

A Note on some Themes of St. Augustine's *de Trinitate*, present in *de Libero Arbitrio*

Some years ago, under the title of "St. Augustine's 'notitia sui' related to Aristotle and the early neo-Platonists", this periodical published a dissertation of mine in article form¹). In it I proposed that in his *de Trinitate* Augustine set up a precise philosophical counterpart to the neo-Platonist systems of Plotinus and Porphyry²), with which he may have come into contact (not for the first time) with the arrival in North Africa of refugees from the Vandal invasion of Italy, and their capture of Rome in 410³). The change in orientation of the work from book VIII shows a preoccupation with neo-Platonism, which parallels a similar change in orientation in *de Civitate Dei*⁴), at book VII; and both works were being written at the same time. Even the scriptural setting in which *de Trinitate* was written could have had the neo-Platonists in mind; for whereas Porphyry had attacked the gospels as tissues of contradictions, and the evangelists as "criminal sophists"⁵), Augustine was able to derive from the Scriptures a concept of superior beauty and superior humanity⁶).

In the fifth section of this work: "Self-Knowledge in Augustine. b) Triadic Structures"⁷), I argued that his triadic construction of knowing, in which a third element, will or desire, united object with subject, can be viewed as a contribution to the Graeco-Roman philosophical tradition as he knew it, and particularly in relation to the speculations of Plotinus and Porphyry⁸); and I suggested parallels. I also proposed that Augustine had gathered "these ideas from scattered places and obscure

¹) v. *Augustiniana* (= *Aug*), 27 (1977), pp. 70-132, 364-401; 28 (1978), pp. 183-221; 29 (1979), pp. 97-124. The *Excursus* from the dissertation, "Hegel's Conception of Self-Knowledge Seen in Conjunction with Augustine's", was published in 30 (1980), pp. 221-50.

²) v. *Aug* 27 (1977), pp. 364-401, and 28 (1978), pp. 191, 197-200.

³) v. *Aug* 27 (1977), pp. 366-9.

⁴) v. pp. in previous note. The circle for whom Augustine wrote *de Civitate Dei* was reconstructed by P. Brown, in *Augustine of Hippo*, (London, 1967), ch. 26.

⁵) v. *Aug* 27 (1977), p. 365.

⁶) Cf. *ib.*, pp. 102-4, 395; 28 (1978), p. 198, n. 67.

⁷) i.e. *Aug* 29 (1979), pp. 97-124.

⁸) v. *ib.*, pp. 97-106.

formulations", and that his "reinterpretation of them... was not only a hermeneutical *tour de force*: all the time it was as much speculative theology in the search for dependable analogies between human *mens* and Godhead"⁹). And I went on to interpret the inner constitution of the triad of *mens* (*memoria sui — se nosse — se velle*) as Augustine's assertion of man's "godlike independence" and "self-equality", which had in mind the neo-Platonists' assertion of the essential unification of mind and soul with the transcendent hypostases of *νοῦς* and *φύχῃ*, which lacked that self-equality: their source was in the inexplicable loss of self-equality by the One; and their reality was determined by their effort to rediscover it in themselves, through reunion with the One. Hence they conceived the proper place for the human mind and soul was a one-in-many absorption of the individual into these transcendences¹⁰). His rehabilitation of the memory against the neo-Platonist effort, in the search for ecstatic union though *νοῦς* with the One, to rise beyond memories which chain the mind and soul to lower and transient things, also seemed to me to be significant¹¹): "It was at once a brilliant insight into the means of wholesale unification of knowledge and an inversion of neo-Platonist speculation to give the despised human memory the same function as the self-gathering and knowledge unification of their *φύχῃ* and providing the possibility of the presence to self of their *νοῦς*"¹²).

This interpretation of the thought of Augustine as part of an anti-neo-Platonist apologetic does not seem to be in need of correction. However, the historical setting can be improved in a way which reveals an impressive continuity in Augustine's thought, where it had been presumed (even by myself) that the *de Trinitate* provided an isolated development of his thought, explained by his controversy with Roman neo-platonists. For I had assumed that Augustine had forged all his apparently new concepts in response to a need which had arisen after 410. But now I find that he was bringing out and developing some ideas which he had articulated at the beginning of his conversion, in the *de*

⁹) v. *ib.*, p. 106.

¹⁰) v. *Aug.* 27 (1977), pp. 100, 371, 375-8, 383-5. Cf. Augustine's conception: *ib.*, 396-401, and *Aug.* 29 (1979), pp. 106-110.

¹¹) v. *Aug.* 28 (1978), pp. 184-92. Noted by O. du ROY, *L'intelligence de la foi en la Trinité selon s. Augustin*, Études Augustiniennes, (Paris, 1966), p. 123, n. 2.

¹²) v. *Aug.* 28 (1978), p. 190.

Libero Arbitrio, which was begun at Rome in the winter of 387-8, and finished at Hippo in 395.

There is a widespread impression that, between Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, lies a wide division in their view of human nature. Augustine, it is supposed, habitually sees human nature as factually flawed by sin and in need of grace, whilst Thomas sees it primarily as functioning in its unflawed state. That Augustine, in *de Trinitate*, sees human nature as functioning in the unflawed state, has created the impression that it is unusual and is isolated from the rest of his thought. The first thing, therefore, to notice in *de Libero Arbitrio*, is that he distinguishes between these two states of human nature, and he gives primacy to the state of human nature as unflawed:

"Sic etiam ipsam naturam aliter dicimus cum proprie loquimur naturam hominis in qua primum in suo genere inculpabilis factus est, aliter istam in qua ex illius damnati poena et mortales et ignari et carni subditi nascimur"¹³).

Hence, the rational analysis to which he subjects the human *mens* in the search for possible analogies of the divine Trinity, without any reference to the effects of sin in its structure or in its functioning, was a possibility he had always envisaged. The subject matter, which was the transition from the image in man to its divine prototype called for a starting point in an unflawed human nature. The purpose of the work was not, as in *de Civitate Dei* to moralize, but to theorize.

I have referred to the aspect of anti-neo-Platonist apologetic in Augustine's giving a central rôle to memory. It went parallel with his *Romanitas* in insisting on the individuality and independence of the human *mens*¹⁴). In a triadic functioning of the human mind, *mens* could be the source from which the acts of intelligence and acts of will, or love, could procede. This already suggested the Trinity — though, as Augustine realized, there was a need of intellect and will in the constitution of *each* divine Person, and a simple parallelism between act of intellect corresponding to the Word, and act of will, or love, corresponding to the Holy Spirit, was not adequate¹⁵).

¹³) v. *de Libero Arbitrio* III 19, 54.

¹⁴) v. *Aug* 28 (1978), pp. 184-92. The Roman legal sense, which saw the *individual* as the bearer of rights, would not take very seriously the transcendent hypostases of neo-Platonism.

¹⁵) v. *infra.*, n. 31.

Hence his profounder and more satisfying construction of a triad of those powers *within* the *mens*¹⁶), brought to unity by having as their object, themselves, yet identified with *mens*: this is Augustine's conception of the basic constitution of the human personality, brought to precision as he sought out, from within it, the vestiges of the Godhead; it is its unique life, continuous in time, if unconscious — but able to be brought into consciousness by *cogitatio*:

“quadam interiore non simulata sed uera praesentia (non enim quidquam illi est se ipsa praesentius), sicut cogitat uiuere se et meminisse et intellegere et uelle se”¹⁷).

Whilst I had the impression that this discernment arose out of the need to match his neo-Platonist disputants after 410, the presence of this triad in *de Libero Arbitrio*, which I have recently noted, is an impressive affirmation of the continuity of Augustine's thought, showing that the position he developed in the debate which the *de Trinitate* reflects had some roots in the beginning of his philosophical reflections. Yet, even though Augustine was already interested in establishing a model for the Trinity at this period¹⁸), the conception is not used in *de Libero Arbitrio* for this purpose. It arises in *de Libero Arbitrio* in his discussion on the freedom of the will. He mentions that each of the three powers of *ratio*, *voluntas* and *memoria*, has the facility not only of finding its object in something external, but of reflecting back into itself:

“A. Quo modo omnia, quae ad scientiam cognoscimus, ratione cognoscimus, et tamen etiam ipsa ratio inter illa numeratur quae ratione cognoscimus. An oblitus es, cum quaereremus quae ratione cognoscantur, confessum te fuisse etiam *rationem ratione cognosci*? Noli ergo mirari, si ceteris per liberam uoluntatem utimur, etiam ipsa libera uoluntate per eam ipsam uti nos posse, ut quodam modo *se ipsa utatur uoluntas* quae utitur ceteris, sicut se ipsam cognoscit ratio quae cognoscit et cetera. Nam et memoria non solum cetera omnia quae meminimus comprehendit, sed etiam quod non obliuiscimur nos habere memoriam, ipsa se *memoria* quodam modo, tenet in nobis, quae non solum aliorum sed *etiam*

¹⁶) v. *Aug* 29 (1979), pp. 106-15.

¹⁷) v. *de Trinitate*, X 10, 16.

¹⁸) v. du ROY, *op. cit.*, pp. 416-7: putting *de Libero Arbitrio* in the context of his Trinitarian reflections.

sui meminit; uel potius nos et cetera et ipsam per ipsam meminimus"¹⁹).

Also to be found in *de Libero Arbitrio* is the triad, deriving ultimately from Plato, but unquestionably passed on through the use that neo-Platonists made of it: *esse, vivere, intellegere*²⁰). It is interesting to note that at one point the three are arranged hierarchically under *intellegere*:

"cum tria sint haec, esse uiuere intellegere Tenemus etiam id, esse in his tribus praestantius quod homo cum duobus ceteris habet, id est intellegere, quod habentem sequitur et esse et uiuere"²¹).

Later in *de Libero Arbitrio* Augustine sets out a view of human moral growth as a growth in *esse*:

"Si enim magis magisque esse uolueris, ei quod summe est propinquabis; et gratias age nunc quia es. ... Quanto enim amplius esse amaueris, tanto amplius uitam aeternam desiderabis Qui autem amat esse probat ista in quantum sunt et amat quod semper est. ... Huic enim exordio quo esse uis si adicias magis magisque esse, consurgis atque extrueris in id quod summe est ... qui autem plus amat esse quam odit miser esse, adiciendo ad id quod amat quod odit excludat; cum enim in suo genere perfecte esse coeperit miser non erit".

Leaving aside the value and importance of this ontological expression of progression in virtue, we can note that the *esse* of this passage is that of human life, in fact taking in *vivere* and *intellegere*; their separateness, together with their superiority over *esse* is set on one side. And in the course of the reflection, temporal things have been seen in

¹⁹) v. *de Libero Arbitrio* II 19, 51. This text is not referred to by du ROY (*op. cit.*), to whom the theory of Augustine is seen as a genetic development; in terms of which he finds the "démarche anagogique" and "ontologique" (p. 421), and the "cogito trinitaire" (pp. 427, 432). It was a pity he did not notice this key-stone to the thought of *de Trinitate*, even if it was not yet dressed, ready for its final position. Augustine returned to a conception he had already formed and preserved, and found in it virtualities which he had not yet, at least, committed to writing. The monumentality of his thought, entailed by its having an anchorage in the beginnings of his reflection, does not preclude its having a speculative vitality: it makes his thought doubly impressive. The passage is not referred to either by L. CILLERUELO, O.S.A., in "La 'Memoria sui'", *Giornale di Metafisica*, 9 (1954), pp. 478-92.

²⁰) du Roy, *op. cit.*, pp. 471-3, has an appendix on this triad: "Les essais de hiérarchisation triadique des êtres".

²¹) v. *de Libero Arbitrio* II 3.7.

terms of *esse* alone: "quae temporalia et antequam sint non *sunt*, et cum *sunt* fugiunt, et cum fugerint non erunt"²²).

When Augustine came to write *de Trinitate* X, this idea of a triad of the powers of the human soul ("rationem ratione cognosci ... se ipsa utatur voluntas ... memoria sui meminit"), each reflecting on itself, came to his mind as a model of the Trinity, of Persons, and at the same time his reflections on the three realities of *esse*, *uiuere*, *intelligere*, which he had come to regard as a unity in human life, appeared to him as a model of its single essence. And he brought the two reflections together, developing, deepening, extending and yet simplifying them, such that in the human life, *esse uiuere intelligere*, making a unity

²²) v. *ib.*, III 7,21; and cf. also III 13,36-16.45. A source for the unity in *esse* of the triad could be Victorinus: cf. e.g., *Adversus Arium* III, 4: "esse, vivere, intelligere, ita tria esse ut unum semper sint atque in eo quod est esse". This is said of transient things; in III, 6, the same is said of God. (cf. P. HADOT, *Porphyre et Victorinus*, 2 vols., Études Augustiniennes, (Paris, 1968), vol. 2, pp. 24-5). Hadot goes behind Victorinus to find, in a supposed commentary of Porphyry on the *Parmenides*, two "Ones" (τὸ εἶναι and τὸ ὄν), as a "double being" (διττον τὸ εἶναι: *ib.*, pp. 106 and 107; XII, fol. 93v²⁹⁻³⁰). But to derive Victorinus' triad from that in turn is hazardous. Though St. Thomas Aquinas has a metaphysics which reduces everything to *esse*, his thought is actually capable of being a little more nuanced, and is reminiscent of Augustine's variation in the two passages cited at the beginning of this note and in the previous note. Cf. *de Potentia*, 7,2 ad 9: "Nihil autem potest addi ad esse quod sit extraneum ab ipso, cum ab eo nihil sit extraneum nisi non-ens". Yet (*ib.*), "Et per hoc dicit Dionysius (*de Divinis Nominibus*, 5), quod licet viventia sint nobiliora quam existentia, tamen esse est nobilius quam vivere, viventia enim non tantum habent vitam, sed cum vita simul habent et esse". I have already suggested that Augustine's conception of *esse* could have contributed to Boethius' conception of *ipsum esse* (v. my *Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology in Islamic and Christian Thinkers*, Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought, 3rd series, 20, (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 74-5), and Thomas knew his *de Hebdomadibus* well and had commented it). Whether Thomas had Augustine's position on *esse* in mind in such texts, or whether he had just noted in a general way that this position coincided with that of pseudo-Dionysius (who must be counted his primary source in this matter), it is impossible to establish; the coincidence of thought on *esse* in two Christian writers, writing separately against two forms of neo-Platonism, is striking (cf. *infra*, n. 26). The passage from pseudo-Dionysius referred to in *de Potentia* is commented by Thomas at paras. 614-7 of the text edited by C. PERA, O.P. (Turin, 1950): "Cum ipsum esse excedat vitam et vita excedit sapientiam, unde est quod viventia supereminet existentibus et sentientia viventibus et rationalibus sentientibus, et mentes, idest intellectus angelici, rationalibus creaturis". From which arises a difficulty ("objectio"), that the angels, who are supposed to be closest to God, would be furthest from Him. His answer moves from the fact that the angels also have *esse*: "divinae mentes Angelorum non carent esse", to the fact that they more abundantly participate the divine goodness by their intelligence, and more perfectly possess their being and life than other creatures: "ipsum esse et vivere quod alia habent, perfectius ab Angelis possidetur". The context in Thomas is therefore more precise than that of Augustine, but the similar flexibility in the solution should be noted.

together, corresponded to the degree of identity, in their unity with each of the powers, and yet with all of the powers together, whatever their object.

This passage, from *de Trinitate* X 11, 18, needs careful analysis to under make clear its meaning. It is given below, from the *Corpus Christianorum* edition²³); the commentary which follows uses the line-numbers of the extract.

Haec igitur tria, memoria, intelligentia, uoluntas, quoniam non sunt tres uitae sed una uita, nec tres mentes sed una mens, consequenter utique nec tres substantiae sunt sed una substantia. Memoria quippe quod uita et mens et substantia dicitur ad se ipsam dicitur; quod uero memoria dicitur ad aliquid relatiue dicitur. Hoc de intelligentia quoque et de uoluntate dixerim, et intelligentia quippe et uoluntas ad aliquid dicitur. Vita est autem unaquaeque ad se ipsam et mens et essentia. Quocirca tria haec eo sunt unum quo una uita, una mens, una essentia; et quidquid aliud ad se ipsa singula dicuntur etiam simul, non pluraliter sed singulariter dicuntur. Eo uero tria quo ad se inuicem referuntur. Quae si aequalia non essent non solum singula singulis sed etiam omnibus singula, non utique se inuicem caperent. Neque enim tantum a singulis singula, uerum etiam a singulis omnia capiuntur. Memini enim me habere memoriam et intelligentiam et uoluntatem, et intellego me intellegere et uelle atque meminisse, et uolo me uelle et meminisse et intellegere, totamque meam memoriam et intelligentiam et uoluntatem simul memini. Quod enim memoriae meae non memini non est in memoria mea. Nihil autem tam in memoria quam ipsa memoria est. Totam igitur memini. Item quidquid intellego intellegere me scio, et scio me uelle quidquid uolo; quidquid autem scio memini. Totam igitur intelligentiam totamque uoluntatem meam memini. Similiter cum haec tria intellego tota simul intellego. Neque enim quidquam intellegibilium non intellego nisi quod ignoro. Quod autem ignoro nec memini nec uolo. Quidquid itaque intellegibilium non intellego consequenter etiam nec memini nec uolo. Quidquid ergo intellegibilium memini et uolo consequenter intellego. Voluntas etiam mea totam intelligentiam totamque memoriam meam capit dum toto utor quod intellego et memini. Quapropter quando inuicem a singulis et tota et omnia capiuntur, aequalia sunt tota singula totis singulis et tota singula simul omnibus totis, et haec tria unum, una uita, una mens, una essentia.

²³) v. *Corpus Christianorum*, Series Latina L, Aurelii Augustini Opera, Pars XVI, 1, *de Trinitate Libri XV*, (Libri I-XII), edd. W.J. MOUNTAIN and Fr. GLORIE, (Turnhout, 1968), pp. 300-1.

Commentary on this passage:

The reflections on the unity of the human *mens* in *esse*, *vivere*, *intelligere*, are slightly transposed as “una substantia, una vita, una mens” (lines 32-33). It is repeated as “una vita, una mens, una essentia” (line 9; repeated lines 32-33). The terms “essentia” and “substantia” according to the Latins, Augustine had written earlier in the same work²⁴), are synonymous. The term “essentia” however remains close to “esse”, and therefore a degree more abstract; “substantia” remains an independent reality, and the assertion of “not three substances but one” (line 3) is therefore appropriate. The unity of *vita-mens-essentia* will stand for the divine essence: there are different realities in the unity of God’s essence, which can be set out *before* we come to consider how the different Persons are really distinct²⁵). At least, so the thought might be extended; though Augustine does not pursue it. The three powers, *memoria-intelligentia-uoluntas*, are to be images of the distinct divine Persons. They are at the same time *identified* with the single *vita-mens-essentia* (lines 1-3)²⁶), being, like *vita-mens-essentia*, self-related

²⁴) v. *de Trinitate* V 9, 10.

²⁵) To du ROY (*op. cit.*, p. 433), Augustine “paraît ne pas savoir encore comment transposer ces trois dimensions en Dieu”. He may, however, be using the unity of these three powers in the human mind as a starting point. In any case the identity of *mens* with *essentia*, and thereby with *esse*, has a great ontological importance (v. next note); “vita” giving them together a convincing uniform quality. The whole passage can be compared with a similar structure in *de Trinitate*, IX 5, 8, which examines in a very similar way the “Trinitas” of “mens, amor, notitia”. *Notitia* and *amor* are both found to be related to themselves *and* to their objects. In this trinity, *mens* can stand only for a Person, and their unity in the essence is then found in their perfect identity. In the figure we are examining here, the essence is established as a unity — *vita-mens-essentia* — and the powers, as representing the Persons, are found to be identical with it. Thus in the two figures, taken together, Augustine *both* starts from the powers to arrive at their unity (IX 5, 8), *and* starts from the unity to show the powers as both identical and separable from it, and from each other (X 11, 18).

²⁶) This identification of each power with the *essentia* has a significance greater than may appear. Towards the end of *de Trinitate*, Augustine expressed his disappointment with his model which used intellect and will acts as images of the Son and Holy Spirit, because intellect or will alone could not represent a complete person (v. *infra*, n. 31); but Thomas accepted this model, because each procession of a Person was complete by its identification with the divine *esse*: cf. *de Potentia* 9, 5, “Intelligere autem Dei est esse eius”; *ib.*, 9, 9, “in Deo idem sit esse, intelligere et velle”. Yet, through the identification of *essentia* with each power, Augustine has already given to his own problem the same solution which Thomas was to give later! In any case, the establishing of their unity in being by Victorinus and Augustine, ante-dates the same operation which C. Fabro attributes to Thomas: “through his radical reflection on principle taken as act, Aquinas has overcome the static and circular dialectic of the Platonic triads (ὄν, ζῶν, ἔνν).

(lines 4-5, 7-11), and yet *distinguished* from it by the fact that they are capacities related to something else — their object, which is remembered, known or willed (lines 5-7). In so far as they are self-related, like *vita-mens-essentia*, they are said to be at the same time unpluralised and single (line 9-11). This entails that they are equal to each other in such a way that each does not contain just one other, as paired with it, but contains both of the others; for each is equal to all, and each contains all (lines 11-14), as their unity with *vita-mens-essentia* makes clear.

He then exemplifies this in terms of their relationship to their contents in three contexts: i) when the content is the other powers in the self (lines 14-18); ii) extending this to the memory's consciousness about all acts coming from the other two powers, with an entailment that the same relations could be discovered in intellect and will by symmetry with the relationship here established within the memory; iii)

νοῦς) in such fashion as to make *esse ipsum* emerge as the constitutive metaphysics of God and also to make participated *esse* (*actus essendi*) emerge as the act of all acts and the perfection of all perfections" (v. "The Overcoming of the Neo-platonic Triad of Being, Life and Intellect by Saint Thomas Aquinas", in *Neoplatonism and Christian Thought*, ed. D.J. O'MEARA, Studies in Neoplatonism Ancient and Modern 3, (Norfolk, Virginia, 1982), p. 108). There is a need of caution in describing *esse* in Thomas as an act, for it is manifestly unlike the act of *forma*; it signifies "an actualisation coincident with reality" (v. my *Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology*, p. 222 n. 74). But Thomas had in mind the later proclean and crypto-proclean, subordinated emanations of *intelligere-vivere-esse*. I have argued (*ib.*, 202-4, 227-8) that he had confronted this conception from the crypto-proclean *Liber de Causis* particularly in St. Albertus Magnus' commentary-lectures on pseudo-Dionysius' *de Divinis Nominibus*, and that, most significantly, he heard there an almost isolated thought of Albert, that *vivere* and *intelligere* cannot be apart from *esse*: "in veritate nihil est enti addibile quasi altera natura ab ea" (v. Alberti Magni *Opera Omnia*, 37,1 (Munster, 1972), p. 315a). This, it seems to me, is the starting point of Thomas' metaphysics of *esse* as all-embracing. (He knew Albertus' text very well, for he himself wrote out the official text, which was used as the *pecia* series; this autograph MS of Thomas, somewhat mutilated as a source of second-class relics, still exists in Naples Bibliotheca Nazionale: MS I.B.54). It is clear that Augustine has his own philosophy of *esse*, which coincides with that of the authorities whom Thomas used as his starting points — Boethius and pseudo-Dionysius in particular. For Thomas's appreciation of the text under consideration, cf. *Summa Theologiae* Ia Pars: 54,1 ad 2 (n. espec. the attribution of a similar concreteness to *essentia* and *esse*); 77,1 ad 1; 79,1 obj. 2 and ad 2; 79,6 s.c. and corp.; 79,7 obj 1 and ad 1, obj. 3 and ad 3; 87,3 s.c. and corp. (n. the order of objects, given by Augustine, is reversed: "objectum ... actus (not the power itself) ... ipse intellectus"; 87,4 s.c. and corpus. Thomas's attempts to relate Augustine and Aristotle should be noted. The unanimity of Augustine's with Thomas's views on *esse*, like that of Augustine's agreement with pseudo-Dionysius (cf. *supra*, n. 22), is more impressive when there is no attempt to derive one from the other under the defective model of "influence".

when the objects are intelligibles, different from the powers (lines 24-28); thus, all possible objects of the powers are included.

i) Of the first, sufficient was written in the original article²⁷). The second and third contexts call for further comment. The "totam memini" (line 20), together with "totam intelligentiam totamque uoluntatem" (lines 22-24), uses a distinction (made earlier in book X) about self-knowledge, between "knowing all" and "knowing the whole": "absurdum est dicere non eam totam scire quod scit. Non dico: 'Totum scit', sed: 'Quod scit tota scit'. Cum itaque aliquid de se scit quod nisi tota non potest, totam se scit"²⁸). The second context concerns the powers as totalities: as "tota"; the third point goes on more audaciously to the wholeness of their contents: as "totum".

ii) As in the first part, the second begins with the memory. The memory is a "tota" — for what is forgotten is not in the memory. It will contain with it the consciousness of one's understanding what one understands, and of one's willing what one wills (lines 18-23). The sentence, "Similiter cum haec tria intellego tota simul intellego" (lines 22-24), I attach to the forgoing, and understand it as an indication, which the reader must take up, in order to work out the symmetries for intellect and will. For the intellect, the "tria" are: a) the intellect knows itself, as a whole; b) the intellect contains in itself the consciousness of memory's remembering what it remembers; c) the intellect contains in itself the consciousness of the will's willing whatever it wills. For the will, the "tria" are: a) the will willing itself, as a whole; b) the will willing the remembering of whatever is remembered; c) the will willing the understanding of whatever is known.

iii) The third part begins with the intellect²⁹), for now the object is not

²⁷) v. Aug 29 (1979), pp. 109-10.

²⁸) v. de Trinitate X 3,6.

²⁹) As well as the appreciation of this text given by Thomas in the *Summa Theologiae* (v. texts given in n. 26 above), the appreciation given in his commentary in *I Sententiarum* should also be noted. There, Dist. 3, quest. 4 is an elucidation of this text. Note how in art. 1 he accepts the order *memoria-intelligentia-voluntas* (end of corp.), and how in art. 4, corp., he is sensitive to the change in predominance now given to the intellect: "In illis enim quae per habitum acquisitum discuntur, non servatur ordo, ut dictum est supra, quia intelligendi actus praecedat actum memorandi". Augustine's order of potencies is here not replaced, for he continues: "Si autem considerentur respectu huius objecti quod est Deus, tunc servatur ibi actualis imitatio. Maxime autem servatur ordo, quia ex memoria procedit intelligentia, eo quod ipsa est per essentiam in anima, et tenetur ab ipsa non per acquisitionem". The introduction of the factor of *habitus* derives from the analysis of habit formation in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*.

self, nor it is the powers in their coincident inter-relations, but the powers, active with regard to other objects: "intelligibilium" (lines 24, 26, 27). With the rigid distinction between what it knows, and what can neither be known nor willed, he has little difficulty in proposing that *memoria-intellegentia-uoluntas* will, with external objects, also totally penetrate and coincide with each other; for in Augustine the memory has the primary and central role in cognition.

The conclusion (lines 30-33) passes back through the argument to the beginning. Each of the human powers — *memoria-intellegentia-uoluntas* — whether their objects are exterior intelligibles, or the powers themselves, or the self remembering, knowing and loving itself — so coincide with each to the degree of identity, so each take in the whole object of the other powers, as well as the whole of the other powers as themselves, that, whilst distinct in terms of their relationship to the others and to their objects, they nonetheless make up a unity: "una vita, una mens, une essentia". And this provides a model in which the divine Persons can be seen as distinct from each other, but identical with each other in the divine essence.

Conclusion

The two elements from which this reflection began — the unity in *esse*, and therefore in *vivere* and *intellegere* of the moral human being, and the self-reflectiveness of intellect, will and memory in the human self, are among the numerous ideas of *de Libero Arbitrio*. But there they were not brought together, nor where they brought into a Trinitarian model. Their fusion together within a subtle, complex and profound insight of *de Trinitate* witnesses not merely to the maturing of the original seed ideas, but to the simplifying intensity of Augustine's mind. In order to demonstrate the enneadic arrangement of the three powers reflecting on themselves in their nine possible pairings, so that the union of three powers in each divine Person which they represented (whether taken vertically or horizontally on the grid I provided³⁰) did, despite a later expression of failure on Augustine's part³¹), represent the

³⁰) v. *Aug* 29 (1979), p. 110.

³¹) Cf. *de Trinitate* XV 25, 45: "in ipso intellectu conatum me senserim magis habuisse quam effectum ... tria unius personae non sicut humana poscit intentio tribus illis personis conuenire potuerunt". There was no need for this heart-searching if each faculty was ultimately identified with the divine *essentia* — which is to say His *esse*.

completeness of each, and also to show its improvement of neo-Platonist enneads which it may have had in mind, I took this out of its setting. But by so doing, my explanation fell far short of doing justice to the richness of the whole passage.

Edward BOOTH, O.P.