEL 60, p. 534; *Opus imperfectum* III,122, CSEL 85,1, 439; see also J. Burnaby, *Amor Dei. A Study of the Religion of St. Augustine* (The Hulsean Lectures for 1938), London 1947 (2), p. 227-228.

⁵²) "Tibi sumus veraciter liberi, ubi non delectamus inviti."; *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* I,33, CSEL 42, p. 246; see also e.g. *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* II,21, CSEL 60, p. 483. Cf. also de Veer, *La théorie augustinienne de la "déléction victorieuse"*, in BA 23, p. 778-782; Clark, *Augustine*, p. 118; 120-121.

⁵³) Cf. *Opus imperfectum* I,87, CSEL 85,1, p. 100; II,72, CSEL 85,1, p. 216; II,165, CSEL 85,1, p. 286; II,166, CSEL 85,1, p. 287; II,227, CSEL 85,1, p. 343; V,29, PL 45, 1467; VI,41, PL 45, 1606; Thonnard, *La notion de nature chez saint Augustin*, p. 263-264.

⁵⁴) "Ut cognita sancto amore faciamus, quae proprie gratia est."; *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,11, CSEL 60, p. 532; cf. also É. Bailleur, *La liberté augustinienne et la grâce*, in *Mélanges de Science Religieuse* 19 (1962) 30-48, p. 39.

⁵⁵) "Amor autem Dei quo pervenitur ad Deum, non est a Deo Patre per Iesum Christum cum Spiritu Sancto. Per hunc amorem creatoris, bene quisque utitur etiam creaturis. Sine hoc amore creatoris, nullis quisquam bene utitur creaturis. Hoc ergo amore opus est ut bonum beatificum sit."; *Contra Iulianum* IV,33, PL 44, 756. Only the love, given by God, really wants the good, that makes us happy: "Caritas ex Deo est (1 Joh. 4,7b) quae sola vult beatificum bonum."; *Opus imperfectum* I,95, CSEL 85,1, p. 110. This love gives us the capability to act well: "Ut enim faciat homo, Deus facit; quia ut diligit homo, Deus prior diligit."; I,134, CSEL 85,1, p. 150; see also *Contra Iulianum* IV,41, PL 44, 759; cf. Clark, *Augustine*, p. 122; Clodius, *El libre albedrio según el "Opus imperfectum" de san Agustín*, p. 36-37.

becomes the desirable object. God is loved unselfishly⁵⁶) by the person who spontaneously reacts positively to God's demands and performs them⁵⁷); by the person who, in other words, does the will of the Father as Jesus had taught and demonstrated by his own life.

Only if one abandons this new perspective, that God's love leads to love for God, can one arrive at the conclusion that Augustine denied human freedom. Yet in my opinion, this implies an unacceptable distortion of Augustine's thoughts. I think that Augustine was sincere in his last work when he maintained that he was a *defensor liberi arbitrii* by professing God's grace⁵⁸). As a believer, he realized and professed that what was good on earth primarily existed thanks to the One who is good. This presupposed the awareness of one's own sinfulness, of being loved in such a way that one was lifted from one's own sinfulness and that one, within one's own act of love wanted to act rightly and actually performed good deeds⁵⁹). As a believer, Augustine was convinced that

⁵⁶) See *Contra Iulianum* V,9, PL 44, 788; V,32, PL 44, 804.

⁵⁷) "Fortitudinem gentilium mundana cupiditas, fortitudinem autem christianorum Dei caritas facit, quae diffusa est in cordibus nostris, non per voluntatis arbitrium, quod est a nobis, sed per Spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis."; *Opus imperfectum* I,83, CSEL 85,1, p. 96; see also *Contra Iulianum* IV,33, PL 44, 706; V,32, PL 44, 804; *Opus imperfectum* III,106, CSEL 85,1, p. 426; III,114, CSEL 85,1, p. 434.

According to Augustine, one will only receive the gift of love within faith. From this theological point of view, pagans cannot act morally good, precisely because they have not received faith and love and therefore they cannot be *iusti* in the christian sense of this word; see *Contra Iulianum* IV,25, PL 44, 750-751; cf. also IV,16, PL 44, 745.

In addition to this, also the conviction that Christ is the one and only mediator and therefore the only way to reconciliation with God, plays an important role: "Neminem recte vivere, nisi ex fide per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum (cf. *Rom.* 7,25), unum Dei et hominum mediatorem."; *Contra Iulianum* IV,14, PL 44, 743; "Scito nos illud bonum hominum dicere, illam voluntatem bonam, illud opus bonum, sine Dei gratia quae datur per unum mediatorem Dei et hominum, nemini posse conferri."; IV,33, PL 44, 755. Otherwise, one will put the uniqueness of Christ's death at risk: "Quam si eis tribuerimus, nihil erit causae cur non eos ad illud regnum pervenire dicamus, de quo scriptum est: 'Concupiscentia sapientiae deducit ad regnum' (*Wisd.* 6,21). Ac per hoc Christus gratis mortuus est, si homines sine fide Christi ad fidem veram, ad virtutem veram, ad iustitiam veram, ad sapientiam veram, quacumque re alia, quacumque ratione perveniunt. Prorsus sicut de lege verissime ait apostolus: 'Si per legem iustitia, ergo Christus gratis mortuus est' (*Gal.* 2,21): ita verissime dicitur: 'Si per naturam voluntatemque iustitia, ergo Christus gratis mortuus est.'"; *Contra Iulianum* IV,17, PL 44, 746; cf. also V,18, PL 44, 795; *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* I,13, CSEL 60, p. 434-435; III,2, CSEL 60, p. 487; IV,11, CSEL 60, p. 532; *Opus imperfectum* II,72, CSEL 85,1, p. 216; III,114, CSEL 85,1, p. 434; IV,129, PL 45, 1427 etc. On this point, see the pertinent remarks of R.M. Pizzorni, *Il diritto naturale nel pensiero di S. Agostino*, in *Apollinaris* 57 (1984) 517-546, p. 521-522.

⁵⁸) Cf. *Opus imperfectum* III,214, CSEL 85,1, p. 505; see also III,108, CSEL 85,1, p. 428; III,110, CSEL 85,1, p. 432; IV,124, PL 45, 1409; *De correptione et gratia* 17, PL 44, 926.

⁵⁹) "Alia est remissio peccatorum in eis, quae mala facta sunt, alia caritas, quae

the gift of the Spirit was not merely fictitious. The Spirit endows our hearts with love and thus, our will becomes what God's will is⁶⁰). The gift of the Spirit⁶¹) renews a person⁶²) in such a way that he is raised above his selfish actions which are unfree actions since they are related to sinfulness⁶³). This inner renewal makes people free to follow Christ⁶⁴). The baptized person can in fact honor God in the right manner⁶⁵), do what is good⁶⁶) and live justly⁶⁷); all elements which belong to a *arbitrium laudabiliter liberum*⁶⁸). It is on this level that a person can find true happiness, which is true freedom⁶⁹). As a *filius Dei*⁷⁰), reconciled with God⁷¹) and clothed with Christ⁷²), he possesses a *fidelis voluntas*, a characteristic of the *bona voluntas*. People are

facit liberum ad ea quae bona facienda sunt. Utroque modo liberat Christus, quia et iniquitatem ignoscendo aufert, et inspirando tribuit caritatem.”; *Opus imperfectum* I,84, CSEL 85,1, p. 97; cf. also I,83, CSEL 85,1, p. 96; I,94, CSEL 85,1, p. 109-110; I,107, CSEL 85,1, p. 126; II,71, CSEL 85,1, p. 215; II,165, CSEL 85,1, p. 286; *Contra Iulianum* VI,72, PL 44, 866-867; cf. also Burns, *The Development of Augustine's Doctrine of Operative Grace*, p. 118.

⁶⁰) See *Opus imperfectum* I,98, CSEL 85,1, p. 116.

⁶¹) Cf. *Rom.* 5,5; see also Anne-Marie La Bonnardière, *Le verset paulinien Rom., V,5 dans l'œuvre de saint Augustin*, in *Augustinus Magister* II, Paris, 1954, p. 657-665.

⁶²) So e.g. *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* III,5, CSEL 60, p. 491.

⁶³) See *Contra Iulianum* VI,72, PL 44, 866-867: “Verum tu a vestro dogmate non recedis, quo putatis gratiam Dei per Iesum Christum dominum nostrum sic in sola peccatorum remissione versari ut non adiuvet ad vitanda peccata et desideria vincenda carnalia, diffundendo caritatem in cordibus nostris per Spiritum sanctum qui ab illo datus est nobis (cf. *Rom.* 5,5)”; *Opus imperfectum* II,165, CSEL 85,1, p. 286: “Iustificat quippe impium Deus non solum dimittendo, quae mala facit, sed etiam donando caritatem, ut declinet et a malo et faciat bonum per Spiritum sanctum.”; see also Ph. Platz, *Der Römerbrief in der Gnadenlehre Augustins* (Cassiciacum V), Würzburg, 1938, p. 136-137; J.P. Burns, *The Interpretation of Romans in the Pelagian Controversy*, in *Augustinian Studies* 10 (1979) 43-54, p. 45.

⁶⁴) “Per summistrationem Spiritus sancti, ut eum (= Christus) imitentur, adducti, quem Spiritum super suos ditissime effudit.”; *Opus imperfectum* II,146, CSEL 85,1, p. 268-269.

⁶⁵) *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II,8, CSEL 42, p. 260; *Opus imperfectum* I,86, CSEL 85,1, p. 98-99; I,7, CSEL 85,1, p. 100; II,72, CSEL 85,1, p. 216 etc.

⁶⁶) *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II,8, CSEL 42, p. 260; *Opus imperfectum* III,118, CSEL 85,1, p. 436; III,119, CSEL 85,1, p. 437.

⁶⁷) *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* I,5, CSEL 60, p. 426; II,9, CSEL 60, p. 468.

⁶⁸) *Opus imperfectum* I,79, CSEL 85,1, p. 94.

⁶⁹) “Hoc arbitrium liberum adiuvatur per Dei gratiam, ut quod naturaliter volumus, hoc est beate vivere, bene vivendo habere possimus.”; *Opus imperfectum* VI,26, PL 45, 1506.

⁷⁰) See e.g. *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* II,11, CSEL 60, p. 471; II,16, CSEL 60, p. 478; III,5, CSEL 60, p. 491.

⁷¹) Cf. *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,8, CSEL 60, p. 529.

⁷²) See e.g. *Contra Iulianum* VI,27, PL 44, 838; *Opus imperfectum* II,193, 309.

certainly helped and supported by God⁷³) but they themselves must continuously take up their responsibilities and resist sinful desires while sincerely attempting to obey the demands of the Law. What is involved therefore is a process of personal growth whereby one is situated between two extremes, namely that which *a iustitia deficit* and that which *ad iustitiam proficit*⁷⁴). Thanks to grace, the *delectatio iustitiae* is present in people, which acts, as it were, as a counterbalance and which enables people to truly conquer the *delectatio peccati*⁷⁵). Once again, the person himself has to obey the spirit of justice and resist the tendency to sin⁷⁶). In the dynamic process of growth, the person will attempt throughout his life — which is characterized by incompleteness since a true completeness is only expected in the life hereafter — to lessen his *vitia* by not giving in to them and by living moderately, sincerely and religiously⁷⁷). Complete happiness will be granted to this person as a reward for his good deeds⁷⁸). Thus, it is obvious that, for Augustine, human freedom really existed. How could he have otherwise spoken of a reward? I therefore think that it is incorrect to speak of Augustine's notion of freedom without mentioning this aspect of grace. Every author, even Augustine, has the right to be discussed from the

⁷³) "(Ipsa voluntas) ... Dei gratia ... ad omne bonum actionis, sermonis, cogitationis adiuta."; *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* II,9, CSEL 85,1, p. 469; "Hominis autem propositum bonum adiuuat quidem subsequens gratia"; II,2, CSEL 60, p. 484; "Utroque enim modo adiuuat gratia, et dimittendo, quae male fecimus, et opitulando, ut declinemus a malis et bona faciamus."; *Opus imperfectum* II,227, CSEL 85,1, p. 343; see e.g. also II,84, CSEL 85,1, p. 222. Cf. also de Plinval, *Aspects du déterminisme et de la liberté dans la doctrine de saint Augustin*, p. 256.

⁷⁴) "Dum contra hoc nostrum quod a iustitia deficit, illo nostro quod ad iustitiam proficit dimicatur: ut vincente profectu totum surgat in melius, non vincente defectu totum vergat in peius."; *Contra Iulianum* II,8, PL 44, 679; see also *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II,36, CSEL 42, p. 248.

⁷⁵) "Ille liberat, qui (...) donat per spiritum caritatem, cuius delectatione vincatur delectatio peccati"; *Opus imperfectum* I,107, CSEL 85,1, p. 126; see also II,217, CSEL 85,1, p. 329; II,226, CSEL 85,1, p. 342; *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* I,27, CSEL 60, p. 446.

⁷⁶) So *Opus imperfectum* II,228, CSEL 85,1, p. 344.

⁷⁷) *Opus imperfectum* VI,8, PL 45, 1514; cf. already *De natura et gratia* 84, CSEL 60, p. 298-299; see also A. Sage, *Vie de perfection et conseils évangéliques dans les controverses pélagiennes*, in *Sanctus Augustinus vitae spiritualis magister* I, Roma, 1958, p. 199-207; R.B. Eno, *Some Patristic Views on the Relationship of Faith and Works in Justification*, in *Recherches augustiniennes* XIX (Études augustiniennes), Paris, 1984, p. 18-19; Iodice, *Legge e Grazia in S. Agostino*, p. 88.

⁷⁸) *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* III,17, CSEL 60, p. 506; III,23, CSEL 60, p. 515; *Opus imperfectum* I,33, CSEL 85,1, p. 147; VI,8, PL 45, 1514-1515.

point of view of their most essential concerns. Only then can one justly assess an author.

Concerning the *concupiscentia carnis*, I have the feeling that Pagels does not delve deep enough. First of all, I would like to note that Augustine was intrigued by the fact that the *concupiscentia carnis*, which also belongs to a person's lower, bodily functions, could act autonomously from the soul, which should be the governing principle since it is higher in distinction and function. According to Augustine, this inverted situation did not exist prior to the fall. In saying this, he based himself on Scripture, namely on *Gen.* 2,25: "The man and his wife were both naked, yet they felt no shame"⁷⁹). The absence of shame was fundamentally related to the absence of sin⁸⁰). *Concupiscentia carnis* as such could have very well been present in the first people prior to the fall. Yet if this was the case, it coexisted in harmony with the will⁸¹). Moreover, Augustine did not exclude the possibility that some *concupiscentia carnis*, such as eating and drinking, could be part of the paradisaical experience if they enhanced the body's well-being or if they helped effect procreation. In light of what has been said, I think it is clear that Augustine's discussion of *concupiscentia carnis* as rebellion

⁷⁹) Cf. Augustine's commentary in e.g. *De civitate Dei* XIV,17, CCL 48, p. 439-440; *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* I,6, CSEL 42, p. 218; *Contra Iulianum* IV,82, PL 44, 761; *Opus imperfectum* I,68, CSEL 85,1, p. 75; IV,36, PL 45, 1356.

⁸⁰) "Audimus enim scripturae manifestissimum testimonium, contra quod vos obsurdescitis, cum ommutescere deberetis. Quis enim audiens, quod illi primi homines nudi erant et non pudebat eos, non videat, unde sit factum, ut post peccatum puderet eos nudos esse et ea membra, quorum puderet, festinarent succinatoriis qualibuscumque velare?" *Opus imperfectum* III,74, CSEL 85,1, p. 404.

⁸¹) Cf. *Contra Iulianum* III,57, PL 44, 732; see also *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II,59, CSEL 42, p. 317-318; *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* I,34-35, CSEL 60, p. 450-452; *Contra Iulianum* IV,57ff., PL 44, 765ff.; V,22, PL 44, 797; *Opus imperfectum* I,68, CSEL 85,1, p. 75; I,70, CSEL 85,1, p. 79-80; I,71, CSEL 85,1, p. 83; II,42, CSEL 85,1, p. 193; II,45, CSEL 85,1, p. 195; II,122, CSEL 85,1, p. 253; III,177, CSEL 85,1, p. 478; IV,19, PL 45, 1349 etc. See e.g. also A. Zumkeller, *Aurelius Augustinus. Schriften gegen die Pelagianer* III (Sankt Augustinus. Der Lehrer der Gnade), Würzburg, 1977, p. 471; M. Müller, *Die Lehre von der Paradiesesehe und ihre Auswirkung in der Sexualethik des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts bis Thomas von Aquin*, Regensburg, 1954, p. 19-32; B. Honings, *Morale coniugale agostiniana*, in *Ephemerides Carmeliticae* 20 (1969) 259-319, p. 310; Y. de Montcheuil, *La polémique de saint Augustin contre Julien d'Éclane*, in *Recherches de Science Religieuse* 44 (1956) 193-218, p. 205-207; D. Covi, *Valor y finalidad del sexo según san Agustín. La ética sexual en el paraíso según san Agustín*, in *Augustinus* 18 (1973) 3-21, p. 14-16; E. Schmitt, *Le mariage chrétien dans l'œuvre de saint Augustin. Une théologie baptismale de la vie conjugale* (Études augustinienes), Paris, 1983, p. 101-105; Elizabeth A. Clark, *Ascetic Piety and Women's Faith. Essays on Late Ancient Christianity* (Studies in Women and Religion 20), Lewiston-Queenston, 1986, p. 293.

after the fall should not be viewed as an exposition on *concupiscentia carnis* as such. Rather, it should be regarded from the viewpoint of the antinomy between flesh and spirit. Because of his sinfulness, man's lower functions (*caro*) turn against his higher functions (*mens*)⁸³). We should also note that Augustine derived this *discordia carnis et spiritus* from the opposition between *Gen.* 2,25 and 3,7 which expressed the idea that before the fall, Adam and Eve were naked yet they were not ashamed. After the fall however, they experienced shame. This *confusio* was, according to Augustine, the consequence of an inappropriate rebellion of the *genitalia*⁸⁴). Because of the flesh's disobedience (*inobedientia carnis*), a person realized what his own disobedience to God led to⁸⁵). Due to his own hubris, the first man had disturbed the hierarchical order. His task as a free human being was to obey God⁸⁶). The original harmony, in which the human spirit was given control over the body and over creation in general, was based on obedience to the creator. Man destroyed this harmony and along with it, the harmony within himself.

The rebellion of the flesh, or desire which goes its own way⁸⁷), indicates that one has lost control over oneself⁸⁹). This loss or, this uncontrollability of the *libido carnalis* as a sexual drive, brings about shame⁹⁰). Shamefulness refers to the spirit: man knows he is guilty. He

⁸²) "Ut omni modo rationali subdita voluntati, non alias adesset, nisi cum per illam vel salutem corporis, vel stirpis propagini consulendum"; *Contra Iulianum* IV,69, PL 44, 773.

⁸³) See *Opus imperfectum* V,16, PL 45, 1449 and already *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* I,21, CSEL 60, p. 20-21.

⁸⁴) Cf. *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* I,6, CSEL 42, p. 216; see also Augustine's lengthy discussion of this feeling of shame in *De civitate Dei* XIV,17ff., CCL 48, p. 439ff.

⁸⁵) "Iniustum enim erat ut obtemperaretur a servo suo, id est a corpore suo ei qui non obtemperat domino suo"; *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* I,7, CSEL 42, p. 218; cf. also I,24, CSEL 42, p. 237; II,14, CSEL 42, p. 266.

⁸⁶) It has to be emphasized that neither Augustine nor his predecessors ever questioned the fact that human beings must obey God. In the Bible, true happiness depends on the doing of God's will. The resurrection of Christ is also based on his obedience to God till death. Therefore, one may not confuse the person's duty to obey with the question concerning the theoretical possibilities of the free will. Moreover, in a Christian view, true obedience leads human beings to true freedom.

⁸⁷) "Velut sui iuris libido commoveat"; *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* I,7, CSEL 42, p. 219.

⁸⁸) Augustine's considerations in *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* I,7, CSEL 42, p. 219 are put in the form of questions.

⁸⁹) *Ibidem*; see also *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* I,32, CSEL 60, p. 450.

⁹⁰) See also F.-J. Thonnard, *Pudeur, révolte des sens et lois psychologiques*, in *BA* 23, p. 671-675.

is aware of the fact that his sinfulness entails the loss of harmony as a punishment⁹¹).

Nevertheless, it remains true that, in Augustine's thought, *concupiscentia carnis*, insofar as it is related to fallen humanity, possessed a negative connotation. It referred to vices such as anger, avarice, obstinacy, ostentation, lust for power and sexual desires⁹²). Its presence pointed to a fundamental inner tension between *caro* and *spiritus*, between the tendency to sin and the desire to do good. The content of this *concupiscentia carnis* could in the first place be better understood by means of its counterpart, the *bona concupiscentia*, which was a *concupiscentia spiritus* (Gal. 5,17b) or also a *concupiscentia sapientiae* (Wis. 6,21)⁹³). Elsewhere, Augustine spoke of a *cupidatis boni*, where *boni* was identified with the love which is from God⁹⁴).

Alongside this concept, Augustine also spoke of *concupiscentia naturalis* which indicated the natural desire for happiness⁹⁵). This desire is correct if it is directed toward God. In order for the desire to be correct, it should involve a desire for God. In light of this, one can already anticipate the significance of *concupiscentia carnis*. It is a desire which is not directed toward God but toward oneself. It is a desire which pulls a person away from God. I believe that Augustine's discussion of *concupiscentia carnis* should be interpreted within this theological-ethical framework. Moreover, I believe it is incorrect to reduce *concupiscentia carnis* to sexual desires. Augustine himself reacted against such an understanding in his discussion with Julian. According to Augustine, every sinful desire (which I think is the most adequate

⁹¹) Cf. *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II,14, CSEL 42, p. 266; II,36, CSEL 42, p. 290; III,52, CSEL 42, p. 308-309; *Contra Iulianum* IV,82, PL 44, 781; see also Zumkeller, *Schriften gegen die Pelagianer* III, p. 413-414.

Augustine connects the getting dressed of Adam with mortality, actualized by sin. The dressing refers to the fact that the body became *corruptibile*. The first man will have to die; cf. *Opus imperfectum* IV,37, PL 45, 1387; see also J. Pépin, *Saint Augustin et le symbolisme néoplatonicien de la vêtue*, in *Augustinus Magister* I, Paris, 1954, p. 302-305.

⁹²) *De civitate Dei* XIV, 15-16, CCL 48, p. 438; cf. also Zumkeller, *Schriften gegen die Pelagianer* III, p. 413-414.

⁹³) See *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II,23, CSEL 42, p. 275; II,52, CSEL 42, p. 308; *Contra Iulianum* IV,17, PL 44, 746; *De civitate Dei* XIV,7, CCL 48, p. 422; see also Anne-Marie La Bonnardière, *Biblia Augustiniana. A.T. Le livre de la Sagesse* (Études augustiniennes), Paris, 1970, p. 103; 280.

⁹⁴) So *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* II,17. CSEL 60, p. 479; II,21, CSEL 60, p. 482.

⁹⁵) "Nonne concupiscentia beatitudinis est concupiscentia naturalis?"; *Opus imperfectum* IV,67, PL 45, 1378.

translation of the term) is directed against the spirit⁹⁶). This sort of desire was present in every person, believer included⁹⁷). It was a desire which monopolized. In this regard, it is interesting to note that Augustine, by means of a reference to *Matt.* 5,28 ("What I say to you is: anyone who looks lustfully at a woman has already committed adultery with her in his thoughts"), indicated that there was a difference between a perception as such and a perception originating in an evil desire⁹⁸). One could therefore posit that, with the expression *discordia spiritus et carnis*, Augustine was claiming that a person experienced an inner tension within himself as a "total" experience: "Concupiscentia carnis sentitur sensu et mentis et carnis"⁹⁹). Thus, *concupiscentia carnis* could also be a desire of the soul. What is involved is the desires of the spirit which are called desires of the flesh since the spirit longs for the flesh¹⁰⁰). Here, we are dealing with a *vitium* within the spirit¹⁰¹), a

⁹⁶) "Ita hoc dicis, quasi nos concupiscentiam carnis in solam voluptatem genitalium dicamus aestuare. Prorsus in quocumque corporis sensu caro contra spiritum concupiscit, ipsa cognoscitur; et quoniam si non adversus eam spiritus fortius concupiscat, ad mala pertrahit, malum esse convincitur."; *Opus imperfectum* IV,28, PL 45, 1352; cf. also *De civitate Dei* XIV,15-16, CCL 48, p. 436-439.

⁹⁷) "Omnibus quippe congenita est carnis concupiscentia, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, etiam recta fide atque doctrina pietatis imbutum."; *Opus imperfectum* VI,9, PL 45, 1515.

⁹⁸) See esp. *Contra Iulianum* IV,65, PL 44, 769-770; cf. also VI,56, PL 44, 856; *Opus imperfectum* IV,29, PL 44, 856; IV,47, PL 45, 1366; IV,48, PL 45, 1366; IV,53, PL 45, 1370. See also Schmitt, *Le mariage chrétien dans l'œuvre de saint Augustin*, p. 102-104.

⁹⁹) See *Opus imperfectum* IV,69, PL 45, 1379. Augustine's negative judgement concerning sexual desire has therefore to do with its opposition to the *bonum rationis*: "Congruere enim cum cogitatione magna voluptas corporis non potest."; *Contra Iulianum* IV,72, PL 44, 774; see also *Opus imperfectum* IV,58, PL 45, 1374. It is a problem for the rational human being, not for e.g. animals, in which the *bonum rationis* is absent: "Hoc de libidine pecorum dici potest, quibus ideo non est malum, quia non habent rationis bonum"; *Opus imperfectum* IV,58, PL 45, 1374; see also *Contra Iulianum* IV,74, PL 44, 776; *Opus imperfectum* II,122, CSEL 85,1, p. 253; IV,37, PL 45, 1357; IV,38, PL 45, 1359; IV,39, PL 45, 1359-1360; IV,43, PL 45, 1362-1363; IV,56, PL 45, 1372; V,8, PL 45, 1436; V,20, PL 45, 1453. See also de Montcheuil, *La polémique de saint Augustin contre Julien d'Éclane d'après l'Opus imperfectum*, p. 215; F. Réfohle, *Misère des enfants et péché originel d'après saint Augustin*, in *Revue Thomiste* 63 (1963) 341-362, p. 352; A.-M. Dubarle, *Le péché originel. Perspectives théologiques* (Cogitatio Fidei 118), Paris, 1983, p. 37-38.

¹⁰⁰) "Sed aliae sunt rerum corporalium qualitates (...), et aliae sunt animae cupiditates, quae propterea carnis dicitur, quia secundum carnem anima concupiscit, cum sic concupiscit, ut ei spiritus, id est pars eius melior et superior, debeat repugnare."; *Contra Iulianum* V,28, PL 44, 802; cf. also V,16, PL 44, 793; VI,41, PL 44, 845; *Opus imperfectum* I,72, CSEL 85,1, p. 86-87. See also N. Cipriani, *Una teoria neoplatonica alla base dell'etica sessuale di S. Agostino*, in *Augustinianum* 14 (1974) 351-361, esp. p. 357.

¹⁰¹) "Sed ego ipsum vitium, quo animus vel ulla pars eius modo vitiosa est, libidinem dico, ut omni vitio sanata salva erit tota substantia"; *Contra Iulianum* VI,53, PL

tension within the spirit between good and evil desires¹⁰²). In short, what is at stake is the tension between being directed toward God as opposed to being directed toward oneself. In a way, this sinful desire escapes the control exercised by the spirit. Even though one knows one should love one another and one sincerely attempts to do so, one does not always succeed.

Concerning the experience of sexual arousal, Pagels notes the following: "The experience of arousal apart from any action taken, Augustine insists, itself is sin"¹⁰⁴). Here, she refers to *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* II, 22, 36¹⁰⁵). As opposed to Pagels, I would like to quote Augustine's text in its entirety. "Neque enim Deo pudendum est aut molestum, si nos ei non oboedimus, cuius in nos summam potestatem nullo modo minuere valemus, sed nobis pudendum est, quod imperio nostro caro non servit, quia hoc fit per infirmitatem quam peccando meruimus, vocaturque peccatum habitans in membris nostris. Sic est autem hoc peccatum, ut sit poena peccati". Augustine clearly had Paul in mind (*Rom.* 7,17.23) when he stated *peccatum habitans in membris nostris*. He further claimed that this was so sinful that it was the punishment for sin. Elsewhere, Augustine had already explained in which sense this *concupiscentia carnis* was a *lex peccati*. It was a *lex peccati* because it induced and commanded sinfulness. When the spirit subsequently gives in to it, a person will sin. It is called sin because it originates in sin and desires to sin. Baptism takes away its guilt but its conflict, which entails a constant struggle, remains active¹⁰⁶). The desire is therefore the consequence of Adam's sin and

44, 854; cf. also *De civitate Dei* XIV,19, CCL 48, p. 441; Plato, *Republica* IV,436a-b; IX,580d-581a; *Timaeus* 70a. See also Cipriani, *Una teoria neoplatonica*, p. 357, n. 16.

¹⁰²) "Motibus igitur suis anima quos habet secundum spiritum, adversatur aliis motibus suis quos habet secundum carnem, et rursus, motibus suis quos habet secundum spiritum; et ideo dicitur caro concupiscere adversus spiritum et spiritus adversus carnem (*Gal.* 5,17)."; *Contra Iulianum* VI,41, PL 45, 845; see also *De continentia* 29, in *BA* 3, p. 92: "Spiritus itaque hominis adhaerens spiritui Dei, concupiscit adversus carnem, id est *adversus se ipsum*."; for the date of this work (416-418?), see Anne-Marie La Bonnardière, *La date du "De continentia" de saint Augustin*, in *REA* 5 (1959) 121-127.

¹⁰³) Augustine therefore also speaks of *concupiscentia peccatorum*; cf. *Contra Iulianum* VI,48, PL 44, 850; *Opus imperfectum* I,71, CSEL 85,1, p. 82.

¹⁰⁴) Pagels, p. 111.

¹⁰⁵) CSEL 60, p. 108.

¹⁰⁶) The *concupiscentia carnis* is a *lex peccati*: "Quia suadet peccata atque (...) iubet, et si ei mente servatur, sine excusatione peccatur. Peccatum dicitur, quia peccato facta est appetitque peccare. Reatus eius regenerationis solutus est, conflictus eius ad agonem relictus est."; *Opus imperfectum* I,71, CSEL 85,1, p. 84.

his aspiration toward sin. It is sinfulness but not sin in the strict sense of the word. It is an aspiration toward sin which only leads to actual sin if a person gives his assent¹⁰⁷). A person's negative answer however, is inspired by the *spiritu concupiscere*¹⁰⁸). Thus, when one surrenders to sexual arousal, regardless of procreation, it becomes sinful though it is merely a *peccatum veniale* if one consents. In other words, a person's action is presupposed and therefore, the ethical judgement is very much based on people's actions.

However, there are instances when Augustine did not speak positively about sexual desires, mostly because of their irrational character. According to Augustine, this desire did not only strive for what was permitted but also for what was not permitted. Ethically speaking therefore, it was evil because it did not avoid that which was not permitted if rational man did not intervene¹⁰⁹). Sexual desire had negative connotations because it did not conform to reason but pursued its own gratification. It was disorderly and brought about shamefulness¹¹⁰). In spite of the fact that the desire resisted the *voluntas iubens*¹¹¹) and tried to seduce a person regardless of his defenses¹¹²),

¹⁰⁷) Cf. the obvious examples given by Augustine in *Contra Iulianum* IV,66-67, PL 44, 770-771.

¹⁰⁸) *Contra Iulianum* IV,66, PL 44, 771.

¹⁰⁹) "Eius quippe impetus non sua sponte moderatus est: a nullo namque illicito sese abstinere, si membra desiderio eius inserviant. Ac per hoc eius motus, non in ipso, cuius inquietus est motus, sed in refrenante ac bene utente laudatur."; *Contra Iulianum* IV,2, PL 44, 737; "Concupiscentia vero carnis indifferenter illicita et licita cupiuntur, quae non concupiscendo, sed intelligendo diiudicantur"; *Opus imperfectum* IV,69, PL 45, 1379; see also *Contra Iulianum* IV,7, PL 44, 739; VI,50, PL 44, 852.

¹¹⁰) See e.g. *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* I,1, CSEL 42, p. 212; I,6, CSEL 42, p. 217-218; I,7, CSEL 42, p. 218-219; I,8, CSEL 42, p. 219-220; I,9, CSEL 42, p. 221; I,13, CSEL 42, p. 226; I,18, CSEL 42, p. 230; I,19, CSEL 42, p. 232; I,24, CSEL 42, p. 237; I,27, CSEL 42, p. 239; II,14, CSEL 42, p. 266; II,16, CSEL 42, p. 269; II,17, CSEL 42, p. 270; II,18, CSEL 42, p. 271; II,20, CSEL 42, p. 272; II,22, CSEL 42, p. 275; II,23, CSEL 42, p. 275; II,26, CSEL 42, p. 279; II,29, CSEL 42, p. 283; II,36, CSEL 42, p. 290; II,37, CSEL 42, p. 291; II,42, CSEL 42, p. 296; II,52, CSEL 42, p. 308-309; II,53, CSEL 42, p. 310; II,54, CSEL 42, p. 312; II,55, CSEL 42, p. 312; II,59, CSEL 42, p. 316; *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* I,33, CSEL 60, p. 450; *Contra Iulianum* III,26, PL 44, 715; III,27, PL 44, 716; III,38, PL 44, 722; III,42, PL 44, 723; IV,40, PL 44, 741; V,30, PL 44, 803; *Opus imperfectum* III,184, CSEL 85,1, p. 483; IV,37, PL 45, 1357; IV,43, PL 45, 1363; IV,63, PL 45, 1376.

Cf. also de Montcheuil, *La polémique de saint Augustin contre Julien d'Éclane d'après l'Opus imperfectum*, p. 205-206; Thonnard, *Pudeur, révolte des sens et lois psychologiques*, in BA 23, p. 671-676.

¹¹¹) See e.g. *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* I,7, CSEL 42, p. 219; II,20, CSEL 42, p. 272; II,53, CSEL 42, p. 310; II,54, CSEL 42, p. 311; *Contra Iulianum* III,26, PL 44, 715; III,27, PL 44, 716; III,57, PL 44, 732; V,19, PL 44, 796; *Opus imperfectum* II,45, CSEL 85,1, p. 195; IV,39, PL 45, 1360; V,13, PL 45, 1445; V,17, PL 45, 1451.

¹¹²) So *Opus imperfectum* II,45, CSEL 85,1, p. 195 "Nuptiae porro quas benedixit

Augustine also stressed that a person could truly resist this desire with reasonable success¹¹³). Augustine remained very formal during his discussion with Julian regarding this issue. He emphatically denied Julian's reproach that his opinion allowed for immoral behavior¹¹⁴). In Augustine's thinking however, tension was not the same as blind compulsiveness. Desires could be counteracted. They only won if a person gave in to his arousal¹¹⁵).

In light of this, I find it rather unfortunate that Pagels states: "And since he (= Augustine) insists everyone, even he most advanced ascetic, confronts the same continual insurrections within, Augustine concludes that humanity has wholly lost its original capacity for self-government"¹¹⁶). It is true that being in total control of oneself is no longer evident but this definitely does not mean that one no longer has any self-control. Humanity indeed lost the "original capacity" but not "wholly". It is certainly not true that "we cannot even control our sexual impulses"¹¹⁷) because a person *can* in fact do this. What is beyond our control is the arousal of these impulses, not their curbing.

According to Augustine, a person can and should resist desires¹¹⁸).

(Deus), si peccatum non fuisset amissum, quo natura vitiata est, aut, sic uterentur genitalibus membris, quemadmodum aliis utimur sine ulla libidine oboedientibus voluntati, aut pudenda ibi libido non esset, quoniam numquam resisteret voluntati, qualis nunc utique non est, quod profecto etiam tu sentis, quando ab ea sollicitante atque illiciente dissentis."; cf. also II,122, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 253.

¹¹³) "Concupiscentiam sive naturalem, sive carnalem tibi placeat appellare, eam nos concupiscentiam vituperamus, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum et trahit ad illicita, nisi et spiritus adversus eam fortius concupiscat"; *Opus imperfectum* V,5, *PL* 45, 1436; cf. also *Contra Iulianum* II,33, *PL* 44, 696-697; IV,34, *PL* 44, 756; IV,73, *PL* 44, 775; *Opus imperfectum* III,185, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 484; III,187, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 490; III,212, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 504; IV,10, *PL* 45, 1344; IV,57, *PL* 45, 1373; IV,61, *PL* 45, 1375; IV,67, *PL* 45, 1378; V,16, *PL* 45, 1449; V,19, *PL* 45, 1452; V,30, *PL* 45, 1469; VI,3, *PL* 45, 1508; VI,24, *PL* 45, col. 1558 etc.

See also de Montcheuil, *La polémique de saint Augustin contre Julien d'Éclane d'après l'Opus imperfectum*, p. 208.

¹¹⁴) "Sic autem dicis: 'Qua ratione quaereret iustos in Sodomis Deus (*Gen.* 18,26), si illos tales natura faciebat?' tamquam nos dicamus, mentes excellentiore natura concupiscentiam carnis non posse frenare."; *Contra Iulianum* III,39, *PL* 44, 722; V,24, *PL* 44, 799; V,27, *PL* 44, 801; V,32, *PL* 44, 804: "Invictam sane *numquam* ego voluptatem carnis (...) dixi."

¹¹⁵) This is very obvious in e.g. *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II,58, *CSEL* 42, p. 316; *Opus imperfectum* VI,3, *PL* 45, 1511; VI,6, *PL* 45, 1511.

¹¹⁶) Pagels, p. 113.

¹¹⁷) Pagels, p. 131.

¹¹⁸) "Lex quippe ista peccati, quae in membris est corporis mortis huius, et remissa est regeneratione spirituali, et manet in carne mortali: remissa scilicet, quia reatus eius solutus est sacramento, quo renascuntur fideles; manet autem, quia operatur desideria, *contra quae dimicant et fideles.*"; *Contra Iulianum* II,5, *PL* 44, 675; see also e.g. VI,47, *PL* 44, 849-850; VI,53, *PL* 44, 853; VI,62, *PL* 44, 860-861.

Moreover, this is the *conditio sine qua non* for making progress as a believer¹¹⁹). Once again, grace is active, liberating¹²⁰) and helping¹²¹), and a dynamic interaction between God's help and human effort is operative. The more a person wishes to please God, the more he will fight off sinful desires¹²²). He is able to do this because he has been granted the gift of love¹²³). Thanks to a *spiritalis delectatio*, he can say no to sinful desires¹²⁴).

Because of his struggle, a believer progresses and succeeds in diminishing the *concupiscentia carnis* through a growing renewal¹²⁵). As a reward, a person will receive a definitive healing of this disease in the life hereafter¹²⁷). Augustine noted moreover that many people

¹¹⁹) See e.g. *Contra Iulianum* II,3, PL 44, 673; III,49, PL 44, 727.

¹²⁰) Cf. *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* I,18, CSEL 60, p. 440.

¹²¹) So *Contra Iulianum* II,5, PL 44, 676; II,9, PL 44, 680; V,65, PL 44, 820; VI,20, PL 44, 829; *Opus imperfectum* I,70, CSEL 85,1, p. 78; II,218, CSEL 85,1, p. 330; IV,57, PL 45, 1373; VI,8, PL 45, 1514.

¹²²) "Adversus eam configant etiam baptizati, tanto fortius atque vehementius, quanto magis placere student oculis eius, cuius gratia adiuvantur, ne in tali certamine superentur."; *Contra Iulianum* II,5, PL 44, 676.

¹²³) Cf. *Contra Iulianum* V,32, PL 44, 804; V,56, PL 44, 815; VI,41, PL 44, 845-846; VI,71, PL 44, 866; *Opus imperfectum* II,71, CSEL 85,1, p. 215; II,137, CSEL 85,1, p. 262; II,140, CSEL 85,1, p. 264; II,233, CSEL 85,1, p. 347; VI,15, PL 45, 1535.

¹²⁴) *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* I,17, CSEL 60, p. 440.

¹²⁵) "Hoc (...) diligentissime proficit et Spiritu Dei agitur (cf. *Rom.* 8,14)"; *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* I,27, CSEL 60, p. 445; cf. also Platz, *Der Römerbrief in der Gnadenehre Augustins*, p. 143; de Montcheuil, *La polémique de saint Augustin contre Julien d'Éclane d'après l'Opus imperfectum*, p. 201-202; 214-215; Schmitt, *Le mariage chrétien dans l'œuvre de saint Augustin*, p. 186.

¹²⁶) "Proficiente renovatione interioris hominis de die in diem"; *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* I,28, CSEL 42, p. 240; "Et si nobis admeliora proficientibus magis magisque minuuntur."; *Contra Iulianum* II,7, PL 44, 678; "Quo proposito perfectionis exemplo (= Christus), ad hoc se debet omnis imitator extendere, ut concupiscentias carnis, quas vetat apostolus perfici (cf. *Gal.* 5,16), nitatur atque optet penitus non habere: sic enim eas potest *profectu quotidiano* minuere, quas nullas habeat salute perfecta."; *Opus imperfectum* IV,57, PL 45, 1373; "Non est ergo huius vitae iustitiae, vitium non habere, sed vitia non eis consentiendo minuere, eisque resistendo, temperanter et iuste et pie vivere."; VI,8, PL 45, 1514; cf. also e.g. *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* I,30, CSEL 42, p. 242; I,32, CSEL 42, p. 244; I,33, CSEL 42, p. 245; I,56, CSEL 42, p. 248; *Contra Iulianum* VI,41, PL 44, 845; VI,50, PL 44, 852; VI,56, PL 44, 856; VI,60, PL 44, 859; *Opus imperfectum* III,71, CSEL 85,1, p. 403.

¹²⁷) "Hoc autem malum non in baptisate ponitur: sed baptizatis per gratiam regenerationis ab eius obligatione iam liberis, ne ad illicita pertrahat, salubriter vincitur. Ut autem resurrectionis tempore non sit omnino in vivente corpore nec dolente, praemium est eorum qui contra eam fideliter certaverant, qui languore sanato, immortalitate beatissima vestientur."; *Contra Iulianum* VI,50, PL 44, 852; cf. also IV,3, PL 44, 738; this reward has to be given to the just; cf. *Opus imperfectum* VI,7, PL 45, 1512.

during his time fended off this *concupiscentia carnis*, strove toward a virtuous life and were successful in their attempts¹²⁸).

I am rather surprised to observe that Pagels succeeds in discussing Adam's fall and its consequences for humanity without dealing with Adam's counterpart, Christ our Savior. She states that, according to Augustine, "everyone, arising as he does from a condemned stock, is from the first necessarily evil and carnal through Adam"¹²⁹), but she omits the essential completion, namely "Quod si in Christum renascendo profecerit, post erit bonus et spiritualis"¹³⁰). On the basis of this second part of the sentence, better justice is done to Augustine's text by translating *primo* as "first" instead of "from the first". There is a clear continuity in the mentioned passage: "*primo ... post*". I admit that Pagels' inaccurate translation¹³¹) fits her argumentation very well but she does not take one of the essential viewpoints of Augustine's doctrine into account. Initially, every human being is born for the world, the *civitas terrena*, but this is not the ultimate purpose of procreation. Christians propagate in order to offer their children through baptism *per Christum* to God.

In the dispute with the Pelagians, Augustine frequently placed Adam and Christ in opposition to each other¹³²). A human being belongs either to Adam or to Christ¹³³). In this context, one can speak

¹²⁸) See *Opus imperfectum* VI,7, PL 45, 1513.

¹²⁹) Pagels, p. 114.

¹³⁰) *De civitate Dei* XV,1, CCL 48, p. 452.

¹³¹) Ph. Levine, *Saint Augustine. The City of God against the Pagans* IV, books XII-XIV (The Loeb Classical Library) London-Cambridge (Mass.), 1966, p. 413 translates *primo* very correctly as *first*. At least here, Pagels does not follow Levine, although she maintains to follow him "generally"; cf. p. 168, n. 42.

¹³²) For this point, see, among others, H. Rondet, *Le Christ nouvel Adam dans saint Augustin*, in *Études Mariales. La nouvelle Ève II. Bulletin de la Société Française d'Études Mariales* 13 (1955) 25-41; E. Franz, *Totus Christus. Studien über Christus und die Kirche*, Bonn, 1956, p. 6-93; W. Geerlings, *Christus Exemplum. Studien zur Christologie und Christusverkündigung Augustins* (Tübinger Theologische Studien 13), Mainz, 1978, p. 74-77; G. Remy, *Le Christ médiateur dans l'œuvre de saint Augustin*, Lille-Paris, 1979, t. I, p. 395ff.; 644-648; G. Bonner, art. *Adam*, in *Augustinus-Lexikon* I, 1/2, Basel-Stuttgart, 1986, 84-86.

¹³³) "Et ideo manifestum est ad illum pertinere omnem, qui ex illo successione propaginis nascitur, sicut ad istum pertinet omnis, qui in illo gratiae largitate renascitur; unde fit, ut totum genus humanum quodammodo sint homines duo, primus et secundus."; *Opus imperfectum* II,163, CSEL 85,1, p. 285.

This opposition between the first and second man is often found; see *Contra duas epistulas* IV,8, CSEL 60, p. 529; *Contra Iulianum* VI,10, PL 44, 828; VI,48, PL 44, 850; *Opus imperfectum* II,97, CSEL 85,1, p. 229; II,187, CSEL 85,1, p. 306; II,190, CSEL 85,1, p. 307; II,192, CSEL 85,1, p. 309; II,216, CSEL 85,1, p. 327; VI,31, PL 45, 1585;

of a twofold birth: the first in Adam (*generatio*) and the second in Christ (*regeneratio*)¹³⁴). By the second birth, the calamity caused by Adam is rectified¹³⁵). I think that the "negative" side of our existence alone should not be emphasized. It is not an isolated reality. For Augustine, both Adam and Christ are involved. Support for this idea can be found in *Rom.* 5,12-19 and *1 Cor.* 15,21-22¹³⁶). In light of Adam and Christ, no one is "neutral"¹³⁷).

Augustine sometimes calls Christ the second Adam. So he indicates that Christ stands at the beginning of our salvation, just as Adam stood at the beginning of our doom. See e.g. *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II,35, CSEL 42, p. 289; *Contra Iulianum* IV,16, PL 44, 745; VI,48, PL 44, 850; *Opus imperfectum* VI,7, PL 45, 1512.

¹³⁴) Such opposition can also be indicated by e.g. *nasci-renasci*; see e.g. *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* I,21, CSEL 42, p. 233; II,35, CSEL 42, p. 289; II,46, CSEL 42, p. 301; II,58, CSEL 42, p. 316; *Contra Iulianum* I,4, PL 44, 545; I,14, PL 44, 649; II,8, PL 44, 679; II,31, PL 44, 694; II,110, PL 44, 680; III,15, PL 44, 709; III,35, PL 44, 721; III,46, PL 44, 725; III,54, PL 44, 730; III,58, PL 44, 732; III,63, PL 44, 734; IV,3, PL 44, 738; IV,5, PL 44, 738; IV,49, PL 44, 763; V,56, PL 44, 815; V,63, PL 44, 819; VI,6, PL 44, 824 (*De nuptiis et concupiscentia* I,21); VI,29, PL 44, 839; VI,42, PL 44, 846; VI,55, PL 44, 855; VI,60, PL 44, 859; *Opus imperfectum* II,31, CSEL 85,1, p. 185; II,45, CSEL 85,1, p. 195; II,54, CSEL 85,1, p. 202; II,71, CSEL 85,1, p. 215; II,76, CSEL 85,1, p. 218; II,101, CSEL 85,1, p. 232; II,105, CSEL 85,1, p. 239; II,108, CSEL 85,1, p. 242; II,109, CSEL 85,1, p. 242; II,135, CSEL 85,1, p. 261; II,137, CSEL 85,1, p. 262; II,146, CSEL 85,1, p. 269; II,177, CSEL 85,1, p. 297; II,187, CSEL 85,1, p. 306; II,190, CSEL 85,1, p. 307; II,191, CSEL 85,1, p. 308; II,192, CSEL 85,1, p. 308; II,193, CSEL 85,1, p. 309; II,218, CSEL 85,1, p. 330; III,51, CSEL 85,1, p. 391; III,175, CSEL 85,1, p. 476; IV,129, PL 45, 1426; V,12, PL 45, 1442; V,23, PL 45, 1458; V,29, PL 45, 1467; VI,22, PL 45, 1553; VI,36, PL 45, 1593.

See also Franz, *Totus Christus*, p. 26-27; G. Folliet, '*Trahere*'/'*contrahere peccatum*'. *Observations sur la terminologie augustinienne du péché*, in C. Mayer-K.H. Chelius (ed.), *Homo Spiritalis*. Festgabe für Luc Verheijen, zu seinem 70. Geburtstag, Würzburg, 1987, p. 118-135, esp. p. 125-129.

¹³⁵) "Exordium vero parvulorum, ex quo nascerentur, in Adam fuit, quo per peccatum vitiatum atque damnatum, alterum eis Christus ex quo renascerentur, instituit."; *Contra Iulianum* III,58, PL 44, 732; "Dicimus ideo divinitus esse provisum secundae spiritalis nativitatis auxilium quam fieri in se ipso Christus instituit, quoniam secundum Adam carnaliter nati contrahunt mortis antiquae prima nativitate contagium."; *Opus imperfectum* I,106, CSEL 85,1, p. 125; see also II,177, CSEL 85,1, p. 297; II,187, CSEL 85,1, p. 306; II,216, CSEL 85,1, p. 327; III,92, CSEL 85,1, p. 418.

¹³⁶) See e.g. *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* II,46, CSEL 42, p. 300; *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,8, CSEL 60, p. 569; *Contra Iulianum* IV,1, PL 44, 737; VI,9, PL 44, 827; VI,43, PL 44, 847; *Opus imperfectum* II,54, CSEL 85,1, p. 202; II,101, CSEL 85,1, p. 232; II,108, CSEL 85,1, p. 242; II,135, CSEL 85,1, p. 261; II,136, CSEL 85,1, p. 262; II,138, CSEL 85,1, p. 263; II,177, CSEL 85,1, p. 297; II,180, CSEL 85,1, p. 300; II,182, CSEL 85,1, p. 301; II,184, CSEL 85,1, p. 301-302; II,203, CSEL 85,1, p. 315; II,204, CSEL 85,1, p. 316; II,215, CSEL 85,1, p. 326; III,38, CSEL 85,1, p. 381; III,107, CSEL 85,1, p. 428; VI,7, PL 45, 1512; VI,31, PL 45, 1585; VI,36, PL 45, 1593-1594.

¹³⁷) "Nullus enim hominum nisi per Adam trahitur ad damnationem, de qua per lavacrum regenerationis homines liberantur, et nullus hominum nisi per Christum ab hac

It is precisely because Augustine wanted to safeguard the essential role of Christ as the unique mediator between God and humanity that he insisted on the "dark side" of humanity¹³⁸). Salvation implies a transition *ex Adam ad Christum*¹³⁹). Since, according to the message of the New Testament, Christ came for sinners, we must as it were belong to Adam in order to receive salvation. This is indeed the basic reason why Augustine, time and again, repeated that children were born with guilt. It was the only possibility for them to be affected by Christ. The salvation of Christ can only become salvation for children if they belong, in one way or another, to sinful humanity.

With regard to Pagels' considerations concerning Augustine's view on society, I agree with the statement that the bishop of Hippo saw slavery as a consequence of the fall of man¹⁴⁰). Augustine was not alone in that opinion¹⁴¹). It is certainly true that Augustine did not question the system as such but this is not to say that he was insensitive

damnatione liberatur."; *Opus imperfectum* II,135, CSEL 85,1, p. 261; "Ex prima origine generis humani nemo ad mortem, nisi per Adam et nemo per Adam nisi ad mortem et nemo ad vitam nisi per Christum et nemo per Christum nisi ad vitam."; *Contra Iulianum* VI,80, PL 44, 872. See also *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* IV,8, CSEL 60, p. 529; *Opus imperfectum* II,197, CSEL 85,1, p. 310-311; VI,31, PL 45, 1585.

¹³⁸) Augustine's source of inspiration is 1 Tim. 2,5: "Unus mediator Dei et hominum homo Christus Iesus"; see e.g. *Contra duas epistulas pelagianorum* I,12, CSEL 60, p. 432; I,39, CSEL 60, p. 457; IV,60, CSEL 60, p. 526; *Contra Iulianum* IV,14, PL 44, 743; IV,33, PL 44, 755; *Opus imperfectum* I,124, CSEL 85,1, p. 138; I,138, CSEL 85,1, p. 154; VI,7, PL 45, 1512; VI,36, PL 45, 1594. For this christocentric emphasis in Augustine's view on salvation, see esp. A. Vanneste, *L'histoire du dogme du péché originel*, in *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses* 38 (1962) 895-903; *id.*, *Saint Paul et la doctrine augustinienne du péché originel*, in *Studiorum Paulinorum Congressus Internationalis Catholicus 1961*, v. II (Analecta Biblica 18), Roma, 1963, p. 513-522; *id.*, *Het dogma van de erfzonde: zinloze mythe of openbaring van een grondstructuur van het menselijk bestaan* (Woord en beleving II,9), Tielt, 1969; Remy, *Le Christ médiateur*, p. 173-174; 403; 635-657 and *passim*; J. Plagnieux - F.-J. Thonnard, *L'unique médiateur, l'homme Christ-Jésus*, in *BA* 22, p. 729-732; P. Ciarlatini, *Mediator: Paganismo y cristianismo en 'De civitate Dei' VIII, 12-XI,2 de San Agustín*, in *Revista Agustiniana* 24 (1983) 9-62; 25 (1984) 5-60; 325-402; 26 (1985) 5-47; 301-322.

¹³⁹) See e.g. *Contra Iulianum* IV,38, PL 44, 757; IV,54, PL 44, 764; V,56, PL 44, 815; *Opus imperfectum* I,60, CSEL 85,1, p. 58; II,193, CSEL 85,1, p. 309; II,218, CSEL 85,1, p. 331.

¹⁴⁰) Cf. Pagels, p. 114.

¹⁴¹) One may not forget that it were not the slaves, but the little tenant farmers (*coloni*) and the seasonal workers who hired themselves out as harvesters, who were the real poor in Augustine's day. For a good discussion, see R. Klein, *Die frühe Kirche und die Sklaverei*, in *Römische Quartalschrift* 80 (1985) 259-283; *id.*, *Die Sklaverei in der Sicht der Bischöfe Ambrosius und Augustinus* (Forschungen zur antiken Sklaverei 20) Stuttgart, 1988; G. Corcoran, *Saint Augustine on Slavery* (Studia Ephemeridis "Augustinianum" 22), Roma, 1985.

to the lot of slaves¹⁴²). Augustine often taught masters their duties towards their slaves. In *De civitate Dei* XIX,16¹⁴³), he firmly emphasized that the true *pater familias* had to take the same care for all the members of his *familia*, included the slaves, when it came to honoring God and seeking His favor. A good master is concerned about his slave's welfare. He does not act out of tyranny. Moreover, according to Augustine, the obedience of slaves was conditional. The moment that a master's demands were contrary to faith, a slave must say no. Augustine was convinced that slavery would disappear after this life. He regarded ex-slaves and free men living together in the monastery as an anticipation of that future classless society.

However, concerning the relationship between master and slave, a good Christian master was not allowed to possess his slave in the same way that he possessed a horse, money or clothes, for he had to love the slave as himself and to care for his spiritual well-being¹⁴⁴). For Augustine, no one was born rich or poor, and no one died as such. By nature, we are all equal¹⁴⁵). The bishop of Hippo emphasized that the rich, possessing the superfluous goods, in fact usurped the necessary goods of the poor¹⁴⁶). Thus to give help was nothing other than to repay a debt¹⁴⁷).

It is not surprising to see that Augustine identified Christ with the poor. It is an inner consequence of his doctrine on the *Christus totus*. The identification of Christ with the poor was a recognition of their human dignity as well as a motivation for feeding and clothing them¹⁴⁸). Moreover, according to Augustine, one of the fundamental tasks of the Church lay in teaching that love was due to everyone and that it was forbidden to treat a human being unjustly, whoever it may be¹⁴⁹).

I am not convinced that Augustine favored a "political quietism". Indeed, Augustine frequently asked for new laws or criticized existing

¹⁴²) See Klein, *Die frühe Kirche und die Sklaverei*, p. 273-278.

¹⁴³) CCL 48, p. 683.

¹⁴⁴) See *De sermone Domini in monte* I,59, PL 34, 1260.

¹⁴⁵) Cf. *Sermo* 61,9, PL 38, 412.

¹⁴⁶) So *Enarratio in psalmum* 147,12, CCL 40, p. 2148; *Sermo* 206,2, PL 38, 1041; cf. also *Sermo* 50,4, PL 38, 327.

¹⁴⁷) *Enarratio in psalmum* 95,15, CCL 39, p. 1353.

¹⁴⁸) See e.g. *Sermo* 41,7, PL 38, 251-252; *Sermo* 86,3, PL 38,524; *Sermo* 236,3, PL 38, 1121; *Sermo* 239,7, PL 38, 1129-1130.

¹⁴⁹) *De moribus ecclesiae catholicae* I,63, PL 32, 1336.

laws. In 401, the North African bishops requested the reintroduction of the institution of "defenders in view of the distress of the poor". Their request probably remained unanswered; for in 420, Augustine asked for the mediation of the bishops Alypius and Peregrinus, who were in Italy at that time, in order to obtain such a defender for the city of Hippo.

Further, he was quite distressed by the sale of children¹⁵⁰). The Christian emperors had allowed the sale of children in order to prevent infanticide when parents were unable to feed their new born babies. The tenant farmers especially had to resort to the desperate measure of hiring out or even selling their children. This often led to perpetual slavery which was not permitted by the law. Augustine vehemently protested against such an abuse of children and he strongly insisted that selling children's labor should only be permitted for the fixed number of 25 years. After that period, they were to become freemen again. The bishop held the fate of the children very close to his heart. He considered it his task to protect orphans so that they would not be oppressed by strangers. He also saw it as his duty to care for abandoned children¹⁵¹).

Regarding the poor, it was the Church's custom to provide help for every person whoever he or she might be, whether a prostitute or a fighter in the arena, on account of their human nature¹⁵²). After the destruction of Rome, Augustine beseeched the people of Hippo to help and provide hospitality for the crowd of refugees¹⁵³). We should also mention a number of letters written by Augustine, protesting the injustice of the powerful. For instance, he intervened on behalf of the small farmers who were being forced to pay taxes twice¹⁵⁴). Four letters were written in order to defend the administrator Faventius, who had come into conflict with his master and who sought refuge in the diocese of Hippo where he enjoyed the rights of asylum. After having

¹⁵⁰) See *Epistula* 10* (ed. J. Divjak), in *BA* 46B, p. 166-183; *Epistula* 24* (ed. J. Divjak), in *BA* 46B, p. 382-387.

¹⁵¹) Cf. *Sermo* 176,2, *PL* 38, 951; *Epistula* 98,6, *CSEL* 34,2, p. 527-528.

¹⁵²) Cf. *Enarratio in psalmum* 46,5, *CCL* 38, p. 532; *Sermo* Lambot 28, *Revue Bénédictine* 66 (1956), p. 156-158; Possidius, *Vita Augustini* 24 (ed. A.A.R. Bastiaensen), in *Scrittori greci e latini*, Verona, 1975, p. 188-195.

¹⁵³) *Sermo*, 81,9, *PL* 38, 506.

¹⁵⁴) Cf. *Epistula* 247, *CSEL* 57, p. 585-589.

In *Epistula* 251, *CSEL* 57, p. 599-600, Augustine intervenes to protect oppressed farmers living at the estate of a certain Pancarius.

been kidnapped, however, he disappeared. Augustine was terribly alarmed by this and did all he could to find him again¹⁵⁵).

Finally, as *pastor* Augustine reacted vehemently against the practice of slave traders who led people off into captivity and sold them into slavery abroad. But even in this case, he took the slave traders into account. He wanted to prevent them from being submitted to the death penalty for such malpractice¹⁵⁶). Here, Augustine proved himself to be very consistent. He always resisted the maltreatment and cruel exploitation of slaves or *coloni*. He also refused to grant the master the right to decide in an arbitrary way on the life of his slave. But at the same time, he opposed the death penalty for the slave traders. As bishop, Augustine wanted to attend to the well-being of the whole community. He considered it his duty to preserve the unity of that community. In his time, that entailed pleading for a harmonious coexistence of master and slave, rich and poor, within the existing structures. According to Augustine, such a coexistence was to be based on natural respect rather than on coercion.

I also agree with Pagels when she states that Augustine did not trust political leaders of his day but I would like to nuance her statement that the later Augustine "came to endorse, for the church as well as the state, the whole arsenal of secular government that Chrysostom had repudiated — commands, threats, coercion, penalties, and even physical force"¹⁵⁷). A simple reading of letter 134, addressed to Apringius, already proves how Augustine made a real effort to rescue some *circumcelliones* and Donatists, who had killed two Catholic priests, from the death penalty¹⁵⁸). It is certainly true that Augustine, wizened by the controversy with the Donatists, was no longer opposed to the intervention of the secular power in religious affairs¹⁵⁹). However,

¹⁵⁵) *Epistulae* 113-116, CSEL 34,2, p. 659-663. From *Epistula* 268, CSEL 57, p. 652-654 we learn that Augustine intervened for a person who was bowed down by a burden of debts. Augustine himself had not the sum needed to help him, and borrowed the money from a rich man. However, in doing so Augustine himself got in trouble, for he could not give the money back, and had to ask the help of the people of Hippo.

¹⁵⁶) See *Epistula* 10*, mentioned in note 150 and the *Notes complémentaires*, in BA 46B, p. 466-474.

¹⁵⁷) Pagels, p. 115; 117.

¹⁵⁸) *Epistula* 134, CSEL 44, p. 84-88.

¹⁵⁹) See e.g. *Contra Iulianum* III,5, PL 44, 703-704; *Opus imperfectum* I,10, CSEL 85,1, p. 11; II,14, CSEL 85,1, p. 181; II,103, CSEL 85,1, p. 235. However, one may not forget that the Catholic African Church at the beginning really tried to propose a revolutionary program of reconciliation with the Donatists; see *Epistula* 128, CSEL 44,

till the end of his life, he was only too aware of the fact that external coercion had absolutely no effect if conversion did not occur in a man's heart on the basis of a free endorsing of God's initiative in love¹⁶⁰). Therefore, I think that it is not correct to simply blame Augustine for using violence without making reference to the context within which Augustine came to certain statements and without regard for Augustine's conviction that political intervention was necessary in light of the salvation of those who erred. It should be said that Augustine was especially concerned about the *civitatis Dei*. For Augustine, its aims were different from those of the *civitas terrena*. No structure of society has the right to obstruct that which was essential: the honor of God¹⁶¹).

Let us now deal with Pagels' view on John Chrysostom and Julian. We should first make a small remark. Pagels' presentation of the course of events which occurred during April 418 should be nuanced¹⁶²). Only the exile of the Pelagians by the emperor took place in this month (30 April 418). On 1 May at Carthage, several theses were condemned by nine *canones* but without mentioning either Pelagius or Caelestius by name. The *Epistula tractoria* of Zosimus, the bishop of Rome, is to be dated later, probably around the end of the spring or the beginning of the summer¹⁶³). Only then did Julian come into prominence. Together with 18 *collegae*, he refused to sign Zosimus' letter. Concerning the banishment of the Pelagians, it is interesting to note that a revolt, caused by the Pelagians in Rome, gave rise to their exile¹⁶⁴).

I see no grounds for Pagels' statement that Julian "once shared the nearly universal admiration for Augustine's learning and teaching"¹⁶⁵).

p. 30-34. Augustine's later position is in fact also inspired by the stubbornness of the Donatists.

Against the reproaches of bribery Augustine always protested forcibly; see *Opus imperfectum* I,42, CSEL 85,1, p. 30-31; I,74, CSEL 85,1, p. 90; III,35, CSEL 85,1, p. 375.

Contrary to Pagels, p. 120, I am not convinced that Julian's reproaches are true. However, one is not able to prove which of them tells us the truth.

¹⁶⁰) An excellent example is given in *Opus imperfectum* II,157, CSEL 85,1, p. 279-280; see also II,11, CSEL 85,1, p. 170; III,106ff., CSEL 85,1, p. 426ff.; III,114, CSEL 85,1, p. 434-435.

¹⁶¹) See *De civitate Dei* XIX,17, CSEL 48, p. 683-685.

¹⁶²) See Pagels, p. 130.

¹⁶³) See esp. O. Wermelinger, *Das Pelagiusdossier in der Tractoria des Zosimus*, in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 26 (1979) 336-366.

¹⁶⁴) Cf. *Collectio Quesnelliana* XIV, PL 56, 490-492.

¹⁶⁵) Pagels, p. 132.

It is true that Augustine held Julian in esteem and that Julian's father was on good terms with Augustine but concerning Julian's own attitude toward the bishop of Hippo in the period before 418, nothing is known¹⁶⁶).

I find it difficult to believe that "Augustine argued against those who agreed with John Chrysostom, and then against followers of Pelagius, both of whom insisted that Christians, through their baptism, are free to make moral choices..."¹⁶⁷).

In the foregoing, I have sufficiently pointed out that, for Augustine as well, believers were able to make moral choices and to fulfill them. It is highly questionable whether Augustine was far removed from Chrysostom who considered that, "through baptism", man regained the capability to "self-government"¹⁶⁸). Moreover, it is not completely correct to say that Pelagius believed that through baptism one became capable of making free choices. It is more accurate to say that, for Pelagius, everyone, believer and non-believer, is by nature truly able to make moral choices. Pelagius even referred to the moral life of pagans which sometimes could be a model for believers¹⁶⁹).

Further, I think that one should be cautious in drawing a connection between Chrysostom and the Pelagians. There are serious differences between Chrysostom and Julian of Aeclanum for example, concerning Adam's state before the fall or the consequences of the fall on him and on humanity¹⁷⁰). Of course, it is true that Chrysostom did not present

¹⁶⁶) Cf. *Epistula* 101, *CSEL* 34,2, p. 539-543.

¹⁶⁷) Pagels, p. 129.

¹⁶⁸) Pagels, p. 103 and *infra*, p. 000.

¹⁶⁹) "Cuius bonum ita generaliter cunctis institutum est, ut in gentilibus quoque hominibus, qui sine ullo cultu Dei sunt, se nonnumquam ostendat, ac proferat. Quam multos enim philosophorum et audivimus et legimus, et ipsi vidimus castos, patientes, modestos, liberales, abstinentes, benignos, et honores mundi simul, et delicias respuentes, et amatores iustitiae non minus quam scientiae! Unde, quaeso, hominibus alicuius a Deo placent? Unde autem illis bona nisi de naturae bono? Et cum ista, quae dixi, vel omnia in uno, vel singula in singulis haberi videamus, cum omnium natura una sit, exemplo suo invicem sibi ostendunt, omnia in omnibus esse posse, quae vel omnia in omnibus, vel singula in singulis inveniantur. Quod si etiam sine Deo homines ostendunt, quales a Deo facti sunt: vide quid Christiani facere possunt, quorum in melius per Christum natura et vita instructa est et qui divinae quoque gratiae iuvantur auxilio."; *Epistula ad Demetriadem* 3, *PL* 30, 18.

¹⁷⁰) For Chrysostom's view on Adam's sin and its consequences for his descendants, see J. Gross, *Entstehungsgeschichte des Erbsündendogmas. I. Von der Bibel bis Augustinus*, München-Basel, 1960, p. 181-190 and esp. L. Scheffczyk, *Urstand, Fall und Erbsünde. Von der Schrift bis Augustinus* (Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte II,3a.1), Freiburg-Basel-Wien, 1981, p. 167-171.

a systematic treatise on these themes, although both Julian and Augustine wished to turn to him in order to bolster their arguments. Chrysostom was primarily a preacher and a pastor. He was not really interested in *begriffliche Klärungen*¹⁷¹).

Concerning Adam's state before the fall, Chrysostom claimed that Adam was created in the image of God¹⁷²). He was free of ἐπιθυμία, care, corruptibility and mortality¹⁷³). In Adam, a perfect harmony between soul and body existed. The body obeyed the soul. Adam was gifted with unbelievable intelligence, for he gave a name to all the animals¹⁷⁴). Living in a place where suffering did not exist, he ruled all creation, including the animals¹⁷⁵). Totally free, he knew precisely what he must do and he was aware of the gravity of God's commands and of the punishment which he would incur should he disobey¹⁷⁶).

Because of his sin, disobedience¹⁷⁷), Adam caused much damage to himself and to his progeny. Because of Adam, humanity was condemned¹⁷⁸). As a punishment for his sin, death came upon all¹⁷⁹). Although it is true that death sometimes can be a consolation or a blessing to people, as in the case of martyrs for example, it is primarily a punishing death, closely connected to the πάθοι to which concupiscence also belongs¹⁸⁰). Adam's punishment, as a result of his sin, had the following consequences: loss of God's presence, mortality, physical

¹⁷¹) For a nuanced discussion, see Scheffczyk, *Urstand, Fall und Erbsünde*, p. 167; see also J.N.P. Kelly, *Initiation à la doctrine des Pères de l'Eglise*, Paris, 1968, p. 361.

¹⁷²) Cf. *In Genesim homilia* 8,4, PG 53, 73.

¹⁷³) "Ἐπεὶ μέχρις ἐκείνου καθάπερ ἄγγελοι οὕτω διητῶντο ἐν τῷ παραδείσῳ, οὐχ ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας φλεγόμενοι, οὐχ ὑπὸ ἐτέρων παθῶν πολιορκούμενοι, οὐ ταῖς ἀνάγκαις τῆς φύσεως ὑποκείμενοι, ἀλλὰ δι' ὅλου ἀφθαρτοὶ κτισθέντες καὶ ἀθάνατοι, ὅπου γε οὐδὲ τῆς τῶν ἱματίων περιβολῆς ἐδέοντο"; *In Genesim homilia* 15,4, PG 53, 123.

¹⁷⁴) See *In Genesim homilia* 15,3, PG 53, 122.

¹⁷⁵) See *In Genesim homilia* 9,3-4, PG 53, 77-79. For Chrysostom, the woman is from the very beginning submitted to Adam; see *In Genesim homilia* 8,4, PG 53, 73.

¹⁷⁶) *In Genesim homilia* 16,5, PG 53, 131f.; see also F.-J. Thonnard, *Saint Jean Chrysostome et saint Augustin dans la controverse pélagienne*, in *Revue des Études Byzantines* 25 (1967) 189-218, esp. 215-216.

¹⁷⁷) On this point, I see no difference between Augustine and Chrysostom, although Augustine is criticized by Pagels because of his view; see Pagels, p. 108.

¹⁷⁸) "Ὅτε γὰρ ἡμαρτεν ὁ Ἀδὰμ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἐκείνην τὴν χαλεπὴν καὶ τὸ κοινὸν πάντων ἀνθρώπων κατεδίκασε γένος"; *Epistula ad Olympiam* 10,3, SC 13bis, p. 248.

¹⁷⁹) Cf. Scheffczyk, *Urstand, Fall und Erbsünde*, p. 170; Schelkle, *Paulus, Lehrer der Väter. Die altkirchliche Auslegung von Römer 1-11*, Düsseldorf, 1959², p. 170; 181.

¹⁸⁰) "Μετὰ γὰρ τοῦ θανάτου, φησὶ, καὶ ὁ τῶν παθῶν ἐπεισῆλθεν ὄχλος. Ὅτε γὰρ θνητὸν ἐγένετο τὸ σῶμα ἐδέξατο καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀναγκαιῶς λοιπὸν, καὶ ὀργὴν καὶ λύπην καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα"; *In Romanos homilia* 13,1, PG 60, 507.

and moral misery and proclivity to do evil. Adam's progeny participates in this punishment¹⁸¹). Therefore, one may state that Adam's fall has brought about an ontological deterioration of the human state, as is proved in Chrysostom's exegesis of *Rom.* 5,12-21. Mortality befell us because of Adam¹⁸²). However, Chrysostom, unlike Augustine, did not connect mortality with guilt. For Chrysostom, such an idea was contrary to God's righteousness. Moreover, guilt always involved personal sin. Therefore, we participate only in Adam's punishment, not in his guilt¹⁸³).

Of course, some texts seem to indicate, at least implicitly, the idea of an universal condemnation. Thus we read in *Oratio* III,21 that Adam was the first to assume guilt and that we, because of our sins, have augmented the burden¹⁸⁴). But even though the content of this guilt is curse, sin, death and condemnation by the Law, I am still convinced that the augmentation involves our personal sins. Indeed, Chrysostom always emphasized our own responsibility and did not refer to an idea of inherited guilt¹⁸⁵). For Chrysostom, the free will of every individual person was at the basis of that person's moral activity. The inner tension, which resulted from Adam's sin and which was experienced by humanity, does not cancel our freedom. This freedom is a gift from God. It belongs to the essence of our nature. Sin is the result of a free choice¹⁸⁶) and we are responsible for such a choice¹⁸⁷). Sinning is

¹⁸¹) See E. Nowak, *Le chrétien devant la souffrance. Étude sur la pensée de Jean Chrysostome* (Théologie historique 19), Paris, 1970, p. 123; Scheffczyk, *Urstand, Fall und Erbsünde*, p. 169.

¹⁸²) Cf. *In Romanos homilia* 10,1, PG 60, 474; 10,3, PG 60, 476-477. For this rather strange interpretation, see J. Freundorfer, *Erbsünde und Erbtod beim Apostel Paulus. Eine religionsgeschichtliche und exegetische Untersuchung über Römerbrief 5,12-21* (Neutestamentliche Abhandlungen 13,1-2), Münster, 1927, 118-120; S. Lyonnet, *Le sens de ἐφ' ᾧ en Rom. 5,12 et l'exégèse des Pères grecs*, in *Biblica* 36 (1955) 436-456, p. 447; *id.*, *Le péché originel en Rom. 5,12. L'exégèse des Pères grecs et les décrets du concile de Trente*, in *Biblica* 41 (1960) 325-355, p. 330; D. Weaver, *The Exegesis of Romans 5/12 among the Greek Fathers and its Implication for the Doctrine of Original Sin: the 5th-12th Centuries*, in *St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly* 29 (1985) 133-159, p. 140.

¹⁸³) Schelkle, *Paulus, Lehrer der Väter*, p. 170; H. Rondet, *Le péché originel dans la tradition patristique et théologique*, Paris, p. 127; Scheffczyk, *Urstand, Fall und Erbsünde*, p. 170.

¹⁸⁴) SC 50bis, p. 163; Augustine refers to this text in e.g. *Contra Iulianum* I,26, PL 44, 689; according to Wenger, SC 50bis, p. 163, "Augustin a été bien inspiré en citant se passage contre Julien d'Éclane".

¹⁸⁵) Cf. J. Quasten, *Patrology* III, Westminster, 1963, p. 478.

¹⁸⁶) "Ἡ μὲν γὰρ βούλησις, ἐμψυτον καὶ παρὰ Θεοῦ· ἡ δὲ τοιαύδε Βούλησις, ἡμέτερον καὶ τῆς γνώμης ἡμῶν."; *In Romanos homilia* 13,2, PG 60, 510.

¹⁸⁷) See *In Romanos homilia* 19,6, PG 60, 591-592; *In Acta apostolorum homilia* 23,3, PG 60, 181-182.

therefore not the result of coercion. Weakness of the flesh, hope of reward or fear of punishment can at the most push someone into a corner but they never cancel one's freedom or responsibility¹⁸⁸). Concerning Adam's sin and its consequences, it should be mentioned that Chrysostom also saw some positive aspects. According to him, Adam's sin was relieved by the shame which he experienced¹⁸⁹), the birth of children was a consolation for the torment of the *concupiscentia*¹⁹⁰) and the prospect of motherhood softened the pains of childbirth¹⁹¹). However, temptation was still inherent in human life. Even after our baptism (!) we must constantly struggle against all kinds of temptation¹⁹²).

It seems important to me that, according to Chrysostom, true freedom was only given to those who belonged to Christ. But even then, man, being prone to sin, still needed God's grace¹⁹³). God himself effects that a person who really wants to choose the good indeed desires and realizes that good. A man can reject God's grace but he is never in a position in which he no longer needs this grace. Even if one consents to God's appeal, God's grace is still required¹⁹⁴). The effectiveness of one's acceptance also depends on God's grace¹⁹⁵). In spite of the emphasis on freedom and autonomy, for Chrysostom, grace was also a *conditio sine qua non* for a good life.

I would like to conclude by remarking that we remain most faithful to Chrysostom when we consider him as a representative of the

Cf. also A. Stötzel, *Kirche als "neue Gesellschaft". Die humanisierende Wirkung des Christentums nach Johannes Chrysostomus* (Münsterische Beiträge zur Theologie 51), Münster, 1984, p. 154-155; I. Sanna, *Spirito e Grazia nel "Commento alla lettera ai Romani" di Teodoro di Ciro e sua dipendenza in quest'opera da Giovanni Crisostomo e Teodoro di Mopsuestia*, in *Lateranum* 48 (1982) 238-260, p. 251-257.

¹⁸⁸) See E. Osborn, *La morale dans la pensée chrétienne primitive. Description des archétypes de la morale patristique* (Théologie historique 68), Paris, 1984, p. 186; D. Amand, *Fatalisme et liberté dans l'Antiquité Grecque. Recherche sur la survivance de l'argumentation antifataliste de Carnéade chez les philosophes grecs et les théologiens chrétiens des quatre premiers siècles* (Recueil de Travaux d'Histoire et de Philosophie III, 19), Louvain, 1945, p. 493-496.

¹⁸⁹) In *Genesim homilia* 16,6, PG 53, 133.

¹⁹⁰) In *Genesim homilia* 18,4, PG 53, 153f.

¹⁹¹) In *Genesim homilia* 17,7-8, PG 53, 143f.

¹⁹²) In *Genesim homilia* 13,2, PG 53, 107f.

¹⁹³) In *Hebraeos homilia* 13,3, PG 63, 99; In *Genesim homilia* 25,7, PG 53, 228-229; 58,5, PG 53, 513; In *Romanos homilia* 14,7, PG 60, 532-534; 19,1, PG 60, 583-584.

¹⁹⁴) See Kelly, *Initiation à la doctrine des Pères de l'Eglise*, p. 363; Osborn, *La morale dans la pensée chrétienne primitive*, p. 185-187.

¹⁹⁵) See the pertinent remarks of Amand, *Fatalisme et liberté dans l'Antiquité Grecque*, p. 497-498.

traditional *Erbübellehre*. Chrysostom was not blind to the consequences of Adam's sin. While emphasizing human responsibility, he was in agreement with his predecessors (as we have seen, this was also true for Augustine). Concerning the positive effect of salvation, Chrysostom, as a believer, gave priority to God's grace, without thinking that he had neglected the capacities of the free will.

Julian, as well as Pelagius¹⁹⁶), took quite a different view on Adam¹⁹⁷). Of course, according to Julian also, God took great concern in the creation of the first man¹⁹⁸). After the creation of Adam, God remained close to him. He only commanded him not to eat a certain fruit. The observance of this prohibition would be proof of Adam's devotion. Julian further mentioned that God gave Adam a companion in order that he could become a father. He concluded by stating that God also remained benevolent to Adam thereafter¹⁹⁹).

According to Julian, although Adam was created as a mortal²⁰⁰),

¹⁹⁶) For Pelagius, see the recent article of Th.S. de Bruyn, *Pelagius's Interpretation of Rom. 5:12-21: Exegesis within the Limits of Polemic*, in *Toronto Journal of Theology* 4 (1988) 30-43, esp. p. 33-38.

¹⁹⁷) Concerning Julian's view on Adam's condition before the fall, his sin and its consequences, see esp. *Ad Florum* VI. Pagels' outline of Julian's view is in general correct.

¹⁹⁸) "Vide quod negotium in formando et animando homine pietas divina suscepit."; *Ad Florum* VI,20, PL 45, 1545.

¹⁹⁹) "Verum nec perfectum eum reliquit familiaritas conditoris: transfertur ad amoeniorem locum, et quem clementer fecerat, munifice locupletat. Nec hoc tamen praestitisse contentus, illustrat eum impertitione colloqui: dat ei praeceptum ut libertatem suam intelligens, videret sibi suppetere per quod fieret amicior Conditori: quod praeceptum non in multa distenditur, ne quid oneris de multiplicata lege sentiret; sed interdictum unius pomuli, testimonium devotionis expetitur. Postea quoque ut haberet consortium, per quam pater fieret, denuo illius manus, qua conditus erat, nobilitatur attactu; divino quoque subinde colloquio fovetur atque honoratur."; *Ad Florum* VI,20, PL 45, 1545.

Elsewhere, the interdiction on eating is seen as a test of the obedience of the first man: "Ad communionem generis humani primi mandati pertingit auctoritas: nam interdicta ligni abstinencia non gustum pomi invidit, sed oboedientiam hominis exploravit."; *Expositio libri Iob* XXVII, 28, CCL 88, p. 78.

²⁰⁰) "Adam etiam mortalem factum, qui sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, fuisse moriturum: nec hoc esse (...) ratione subnixum; sed qui si non peccasset, per gustum ligni vitae, virtutem posset immortalitatis adipisci. Male igitur dictum est, sive peccaret, sive non peccaret fuisse moriturum."; *Epistula ad Zosimum*, frg. 5, CCL 88, p. 336; cf. also *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 26, CCL 88, p. 347. See also A. Bruckner, *Julian von Eclanum. Sein Leben und seine Lehre. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Pelagianismus* (TU 15,3) Leipzig, 1897, p. 144; A. von Harnack, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte* III, Tübingen, 1932(5), p. 195.

The view of F. Refoulé, *Julien d'Eclane, théologien et philosophe*, in *Recherches de Science religieuse* 52 (1964) 42-84, esp. p. 66-72 to whether Julian should distinguish between a "philosophical" and a "theological" level, is criticized by F.-J. Thonnard, *L'artistotélisme de Julien d'Éclane et saint Augustin*, in *REA* 11 (1965) 296-304. On this point, Ch. Pietri,

he could have received immortality as a personal reward. However, that gift would never have been the general rule for humanity as such²⁰¹). In this regard, Julian referred to Enoch and Elijah. Although they personally did not die, the children of Enoch had to die. Moreover, death came over many righteous men such as Abel, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob and others as well²⁰²).

For Julian, Adam's sin did not harm his nature as such. His sin was to be situated on the level of the will but it did not change Adam's constitution as a free, created human being in any way²⁰³). Adam's sin was a slight offense of an inexperienced and, morally speaking, rather primitive human being²⁰⁴). Julian did not explain how this could be reconciled with the statement that Adam had been created as good. One may wonder what then was the value of God's benevolent presence. More than likely, Julian, in a polemic context, intended to minimize the gravity of Adam's sin.

Due to his sin, Adam lost his natural innocence²⁰⁵), innocence that was also attributed to newborn children²⁰⁶). For Julian, Adam's death was not the result of his sin. Death was part of his natural

Roma Christiana. Recherches sur l'Église de Rome, son organisation, sa politique, son idéologie de Miltiade à Sixte III (311-440) (Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome 224), Rome, 1976, t. 2, p. 939-940 agrees with Thonnard and adds new arguments to the discussion.

²⁰¹) "Haud sane impugnavero eos qui autumant Adam, si dicto audiens exstitisset, ad immortalitatem potuisse pro remuneratione transferri. (...) Exercuisset se igitur in reliquis innata mortalitas, etiamsi primus ille in aeternitatem a diurnitate migrasset."; *Ad Florum* VI,30, PL 45, 1579.

²⁰²) See *Ad Florum* VI,30, PL 45, 1579-1580. For Enoch and Elijah, see resp. *Gen.* 5,24 and *II Kings* 2.

²⁰³) See *Ad Florum* VI,20, PL 45, 1545.

²⁰⁴) "Iussum fuerat ut edulio unius arboris abstinere: rudis, imperitus, incautus, sine experimento timoris, sine exemplo iustitiae, suggestu mulieris usurpavit escam, cuius illexerat et suavis et venustas."; *Ad Florum* VI,23, PL 45, 1554.

²⁰⁵) "Hic dicat aliquis, Quid ergo? tu negas illam innocentiam, in qua fuerat conditus, spontanei peccati admissione corruptam? Nam etsi possibilitas revertendi ad bonum commissi iniquitate non pereat; tamen certum est meritum innocentiae, cum qua humanum procedit exordium, voluntatis vitio deperire. At ego ista id esse non abnuo: sed illud est, quod his illuminatum exemplis volo, quia cum talis sit conditio facta qualitatibus, per quas boni et mali dicimur, ut sub iure agitent voluntatis tamque hoc sit serio constitutum, ut nec innocentis, quae pro dignitate auctoris officium antevenit voluntatis et naturalis est; tamen nulla se potestate in animo repugnante custodiat"; *Ad Florum* VI,19, PL 45, 1542-1543.

²⁰⁶) See in this respect M. Lamberigts, *Julian of Aeclanum: a Plea for a Good Creator*, in *Augustiniana* 38 (1988) 5-24, esp. 10ff.

condition. *Gen.* 3,19: "Qui terra es et in terram ibis" must be understood literally²⁰⁷). If death was caused by sin, then the author of *Genesis* had to mention it²⁰⁸). Therefore Julian considered death as more of a consolation for Adam because of the fact that after the fall, Adam would lead a hard and painful life. Even before the fall, Adam had to work²⁰⁹) but the exile from paradise seriously aggravated his life. Julian emphasized that this punishment was personal. Worry and pain plagued Adam and Eve personally. These burdens were not to be seen as a punishment for all humanity as such²¹⁰). For Julian, the pains of childbirth were also not equated with punishment. *Multiplicare* in *Gen.* 3,16 at most indicated a personal augmentation of pain. *Multiplicare* proved in fact that pain would have existed even if Adam and Eve had not sinned. Moreover, *Eph.* 5,25 and *1 Cor.* 11,9 also clearly prove that the obedience of a woman to her husband belonged to her natural condition²¹¹). Julian noticed that the pains of childbirth varied from

²⁰⁷) "Verum non semper ista patieris; sed 'donec convertaris in terram de qua sumptus es; quia terra es', inquit, 'et in terram ibis' (*Gen.* 3,19b). Cur non, postquam dixit, 'donec convertaris in terram de qua sumptus es'; subdidit, Quia peccasti et mea praecepta transgressus es? Hoc enim dicendum erat, si resolutio corporum ad crimina pertineret. Verum quid dixit? 'Quia terra es', inquit, 'et in terram ibis.' Causam cur in terram rediturus esset, ostendit: 'Quia terra es', inquit. Quomodo autem esset terra, superior sermo patefecerat: 'Quia de terra', inquit, 'sumptus es.'

Si ergo redeundi in terram, hanc esse rationem dixit Deus, quoniam fuerat assumptus e terra, porro ut assumeretur, ad iniquitatem spectare non potuit; procul dubio non iniquitatis, sed naturae mortalis fuit, ut qui aeternus non erat, in corporis parte solveretur."; *Ad Florum* VI,27, PL 45, 1568.

²⁰⁸) "Sequitur autem: 'Donec convertaris in terram ex qua sumptus es; quoniam terra es', inquit, 'et in terram ibis.' (*Gen.* 3,19b) Haec sane pars extrema sententiae, sicut illa mulieris, ad indicium, non ad supplicium respicit: quin imo, ut res indicat, promisso fine consolatur hominem."; *Ad Florum* VI,27, PL 45, 1567-1568.

²⁰⁹) For this statement, Julian refers to *Gen.* 2,15: "Et sumpsit Dominus Deus hominem quem fecit, et posuit illum in paradiso, operari eum et custodire." According to Julian, *operari* proves that Adam already had to work before the Fall. Therefore, "In sudore faciei tuae edes panem tuum" (*Gen.* 3,19a) is not to be considered as a punishment. The work Adam had to do in the paradise, led up to sweat. Moreover, sweating does a human being good. So, Julian concluded: "Si ergo etiam in paradiso noluit eum Deus pabula examussim illaborate suscipere, sed indicto operationis, quem indiderat, excitavit industriam; quid ei novum accidisse credimus, si sentiret sudorem, qui experiebatur laborem?" *Ad Florum* VI,27, PL 45, 1567. Cf. also Pagels, p. 137.

²¹⁰) "Illa ergo sterilitas arborum, illa veprium ubertas, illa agri partus aucta calamitas, *personis* hominum sunt illata, *non generi*."; *Ad Florum* VI,27, PL 45, 1568; "Cibos autem et spinas et sudores primo fuisse naturalitate instituta, post in aliquibus aucta iudicialiter, ad nostram vero aetatem sine peccati illius admiratione venisse; res tam apertae sunt, ut longiore penitus assertionem non egeant."; *Ad Florum* VI,28, PL 45, 1576; cf. also VI,29, PL 45, 1577.

²¹¹) Cf. *Ad Florum* VI,26, PL 45, 1561-1563.

woman to woman. Women who had worked very hard, were better prepared for such pain than rich women, whose bodies had become soft as a result of their comfortable lives²¹²). Therefore, I am not sure that Julian admitted that "male domination (...) may become, through sin, both painful and oppressive"²¹³). In fact, Julian explicitly stated that the submission of a woman to her husband was not a punishment and he referred to Scripture in support of this. A woman must obey her husband by nature. Obedience as such was therefore not "painful and oppressive" but would become so if a woman no longer obeys. A woman therefore sinned only if she ran counter to the order established by nature²¹⁴). Moreover, Pagels is mistaken when she states that Julian "says, Adam began to die morally and spiritually from the day he chose to sin"²¹⁵). It is certainly not true that Adam, after his fall, began leading a sinful life. According to Julian, Adam sinned only once. In this, Julian explicitly referred to history²¹⁶). He also emphasized that Adam repented and was purified, making reference to *Wis.* 10,2 and to the current tradition²¹⁷). With regard to Julian's view of freedom as a freedom of choice with a permanent capacity to do either good or evil, the interpretation presented by Pagels, without the support of any textual evidence, makes absolutely no sense.

In Julian's view, there was a close relationship between marriage, procreation and *concupiscentia*. The existence of *concupiscentia* was a fundamental condition for successful procreation. Thus, it belongs to our created nature as such. Therefore, Julian refused to see *concupiscentia carnis* as a result of the fall²¹⁸). Adam's feeling of shame and his effort to hide his nakedness were seen as merely a shock reaction²¹⁹).

²¹²) See *Ad Florum* VI,29, PL 45, 1577; Pagels, p. 136-137.

²¹³) Pagels, p. 137.

²¹⁴) *Ad Florum* VI,26, PL 45, 1562-1563.

²¹⁵) Pagels, p. 132.

²¹⁶) "Prudenter ergo, eum de Adam loqueretur, nominavit unum peccatum, quod voluit intellegi formam praevaricationis fuisse; ideo, inquam, unum et non multa memoravit, quia sciebat unum tantum Adae peccatum in legis historia contineri. (...) Quod ergo praemisit unum peccatum, fidem servavit historiae"; *Ad Florum* II,109, CSEL 85,1, p. 212.

²¹⁷) "Denique Adam ipsum, et ille liber qui Sapientia dicitur, et multorum opinio, secuta emendatione asserit expiatum."; *Ad Florum* VI,30, PL 45, 1580.

²¹⁸) See Lamberigts, *Julian of Aeclanum*, p. 16-19.

²¹⁹) "Non igitur quia peccaverant genitalia vel diabolica vel inhonesta fecerunt, sed quia pavitabant, in ea qua primam fuerant honestate permanentia membra texerunt."; *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 151, CCL 88, p. 372; cf. also frg. 79, CCL 88, p. 360-361; frg. 81, CCL 88, p. 361; frg. 91, CCL 88, p. 363; frg. 149, CCL 88, p. 371-372; frg. 153, CCL 88, p. 372.

Adam's initial nakedness was explained as a proof of the absence of moral concern to dress himself²²⁰). Clothing oneself was the result of a growing culture and depended on people, places and circumstances²²¹).

Moreover, Julian continued, *concupiscentia carnis* in its broad meaning, existed even before the fall²²²) due to the fact that the desire for the forbidden fruit which, because of its beauty and appetizing appearance, compelled Adam and Eve to eat it²²³). However, according to Julian, the mind led and governed the body. Julian was convinced that this mind was really able to govern and to keep the human impulses under control²²⁴).

It goes without saying that for Julian, unlike Chrysostom, Adam's fall did not have consequences for his progeny. Adam was seen by Julian as a simple man who died long ago²²⁵). For Julian, suffering and

²²⁰) "Ideo (...) homines fuisse primitus nudos, quia ad sollertiae humanae operam ut se tegerent pertinebat, quae nondum in illis fuit."; *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 150, CCL 88, p. 372.

²²¹) "Quis ergo neget, honestatem hanc, qua genitalia nostra contegimus, pro personis, locis, officiis moribusque variari? Sic in conventiculis publicis obscenior nuditas, nihil habet turpitudinis in lavacris. Sic alter est cubicularis habitus, seminudus et securus; alter vero forensis, sollicitior et profusior. Quid, quod ad testimonium crebro familiaritatis, respicit negligentia cautionis, et quanto persona aut ignotior aut honoratior adfecerit, tanto diligentior habitus comparatur? Quid, quod nautis et opificibus plerisque nemo vitio nuditatem dedit? Ac ne ista simplicitas personis magis quam negotiis imputetur, more omnium etiam Petrus apostolus, et post resurrectionem Domini nudus in navigio piscabatur (*Joh.* 21,7). Dirige hinc oculos ad medicantum munera: ducunt artem studio salutis in locos pudoris. Athletis nuditas etiam decora est. Iam vero non solum adolescentulis, et petulanti sibi societate coniunctis, sed etiam totis quibusdam gentibus uterque sexus retectus, et sine secreti est electione commixtio. Quid tamen mirum, si id Scotus vicinarumque gentium barbaries agat"; *Ad Florum* IV,44, PL 45, 1363-1364; "Ita natura praescripsit esse quaedam, quae ut ratio, ita fides cum religione pronuntiet; et tamen pudor et decentia conversationis oculis non permittat exponi."; *Ad Florum* IV,55, PL 45, 1371. Cf. also *Ad Florum* III,74, CSEL 85,1, p. 404; IV,30, PL 45, 1353; IV,43, PL 45, 1361-1362; IV,64-65; PL 45, 1376-1377; IV,67, PL 45, 1377.

²²²) "Prius in homine concupiscentiam carnis, quae spem imitat saporis et oculorum, fuisse quam culpam."; *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 144a, CCL 88, p. 370.

²²³) "Hanc autem voluptatem concupiscentiam ante peccatum in Paradiso fuisse res illa declarat, quia ad delictum via per concupiscentiam fuit, quae cum pomi oculos incitasset, spem etiam iucundi irritavit saporis. Non ergo potuit haec concupiscentia (...) fructus esse peccati, quae docetur non suo quidem vitio, sed voluntatis, occasio fuisse peccati."; *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 144b, CCL 88, p. 370.

²²⁴) "Quoniam ex imparibus bonis compositi sumus, animum corpori debere dominari, quorum alterum nobis cum diis, alterum cum beluis (...) esse commune; et ideo id quod est melius, id est animum, virtute praeditum (...) et membris corporis bene et cupiditatibus imperare."; *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 116, CCL 88, p. 366; see also frg. 233, CCL 88, p. 383.

²²⁵) "Olim defuncti hominis"; *Ad Florum* II,163, CSEL 85,1, p. 284.

death were natural conditions. Sinfulness was, as it were, not ingrained in human nature²²⁶). Sin was always personal sin and the result of a free decision made by an individual who knew what he must and must not do²²⁷). Adam's sin would not be more than an example and even then only for someone who knew Adam's story²²⁸). I will leave aside the question of whether there is a contradiction between the fact that, in *Ad Florum*, book VI, Adam's sin was called a slight offense while in book II, it was described as the *maxima forma peccati*²²⁹).

However, one should not forget that Julian's reaction against the doctrine of *peccatum originale* was, in spite of his polemic tone, inspired by serious theological arguments²³⁰). First of all, Julian was truly concerned about defending God Himself. Julian wanted above all to safeguard the goodness of God's creative activity.

Since in the doctrine of original sin newborn children were burdened with guilt, although they had not yet developed personal moral activity, God's good creative activity and thus his own goodness were brought into question. For God was, is and will be the creator of the human being, especially of the human soul. As a convinced creationist, Julian could not believe that any guilt should be present on the level of the

²²⁶) J. Gross, who cannot be suspected of sympathy for Augustine, noticed correctly in his work *Entstehungsgeschichte des Erbsündendogmas* I, p. 312: "Wie immer man dieses psychologische Rätsel lösen mag, in einem Punkte wenigstens hat Augustinus nach seiner Bekehrung seine Meinung nie geändert und sich mit vollem Recht gegen die Pelagianer auf die Ueberlieferung berufen: stets hat er im Tode und in der Sündhaftigkeit der geschichtlichen Menschheit Straffolgen der Ursünde gesehen. Die Leugnung dieser grosskirchlichen Tradition durch die Pelagianer dürfte einer der Hauptursachen ihres Misserfolgs gewesen sein."

Therefore, I think that Pagels, p. 133-135 misjudges a broader tradition while criticizing Augustine's view on suffering and death.

²²⁷) Cf. e.g. *Ad Turbantium*, frg. 108, CCL 88, p. 345; frg. 263, CCL 88, p. 386; *Ad Florum* I,79, CSEL 85,1, p. 94; I,94, CSEL 85,1, p. 109; II,17, CSEL 85,1, p. 174; II,151, CSEL 85,1, p. 274; II,185, CSEL 85,1, p. 302; IV,39, PL 45, 1359; IV,43, PL 45, 1361; IV,59, PL 45, 1374-1375; IV,129, PL 45, 1436; V,26, PL 45, 1464 etc.

²²⁸) See e.g. *Ad Florum* II,53, CSEL 85,1, p. 201-202; II,55, CSEL 85,1, p. 202-203; II,56, CSEL 85,1, p. 203 etc.

²²⁹) "Ita etiam in parte contraria Adam dicitur forma peccati non prima sed maxima"; II,189, CSEL 85,1, p. 306; see also Augustine's reaction in *Opus imperfectum* VI,23, PL 45, 1557.

²³⁰) I am not sure that Refoulé, *Julien d'Eclane*, p. 66-72 is right with his distinction in Julian's teaching between a philosophical and a theological level. I think that Julian's distinction between nature and will is to be understood from a deeper background, namely his view on God. The distinction is included in the idea that a good God created a good human nature. God wants that this free and autonomous nature enters into a relation with him. The nature then refers to God's creating activity, the will to the human capacity, to enter or not into a relation desired by God.

soul, precisely because God Himself gave the soul to every newborn child²³¹).

With this, I would like to draw attention to another theological category which was of great importance to Julian, namely God's justice. God rewards or punishes everybody according to their merits²³²). This being the case, it would be unjust to blame a child for the sin of someone else, be it Adam or even the child's own parents. Here also, Julian's reaction really involved his notion of God. God was just and therefore it was inconceivable that He should act in an unjust way. Since, according to Julian, one's relationship with God was always personal, one therefore had to judge one's own moral activity. Only such activity was subject to God's just judgement. Thus and only thus, do we do justice to both God *and* man.

The fact that God desired to create a free man was yet another theological concern for Julian. I think that one is mistaken if one understands Julian's definition: "*Libertas arbitrii, qua a Deo emancipatus homo est, in amittendi peccati et abstinendi a peccato possibilitate consistit*"²³³) in the sense of an alienation, as Augustine did²³⁴. Rather, I believe that *a Deo emancipatus homo est* should be translated as "man is emancipated by God". In fact, in I,79, Julian explicitly stated: "*Factum est enim rationale, mortale, capax virtutis et vitii, quod posset ex concessa sibi possibilitate*"²³⁵). In other words, man is created like this and has received the capacity to choose. The will is only free if it is not compelled by nature. Only a *emancipata voluntas*

²³¹) See article, mentioned in note 206.

²³²) "*Iustitia est virtus, fungens diligenter officio ad restituendum sua unicuique sine fraude sine gratia, id est sine personarum acceptione.*"; *Ad Florum* I,35, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 26; cf. also I,131, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 143; III,2, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 352.

This definition is already found in Cicero; see e.g. *De natura deorum* III,38; *De finibus* V,65; *De inventione* II,160; *De republica* II,18; *De legibus* I,19; *De officiis* I,15.

Cf. also T. Mayer-Maly, *Gemeinwohl und Naturrecht bei Cicero*, in *Das neue Cicerobild* (Wege der Forschung 27), 1971, p. 371-387; F.-J. Thonnard, *Justice de Dieu et justice humaine selon saint Augustin*, in *Augustinus. Strenas augustinianas P. Victorino Capánaga oblatas* (ed. J. Oroz-Reta), Madrid, 1967, p. 387-402; A.E. Mc Grath, *Divine Justice and Divine Equity in the Controversy between Augustine and Julian of Eclanum*, in *Downside Review* 101 (1983) 312-319.

²³³) See *Ad Florum* I,78, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 93.

²³⁴) "Emancipatum hominem dicis a Deo nec attendis hoc cum emancipato agi, ut in familia patris non sit."; *Opus imperfectum* I,78, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 93. However, from a juridical standpoint, Augustine's reaction is correct: *emancipare* contains such an idea of alienation.

²³⁵) See *Ad Florum* I,79, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 94 and already I,76, *CSEL* 85,1, p. 92.

can be free²³⁶). This *libertas arbitrii* is a gift from God. The capacity to sin or to act justly is a *bonum aequae opus Dei*²³⁷). The capacity to choose, which is included in the term freedom, is desired by God Himself. He is the creator of the good nature as well as of free will²³⁹) and He has done so in such a way that no pressure is brought to bear on that will. This was one of Julian's basic reasons for reacting against what he called the *peccatum naturale*, where sin and guilt were considered to belong to our nature. They belong to the realm of necessity and therefore accuse the creator Himself. Moreover, in this case, man was not really free in his desires and actions. For Julian, it was clear that God Himself desired a free human being. This was true not only for the first man but for every human being. So, Julian made room for real moral activity and real responsibility in every human being. Only if we are free, are we able to do what we must do and only then can we be called to account or be rewarded²⁴⁰). That we exist as free human beings is a necessity. How we shall live, on the other hand, belongs to the realm of the possible. The concrete living out of our personal moral life, the choice for good or evil, implies a possibility for change. This change depends on the will but it does not effect our nature. Sinning is the result of an act of the will, not of created nature as such²⁴¹). Sin does not cancel our freedom of judgement, for this freedom belongs to our nature and offers the framework within which we desire and do that which is morally good or evil²⁴²). Morality belongs to the level of the will and an act performed on this level has no consequences for one's own nature or the nature of other people²⁴³).

It is true that Julian was not able to explain how it was possible for some people to sin so often that it became a *secunda natura* for them.

²³⁶) Cf. *Ad Florum* V,28, PL 45, 1466.

²³⁷) *Ad Florum* V,56, PL 45, 1489.

²³⁸) *Ad Florum* V,57, PL 45, 1490.

²³⁹) *Ad Florum* V,47, PL 45, 1483.

²⁴⁰) See e.g. *Ad Florum* I,81, CSEL 85,1, p. 95; I,82, CSEL 85,1, p. 95; II,7, CSEL 85,1, p. 167; III,107, CSEL 85,1, p. 427; V,61, PL 45, 1496.

²⁴¹) See *Ad Florum* V,63, PL 45, 1500-1501; see also Refoulé, *Julien d'Éclane*, p. 75-77; Clodius, *El libre albedrío según Julián de Eclano*, in *Anales de la Facultad de Teología* 14 (1962) 99-134, p. 111; L. Arias, *Pecado original y concupiscencia en el "Opus imperfectum" de S. Agustín*, in *Religión y Cultura* 31 (1985) 567-586, p. 569-570.

²⁴²) Cf. *Ad Florum* I,108, CSEL 85,1, p. 187; V,47, PL 45, 1483; V,55, PL 45, 1489; V,56, PL 45, 1489.

²⁴³) See e.g. *Ad Florum* IV,98, PL 45, 1396; IV,99, PL 45, 1396; cf. also Clodius, *El libre albedrío según Julián de Eclano*, p. 111.

He was also not able to reconcile this factual situation with his view that, thanks to our innate virtues, we all know what we should do and that we really are able to do it²⁴⁴). What precisely was the link between a good creation and moral activity? What was the value of the innate virtues? Moreover, concerning the mental deficiencies in man, Julian kept silent. How could these be explained within a creationist view? This is one of the reasons why Augustine referred to the so-called *moriones*²⁴⁵). The point here was in fact how to explain why some people, although having received a newly created soul directly from God, did not possess the most characteristic feature of the soul, namely the intellect. However, it should still be recalled what Julian really wanted to safeguard: man was, by his created nature, able to sin or to act rightly and he was always responsible for his own acts. Although Julian deviated from the tradition of his time in his opinion on Adam, he was rather close to the viewpoint of Chrysostom for example and in fact also to Augustine if he is understood correctly.

I hope that these few considerations, which in no way pretend to be exhaustive²⁴⁶), will be proof of the interest with which I have read the last part of Pagels' work. Personally, I am convinced that, concerning the Pelagian controversy, only one valid approach will lead to a correct interpretation. One has to read both Augustine and Julian in light of their own particular points of view. Only a constant respect for the ideas of each of the two antagonists enables us to recognize the values and the limitations of their exposition. Both men give evidence of great shrewdness and deep religious conviction to such a degree that it becomes difficult to completely agree with either one or the other. I believe that assessing the controversy on the basis of an 'either-or' attitude is insufficient. Further, I do not believe that it is the correct approach to link the possible rehabilitation of Pelagius or Julian to a repudiation or rejection of Augustine's positions. Such an attitude

²⁴⁴) See e.g. *Ad Florum* I,16, CSEL 85,1, p. 13; I,67, CSEL 85,1, p. 67; I,69, CSEL 85,1, p. 75-76; I,94, CSEL 85,1, p. 109; IV,121, PL 45, 1416.

Cf. also the pertinent remarks of A. von Harnack, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte* III, p. 197.

²⁴⁵) "Quis autem nesciat, quos vulgo moriones vocant, natura ita fatuos, ut quibusdam eorum pene sensus pecorum conferatur?"; *Contra Iulianum* III,10, PL 44, 707.

²⁴⁶) Much could be said concerning Pagels' presentation of Augustine's view on *Rom.* 7,15-25; see Pagels, p. 143-144; see in this regard Schelkle, *Paulus, Lehrer der Väter*, p. 242-258. Also the attitude of A. Bruckner, *Julian von Eclanum* is not as favourable to Augustine as Pagels, p. 144 pretends. According to Bruckner, Augustine's doctrine of original sin is in a convincing way refuted by Julian; see p. 64ff.

would only result in a mirror image of former approaches to the matter and would not truly advance the scientific research into this dispute. To begin with, it was a pity that Augustine and Julian responded to each other by means of a polemic genre. Perhaps, after the intervention of several authorities in 418, this was the only possible way. It is sufficiently known that, because of this, certain valuable insights of both Pelagius and Julian have been erroneously suspect and also that, due to such condemnation, a latent conflict remained operative within the world of theological thought. This conflict has re-emerged periodically and frequently in other forms. One only has to think of the sixteenth and the seventeenth century.

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