Augustine on the identity of the neighbour and the meaning of true love for him "as ourselves" (Matt. 22. 39) and "as Christ has loved us" (Jn. 13. 34)

I. Who is the neighbour?
  A. The designation of the neighbour as *animus* (*anima*)
    1. Gunnar Hultgren's objections
    2. Response to objections
  B. Every person as my neighbour
  C. Christ as the neighbour
  D. The enemy
    1. The perfection of the lover of enemies in texts prior to 400
    2. Concern for the enemy himself in post-400 texts

II. Love of neighbour "as oneself" and "as Christ has loved us"
  A. Love of neighbour "as oneself"
    1. De Moribus 1,26,49 and parallels
    2. De Vera Religione 243-263 and parallels
  B. Love of neighbour "as Christ has loved us"

I. WHO IS THE NEIGHBOUR?

When he has the commandment of love for neighbour before him, who does Augustine consider the neighbour to be? How does he designate and characterise the neighbour Christ commands us to love 'as ourselves' and 'as he has loved us'? What makes people neighbours to one another? How far does the precept to love the neighbour go? In an attempt to answer these questions we offer in a schematic way the principal figures of the neighbour we have encountered in assessing Augustine's life-long grappling with the love-commandment. For the sake of clarity they may be grouped under a number of headings as follows: A. *Animus (anima)*, common in the pre-400 period; a question coming in the train of this designation is: what then of care for the neighbour's body?; B. Every person as my neighbour; C. Christ as the neighbour; D. The enemy. We will reflect on each of these figures in turn,

acquainting ourselves with the perspectives they open up and trying to deal with some of the difficulties they give rise to. In this way we hope to build up a full and comprehensive picture of the neighbour whom the commandment of Christ impels us to love.

A. The designation of the neighbour as animus (anima)

In the period up to 396 it is quite usual for Augustine to speak of the neighbour as the soul *(anima)* or the rational soul in man *(animus)*. In 387, rendering the double commandment in his own words, he refers to the New Testament's "neighbour" as "companion souls"[1]). Elsewhere, around the same time and shortly afterwards (393 A.D.), there are slight variations on this theme: "souls related to our own *(cognatis animis)* who are in error and in trouble"[2]) indicate the human neighbour; or the designation is simply "the soul in trouble" *(animae laboranti)* whom mercy calls us to help[3]). Of interest in this latter case is that even the enemy is seen as being included amongst those 'souls in trouble'. Likewise, in *De Vera Religione*, dating from 390, the neighbour appears in many guises — as friend, enemy, those we can actively help, all people whom we can at least wish well[4]).

> And although a person does not love temporal things, he uses them rightly and he takes care of people according to their conditions of life, even if he is unable to be equally mindful of all people. If he is more inclined to speak to one of his intimates than to anyone else, the reason is not that he loves him more but that he has greater confidence in him and more opportunities to see him. To the extent that he himself is less tied down by time, he treats those lost in time better. Though he cannot be of benefit to all, while he loves all people equally, he would be unjust if he were to fail to give

[1]) *De Musica* 6,14,46 (ML 32,1187): "Tenet ordinem, seipsa tota diligens quod supra se est, id est Deum, *socias animas* tanquam seipsam".

[2]) *De Quantitate Animae* 34,78 (ML 32,1078): "*Errantibus* vero *cognatis animis et laborantibus*, quantum licet atque praeceptum est, opem ferendam esse sciamus ...". Cf. *De Musica* 6,14,45 (ML 32,1186-1187): "... omnesque illos (numeros) qui de *adiunctis animis* operantur ... non ad superbam excellentiam suam, sed ad ipsarum animarum utilitatem redigit".

[3]) *De Sermone Domini in Monte* 1,21,69 (CC 35,78. ML 34,1264): "Perfectio autem misericordiae qua plurimum *animae laboranti* consulitur, ultra dilectionem inimici porrigi non potest ...".

[4]) *De Vera Religione* 256 (CSEL 77,66) = 47,91 (CC 32,246-247. ML 34,163): "Hic vir quamdiu est in hac vita utitur amico ad rependendam gratiam, utitur inimico ad patientiam, utitur quibus potest ad beneficientiam, utitur omnibus ad benevolentiam".

ZA 4/958

> preference to those more closely related to him *(coniunctioribus)*. *The bond of the spirit*, however, is *superior (animi coniunctio maior)* to the bonds of time and space which accompany our birth in this body; but the greatest bond *(ea maxima)* is that which triumphs over everything. Therefore, the person who loves God with all his mind and soul *(animo)* will not be afflicted by the death of another, because he knows that whoever does not pass away for God does not pass away for him either. For God is lord both of the living and the dead[5]).

Beneath all the faces our neighbour in time and space can have for us, familiar or strange, friendly or inimical, trusted or unknown, there exists a spiritual bond *(animi coniunctio)* which is stronger and more important *(superior)* than the natural closeness of family, friends and acquaintances, even though love has to begin with those more closely related to us *(coniunctioribus)*[6]). There is, however, a greater bond yet

[5]) *Ibid.*, 256-257 (CSEL 77,66) = 47,91 (CC 32,247. ML 34,163): "Et quamquam temporalia non diligat, ipse recte utitur temporalibus et pro eorum sorte hominibus consulit, si aequaliter non potest omnibus. Quare si aliquem familiarium suorum promptius quam quemlibet alloquitur, non eum magis diligit, sed ad eum habet maiorem fiduciam et apertioris temporis ianuam. Tractat enim tempori deditos tanto melius quanto ipse minus obligatus est tempore. Cum itaque omnibus quod pariter diligit prodesse non possit, nisi coniunctioribus prodesse malit iniustus est. Animi autem coniunctio maior est quam locorum aut temporum quibus in hoc corpore gignimur; sed ea maxima est quae omnibus praevalet. Non ergo iste affligitur morte cuiusquam, quoniam qui toto animo deum diligit, novit nec sibi perire quod deo non perit; deus autem dominus est et vivorum et mortuorum".
John H.S. Burleigh in his translation *Of True Religion* in *Augustine: Earlier Writings* (The Library of Christian Classics, 6), p. 272, renders "Cum itaque omnibus, quod pariter diligit prodesse non possit, nisi coniunctioribus prodesse malit iniustus est" as: "If he cannot help all whom he loves equally without preferring to benefit those who are more closely related to him, he is unjust". This is the opposite of our translation. Presuming consistency in Augustine on this point, a clear parallel in *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,61 (CSEL 80,23) = 1,28,29 (CC 32,22. ML 34,30) speaks in favour of our version: "Omnes autem aeque diligendi sunt. Sed cum omnibus prodesse non possis, his potissimum consulendum est qui pro locorum et temporum vel quarumlibet rerum oportunitatibus constrictius tibi quasi quadam sorte iunguntur". Furthermore, it is difficult to reconcile Burleigh's version with the grammar of the sentence. Why is "cum" translated as "if"? And the "nisi ... malit" clause is highly awkward if appended to the "cum ... non possit" clause, as in Burleigh's construction.

[6]) Augustine suggests in this same work, *De Vera Religione* 247 (CSEL 77,63) = 46,88 (CC 32,244-245. ML 34,161) that there would have been no giving birth and no bonds of kinship if the fall had not corrupted human nature; therefore, in order to be a fit candidate for the kingdom of God, one has to hate the ties of flesh and blood. "Sed nec sic quidem ab homine homo diligendus est ut diliguntur carnales fratres vel filii vel coniuges vel quique cognati aut adfines aut cives. Nam et ista dilectio temporalis est. Non enim ullas tales necessitudines haberemus quae nascendo et moriendo contingunt, si natura nostra, in praeceptis et in imagine dei manens, in istam corruptionem non relegaretur. Itaque ad pristinam perfectamque naturam nos ipsa veritas vocans praecipit ut carnali consuetudini

(ea maxima) by which one is given over mind and soul *(animo)* to God. This total openness to God triumphs over the limitations of life in this body, it prevails even over the separation brought about by death. Complete attachment to God means that dead loved ones are not lost for us. It is worth noting that J. Pegon S.J., in his French translation of this passage[7]), sees the *animi coniunctio superior* and *ea maxima* as referring to the same bond, such that the former also includes God and the latter the neighbour. This is not out of the question, for the spiritual bond between human beings does, when people are fully intent upon God, endure beyond death. It has the characteristic of *ea maxima* of 'triumph-

resistamus, docens neminem aptum esse regno dei qui non istas carnales necessitudines oderit". This way of thinking sounds through in many of Augustine's subsequent assertions in *De Vera Religione* and influences all his reflections on love for neighbour here, e.g. "Oderimus ergo temporales necessitudines, si aeternitatis caritate flagramus" (250 = 46,89); "Ipsa igitur natura humana sine carnali condicione diligenda est" (251 = 46,89). In the *Retractationes*, however, Augustine firmly rejects the opinion that giving birth is the outcome of sin, and therefore also its corollary that the relations established by birth and conditioned by time are to be hated. See 1,12,8 (CSEL 36,63-64) = 1,13,8 (ML 32,605): "hunc sensum prorsus inprobo ... ad hoc enim ducit, ut credantur illi coniuges primi non generaturi posteros homines, nisi peccassent, tamquam necesse fuerit, ut morituri gignerentur, si de concubitu maris et feminae gignerentur. Nondum enim videram fieri potuisse, ut non morituri de non morituris nascerentur, si peccato illo magno non mutaretur in deterius humana natura ...". See further, *Retractationes* 1,18,5 (CSEL 36,91-92) = 1,19,5 (ML 32,615-616) where Augustine rejects a similar interpretation found in *De Sermone Domini in Monte* 1,15,41 (CC 35,45-46. ML 34,1250): "Hoc et de patre et de matre et de ceteris vinculis sanguinis intellegendum est, ut in eis oderimus quod genus humanum nascendo et moriendo sortitum est ...". The reason for the change is the same as above. On "hatred" for kin, he concludes: "ac per hoc aliter solvenda quaestio est, cur dominus praeceperit diligendos inimicos, cum alio loco praecipiat odio habendos et parentes et filios, non sicut hic soluta est, sed sicut eam posterius saepe solvimus, id est ut diligamus inimicos lucrandos regno dei et oderimus in propinquis, si inpediunt regno dei".
Since the idea of distancing oneself from relationships of flesh and blood is dominant in *De Vera Religione*, however, one can see the reason that led Burleigh to his translation considered in the previous note. For Burleigh, a person who prefers to benefit those more closely related to himself is unjust; this makes sense if "coniunctioribus" is conceived in terms of "temporales necessitudines" and 'carnalis condicio'. Then, the "autem" of the following sentence ("Animi *autem* coniunctio maior est ...") may be read as a continuation of the same thought, as offering an explanation for the injustice of caring for one's own first. Because of the factors mentioned above, however, I believe that the "autem" should be translated "however", introducing a contrasting thought, indicating that, although love is to begin at home, it is called by the spiritual bond to go beyond it. Thus, for the Augustine of *De Vera Religione*, it may be the case that "those more closely related to us" may rightly be considered as having first claim on our loving help, even though we are to hate the temporal, carnal bond that joins us to them and to allow our love to prevail over it.

[7]) See *Œuvres de Saint Augustin* (Bibliothèque Augustinienne, 8), Paris, 1951, p. 161: "Or, le lien spirituel est supérieur à ceux de temps et de lieu qui président à notre naissance charnelle et d'autant plus étroit qu'il triomphe de tout".

ing over everything'. If we were to follow up this line of thought, we could envisage the *animi coniunctio*, in that it is superior to the ties of flesh and blood and of familiarity, as uniting those whom space and time and the limitations of life "in this body" divide, as prevailing over distance and enmity, as well as over death, in challenging human love beyond the family hearth. In a letter written more than twenty years later (in 413-414 A.D.) the unifying function which the human spirit *(animus)* most probably has in *De Vera Religione* is even more clearly fulfilled by the human reason *(ratio)*: in the second part of the double commandment "the neighbour in question is not to be understood as those who are related to us by blood, but those with whom we share reason *(ratio)* which joins all men and women in a single community"[8]).

But, as early as the *Soliloquia*, it is stated that the rational soul *(rationalis anima)* is to be loved in people, not their animality. Thus, one may even love the wicked person, while hating the evil use he makes of his rational soul[9]). The wicked so loved are presumably among the many *(plurimos)* whom lovers of beauty and wisdom seek to share in their enjoyment and thus to become their friends[10]). This conception of the wicked becoming friends of the good, uncommon in Augustine's pre-400 period, is reminiscent of the way in which he will from *De Doctrina Christiana* on, and especially in *In Epistolam Ioannis*, speak of love of enemies. *De Vera Religione*, while allowing *anima* to stand for the neighbour, witnesses something similar. "A person loves a wise and perfect soul *(sapientem animam atque perfectam)* just as he sees it; a foolish soul he does not love as such, but because it is capable of perfection and wisdom. For nor does he love himself as a fool. Whoever loves himself as a fool makes no progress towards wisdom; nor will a

[8]) *Epistola* 155,4,14 (CSEL 44,444. ML 33,672): "Proximus sane hoc loco, non sanguinis propinquitate, sed rationis societate pensandus est, in qua socii sunt omnes homines".

[9]) *Soliloquia* 1,2,7 (ML 32,873): "Et homines sunt, et eos amo, non eo quod animalia, sed eo quod homines sunt; id est, ex eo quod *rationales animas* habent, quas amo etiam in latronibus. Licet enim mihi in quovis amare rationem, cum illum iure oderim qui male utitur eo quod amo. Itaque tanto magis amo amicos meos, quanto magis bene utuntur anima rationali, vel certe quantum desiderant ea bene uti".
Cf. the designation of the neighbour in *De Diversis Quaestionibus 83*, q. 30 (CC 44A,39. ML 40,20) (Date: 389-396): "... utitur etiam ceteris *rationalibus animantibus* ad societatem ...".

[10]) *Soliloquia* 1,13,22 (ML 32,881): "Quem modum autem potest habere illius pulchritudinis amor, in qua non solum non invideo caeteris, sed etiam plurimos quaero qui mecum appetant, mecum inhient, mecum teneant, mecumque perfruantur; tanto mihi amiciores futuri, quanto erit nobis amata communior".

person become such as he desires to be unless he hates himself such as he is"[11]). The rational soul both in oneself and in others is then loved not only because it is capable of wisdom and perfection, but so that progress towards these may be made.

1. Gunnar Hultgren's objections

Gunnar Hultgren has at least two major difficulties with this presentation of the neighbour as *anima*, *rationalis anima* and *animus* in the pre-400 period. Firstly, love for neighbour is over-spiritualised. In denying the eternal value of natural ties Augustine robs love for neighbour of its individual character. The link between the love that comes naturally and Christian love is too tenuous. One may well ask, says Hultgren, whether there is anything personal about this love at all[12])? Secondly, very little importance is attached to the material side of love for neighbour. To be sure, Augustine dwells at some length on it in *De Moribus* 1,27,52-54, but he sees help for the body only in view of the soul: *De Moribus* 1,28,55-58. Even though some formulations of love's activity are so general that it is difficult to determine their character, e.g. *opem ferre*, *subventum velle*, *consulere*, *adiuvare*, *praestare beneficium*, wherever love for neighbour is presented under a concrete form, it is almost always a matter of spiritual help[13]). This spiritual help is,

[11]) *De Vera Religione* 262 (CSEL 77,67) = 48,93 (CC 32,248. ML 34,164): "Sapientem animam atque perfectam talem diligat qualem illam videt, stultam non talem, sed quia esse perfecta et sapiens potest, quia nec se ipsum debet stultum diligere. Nam qui se diligit stultum, non proficiet ad sapientiam; nec fiet quisque qualis cupit esse nisi se oderit qualis est".

[12]) G. Hultgren, *Le commandement d'amour chez Augustin*, p. 175: "Il y a lieu de se demander si l'on peut encore parler dans ce cas d'un amour personnel avec une personne comme sujet et une autre comme objet et s'il reste encore en lui quelque chose de la communauté naturelle. La communauté naturelle dépouillée de ce qu'il y avait en lui de 'corporel' et d'individuel devient une forme vide de substance". J. Brechtken, *Augustinus Doctor Caritatis*, p. 108, has a similar difficulty with the designation of the neighbour as the one who can enjoy God with us (*De Doctrina Christiana* 1,60 (CSEL 80,23)): "Aber was nutzt das aufs Ganze gesehen, wenn sich am Ende nicht sagen lässt, nicht ethisch exakt bestimmen lässt, was mein Verhältnis zum anderen Menschen, was die Ich-Du Relation eigentlich ist und sein soll?". Cf. also p. 139. It may, I think, be considered questionable whether the individual, highly personal (and of necessity rather rare) "I-Thou" relationship should be posed as the determining standard of "my relationship to other people".

[13]) G. Hultgren, *op. cit.*, p. 178: "Cependant, comme le terme 'prochain' se rapporte en réalité à l'âme, l'apport de l'amour sera d'ordre spirituel par excellence. Comme on le voit, Augustin considère l'apport matériel destiné à aider le corps en tant que support de l'âme, comme un acte préparatoire. C'est rarement, du reste, qu'Augustin attache à cet apport matériel une telle importance. Il est vrai qu'ailleurs il parle de l'activité de l'amour

according to Hultgren, rather negative, merely the absence of malice and the abstention from evil action[14]); it is passive, for one must not allow one's tranquillity of mind to be disturbed[15]); it is a *moralisation* of love for neighbour in that it offers only external help not personal support, and a *rationalisation* in that it is reason's response to the motivation of the *ordo rerum* and the advantage to be had for oneself in increasing

dans des termes si généraux qu'il est difficile d'en discerner le caractère. Cependant, là où l'amour du prochain est représenté sous une forme concrète ou illustré par des exemples, il est presque toujours question de l'aide spirituelle".

[14]) *Ibid.*, p. 179. On this point, Hultgren refers principally to *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae* 1,26,49-51. "Agendum autem *in primis* est, ut benevoli simus, id est ut nulla malitia, nullo dolo malo adversus hominem utamur. Quid enim homini homine propinquius?" 1,26,49 (ML 32,1332). 1,26,50 sees love for neighbour in terms of Rom. 13.10, i.e. "Dilectio proximi malum non operatur" and as "cunabula caritatis Dei". Further, 1,26,51 (ML 32,1332): "Atque utinam ut facile est bene instituto et benigno diligere proximum ita facile esset *vel consulere, vel nihil nocere*". Hultgren's reading of these texts is open to criticism. According to Lewis and Short, *A Latin Dictionary*, p. 441, "consulere" means "to take care for some person or thing, to be mindful of, take care of, look to, have regard for". It is difficult to see how this can be construed as "negative" in *De Moribus* 1,26,51. Moreover, part of the evil that love for neighbour does not do (cf. Rom. 13.10 in *De Moribus* 1,26,50) is to fail to help one's neighbour when one can. Thus, even though the construction is negative, the help for neighbour envisaged is positive. "Sed cum duobus modis peccetur in homine, uno si laedatur, *alio si cum potest non adjuvetur*; eaque ipsa sint quibus mali homines esse dicantur, quorum neutrum, qui diligit, facit: satis, opinor, quod volumus demonstrat ista sententia: *Dilectio proximi malum non operatur*". Finally, the negative formulation in *De Moribus* 1,26,49 ("nulla malitia, nullo dolo malo") is just a first step ("in primis"), and it follows on the thought that it is difficult not to err in fulfilling our duties towards our fellow human beings. The first step then is to protect our neighbour from any possible mishandling on our part arising from disordered self-love. But the second step is to bring our neighbour to love God perfectly: «Te autem ipsum salubriter diligis, si plus quam te diligis Deum. Quod ergo agis tecum, id agendum cum proximo est; hoc est, ut ipse etiam perfecto amore diligat Deum. Non enim eum diligis tanquam teipsum, si non ad id bonum ad quod ipse tendis, adducere satagis". This may be spiritual, but it is certainly not negative.

[15]) Almost all the virtues given in the "catalogue" in *De Moribus* 1,30,63 (ML 32,1336-1337) are said to be passive. See G. Hultgren, *op. cit.*, p. 179. I find this questionable. See, for example: "Tu (Ecclesia catholica) dominos servis, summi Dei communis Domini consideratione *placabiles*, et *ad consulendum* quam coercendum *propensiores* facis".

Most surprisingly of all, bearing one another's burdens (Gal. 6.2), as described in *De Diversis Quaestionibus 83*, q. 71, is considered by Hultgren, p. 179, "une tache *toute* passive" (My emphasis). If this is passive, then the action of the kenotic Christ on our behalf (Phil. 2.5-8) is passive, for this is the model Augustine gives of burden-bearing. The Christ to be imitated "non adtendit sua sed nostra": *quaestio* 71,3 (CC 44A, 203. ML 40,82). Likewise, Paul maintains "*Omnibus omnia factus sum, ut omnes lucri facerem* (1 Cor. 9.22), cogitando scilicet in eo vitio etiam se esse potuisse, unde cupiebat alium liberare. Conpatiendo enim potius id agebat non mentiendo ...": *quaestio* 71,4 (CC 44A,204. ML 40,82).

one's own love for God[16]). Thus, love for neighbour risks being compromised.

> The form this love will take, if it is determined by the concern for our own love of God, will be markedly different from that taken by a love before all else concerned with the needs of the neighbour. If it is above all a matter of preserving and developing our own love for God, it is perhaps not necessary to perform positive acts of love. It is enough then to refrain from evil actions, or perhaps just to bear this love in ourselves. This easily noticeable diminution of love for neighbour in Augustine proves, therefore, that he was unable to avoid the danger of egocentrism[17]).

Such, for Hultgren, is the outcome of Augustine's over -emphasis on the spiritual aspect of love, of paying too much attention to souls, including one's own, and not enough to positive, active, material, personal care for others. This critique Hultgren will apply also, *mutatis mutandis*, to basing all people's being neighbours on a common human nature or on the fact that there is no one to whom we are to do evil (cf. Rom. 13.10).

2. Response to objections

Regarding the first point, we can to a certain extent sympathise with Hultgren that Augustine has over-stressed the spiritual to the detriment of the naturalness and freshness of other dimensions, especially of the closest human relationships. Thus, to hear in *De Sermone Domini in Monte* that a good Christian loves the creature of God, the "human being" *(homo)* in his wife, but that he hates her as his wife *(quod uxor est)* and the corruptible, mortal *coniunctionem copulationemque* that

[16]) G. Hultgren, *op. cit.*, p. 181: "Une rationalisation du fait que 'l'esprit' d'amour y est représenté par la raison qui considère l'amour du prochain motivé tant par l'*ordo rerum* que par l'avantage qu'en tire l'amour de Dieu. Et une moralisation du fait que 'l'action' n'est qu'une aide extérieure et non pas un apport personnel de l'homme".

[17]) *Ibid.*, p. 180: "La forme que prendra cet amour, s'il est déterminé par le souci de notre propre amour de Dieu, sera sensiblement différente de celle que prendra un amour avant tout soucieux des besoins du prochain. S'il s'agit surtout d'entretenir et d'éduquer notre propre amour de Dieu, il n'est peut-être pas nécessaire d'accomplir des actes d'amour positifs. Il nous suffira alors de nous abstenir des mauvaises actions, ou peut-être sera-t-il assez de porter en nous cet amour. Cette diminution de l'amour du prochain facile à constater chez Augustin nous prouve donc que celui-ci n'a pas su éviter le danger égocentrique".
For a critique of the kind of Augustinian eudaimonism presupposed in these statements, the reader is referred to the foregoing articles.

joins him to her, comes across to us as forced, if not repellent[18]). It should be remembered, however, that this is precisely the way of reasoning, found also in *De Vera Religione* 247 and in *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 1,19,30, which Augustine later systematically and firmly rejects[19]). The spiritual headstrongness of the new convert gives way to a more balanced vision[20]). Preaching at Hippo in 412, Augustine distinguishes between divine and human love, and between lawful and unlawful human love. It would be inhuman and reprehensible not to love one's wife, children and friends, he states; but pagans, Jews and heretics love those closely related to them as well[21]). Needless to say, unlawful human love, such as that for a prostitute, cannot be reconciled with love for God. But lawful human love can be:

> Love your children, love your spouses, even though it be in a worldly way *(saeculariter)*. For you should love them as Christ wants you to *(secundum Christum)* so as to help them as God wants you to *(secundum Deum)*. Love in them only Christ and hate in

[18]) De *Sermone Domini in Monte* 1,15,41 (CC 35,45-46. ML 34,1250): "Sic invenitur bonus christianus diligere in una femina creaturam dei, quam reformari et renovari desiderat, odisse autem coniunctionem copulationemque corruptibilem atque mortalem, hoc est diligere in ea quod homo est, odisse quod uxor est. Ita etiam diligit inimicum, non in quantum inimicus est, sed in quantum homo est, ut hoc ei velit provenire quod sibi, id est ut ad regnum caelorum correctus renovatusque perveniat. Hoc et de patre et de matre et de ceteris vinculis sanguinis intellegendum est, ut in eis oderimus quod genus humanum nascendo et moriendo sortitum est, diligamus autem quod nobiscum potest ad illa regna perduci, ubi nemo dicit pater meus, sed omnes uni deo pater noster; nec mater mea, sed omnes illi Hierusalem mater nostra; nec frater meus, sed omnes de omnibus frater noster. Coniugium vero cum illo simul nobis in unum redactis quasi unius coniugis erit, qui nos de prostitutione huius saeculi sui sanguinis effusione liberavit. Necesse est ergo ut oderit ea quae transeunt discipulus Christi in his quos secum ad ea venire desiderat quae semper manebunt; et tanto magis haec in eis oderit, quanto magis eos diligit".
See G. Hultgren, *op. cit.*, p. 177: "La conception artificielle de l'homme en tant qu'un être partagé en deux et la réflexion qui calcule sur les conséquences de l'amour, menacent d'ôter à l'amour du prochain son naturel et sa fraîcheur". Regarding "la réflexion qui calcule", it should be noticed that in this text one desires for another human being, one's wife, the same transformation, renewal and eternal life in the kingdom of God that one desires for oneself. This, while very spiritual, is not insignificant. The difficulty here is rather that Augustine sees the relationship to one's wife as "wife" as a transient temporal bond and therefore to be hated in view of the eternal. This leads him to obscure the specificity of the marriage relationship by approaching it in the same way he does love of enemies.

[19]) Se note 6 above. For *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 1,19,30 (cf. G. Hultgren, *op. cit.*, p. 174), see *Retractiones* 1,9,3 (CSEL 36,48-49) = 1,10,2 (ML 32,599).

[20]) See *Sermo* 159,2 (ML 38,868) (Date: 418), where "coniugales amplexus" feature among the "lawful delights".

[21]) *Sermo* 349, 1&2 (ML 39,1529-1530).

> your loved ones whatever resistance to Christ you find there. For this is divine love. What does your transitory and mortal affection benefit them? Rather when you love, humanly speaking, love Christ more. I do not say that you are not to love your spouse, but love Christ more. I do not say that you are not to love your parents or your children, but love Christ more. Lest you think these are my own words, listen to the Lord: "*He who loves father or mother more than me is not worthy of me" (Matt. 10.37)* ...[22]).

We may find it grudging and insufficient to have family relationships described as "lawful" and to have love for family referred to as "transitory and mortal". Yet, an important advance has been made over the earlier texts. It is not the bond of flesh and blood that is to be hated but any resistance to the healing and illuminating power of Christ. Moreover, whereas in the *Soliloquia* the wicked person's evil use of his rational soul was the object of hatred, and in *De Vera Religione* the imperfect and foolish soul, here it is anything that stands in the way of God's plan being fulfilled in another, of Christ being fully formed in him. Love is to be "*secundum Christum ... secundum Deum*".

Seven or eight years later, Augustine is explaining what is new about Christ's commandment in Jn. 13.34: "love one another as I have loved you". Its newness is that it renews, making a "new person", a new people. By adding "as I have loved you", Christ distinguished this renewing love from the carnal love *(carnali dilectione)* of husbands and wives, parents and children, and of all other kinds of human bonds[23]). This love makes us members of the Body of the Son of God, sharing one another's joys and trials (cf. 1 Cor. 12.25-26).

> (Those who keep the new commandment) do not love one another as the corrupt do, nor is their love like that of human beings

[22]) *Sermo* 349,7 (ML 39,1532-1533): "Amate filios vestros, amate conjuges vestras, etsi saeculariter. Nam secundum Christum amare debetis, ut secundum Deum illis consulatis, et non in eis nisi Christum diligatis, et oderitis in vestris si Christum habere noluerint. Ipsa enim est charitas illa divina. Nam quid eis proderit transitoria et mortalis charitas vestra? Tamen quando et humanitus diligitis, plus Christum amate. Non dico ut non diligas uxorem; sed plus dilige Christum. Non dico ut non diligis patrem, non dico ut non diligas filios; sed plus dilige Christum. Audi illum dicentem, ne mea putes ista verba: *Qui amat patrem aut matrem plus quam me, non est me dignus* (Matt. 10.37) ...".

[23]) *Tractatus in Evangelium Ioannis* 65,1 (CC 36,490-491. ML 35,1808): "Innovat quippe audientem, vel potius obedientem, non omnis, sed ista dilectio quam Dominus ut a carnali dilectione distingueret, addidit: *sicut dilexi vos* (Jn. 13.34). Nam diligunt invicem mariti et uxores, parentes et filii, et quaecumque alia inter se homines necessitudo humana devinxerit (ut taceamus de dilectione culpabili atque damnabili, qua diligunt invicem adulteri et adulterae ...)".

> for each other because they are human beings. Rather they love one another because they are gods and all sons of the Most High, so that they may be brothers of his only Son. Their love for one another is that with which the Son has loved them; by it he will lead people to that end which satisfies them and fills their desire with good (Ps. 102 (103).5). For nothing will be lacking to desire when God will be all in all (1 Cor. 15.28). Such an end is without end ... "Love is strong as death" (Cant. 8.6). For by this love it comes about that, while still living in this corruptible body, we die to this world and our life is hidden with Christ in God (cf. Col. 3.3). Love itself for us means dying to the world and life with God. For if we speak of death when the soul leaves the body, may we not speak of death when our love leaves the world? Love therefore is as strong as death. What is stronger than this love which conquers the world[24])?

On the one hand, we might consider this text as a highly developed example of Augustine's spiritualising tendency and again lament that, in defining Christian love in contrast to "human" love, the latter appears, perhaps rather shabbily, as *carnalis dilectio*. Already in *Epistola* 243 to Laetus specifically maternal love had been underrated in favour of a broader ecclesial love[25]). Is it not possible, however, that love in blood relationships may provide the fertile soil for higher forms? And why could married people, children and parents, those whom life throws together, when they have been renewed by the love of Christ, not experience a deepening of these very relationships and know their love for one another to be more than "transitory and mortal affection", indeed as strong as death? Augustine does not specifically develop this side of the question. But what he does is not without merit. He sees all

[24]) *Ibid.*, (CC 36,491. ML 35,1808-1809): "... non sicut se diligunt qui corrumpunt, nec sicut se diligunt homines, quoniam homines sunt; sed sicut se diligunt, quoniam dii sunt et filii Altissimi omnes, ut sint Filio eius unico fratres, ea dilectione invicem diligentes, qua ipse dilexit eos, perducturus eos ad illum finem qui sufficiat eis, ubi satietur in bonis desiderium eorum. Tunc enim aliquid desiderio non deerit, quando omnia in omnibus Deus erit. Talis finis non habet finem ... *Valida est sicut mors dilectio* (Cant. 8.6). Hac enim dilectione fit ut in isto adhuc corruptibili corpore constituti moriamur huic saeculo, et vita nostra abscondatur cum Christo in Deo, immo ipsa dilectio est mors nostra saeculo, et vita cum Deo. Si enim mors est quando de corpore anima exit, quomodo non est mors quando de mundo amor noster exit? Valida est ergo sicut mors dilectio. Quid ea validius, qua vincitur mundus?".

[25]) *Epistola* 243,4 (CSEL 57,571. ML 33,1056): "Quod ergo tu illi etiam carnali necessitudine annecteris, ad sortem valere debet familiarius colloquendi, et apertiore ianua consulendi ut hoc ipsum, quo te privatim diligit, interficiatur in ea, ne quod ex utero suo genuit, pluris pendat, quam quod ex utero ecclesiae genita est tecum". Note, however, that the carnal relationship between mother and son ("carnali necessitudine") is envisaged as giving the son a greater possibility of promoting this more extensive love in his mother.

too well the danger of confusing Christian love with the ease and immediacy of family affection, which may mask a great deal of pride and selfishness; familiarity with a relative or friend may breed contempt for his or her deepest self, for the plan that God has for them. Besides, this "new" love makes of us a new people in which, as members of Christ's body, we are called to share in a wider circle of concerns. No one will deny that families or groups as a whole may display selfishness to outsiders while claiming to love one another. Thus, in a startling passage from *De Disciplina Christiana*, the narrow circle of the Roman law of succession is broken open by the appeal of the poor Christ of Matt. 25.40 ("When you did it to one of the least of mine, you did it to me"):

> I put Christ before you; and you place your children over against him. Is it really just that your son has everything he needs to live luxuriously, while the Lord suffers want? "When you did it to one of the least of mine, you did it to me" (Matt. 25.40). Haven't you ever read that? Haven't you taken any notice of it? "When you failed to do it to one of the least of mine, you failed to do it to me" (Matt. 25.45) ... Look who is suffering poverty. And you dare to count your children. Count your children by all means. Add another one to their number, namely your Lord Christ. If you have one son, let Christ be your second heir. If you have two or three sons, let him be the third of fourth heir[26]).

This is the other side to the exhortation to 'love Christ more' of *Sermo* 349; while there the accent was spiritual, here it is social. Even so, the "spiritual" love for neighbour 'as Christ has loved us' presented in *In Ioannis Evangelium* 65,1 — that is, love in order that people become brothers and sisters of Christ, that God be all in all — has a world-conquering strength. Having died to attachment to the world, its life is hidden in Christ with God. Ordinary human affection can find itself powerless in the face of evil and of death, but the love of Christ that, hidden in God, sees others as gods and as children of the God who will be all in all to them, is filled with the hope of being stronger than death[27]).

[26]) *De Disciplina Christiana* 8,8 (CC 46,216. ML 40,673-674): "Christum illi oppono, filios suos mihi reponit. Ita vero magna iustitia, ut habeat unde luxurietur filius tuus, egeat dominus tuus? *Cum enim uni ex minimis meis fecisti mihi fecisti* (Matt. 25.40). Non legisti, non advertisti? *Cum uni ex minimis meis non fecisti, nec mihi fecisti* ... Ecce quis eget, et filios tuos numeras? Postremo numera filios tuos, adde unum illum inter illos, dominum tuum. Unum habes, sit ille secundus; duos habes, sit tertius; tres habes, quartus sit ...". Cf. *En. in ps.* 38,12 (CC 38,414. ML 36,424); *Sermo* 9,20 (CC 41,147. ML 38,90).

[27]) In a novel by Iris Murdoch, the bankruptcy in the face of death of affections that we perhaps too readily call "love" and the need for a higher love are well brought out. See

With Hultgren's second criticism regarding the spiritualising of love for neighbour by Augustine it is not so easy to be sympathetic. To be sure, with a few not insignificant exceptions[28]), it is true that, in the period prior to 400, whenever Augustine concretises love for neighbour it is mostly a matter of spiritual help. Spiritual help, however, may have practical material consequences. For example, the treatment of help for the neighbour's soul in *De Moribus*, which is introduced as *disciplina* (education for life), at least partly entails teaching others to perform the corporal works of mercy[29]). Moreover, as we have indicated in referring to the texts adduced by Hultgren in this regard, there are elements present in them which argue against understanding "spiritual" as a synonym for "negative" and "passive". Does one have to be of material advantage to others in order to be able to help them actively and positively? Furthermore, as we shall see, although spiritual love of neighbour remains in the foreground throughout Augustine's life, there is nevertheless an impressive body of post -400 texts which show love for neighbour as material giving to the poor[30]). In a commentary from 407

Bruno's Dream, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1969, p. 138. Two women are discussing the death of their father; one was present at the time and the other is questioning her about it.
"'We were trying to deceive ourselves. It was terrible to see him realizing the truth'.
'Oh God, what did you do?'
'Held his hand, said I loved him'.
'I suppose that is the only thing one would want to know'.
'What was awful was that he didn't want to know. We're so used to the idea that love consoles. But here one felt that even love was — nothing'.
'That can't be true'.
'I know what you mean. It can't be true. Perhaps one just suddenly saw the dimensions of what love would have to be — like a huge vault suddenly opening out overhead —' ...".
It can be suggested that the love with which Christ loves us, in Augustine's mind, at least measures up to those dimensions.

[28]) See, for example, *Sermo* 352,7 (ML 39,1556-1558) for which love of neighbour includes both forgiving and giving; *De Disciplina Christiana* 6,6 (CC 46,213. ML 40,672): "Volebas diligere proximum tuum tamquam te ipsum, divide cum illo pecuniam tuam"; *Sermo Denis* 15,3 (MA I,72-73) which sees conversion at least partly according to the model of the Acts of the Apostles: they sold their goods and laid the proceeds at the feet of the Apostles to be distributed as there was need; *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,67 (CSEL 80,25) = 1,30,31 (CC 32,24. ML 34,31) where the Good Samaritan's actions are the example of love for neighbour.

[29]) *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae* 1,28,55 (ML 32,1333): "... sic in animo sunt quaedam, in quibus excellentia illa et rara magisteria non admodum desiderantur, ut cum hortamur et monemus ut haec ipsa indigentibus exhibeantur quae corpori exhibenda esse diximus. Cum enim haec facimus, ope corpori; cum autem docemus ut fiant, disciplina animo subvenimus".

[30]) For example, *Tractatus in Evangelium Ioannis* 17,8 (CC 36,175. ML 35, 1532): "Incipe ergo diligere proximum. *Frange esurienti panem tuum, et egenum sine tecto induc in domum tuam; si videris nudum, vesti, et domesticos seminis tui ne despexeris* (Is. 58.7)".

A.D. on 1 John 3.17 (i.e. "If a man who was rich enough in this world's goods saw that one of his brothers was in need, but closed his heart to him, how could the love of God be living in him?") we encounter a remarkable blending of the material and the spiritual:

> Now you know where love begins. If you are not yet prepared to die for your brother, at least be ready to share your possessions with him. Let your heart be moved by love, not to give out of pride but out of a deep feeling of mercy (*de intimo adipe misericordiae*). Love should make you attentive to your fellow human being in need. If you cannot give something of your abundance to aid your brother, how will you be able to lay down your life for him? ... What then are you going to do with your money? Your brother is hungry and in need. Perhaps he lives in the greatest uncertainty, with creditors putting pressure on him. He has no money; you do have money. He is your brother; you have been ransomed together, one and the same price has been paid for you both, you have both been redeemed by the blood of Christ. See if you, who are rich in this world's goods, have compassion on your fellow human being in want. Perhaps you say: what have I got to do with him? Why should I give my money to relieve others who are in trouble? If this is what your heart tells you, then you do not have the love of the Father in you. If the love of the Father does not remain in you, you are not born of God. Why do you boast of being a Christian? You are a Christian in name, but not in deed[31]).

The spiritual factors in this text are the brotherhood of human beings redeemed by Christ, which Augustine uses as an argument for material giving to our needy equals, and the concern that the love which moves us to give spring not from pride and the desire to boast but from a "deep feeling of mercy" for and compassion with our fellow human beings in want. When such love does make us creatively attentive to another, then we are born of God and the love of the Father remains in us. Spiritual considerations, thus, both emphasise the closeness of human

[31]) *In Epistolam Ioannis*, tr. 5,12 (ML 35,2018): "Ecce unde incipit charitas. Si nondum es idoneus mori pro fratre, jam idoneus esto dare de tuis facultatibus fratri. Jam percutiat viscera tua charitas, ut non de jactantia facias, sed de intimo adipe misericordiae; ut consideres illum in egestate positum. Si enim superflua non potes dare fratri tuo, animam tuam potes ponere pro fratre? ... quid inde facturus es? Esurit frater tuus, in necessitate positus est: fortassis suspenditur, a creditore angustatur; non habet ipse, habes tu: frater tuus est, simul empti estis, unum est pretium vestrum, ambo sanguine Christi redempti estis: vide si misereris, si habes facultates mundi. Quid ad me pertinet, forte dicis? Ego daturus sum pecuniam meam, ne ille molestiam patiatur? Si hoc tibi responderit cor tuum, dilectio Patris non in te manet. Si dilectio Patris non in te manet, non es natus ex Deo. Quomodo te gloriaris esse christianum? Nomen habes, et facta non habes".

beings to one another as equals in Christ and their responsibility for each other, and urge that love be attentive and merciful, not superficial and pretentious.

There is an appeal in this text to genuine active material giving "*de intimo adipe misericordiae*". We can note some progress here over Augustine's hesitation, nineteen years earlier in *De Moribus*, concerning the appropriateness of *misericordia* when a person comes to the physical aid of others. There, influenced by the derivation of the word *misericordia* from *miseria*, and most probably by the Stoic figure of the wise person who helps people with a tranquil mind, without allowing himself to be troubled by the sight of their misery and ills, Augustine revealed a certain suspicion of feelings of mercy.

> Those who are prompted by human kindness to provide the things necessary so that others might resist evils and misfortunes of this sort (i.e. material privation) are called merciful, even though they might be so wise that no anguish of soul disturbs them. For who does not know that the term "mercy" implies heart-felt distress over the evil suffered by another? And who would not agree that the wise man ought to be free from all distress *(ab omni miseria liberum esse debere sapientem)* when assisting those in need, when he gives food to the hungry and drink to the thirsty, when he clothes the naked, offers hospitality to the stranger and delivers those who are oppressed, and when in his kindness he even goes so far as to bury the dead? Although he performs these acts with a serene mind *(mente tranquilla)*, not impelled by the sting of pain but prompted by the duty of kindness, he ought still to be called merciful, for the term will not do him any harm when the feeling of pain is absent[32]).

Gunnar Hultgren sees the wise person undisturbed by painful emotions, whom he understands to be isolated and detached from the concerns of fellow creatures, as representing the ideal attitude for Augustine in love of neighbour. Hultgren links this to the idea that

[32]) *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae* 1,27,53 (ML 32,1333): "Quare illa omnia, quibus hujuscemodi malis incommodisve resistitur, qui officiose atque humaniter praebent, misericordes vocantur, etiamsi sapientes usque adeo sint, ut jam nullo animi dolore turbentur. Nam quis ignoret ex eo appellatam esse misericordiam, quod miserum cor faciat condolentis alieno malo? Et quis non concedat ab omni miseria liberum esse debere sapientem, cum subvenit inopi, cum esurienti cibum praestat potumque sitienti, cum vestit nudum, cum peregrinum tecto recipit, cum oppressum liberat, cum denique humanitatem suam usque ad sepulturam porrigit mortuorum? Etiamsi id faciat mente tranquilla, nullis aculeis doloris instinctus, sed adductus officio bonitatis, misericors tamen vocandus est. Huic enim nihil obest nomen, cum absit miseria". English translation based on *The Fathers of the Church*, Vol. 56, p. 42, but with substantial changes.

happiness comes to the wise when they love God with all their hearts. If the wise then were to allow themselves to be upset by the sufferings of others, the happiness and peace *(tranquillitas mentis)* brought by loving God would be endangered. Thus, Hultgren concludes that the appeal to help the needy neighbour in *De Moribus* 1,27,53 is so hedged about that it becomes an eloquent demonstration that love for God can attenuate our love for neighbour and distance us from our brothers[33]).

A number of things need to be said about this interpretation. Firstly, Augustine himself explains in the *Retractationes* that it was not his intention to affirm that such wise people, emotionally uninvolved in the help they give to alleviate human suffering, exist in this life[34]). He knows that it is different in real life. Even in the continuation of the text from *De Moribus* Augustine shows that he is aware that a sense of duty alone may not be sufficient to call to service of our needy neighbour. The danger he sees is that some people, in their striving for the serenity of a tranquil mind, may shun emotion to such an extent that they become frozen in rigid inhumanity. In other words, in their desire to avoid feeling the pain of others, they shy away from the corporal works of mercy themselves, and, their hearts being hardened, they neglect to assist the needy altogether. This is, of course, totally undesirable, for mercy demands that we drive away physical evils from others[35]). Augustine's ultimate

[33]) G. Hultgren, *op. cit.*, p. 181: "L'attitude idéale, nous la voyons réalisée par le sage qui pratique l'amour du prochain sans que la pitié le trouble en rien. Cela implique une rationalisation et une moralisation de l'amour du prochain ... Le rejet de la compassion entraîne la rupture des liens qui nous unissent à nos semblables ... Plus l'homme est 'sage', plus il s'affranchit de la pitié et plus il s'isole. Pour quelle raison? C'est parce que le sage doit à tout prix garder la paix de l'âme *(tranquillitas mentis)* et 'être libre de toute misère'. Ces expressions qui semblent empruntées au langage des stoïciens ne doivent pas nous faire oublier que suivant la conception d'Augustin, celui-là est sage qui aime Dieu de tout son cœur et que c'est là le bonheur que nous donne l'amour de Dieu qu'il s'agit de défendre. Si ces paroles tendent nettement à nous exhorter à pratiquer l'amour du prochain, il n'en est pas moins vrai qu'elles nous montrent éloquemment comment l'amour de Dieu peut atténuer notre amour du prochain et nous éloigner de nos frères".

[34]) *Retractationes* 1,6,6 (CSEL 36,31) = 1,7,4 (ML 32,593): "item quod dixi de his, qui subveniunt indigentibus, quia *misericordes vocantur, etiam si sapientes usque adeo sint, ut iam nullo animi dolore turbentur* (*De Moribus* 1,27,53), non sic accipiendum est, tamquam definierim in hac vita esse tales sapientes; non enim dixi; cum sint, sed dixi: *etiam si sint*".

[35]) *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae* 1,27,54 (ML 32,1333): "Stulti vero cum misericordiam quasi vitium devitant, quia officio satis moveri nequeunt, si nec perturbatione commoventur, congelascunt potius rigore inhumanitatis, quam rationis tranquillitate serenantur ... Ne cum verbis doctorum inepte utimur, indoctorum animas prius durescere vitando misericordiam, quam benignitatem appetendo mitescere faciamus. Atque ut misericordia jubet, ista nos ab homine pellere incommoda, sic innocentia prohibet inferre".

concern then in this text is that suffering be relieved, that people not let the price of serenity of mind be the growing cold of their love; for only the foolish *(stulti)* consider that there can be wisdom without mercy. And, as the Augustine of the *Retractationes* certainly knows, in this life more than a sense of duty is required to call forth aid for the afflicted. Perhaps his cautionary words in the latter part of the text from *De Moribus* provide an indication that even there he had serious doubts about the possibility of human beings' performing merciful actions without the sting of emotional distress at the ill-fortune of others.

Even though it is not fundamental, there is, however, undeniably the figure of the wise person of unperturbed and tranquil mind in *De moribus* 1,27,53 to contend with. Insofar as preoccupation with this figure has disappeared entirely in the commentary on 1 John, and there is a wholehearted appeal to help the needy "out of a deep feeling of mercy" *(de intimo adipe misericordiae)* and an emphasis on the equality of the giver and receiver in Christ[36]), Augustine had shed Stoic elements under the growing influence of the Christian Scriptures[37]). But is Hultgren right in sketching the wise person of *De Moribus* as a cold, distant figure concerned primarily with the peaceful quest for wisdom and the protection of his own happiness in loving God? Does concern that love for God, for Wisdom, be preserved intact mean that a person necessarily has to assign strict limits to his love of neighbour? We have already shown how in *De Moribus* nothing, not even the quest for tranquillity, is to stand in the way of merciful works being done; seeking peace of mind cannot be used as an excuse for allowing love to grow cold, and in this human existence love will almost certainly atrophy if our feelings are unaffected by others' woes. Augustine does not give us here an elegantly

[36]) See *In Epistolam Ioannis*, tr. 5,12 (ML 35,2018). In *Sermo* 259,5 (ML 38,1200), from the pre-400 period, the equality of giver and receiver is based on common humanity. In the infirmity of the poor the giver humbly feels and aknowledges his own infirmity. "Non enim debet esse sola benignitas largientis, sed et humilitas ministrantis. Nescio quomodo, fratres mei, animus ejus qui porrigit pauperi, velut communi humanitati atque infirmitati compatitur, quando ponitur manus habentis in manum indigentis. Quamvis ille det, ille accipiat, conjunguntur minister et cui ministratur. Non enim jungit nos calamitas, sed humilitas".

[37]) T.J. van Bavel, *Recherches sur la christologie de saint Augustin. L'humain et le divin dans le Christ d'après saint Augustin*, Fribourg, 1954, p. 120, sees the break with Stoicism and Platonism on this point of fleeing the passions and the affections as occurring around 391. "C'est alors que commence une lente christianisation de sa doctrine concernant la vie affective. Les textes font supposer que le changement s'est opéré surtout entre 391-396".

clear and satisfactory solution to this problem, but his priorities are clear. The state of being free from distress is toned down, and this makes Hultgren's supposition that Augustine identifies it with the Supreme Good sought eudaimonistically highly questionable.

Looking at two other texts shows us some of the resonances this idea of distancing oneself can have for Augustine in the years immediately following *De Moribus*. The first is the continuation of a passage we quoted at the beginning of this chapter from *De Vera Religione*. The greatest bond is that which triumphs over everything.

> Therefore the person who loves God with all his mind and soul will not be afflicted by the death of another, because he knows that whoever does not pass away for God does not pass away for him either. For God is lord both of the living and the dead. This person is not made unhappy by the unhappiness of another, for he is not made unjust by the injustice of another. And so no one can take from him justice and God, so no one can take happiness from him. And if perhaps sometimes he is distressed by another's danger or error or pain, he lets it go so far as to help or correct or console the other, but not to bring about his own ruin[38]).

When a person is totally intent upon God, the lord of the living and the dead, distress at another's pain, even at another's death, will not mean the destruction of his own life and happiness. He will not collapse in horror at the sight of human misery and mortality. This does not imply that he flee the sufferings of others lest his world be turned upside down and he be made unhappy. Rather, if he allows the bond with God, the greatest bond which triumphs over everything, to slacken, he will be so shaken and unbalanced by his own emotions in the face of human fragility, fallibility and suffering that he will not be in a fit state to help, correct and console the other. In the second text, from *quaestio* 71, the

[38]) *De Vera Religione* 257-258 (CSEL 77,66) = 47,91 (CC 32,247. ML 34,163): "Non ergo iste affligitur morte cuiusquam, quoniam qui toto animo deum diligit, novit nec sibi perire quod deo non perit; deus autem dominus est vivorum et mortuorum. Non cuiusquam miseria miser est, quia nec cuiusquam iniustitia fit iniustus. Et ut nemo illi iustitiam et deum, sic nemo aufert beatitudinem. Et si quando forte alicuius periculo vel errore vel dolore commovetur, usque ad illius auxilium aut correctionem aut consolationem, non usque ad suam subversionem valere patitur". The French translation in *Œuvres de Saint Augustin* (Bibliothèque Augustinienne, 8), Paris, 1951, p. 161, renders "non usque ad suam subversionem" as "non de se troubler". This is too weak (Lewis and Short, *A Latin Dictionary*, p. 1786, gives the following meanings for "subversio": an overturn, overthrow, ruin, destruction) and too readily accepts an overwhelming influence of the Stoic ideal of "apatheia" on Augustine.

realistic point that sharing the painful condition of others is counter-productive if it robs us of any ability we may have had to be of service to them is made even more clearly.

> Therefore, in matters in which such states of feelings are involved, a person has to a certain extent to share the affliction from which he wishes to relieve the other. And he should do this in such a way as to be of help to the other and not allow it to happen that both of them end up equally miserable. In order to stretch out one's hand to another lying on the ground one has to bend down. But it makes no sense to let oneself fall down next to the other on the ground; for then there are two in need of help. No, one bends down to a person lying on the ground in order to help him up again[39]).

The sage's 'freedom from all distress' in this perspective has to be read with the nuance 'freedom from all distress that would cripple him and make him ineffectual on behalf of others'. As a sermon preached before 400 has it, it is not misfortune which forms the bond between giver and receiver, but the giver's humble sharing in the humanity and the infirmity he feels in common with the needy[40]). As we shall see, the mercy stemming from this humility makes souls neighbours to one another.

B. Every person as my neighbour

By 395 A.D. Augustine can call every person a neighbour without feeling the necessity of explaining himself on the point[41]). This, of course, could be seen as a logical consequence of the designation of the neighbour as soul or rational soul. We all have souls; therefore, we are all neighbours. And indeed, in the text already quoted from *Epistola* 155, we have seen how reason *(ratio)* takes over this unifying function from *animus* and *anima*, stressing our unity in reason as a rallying-point.

> The neighbour in question (in the second part of the double commandment) is not to be understood as those who are related to

[39]) *De Diversis Quaestionibus 83*, q. 71,2 (CC 44A,202. ML 40,81): "Et ideo in huiusmodi affectionibus suscipienda est aliquantulum ipsa aegritudo, de qua vis per te alium liberari, et sic suscipienda, ut ad auxilium non ad aequalitatem miseriae valeat, quemadmodum se inclinat qui manum iacenti porrigit; non enim se proicit ut ambo iaceant, sed incurvat tantum ut iacentem erigat".

[40]) *Sermo* 259,5 (ML 38,1200): "... animus ejus qui porrigit pauperi, velut communi humanitati atque infirmitati compatitur ... Non enim jungit nos calamitas, sed humilitas".

[41]) *Expositio Epistolae ad Galatas* 45 (CSEL 84, 119. ML 35,2138): "Item diligere *proximum*, id est *omnem hominem* ...".

> us by blood but those with whom we share reason *(ratio)*, which joins all men and women in a single community. For, if money can be the cause of our coming together, how much more so nature; not the law of commerce but that of a common origin[42]).

Two further related factors, explicitating the *ratio* factor, make all people neighbours of one another according to this text. The former is our common human nature, the latter our common origin.

Regarding the former Augustine states in *De Vera Religione*: "*Human nature*, therefore, whether it be perfect or to be perfected, is to be loved independently of its carnal condition"[43]). This opens the way, as we have seen, for a love of neighbour beyond blood relationships[44]). Over thirty years later, human nature remains a basis of universal fellowship: "In fact all people are neighbours to one another, and let there be no thought that there is a distance between one race and another where there is a *common nature*"[45]). It is, however, instructive to compare the contexts of these two sentences. In the case of *De Vera Religione*, "human nature", being that which one loves in oneself, is also to be, according to the commandment to love the neighbour as the self, that which one loves in others. The passage proceeds:

> All who love Him and do His will are related under the one God and Father. And all are fathers and sons to one another, fathers when they take care of others, sons when they obey; and above all they are brothers *(fratres)*, because the one Father calls them by His covenant to the same inheritance[46]).

[42]) *Epistola* 155,4,14 (CSEL 44,444. ML 33,672): "Proximus sane hoc loco, non sanguinis propinquitate, sed rationis societate pensandus est, in qua socii sunt omnes homines. Nam si pecuniae ratio socios facit, quanto magis ratio naturae, non negotiandi, sed nascendi lege communis". Augustine illustrates the point of human unity by quoting the famous line from Terence, *Heautontimorumenos* 1,1,77: "Homo sum, humani nil a me alienum puto".

[43]) *De Vera religione* 251 (CSEL 77,64) = 46,89 (CC 32,245. ML 34,162): "Ipsa igitur natura humana sine carnali condicione diligenda est, sive sit perficienda sive perfecta".

[44]) The difficulties with this position encountered and dealth with above do not need to be rehearsed here.

[45]) *En. in ps.* 118, *sermo* 8,2 (CC 40,1686. ML 37,1519): "Omnis quippe homo est omni homini proximus, nec ulla cogitanda est longinquitas generis, ubi est natura communis".

[46]) *De Vera Religione* 251 (CSEL 77,64) = 46,89 (CC 32,245. ML 34,162): "Omnes sub uno deo patre cognati sunt qui eum diligunt et faciunt voluntatem ipsius, et invicem sibi sunt et patres cum sibi consulunt et filii cum sibi obtemperant et fratres maxime, quia eos unus pater testamento suo ad unam hereditatem vocat".

In other words, the idea of a common destiny in God, the one Father, is introduced to deepen the significance of "human nature". And the relationship that develops between "all who love Him and do His will" is based not on natural family ties but on actual good deeds of care and obedience. But what is to be said of those who do not "love Him and do His will"? Are these not among the *fratres?* Perhaps they are to be considered as 'human nature to be perfected'[47]), and, therefore, even though not actually performing good deeds, as included in the one Father's call to a common inheritance. In the case of *En. in ps.* 118, on the other hand, the explicit accompanying idea is the lawyer's response to his own question about the identity of the neighbour in the story incorporating the parable of the Good Samaritan (Lk. 10.29-37): the neighbour is he who showed mercy to the man left half-dead by the road-side. Combining the ideas of a "common nature" uniting vastly different peoples and the neighbour as the one showing mercy, Augustine concludes: "... it is clear that in the matter of works of mercy no one is to be classed as excluded by the person who loves his neighbour"[48]). Further on we will see something of the role played by this parable in Augustine's understanding of the neighbour. For the present it is sufficient to note that for *En. in ps.* 118 (Date: 422) "common nature" is explicitly primarily a universal bond embracing all in the demand for mercy, while for *De Vera Religione* (Date: 390) "human nature" is in the first instance a principle to be loved. In the latter the unifying aspect is obviously not lacking; indeed it appears to be reinforced by the appeal to the fatherhood of the one God and to our vocation to a common inheritance, but the point being emphasised is that a Christian's relationships are ideally spiritual, not "carnal". At any rate here in the background of the broadening of terms of familiarity to include those beyond one's blood relations is the idea, which Augustine later rejects, that being born and giving birth are the result of sin. *En. in ps.* 118,

[47]) It is possible to read 'natura humana perficienda', and thereby to understand the lot of those who do not love God and do his will, in the light of the text concerning the foolish soul which is to be loved because it is capable of being wise and perfect, and in order that it may become such. See *De Vera Religione* 262 (CSEL 77,67) = 48,93 (CC 32,248. ML 34, 164): "Sapientem animam atque perfectam talem diligat qualem illam videt; stultam non talem, sed quia esse perfecta et sapiens potest, quia nec se ipsum debet stultum diligere. Nam qui se diligit stultum, non proficiet ad sapientiam; nec fiet quisque qualis cupit esse nisi se oderit qualis est".

[48]) *En. in ps.* 118, *sermo* 8,2 (CC 40,1686. ML 37,1519): "... patuitque in facienda misericordia neminem alienum esse deputandum ab eo qui diligit proximum".

however, is a forthright and concrete assertion that there is in effect no difference of *genus* at all between peoples, because there is a "common nature"; "common nature" demands that no one remain a stranger to our mercy.

The second of the universalising and unifying factors met above in *Epistola* 155 was our common origin. This is evidently closely associated with our "common nature".

> Friendship therefore begins with one's spouse and children, and goes on to include strangers. But if we reflect that *we have one father and one mother*, who will be a stranger to us? All people are neighbours to one another. Ask nature. Is a person unknown to you? He is a human being. Is he an enemy? He is a human being. Is he a foe? He is a human being. If he is a friend, may he remain a friend. If he is an enemy, may he become a friend[49]).

Because of the connection with "nature" it is most probable that the "one father and one mother" referred to are Adam and Eve, the father and mother of the human race[50]). Augustine had already incorporated and enlarged upon this point in *De Disciplina Christiana*, probably dating from around 398:

> You are one single person. But you have many neighbours. You should not understand neighbour to refer in the first place to a brother or sister, to a blood relation or relation by marriage, for each person is next of kin to every other person. Usually when we speak of next of kin, we think of parents and children, fathers-in-law and sons-in-law, and so on. But there is no greater kinship than that of one human being to another. If, however, we are of the opinion that only children of the same parents are next of kin, we should turn our minds to Adam and Eve. In them it appears we are all brothers and sisters. By the very fact that we are human beings, therefore, we are one another's brothers and sisters. How much more is this true by the fact that we are Christians? Insofar as you are a human being, you have one father, Adam, and one mother, Eve. Insofar as you are a Christian, your one father is God and the

[49]) *Sermo Denis* 16,1 (MA I, 75) (Date: 413, at the latest): "Incipit ergo amicitia a coniuge et filiis, et progreditur usque ad alienos. Sed si consideremus unum nos habuisse patrem et unam matrem, quis erit alienus? Omni homini proximus est omnis homo. Interroga naturam. Ignotus est? homo est. Inimicus est? homo est. Hostis est? homo est. Amicus est? maneat amicus. Inimicus est? fiat amicus".

[50]) See also *Sermo* 90,7 (ML 38,563); *Sermo* 149,18 (ML 38,807): "Dilige proximum tuum, hoc est omnem hominem. Ex duobus enim primis parentibus omnes nati, omnes utique proximi sumus"; *En. 2 in ps.* 25,2 (CC 38,142. ML 36, 189).

church your one mother. Look how many neighbours one single person has. His neighbours are all those whom he meets in one way or another, all those with whom he can enter into relation[51]).

In mentioning the church it is not Augustine's intention here to restrict the word, "neighbour", or even indeed *frater*, to those who share our faith. Otherwise how could it still be true that "there is no greater kinship than that of one human being to another" and that a person's neighbours are "all those with whom he can enter into relation"? And "by the very fact that we are human beings we are one another's brothers and sisters *(fratres)*". For Augustine the fatherhood of God and the motherhood of the church strengthen the bonds uniting human beings as human beings. The neighbour *(proximus)*, then, is in the first place each and every person without exception.

H. Pétré presents a well-documented case, however, for considering that Augustine generally reserves the term *frater* for Christians[52]). "We are all neighbours because of the condition of our earthly birth; in another way we are brothers because of our hope for an eternal inheritance"[53]). But, as Pétré herself acknowledges, one should allow for a certain suppleness in this terminology[54]). For, as we have seen, *De Disciplina Christiana* calls people *fratres* simply because they are human beings, (even if much more so because they are Christians). Moreover, in the same passage in which being "neighbours" on the basis of our

[51]) *De Disciplina Christiana* 3,3-4,4 (CC 46,210. ML 40,671): "Tu unus homo es, proximi tui multi sunt. Non enim primo sic debes intellegere proximum, vel fratrem, vel cognatum, vel affinem. Proximus est omni homini omnis homo. Proximi sibi dicuntur pater et filius, socer et gener. Nihil tam proximum quam homo et homo. Sed si putamus non esse proximos, nisi qui de eisdem parentibus nascuntur, Adam et Evam attendamus, et omnes fratres sumus. Et quidem fratres secundum quod homines sumus, quanto magis secundum quod christiani sumus? Ad id quod homo es, unus pater fuit Adam, una mater Eva; ad id quod christianus es, unus pater est deus, una mater ecclesia. Videte ergo quantos proximos habeat unus homo. Omnes homines in quos incurrerit, quibus iungi potuerit, proximi eius sunt".

[52]) H. Pétré, *Caritas. Étude sur le vocabulaire latin de la charité chrétienne*, Louvain, 1948, p. 134-140. E.g. p. 134: "Il est exceptionnel, en effet, de lui voir appliquer la notion de fraternité à tous les hommes et reconnaître, à côté du lien social, ce lien d'étroite parenté". Cf. p. 158: "Toutefois il reste vrai, en général, qu'il donne au mot 'proximus' une extension plus grande qu'à 'frater' qui désigne plus spécialement le chrétien".

[53]) *En 2 in ps.* 25,2 (CC 38,142-143. ML 36,189): "Omnes proximi sumus conditione terrenae nativitatis; sed aliter fratres illa spe caelestis hereditatis". See also *Sermo* 359,9 (ML 39,1596) where Augustine distinguishes "concordia fratrum" (i.e. Christians) and "amor proximorum" (i.e. pagans and Jews).

[54]) H. Pétré, *op. cit.*, p. 157: "Il ne faut pas il est vrai, forcer cette distinction".

common origin is distinguished from being "brothers" on the basis of hope for a heavenly inheritance, Augustine concludes by urging his hearers to consider all people their neighbours, even before these are Christians.

> For you do not know what others will be with God; you do not know how God has foreknown them. The person you derided because he adored stones may be converted and adore God; perhaps he will turn out to be more religious than you who, a short while before, were deriding him. These people, therefore, who are not yet members of the church are hidden neighbours of ours; and there are others hidden in the church who are far from us. Consequently, let us who do not know the future accept each and every person as a neighbour, not only because of the condition of human mortality in which we come into this world with the same destiny, but also because of hope for that heavenly inheritance. For we do not know what the future holds for someone who at the present time is nothing[55]).

It is evident that the sharp distinction between "neighbour" and "brother" established shortly beforehand is not religiously adhered to. We are called to respect all men and women as "neighbours" because of hope for that heavenly inheritance. This hope for a heavenly inheritance had a little earlier been the distinguishing feature of "brothers". Furthermore, there are people who are not yet members of the church whose future with God we do not know; these may be "hidden neighbours" of ours. How can this be if "we are all neighbours because of the condition of our earthly birth"? What Augustine appears to mean by "hidden neighbours" is that they are potential sharers in a Christian's hope and potential members of the church. In other words, in terms of the distinction as it was at first clearly drawn above, all men and women (i.e. "neighbours") can share our hope in God and his promises and are thereby potentially our brothers and sisters *(fratres)* in faith. As we shall see, this is true even of our enemies[56]).

[55]) *En 2 in ps.* 25,2 (CC 38,143. ML 36,189): "Proximum tuum debes putare omnem hominem, et antequam sit christianus. Non enim nosti quid sit apud Deum, quomodo illum praesciverit Deus ignoras. Aliquando quem irrides adorantem lapides, convertitur, et adorat Deum, fortasse religiosius quam tu, qui eum paulo ante irridebas. Sunt ergo proximi nostri latentes in his hominibus, qui nondum sunt in Ecclesia; et sunt longe a nobis latentes in Ecclesia. Ideoque qui non scimus futura, unumquemque proximum habeamus, non solum conditione mortalitatis humanae, qua in hanc terram eadem sorte devenimus; sed etiam spe illius hereditatis, quia non scimus quid futurus sit qui modo nihil est".

[56]) E.g. *In Epistolam Ioannis*, tr. 10,7 (ML 35,2059): "Omnes homines, etiam inimicos vestros diligatis: non quia sunt fratres, sed ut fratres sint; ut semper fraterno

For the sake of completeness, we may just mention another argument sometimes employed by Augustine to stress that all are neighbours. Romans 13.10 tells us that "love of neighbour does not bring about any evil". But there is no one to whom evil is to be done. Therefore, there is no one who is not our neighbour[57]). This provides an unusual complement to the arguments from all sharing in a common nature, reason and origin, and in God, the one Father's, inheritance.

C. Christ as the neighbour

At the conclusion of *quaestio* 71 on friendship, dating from the period 389-396, Augustine offers the following reflections:

> This is therefore the law of Christ: that we bear one another's burdens. But if we truly love Christ, we will easily put up with the weakness of another, even with that of a person we do not yet love on account of his own good qualities. For we are conscious that the Lord whom we love has died for him. It is this love that the apostle Paul puts before us with the warning: "In this way your knowledge could become the ruin of someone weak, of a brother for whom Christ died" (1 Cor. 8.11). If you love the weak person less because of the faults which make him weak, then think of him in Christ who has died for him. To fail to love Christ, however, is not just a weakness; it is death. Therefore, imploring God's mercy, we should take great care that Christ is not neglected because of a man's faults. It is precisely the weak person we ought to love for Christ's sake[58]).

amore flagretis, sive in fratrem factum, sive in inimicum, ut frater fiat diligendo. Ubicumque fratrem diligitis, amicum diligitis".

[57]) See *De Vera Religione* 245 (CSEL 77,62-63) = 46,87 (CC 32,244. ML 34,161): "Ea est autem regula dilectionis, ut quae sibi vult bona provenire, et illi velit, quae accidere sibi mala non vult, et illi nolit. Hanc voluntatem erga omnes homines servat. Nam erga neminem operandum est malum, et *dilectio proximi malum non operatur* (Rom. 13.10). Diligamus ergo, ut praeceptum est, etiam inimicos nostros ..."; *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,70 (CSEL 80,26) = 1,30,32 (CC 32,24-25. ML 34,31): "... *si quod est aliud mandatum, in hoc sermone recapitulatur: Diliges proximum tuum tamquam te ipsum. Dilectio proximi malum non operatur* (Rom. 13.10) ... manifestum est omnem hominem proximum esse deputandum, quia erga neminem operandum est malum".

[58]) *De Diversis Quaestionibus* 83, q. 71,7 (CC 44A,207. ML 40,83): "Ipsa est ergo lex Christi, ut invicem onera nostra portemus. Christum autem diligendo facile sustinemus infirmitatem alterius, etiam quem nondum propter sua bona diligimus. Cogitamus enim quia ille quem diligimus dominus propter eum mortuus est. Quam caritatem nobis apostolus Paulus ingessit cum diceret: *Et peribit infirmus in tua scientia, frater propter quem Christus mortuus est* (1 Cor. 8.11), ut si illum infirmum propter vitium quo infirmus est minus diligimus, illum in eo consideremus, qui mortuus est propter ipsum. Christum autem non diligere non infirmitas sed mors est. Quapropter ingenti cura et implorata Dei misericordia cogitandum est, ne Christum neglegamus propter infirmum, cum infirmum debeamus diligere propter Christum".

The implication of this text is that if a person is neglected because of his faults or loved less because of his weakness, there has been a failure in love for Christ. The reason for this is that Christ in dying for him has taken his part, has identified himself with his lot. Likewise, ten years or more later, Augustine can speak of the great price Christ has paid to purchase the whole world, and he can maintain therefore that the church throughout the entire world — the church which is preached through the flesh of Christ — is to be loved "because of the neighbour"[59]). The church, the neighbour and the flesh of Christ are brought into connexion. Christ's redemptive death on behalf of people, the ransom he has paid for them, makes them flesh of his flesh, members of his body[60]); indeed those clothed in Christ may even be called Christ, for Christ and the church are one[61]). If therefore the church is to be loved "because of the neighbour", and if Christ and the church are one, we may say that not only is the neighbour to be loved in Christ, as in *quaestio* 71, but that

[59]) *En. in ps.* 120,12 (CC 40,1797-1798. ML 37,1615): "Ecclesia propter proximum diligitur, Deus autem propter Deum ... Quisquis rursus putaverit ecclesiam in una parte esse, et non eam cognoverit diffusam toto orbe terrarum, et crediderit eis qui dicunt: *Ecce hic est Christus, et ecce illic* (Matt. 24.23) ... cum ille totum orbem emerit, quia tantum pretium dedit: ille tamquam in proximo scandalizatur ... id est, per carnem Christi praedicatur ecclesia, quia ipsa caro Christi caput ecclesiae est. Quisquis ibi non scandalizatur, in ipsa ecclesia et carne Christi, a luna non uritur ...".

[60]) See, for example, *In Epistolam Ioannis*, tr. 10,8 (ML 35,2060): "Extende charitatem per totum orbem, si vis Christum amare; quia membra Christi per orbem jacent". Because of Christ's love which attaches Him so closely to His body, He himself, the Head, cries out when His members are afflicted. This introduces again the favourite and widespread Augustinian theme of "totus Christus", head and members, which it is beyond our scope to deal with at length here.

[61]) See *En. in ps.* 100,3 (CC 39,1408. ML 37,1284-1285): "Simus in corpore ipsius et nos cantemus ea. Cantat enim hoc Christus. Si solum caput cantat, a Domino est canticum hoc, ad nos non pertinet. Si autem *totus Christus*, id est caput et corpus eius, esto in membris eius, adhaere illi per fidem, et per spem et per charitatem, et in illo cantas, in illo exsultas. Quia et ipse in te laborat, in te sitit, in te esurit et tribulatur. Ille in te adhuc moritur et tu in illo iam resurrexisti. Nam si non in te moreretur, nollet in te sibi parci a persecutore, cum diceret *Saule, Saule, quid me persequeris?* (Acts 9.4) ... Christum enim induti *Christus sumus* cum capite nostro, quia utique Abrahae semen sumus. Apostolus hoc dicit. Quia dixi *Christus sumus*. Apostolus ait *Ergo Abrahae semen estis* ... semen Abrahae est Christus (Gal. 3.29 & 3.16) ... Manifestum quia ad Christum pertinemus, et quia membra eius et corpus eius sumus, cum capite nostro *unus homo* sumus".
Also, *En in ps.* 101, *sermo* 1,2 (CC 40,1427. ML 37,1295): "Christus et ecclesia utrumque unus, unus quidam vir perfectus in forma plenitudinis suae ..."; *En. in ps.* 90, *sermo* 1,10 (CC 39,1265. ML 37,1157): "... cum quibus tamquam membris unus est Christus ..."; *Sermo* 354,1,1 (ML 39,1563): "Christum ipse praedicat Christus, hoc est corpus Christi toto orbe diffusum ... praedicat corpus caput suum et tuetur caput corpus suum".

Christ is to be loved "because of the neighbour" *(propter proximum)*, as the neighbour.

The rapprochement between Christ and the human race, however, began already with the Incarnation. In his catechetical opusculum of 400 A.D. Augustine considers that

> the most important reason for Christ's coming was that people might know how much God loves them. Further, knowing in this way the extent of God's love for them, people might begin to burn with love for him who loved them first, and, following Christ's commandment and example, they might love the neighbour. Christ, in loving people who were not close to him but wandering far from him, has become the neighbour[62]).

This may be compared with a passage from *Sermo* 171: "When Christ was far away from us — as one who is immortal and good is far from mortal and sinful creatures — in order to overcome the distance he came down to us and became a neighbour to us"[63]). In both cases, therefore, in that of our distance from God and in that of his distance from us, Christ's love bridges the gap. As Augustine's twelfth sermon on psalm 118 (which was preached just seven or eight years before his death) has it: The Word who is God himself "has become flesh so as to be my neighbour as well"[64]). The motive for the Incarnation of Christ is God's love for human beings. The Word's becoming flesh means that Christ is with us as our neighbour. *Sermon Denis* 16 puts it slightly differently:

> When therefore wisdom (i.e. the wisdom of God) was no friend to the foolish (i.e. straying human beings) and far away from them, it adopted our neighbour and became our neighbour. This is the mystery of Christ. What is so distant as foolishness from wisdom? What is so close as one human being to another? ... Therefore wisdom took on a human being and became a neighbour to people through those close to them[65]).

[62]) *De Catechizandis Rudibus* 4,8 (CC 46,128. ML 40,315): "Si ergo maxime propterea Christus advenit, ut cognosceret homo quantum eum diligat deus, et ideo cognosceret, ut in eius dilectionem a quo prior dilectus est inardesceret, proximumque illo iubente et demonstrante diligeret, qui non proximum, sed longe peregrinantem diligendo factus est proximus ...".

[63]) *Sermo* 171,3,3 (ML 38,934): "Cum ergo longe a nobis esset immortalis et justus, tanquam a mortalibus et peccatoribus, descendit ad nos, ut fieret nobis proximus ille longinquus".

[64]) *En in ps.* 118, *sermo* 12,5 (CC 40,1704. ML 37,1435): "Ipse est enim Verbum Deus; et Verbum caro factum est, ut esset et proximus meus (cf. Jn. 1.14)".

[65]) *Sermo Denis* 16,2 (MA I,76): "Cum ergo stultis amica non esset (sapientia), et a

Expressing the mystery of Christ as adopting and becoming the neighbour makes it possible for Augustine to give a surprising answer to the question "do you wish to love your neighbour"? He replies: "you have him in Christ". This answer is based on his interpretation of Jn. 1.14: "The Word was made flesh and dwelt amongst us"[66]). In Christ made man is the neighbour to be loved. Christ then is not only "*proximis proximus*"[67]) during his life on earth, but even after his ascension into heaven he continues as the *totus Christus* to live in real communion with his members[68]). There is therefore an incorporation of people of our time into Christ; he identifies himself with them through love.

In *De Doctrina Christiana* Augustine works from the definition of "neighbour" proferred by the lawyer who had heard the parable of the Good Samaritan — that is, the "neighbour" is the person who revives and takes care of the man left lying half-dead by the road-side, the person who shows mercy to him[69]) — by way of the premiss that Christ has revived us and shown us mercy, to the conclusion that Christ therefore is to be called our neighbour.

> If the person for whom we perform a work of mercy or the person who performs a work of mercy for us is rightly to be called the

stultis longe esset, assumpsit proximum nostrum, et facta est proxima nostra. Hoc mysterium Christi est. Quid tam longe, quam stultitia a sapientia? Quid tam proximum, quam homo et homo? ... Ergo suscepit hominem sapientia, et facta est homini proxima per id quod erat proximum".

[66]) *Sermo* 261,8,8 (ML 38,1206): "In Christo habes totum. Deum tuum vis diligere? Habes in Christo: *In principio erat Verbum, et verbum erat apud Deum, et Deus erat Verbum* (Jn. 1.1). Proximum vis diligere? Habes in Christo: *Verbum caro factum est, et habitavit in nobis* (Jn. 1.14)".

[67]) This formulation is used in *Sermo* 265,9 (ML 38,1223) of the Risen Christ giving the Holy Spirit while still on earth: "Ideo forte informans nos ad dilectionem proximi, dedit in terra conspicuus et *proximis proximus* Spiritum sanctum, insufflando in faciem eorum ...".

[68]) *Sermo* 341,1,1 (ML 39,1493) speaks of Christ not only as pre-existent and as incarnate Mediator and Head of the church, but also as forming a living community comprising both Head and Body: "Tertius modus est quodam modo *totus Christus*, in plenitudine Ecclesiae, id est, caput et corpus, secundum plenitudinem perfecti cujusdam viri, in quo viro singuli membra sumus". See also *Sermo* 25,8,8 (CC 41,339. ML 38,170-171). The topic sentences of the passages are: "Recita, ut scias te non fraudari Christi praesentia. Audi iudicaturum: *Quando uni ex minimis meis fecistis, mihi fecistis* (Matt. 25.40)".

[69]) *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,67 (CSEL 80,25) = 1,30,31 (CC 32,24. ML 34,31): "Cui (i.e. saucio et semivivo derelicto) proximum esse non docuit, nisi qui erga illum recreandum atque curandum misericors extitit ...". Cf. *En. in ps.* 118, *sermo* 8,2 (CC 40,1686. ML 37,1519): "... proximum non fuisse, nisi qui cum illo fecit misericordiam ...".

> neighbour, it is then clear that the good angels too are included in the precept by which we are commanded to love the neighbour. For they serve us compassionately in all kinds of ways ... Likewise, our Lord, God himself, wished to be called our neighbour. For our Lord Jesus Christ pictured himself bringing aid to the man who had been beaten by the brigands and left lying half-dead by the road-side. As the prophet says in the prayer: "I showed him favour as for a neighbour, as for a brother of ours" (Ps. 34(35).14:LXX)[70]).

The tenor of Augustine's allegorical interpretation of the parable of the Good Samaritan is that Christ, our protector and guard *(custos)*, has shown himself a neighbour to sinful and benighted mankind. Mankind caught in the grip of sin, mortality and changeableness is represented by the man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho who falls into the hands of brigands. Christ, the Word made flesh, having come close to human beings, binds up their wounds and supports them, and brings them to health in the church (the inn) and in his kingdom[71]). As one who shows mercy, then, Christ admirably fulfils the conditions for being a neighbour. But there is another side to the matter. If the good angels are to be included in the commandment to love the neighbour because of the compassionate service they show us, should not Christ who has shown us exceeding mercy also have a place there? Is he not to be loved and served as a neighbour? A little earlier it had been elaborated that the neighbour

[70]) *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,71-72 (CSEL 80,26) = 1,30,33 (CC 32,25. ML 34,31): "Iam vero si vel cui praebendum vel a quo nobis praebendum est officium misericordiae, recte proximus dicitur, manifestum est hoc praecepto quo iubemur diligere proximum, etiam sanctos angelos contineri, a quibus tanta nobis misericordiae impenduntur officia ... Ex quo et ipse deus et dominus noster proximum se nostrum dici voluit. Nam et se ipsum significat dominus Iesus Christus opitulatum esse semivivo iacenti in via afflicto et relicto a latronibus. Et propheta in oratione ait: *Sicut proximum, sicut fratrem nostrum, ita complacebam* (Ps. 34(35).14)".

[71]) It would be out of place here to enter into this allegorical interpretation in detail. The reader is referred to D. Sanchis, "*Samaritanus ille*. Exégèse augustinienne de la parabole du bon Samaritain", *Recherches de Science Religieuse*, XLIX, 3 (1961) 406-525. On p. 408-409 Sanchis states: "L'application (de la parabole) à la recherche du prochain, même proposée par le Christ en personne, n'est donc qu'une utilisation parénétique due aux circonstances. Le sens de la parabole elle-même est ailleurs, dans la merveilleuse histoire de la miséricorde de Dieu. Il semble même que, prise ainsi dans la problématique de la recherche du prochain, la parabole fasse mieux encore ressortir ce caractère merveilleux de la miséricorde divine. Car elle est loin de la nature humaine, la nature de Dieu. Et pourtant, délaissant les attributs de sa gloire, le Verbe s'est fait l'un de nous, vraiment notre prochain, pour apporter le salut à notre misère".
As we shall see, Augustine is perhaps prepared to draw an even more daring conclusion from the parable, and this conclusion is specifically concerned with the identity of the neighbour.

is both the one shows mercy and the one to whom mercy is to be shown[72]). Does Augustine not imply here that Christ qualifies to be called the neighbour on both scores?

The Augustine of *De Doctrina Christiana* does no more than to mention this point and he then moves on to the strange distinction we were confronted with earlier between God's love for us and our love of neighbour (when we might rather have expected a distinction between our love for God and love for neighbour). It is as if he sees for a moment quite a startling idea, Christ the neighbour to be loved, but does not immediately follow it up. *Sermo Denis* 16,2, for which Wisdom "adopted our neighbour and became our neighbour", is also intriguing. Augustine again brings these reflections into relation with the statement of the double commandment followed by the parable of the Good Samaritan in response to the lawyer's question: "And who is my neighbour?" *(Et quis est mihi proximus?)*[73]). Christ in Luke's Gospel introduces the parable by recounting the story of *homo quidam*, in the sense of each and every human being, for his intention, according to Augustine, is to commend all people to one another as neighbours[74]). And, in line with the parable, the question concerning the neighbour is turned about from 'who is *my* neighbour?' to 'who was a neighbour to *homo quidam?*', that is, to every man and woman[75]). It is obvious that Augustine considers Christ as

[72]) *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,68 (CSEL 80,25) = 1,30,31 (CC 32,24. ML 34,31): "Cui dominus ait: *Vade et tu fac similiter* (Lk. 10.37), ut videlicet eum proximum esse intellegamus, cui vel exhibendum est officium misericordiae, si indiget, vel exhibendum esset, si indigeret. Ex quo iam est consequens ut etiam ille a quo nobis hoc vicissim exhibendum est proximus sit noster. Proximi enim nomen ad aliquid est, nec quisquam esse proximus nisi proximo potest".

[73]) Both here and in *En. in ps.* 48, *sermo* 1,14 (CC 38,562. ML 36,553), where the Good Samaritan also appears, Augustine has the double commandment on the lips of Christ as in Matthew 22.37-40, whereas in the Lukan version which precedes and gives rise to the parable of the Good Samaritan, it is the lawyer who later asks the question concerning the identity of the neighbour who quotes the double commandment.

[74]) *Sermo Denis* 16,2 (MA I,76): "*Et quis est mihi proximus?* Putabat dicturum dominum: Pater tuus et mater tua, coniux tua, filii tui, fratres tui, sorores tuae. Non hoc respondit, sed qui volebat commendare omnem hominem omni homini proximum, instituit narrationem. *Homo*, inquit, *quidam*, Quis? quidam, tamen homo".
Cf. *En in ps.* 118, *sermo* 8,2 (CC 40,1686. ML 37,1519): "... patuitque in facienda misericordia neminem alienum esse deputandum ab eo qui diligit proximum".

[75]) *Sermo Denis* 16,2 (MA I,76): "Quis ergo erat huic homini proximus? Dic tu, qui interrogaveras dicens: *Quis est mihi proximus?* Iam responde quod verum est. Interrogaverat superbia: loquatur natura. Quid ergo ait? Credo qui cum illo fecit misericordiam. Et dominus ad illum: *vade, et tu fac similiter*".
Cf. *En. in ps.* 48, *sermo* 1,14 (CC 38,562. ML 36,553): "*Et quis est mihi proximus? ... Quis*

being so; he who like the Samaritan was a distant stranger has through showing mercy to all men and women become their neighbour[76]). The imperative to "go and do the same yourself" (Luke 10.37) is, therefore, a command to become a neighbour to *homo quidam*, to everyone, as Christ in his mercy has become to us. On the other hand, however, given the two-sidedness of Augustine's concept of the "neighbour" as the one who shows mercy and the one to whom mercy is to be shown, it is tempting to see *homo quidam*, who has been adopted by Christ and through whom Christ has come close to us, as Christ himself. Thus, we would be enjoined not only to take care of others as Christ does of us, but to show ourselves neighbours to Christ himself. This is not explicit in the text of *Sermo Denis* 16, but in the light of the hint given in *De Doctrina Christiana* which suggests that Christ stands with the neighbours to be loved according to the commandment, and in view of the idea of *totus Christus* and of clearer identification texts to be discussed further on in connection with Matthew 25.35-46, it is not far-fetched to see Christ both as the Good Samaritan and as *homo quidam*. Our love for neighbour, then, would be called to extend beyond family and friends to *homo quidam*, as Christ's does, and it would embrace there Christ himself, the one needy brother lying at the gate of the rich man, who, in receiving our mercy on earth, reveals himself a neighbour at our side and of benefit to us in heaven[77]). All people would be recommended to one another as

est illorum illi sauciato proximus? Respondit ille: Credo, qui cum illo fecit misericordiam. Vade, inquit, *et tu fac similiter*. Cui misericordiam facis, proximus tibi est".

[76]) *Sermo Denis* 16,2 (MA I,76): "Quid tam longinquum, inquam, quam a stultitia sapientia? Ergo suscepit hominem sapientia, et facta est homini proxima per id quod erat proximum ... Transierunt proximi (i.e. priest and levite), et *extraneus* factus est proximus".

[77]) In *En in ps.* 48, *sermo* 1,14 (CC 38,561-563. ML 36,552-553) Augustine explores the various possibilities offered by the words "proximus" and "propinquus" in order to demonstrate how the psalm (Ps. 48(49).10) is correct in stating that the foolish and stupid "leave their fortunes to strangers (alienis)". He sees in the Good Samaritan "quemdam extraneum propinquum factum, quia profuit", and thereby concludes that "si quis tuorum (those to whom one leaves one's fortune) tibi nihil prodest, alienus est". The brothers of the rich man in Hades were unable to help him (cf. Luke 16.19-31: Dives and Lazarus); in leaving his wealth to them, therefore, he left it to strangers. But had he shared his goods with Lazarus, i.e. with Christ, he would have had a friendly brother in heaven on his side: "Quibus et ipsi (i.e. those who have inherited their parents' wealth) servant? Filiis suis, et illi filiis, et tertii filiis. Quid Christo? quid animae suae? Omnia filiis. Inter filios suos quos habent in terra, computent unum fratrem quem habent in caelo, cui totum dare debebant, vel dividant cum illo ... Quid tibi diceret dives? Habeo quinque fratres; unum fratrem mihi amicum non feci, qui iacebat ante ianuam; illi mihi fratres subvenire non possunt qui possident divitias meas; alieni a me facti sunt". Further on in this commentary the identification of Christ with Lazarus is confirmed with reference to Matt. 25.40: *En. in ps.*

neighbours by showing that Christ is the neighbour in both senses of the word.

D. The enemy

As an introduction to this theme of the enemy as the neighbour, we can learn something of Augustine's attitude by looking at his reaction in a case of actual conflict. Addressing himself to the Donatist bishops shortly before the *collatio* convoked by the ordinance of the head of the imperial chancery, Marcellinus, and held between the warring factions, Catholics and Donatists, at Carthage in June, 411, Augustine appeals for a reconciliation as befits brothers belonging to the one Lord.

> "The end of the precept is love from a pure heart" (1 Tim. 1.5). This is an end by which we are perfected, not one by which we are annihilated. This end is broad because it is the commandment of God of which it is said: "Thy commandment is exceedingly broad" (Ps. 118(119).96). "A new commandment I give to you: that you are to love one another" (Jn. 13.34) ... " The love of God has been poured into our hearts" (Rom. 5.5) ... Lord, our God, let it come about that because of this breadth (of the commandment of love) we invite our brothers to take possession of peace. Do you wish to be bishops? Be bishops with us. (But perhaps) the people do not want two bishops. Be brothers in the inheritance with us. Let us not impede the peace of Christ by standing on our honour. What honour will we receive in the peace of heaven if we defend our honour now on this earthly shore? Let the wall of error be taken down and let us be together. Acknowledge me as a brother. I acknowledge you as a brother. But put an end to the schism, the error, the discord. Have these set right and you are mine. Or perhaps you do not wish to be mine. I wish to be yours, if you reform. Therefore, when the error that stands between us like a wall made up of the rubble of contradiction and of division has been demolished, be my brother, and I will be your brother, so that we may both belong to him who is my Lord and yours[78]).

48, *sermo* 1,16 (CC 38,564. ML 36,554): "... adtendere comitem egentem, dare ei cum quo ambulabant, non contemnere Christum ante ianuam ulcerosum, qui dixit: *Cum uni ex minimis meis fecistis, mihi fecistis*". The stranger covered in sores on earth, in being shown mercy, will become the friend in heaven, the "propinquus", who is able to be of benefit to those who had shared their goods with outsiders. In this sense also, Christ becomes a neighbour to us: not just as the Good Samaritan on earth but as the brother in heaven.

[78]) *Sermo* 358,4 (ML 39,1588): "*Finis praecepti est charitas de corde puro* (1 Tim. 1.5). Finis, quo perficimur, non quo consumimur. Iste finis latus est, quia mandatum Dei est, de quo dictum est, *Latum mandatum tuum valde* (Ps. 118(119).96). *Mandatum novum do*

The new commandment of love (Jn. 13.34), then, being "exceedingly broad" (Ps. 118(119).96), aims to embrace as brothers even those with whom we are at strife. This reveals a basic trait of Augustine's treatment of love of enemies: he cannot rest content with enmity as if it were a fixed state, and he is convinced that the person who is today our enemy may change and amend his life[79]), and recognise his subjection with us to one Lord who is "broad" enough to encompass and delight us both. The passage quoted above from a pre-*collatio* sermon is to be read in conjunction with a letter written to Marcellinus about the same time; the

vobis, ut vos invicem diligatis (Jn. 13.34) ... *Charitas autem Dei diffusa est in cordibus vestris* (Rom. 5.5) ... Domine, Deus noster, approba quia propter ipsam latitudinem fratres nostros ad possessionem pacis invitamus. Episcopi vultis esse? Nobiscum estote. Non vult populus duos episcopos. Nobiscum in haereditate fratres estote. Non propter honores nostros impediamus pacem Christi. Quem honorem in coelesti pace accepturi sumus, si honorem nostrum nunc in terrena lite defendamus? Tollatur paries erroris, et simul simis. Agnosce me fratrem: agnosco te fratrem: sed excepto schismate, excepto errore, excepta dissensione. Haec corrigatur, et meus es. Annon vis esse meus? Ego, si te corrigas, volo esse tuus. Ergo sublato errore de medio, tanquam pariete maceriae contradictionis et divisionis, esto frater meus, et ego sim frater tuus, ut ambo simus ejus qui Dominus est et meus et tuus".

[79]) Augustine, as we shall see, consistently presupposes that the enemy is a wicked person who hates us, e.g. *In Epistolam Ioannis*, tr. 8,11 (ML 35,2042-2043): "... ille odit, tu miserere. Febris animae ipsius te odit: sanus erit, et gratias tibi aget ... si odit te inimicus tuus, et injuste te odit; noveris quia cupiditas saeculi in illo regnat, propterea te odit". Also, *En in ps.* 39,4 (CC 38,247. ML 36,435): "Inimicus tuus, quia malus est, inimicus est; fit bonus, et amicus erit, et socius erit ..."; *Sermo* 149,19 (ML 38,807): "Cum enim quisque benefecerit inimico, et non victus malo ejus, vicerit in bono malum; plerumque illum inimicitiarum suarum poenitebit, et irascetur sibi, quod tam bonum hominem laeserit". Or, in the case of the Donatists, the enemies are those separated by their error from the unity of Christian love, e.g. *Epistola* 128,2 (CSEL 44,31. ML 33, 489): "Neque enim in eis divinae Sacramenta veritatis, sed commenta humani detestamur erroris: quibus sublatis fraternum pectus amplectimur, christiana nobis caritate coniunctum, quod nunc dolemus dissensione diabolica separatum". The enmity Augustine has in mind, therefore, is much more than a clash of personalities where both parties might be to blame. He rarely views this question from the point of view of our wickedness and of our co-responsibility for a situation of enmity. As we saw above in *Sermo* 358,4 (ML 39,1588) Augustine can say to the Donatists "I wish to be yours (i.e. to become *your* brother), if you reform". But he pays little attention to the situation in which we might have to reform in order to become a brother of someone whose enemy we are. *Epistolae ad Romanos Inchoata Expositio* 18 (CSEL 84,172. ML 35,2101) (Date: 394), however, does take account of the instance in which a person revenges the wrong done him by an enemy. "... cum autem perpessi fuerint alicuius inimicitias, ista rapiuntur animo ad ulciscendum ... et talibus hominibus iam baptizatis ecclesiae plenae sunt; quos tamen spirituales viri fraterne admonere non cessant, et in spiritu lenitatis instanter instruunt (Gal. 6.1), ut huiusmodi tentationibus occurrere ac resistere parati sint, et magis diligant in Christi pace regnare, quam de inimici oppressione laetari. Quod inaniter fieret, si talium peccatorum nulla spes veniae, nulla poenitentiae medicina remaneret".

proposals contained in it were eventually unanimously approved by a plenary gathering of almost 300 Catholic bishops held before the *collatio*. Augustine concretises his overtures to fraternity with his erstwhile enemies by proposing that, once unity has been restored by the return of the Donatists to the Catholica, both bishops take it in turns to preside until, upon the death of one of them, the other succeeds to the see. If, however, the people are unwilling to countenance the unusual sight of two bishops, Augustine recommends that both step down. For "he (our Redeemer) came down from heaven in the members of a human body so that we might be his members. And are we then afraid to come down from our chairs in order to prevent these very members of his from being torn apart by cruel division?" The peace and unity of the flock of Christ and the eternal interests of the Lord count for more than episcopal dignity and temporal honours[80]). The ermity that might remain smouldering because each is jealous of his own standing is to be overcome by the basic recognition of 'brotherhood in the inheritance' of the one Christ who has made us all his members.

These texts, however, date from 411. In an earlier period Augustine's treatment of love of enemies had been less specific, more theoretical, and more explicitly attentive to the one loving the enemy than to the enemy himself. This is not necessarily to imply a negative judgment of the early Augustine on this point. For, as we have seen in the chapter on love of self, Augustine is concerned in the most important of the texts we will use here to illustrate this period to show that true personal perfection and freedom are to be found in subjection to and service of God, and that they redound to the good of those one loves as oneself. Without taking upon ourselves an exhaustive treatment of the topic, love of enemies, we will now attempt the limited task of tracing the emergence of the enemy as a neighbour to be reckoned with in Augustine's theology.

[80]) *Epistola* 128,3 (CSEL 44,32-33. ML 33,489): "... utrique de medio secedamus ... Quid enim dubitemus Redemptori nostro sacrificium istius humilitatis offerre? an vero ille de caelis in membra humana descendit, ut membra eius essemus; et nos, ne ipsa eius membra crudeli divisione lanientur, de cathedris descendere formidamus? Propter nos nihil sufficientius, quam christiani fideles et oboedientes sumus : hoc ergo semper simus. Episcopi autem propter christianos populos ordinamur: quod ergo christianis populis ad christianam pacem prodest, hoc de nostro episcopatu faciamus. Si servi utiles sumus, cur Domini aeternis lucris pro nostris temporalibus sublimitatibus invidemus? Episcopalis dignitas fructuosior nobis erit, si gregem Christi magis deposita collegerit, quam retenta disperserit. Nam qua fronte in futuro saeculo promissum a Christo sperabimus honorem, si christianam in hoc saeculo noster honor impedit unitatem?".

1. The perfection of the lover of enemies in texts prior to 400

In his commentary on the Sermon on the Mount Augustine comes to deal with Matthew 5.43-48, a passage which urges that, by loving our enemies, we become perfect as our heavenly Father is perfect. The commentary runs:

> Who can fulfil these things which have been spoken of earlier (in the Sermon on the Mount, e.g. the Beatitudes) without that love by which we are commanded to love even our enemies and persecutors? Mercy, which takes great care of the suffering soul, cannot extend to any greater perfection than love of enemies. And consequently the passage concludes: "You must therefore be perfect just as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Matt. 5.48). It is to be understood, however, that God is perfect as God and the soul as the soul ... By the command of Christ who came to fulfil the Law not to abolish it, a person will perfect benevolence and kindness when he reaches the stage of loving even his enemy[81]).

Of the enemy it is said that mercy takes care of his suffering soul, while the lover in showing him mercy in accordance with Christ's commandment is said to have achieved the greatest perfection in benevolence and kindness possible for a human soul. The relationship between the lover and the enemy is not any more closely defined. This, as will become clear, is in contrast to later texts which also speak of love of enemies as perfect love[82]). In Augustine's first period, however, the emphasis is more on the perfection, freedom and security of the individual soul who fulfils the Lord's commandment to love his enemies. Such is evident from two passages we have already referred to in order to argue, it must be remenbered, that true love of self is to love God more than oneself and true freedom to serve him and his unchangeable law. There is no question, therefore, of a solipsistic or complacent perfection,

[81]) *De Sermone Domini in Monte* 1,21,69-70 (CC 35,78-79. ML 34,1264): "Sine ista dilectione, qua etiam inimicos et persecutores nostros diligere iubemur, ea quae superius dicta sunt implere quis potest? Perfectio autem misericordiae, qua plurimum animae laboranti consulitur, ultra dilectionem inimici porrigi non potest. Et ideo sic clauditur: *Estote ergo vos perfecti sicut pater vester qui in caelis est perfectus est* (Matt. 5.48); ita tamen ut deus intellegatur perfectus tamquam deus, et anima perfecta tamquam anima ... Eius autem imperio, qui venit legem implere non solvere, perficiet benivolentiam et benignitatem, cum eam usque ad inimici dilectionem perduxerit".

[82]) See, for example: *In Epistolam Ioannis*, tr. 5,4 (ML 35,2014); tr. 8,10 (ML 35,2041-2042). In tr. 9,2 (ML 35,2045-2047), however, even when more explicit attention is paid to the enemy himself, this perfect love is still seen as giving us confidence on the day of judgment "because just as he (i.e. God) is, so are we too in this world" (Jn. 4.17).

freedom or security; indeed, as we have already argued at length, the achievement of contemplation is a boon to action on behalf of others. Our present point is rather that it is not at this stage the enemy himself who attracts Augustine's notice. In *De Quantitate Animae* the willingness to help even those who have harmed us or wish to harm us or wish at least that harm befall us is called perfect religion.

> Thanks to it, the soul whose greatness is the object of our enquiry is made apt to be reconciled to God and makes itself worthy of freedom. For God, whom it is to each one's greatest advantage to serve, frees us from all things. The only perfect freedom is to be pleasing to him in serving him[83]).

Reconciliation with God and perfect freedom is his service thus flow from love of enemies. Similarly, for *De Vera Religione*, a person is commanded to love even his enemies if he wishes to be invincible to the passions and to assure that what he loves and the freedom it brings are not taken away from him[84]).

Nothing therefore can hurt the person who can relate well *(bene uti)* even to his enemy. He cannot unwillingly be deprived of the certainty of rest from tribulation he expects in the future life. In the self-abnegation of loving his enemy he gains what cannot be lost. Indeed Christ, who has given him the commandment and the grace to love his enemies, stands by to protect and to guard him from harm and from loss[85]). *En. in ps.* 54,

[83]) *De Quantitate Animae* 34,78 (ML 32,1078): "Omnibus enim subventum velle debemus, etiam qui nos laeserunt, aut laedere, aut omnino laedi volunt. Haec est vera, haec perfecta, haec sola religio per quam Deo reconciliari pertinet ad animae, de qua quaerimus, magnitudinem, qua se libertate dignam facit: nam ille ab omnibus liberat, cui servire omnibus utilissimum est, et in cujus servitio placere perfecta et sola libertas est".

[84]) *De Vera Religione* 245-246 (CSEL 77,63) = 46,87 (CC 32,244. ML 34,161): "Diligamus ergo, ut praeceptum est, etiam inimicos nostros, si vere invicti esse volumus. Non enim per se ipsum quisquam hominum invictus est, sed per illam incommutabilem legem cui quicumque serviunt soli sunt liberi. Sic enim eis quod diligunt auferri non potest, quae res una invictos facit et perfectos viros". It is worth insisting again that the passions to which one wishes to be invincible include envy and the desire to lord it over others. The immediate continuation of the passage, which we will deal with further on, insists that the neighbour is to be loved as oneself, not as an object of temporal pleasure or convenience. By stressing the role of love of enemies in perfection, therefore, Augustine may be seen as protecting the neighbour from possible abuse. Anyone so obedient to God as to love his enemies, his persecutors, could not possibly fall prey to the passion to take advantage of his more agreeable neighbours.

[85]) *De Vera Religione* 259 & 261 (CSEL 77,66-67) = 47,92 (CC 32,247-248. ML 34,163): "In omnibus autem officiosis laboribus futurae quietis certa expectatione non frangitur. Quid enim ei nocebit qui bene uti etiam inimico potest? Eius enim praesidio atque munimento inimicitias non pertimescit, cuius praecepto et dono diligit inimicos ... et

which Zarb dates 395 and Rondet 407-408, provides a good example of the security stemming from love of enemies. Preserving love for our human enemy in the face of persecution enables us to combat our hidden enemy, the devil, who seeks to lay waste our inner treasures. Flesh and blood enemies are envious of what is visible to them in us such that, for example, if we have a position of honour, they want us brought down in the world.

> ... (the enemy you see), therefore, aims to destroy or to take away from you those gifts in which he sees himself to be surpassed by you. That hidden enemy too wants to despoil you of the good in which you get the better of him. As a human being you surpass others in that you are happier than they in human terms; but you defeat the devil by loving your enemy ... Take care then to preserve love of enemies in your heart. By this love you vanquish the devil. Let a human being do you all the wrong he can, let him take from you whatever he can. If you love the one who persecutes you openly, the one who attacks you in secret has been conquered[86]).

In this sense, having enemies may be considered an advantage offered to us by God's providence, an opportunity to steel ourselves against more insidious onslaughts or to increase the reward promised to the persecuted (cf. Matt. 5.11-12)[87]).

vincit cum vinci videatur, quisquis cedendo ad id pervenit quod non amittit invitus". The idea that no one can be harmed if he loves what cannot be harmed also occurs later in *In Epistolam Ioannis*, tr. 10,6 (ML 35,2058). The new commandment (Jn. 13.34) is "exceedingly broad" (Ps. 118.96). "Charitas ergo non angustatur. Vis non angustari in terra? In lato habita. Quidquid enim tibi fecerit homo, non te angustat; quia illud diligis quod non nocet homo: Deum diligis, fraternitatem diligis, legem Dei diligis, Ecclesiam Dei diligis; sempiterna erit".

[86]) *En in ps.* 54,6 (CC 39,660. ML 36,632): "... ea ergo adtendit in te vel deicere vel auferre quibus vincitur. Et ille occultus inimicus illud tibi vult tollere unde vincitur. Homo enim hominem vincis humana felicitate, diabolum autem vincis inimici dilectione ... Sed cura in corde servare inimici dilectionem, qua diabolum vincis. Saeviat homo quantum potest, auferat quidquid potest; si diligitur aperte saeviens, victus est occulte saeviens".

[87]) Despite the dominance of other aspects later, the idea of the usefulness of enmity and persecution has not completely disappeared in post-400 texts. For example, *In Epistolam Ioannis*, tr. 8,11 (ML 35,2043): "Quodammodo ferramentum Dei est quo saneris, ipse inimicus tuus. Si novit Deus utile tibi esse ut expoliet te, permittit illum; si novit tibi utile esse ut vapules, permittit illum ut caedaris: de illo te curat, opta ut ille sanetur". Also, *Sermo* 354,3,3 (ML 39,1564) (Date: pre-410) where those who have undertaken a life of chastity are being encouraged to bear with detraction: "... (your detractor) non solum tibi reprehensionibus mercedem non minuit, sed et facit ampliorem. Tu tamen pro illo ora, ne tua mercede moriatur. Nam et hinc probamur, charissimi, quia si non haberemus inimicos, non essent pro quibus oraremus ex praecepto Domini nostri dicentis, *Diligite inimicos vestros, et orate pro eis qui vos oderunt* (Matt. 5.44). Unde probamus, unde cor nostrum interrogamus, utrum hoc facere valeamus, si nullum

De Doctrina Christiana — begun in 396, but not completed until long afterwards — may, if we presume that the references to the enemy in Book I are earlier rather than later, be seen as forming a bridge between the security approach to love of enemies, in which the emphasis is on the lover's invincibility, and the approach that is concerned with what love does for the enemy himself. Firstly, the reviving and healing mercy shown by the Good Samaritan becomes the model that one is to act upon in dealing with enemies. Thus, even the enemy can be seen as *homo quidam* wounded and left lying half-dead by the road-side[88]). Secondly, we find the following passage which, while containing the themes of reward and security for the lover, adds a new element which will characterise the post-400 Augustine's treatment of the subject: attention to the enemy's relationship to God which brings him into a new relationship with ourselves. God, maintains Augustine, wishes to be loved not to gain anything for himself but in order to bestow an eternal reward on those who love him. This reward is himself.

> Thus it follows that we are to love even our enemies. Indeed, we do not fear them for they cannot take what we love away from us. Rather we feel compassion for them because the more they hate us, the more they are separated from the one whom we love. If they turn to him, they necessarily love both him and us. Him they will love as the good that makes them happy and us as those who share with them in such a great good[89]).

inimicum, nullum reprehensorem, nullum detractorem, nullum maledicum experiamur? Videtis ergo quia et mali necessarii sunt bonis".

[88]) *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,69 (CSEL 80,25-26) = 1,30,31 (CC 32,24. ML 34,31): "Nullum autem exceptum esse cui misericordiae denegetur officium, quis non videat, quando usque ad inimicos etiam porrectum est, eodem domino dicente: *Diligite inimicos vestros, benefacite eis qui vos oderunt (Matt. 5.44)*".
This is immediately preceded in context by the definition of the neighbour in terms of the Good Samaritan: "qui erga illum (saucium et semivivum) recreandum atque curandum misericors extitit ...".

[89]) *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,64-65 (CSEL 80,24-25) = 1,29,30 (CC 32,23. ML 34,30): "... quid nos in societate dilectionis dei agere convenit ... qui se vult diligi, non ut sibi aliquid, sed ut eis qui diligunt aeternum praemium conferatur, hoc est ipse quem diligunt? Hinc efficitur ut inimicos etiam nostros diligamus. Non enim eos timemus, quia nobis quod diligimus auferre non possunt, sed miseramur potius, quia tanto magis nos oderunt quanto ab illo quem diligimus separati sunt. Ad quem si conversi fuerint, et illum tamquam beatificum bonum et nos tamquam socios tanti boni necesse est ut diligant".
Sermo Denis 15,3 (MA I,73) (Date: towards 400) also witnesses the theme of conversion of enemies, in this case persecuting "saeculi potestates", who through our love become what we are, that is, people honouring God. "... ipsas saeculi potestates, quas non timuisti, in te convertisti: saevientes sprevisti, honorantes fecisti. Impletum est, quod Domino tuo

The mercy shown to enemies, therefore, aims at their conversion, at their happiness with God. As we shall see, Augustine's thus broadens his general understanding of loving one's neighbour as oneself to include the enemy. Now even the one who hated us and was far from God can become a loving companion *(socius)* in the enjoyment of the reward God has for those who love him, i.e. himself. In this way the other too becomes invincible, secure in God who cannot be taken from him.

2. Concern for the enemy himself in post-400 texts

In tr. 8,4 of his commentary on the first letter of John Augustine quotes Matt. 5.46 (i.e. "For if you love those who love you, what reward will you have? Even sinners do as much, do they not?") and asks why John says nothing of the love of enemies which is commanded by the Lord (Matt. 5.44). To be sure, he states, it is necessary that love, like fire, begin with those who are closest, with brothers in faith *(fratres)*, but loving those who have become one with us is almost the same as loving ourselves. Therefore, love is called to go out to strangers, even to enemies. Why is John silent about this explicit precept of the Lord[90])?

Augustine's answer comes in tr. 8,10. Because it contains most of the aspects of the emergence of the enemy, we will quote the passage at length, pausing at certain points to make our own comments.

> Therefore, have compassion on others and be sensitive to their needs. In loving your enemy you also love a brother. Do not think that John has no command of love of enemies. For he is not silent about fraternal love; and when you love enemies you are loving brothers. How, you ask, can they be brothers?
>
> To understand this you have to ask yourself what your intention is in loving your enemy. You don't love him so that he will be healthy in this life. For what if good health does not turn out to be of advantage to him? You don't love him so that he will become rich. For what is to be done if these riches blind him? Perhaps you want to see him married. But what happens if he has to suffer the bitterness of an unhappy marriage? You may wish him children. But how will he react if they are wicked children? All these things which you wish your enemy out of love are ambiguous and uncertain. Let your wish for him be that he possess eternal life with you. Let it be you desire for him that he really become your brother.

promissum est: *Et adorabunt eum omnes reges terrae, omnes gentes servient illi (Ps. 71(72).11)*".

[90]) Cf. *In Epistolam Ioannis*, tr. 8,4 (ML 35,2037-2038).

> If out of love you wish for your enemy that he become your brother, then in loving an enemy you love a brother. You do not love what he is, but what you want him to become[91]).

De Doctrina Christiana viewed enemies as becoming our companions in the love and enjoyment of God; here one is to wish for enemies that they become our brothers *(fratres)* in the hope of gaining eternal life. Values other than God and eternal life are all too full of uncertainty for us to place our ultimate hope for our enemy in them, if we truly love him and desire his happiness. Inviting enemies to communion of life with ourselves as our brothers means that we desire for them the life with God we desire and hope for ourselves. This life is not diminished for us by being shared[92]). Our enemy, however, as the one who hates us, is not actually our brother. But, in loving him, we put the sinfulness that causes him to hate us to one side; our whole object in loving is that he overcome this state, be reconciled to God and become what we wish him to be, that is, our brother. "You do not love what he is, but what you wish him to become".

Some may take this sentence as a sign that there is no unmotivated love in the Christian sense even in love of enemies, "for love finds a motive even here in the thought of the potential worth in the neighbour, which may in future become actual"[93]). If this were so, it would mean

[91]) *In Epistolam Ioannis*, tr. 8,10 (ML 35,2041-2042): "Miseremini ergo tanquam misericordes; quia in eo etiam quod diligitis inimicos, fratres diligitis. Ne putetis Ioannem nihil de dilectione inimici praecepisse; quia de fraterna charitate non tacuit: fratres diligitis. Quomodo, inquis, fratres diligimus? Quaero quare diligas inimicum: quare illum diligis? Ut sanus sit in hac vita? quid, si non illi expedit? Ut dives sit? quid, si ipsis divitiis excaecabitur? Ut uxorem ducat? quid, si amaram vitam inde patietur? Ut filios habeat? quid, si mali erunt? Incerta sunt ergo ista quae videris optare inimico tuo, quia diligis eum; incerta sunt. Opta illi ut habeat tecum vitam aeternam; opta illi ut sit frater tuus. Si ergo hoc optas, diligendo inimicum, ut sit frater tuus; cum eum diligis, fratrem diligis. Non enim amas in illo quod est; sed quod vis ut sit".

[92]) See *ibid.*, tr. 1,9 (ML 35,1985): "Incertum est utrum alicui sit utilis vita ista, an inutilis; vita vero quae est apud Deum, sine dubio utilis est. Sic dilige inimicos tuos, ut fratres optes; sic dilige inimicos tuos, ut in societatem tuam vocentur"; *En in ps.* 39,4 (CC 38,427. ML 36,435): "Sic ergo lauda Dominum, ut nolis male inimicis tuis. Et quantum eis, inquis, velim bonum? Quantum tibi. Non enim de tuo accepturi sunt ut boni sint, aut quod illis dabitur, tibi minuetur. Inimicus tuus, quia malus est, inimicus est; fit bonus, et amicus erit, et socius erit; ut simul velis possidere quod amabas, iam frater erit".

[93]) A. Nygren, *Agape and Eros*, p. 550. Nygren gives two examples in his footnote 5: (1) *De Vera Religione* 262 (CSEL 77,67) = 48,93 (CC 32,248. ML 34,164): "Sapientem animam atque perfectam talem diligat qualem illam videt; stultam non talem, sed quia esse perfecta et sapiens potest ...". (2) *De Catechizandis Rudibus* 27,55 (CC 46,178. ML 40,348): "Omnes ama: quoniam nescis, quid cras futurus sit, qui hodie malus est".

that our contention regarding the increasing prominence of the enemy himself at this period is considerably shaken; according to Anders Nygren, Augustinian love fails even here to escape from the hold of requiring a motivation. On the contrary, however, it is in our very love for the enemy as a potential brother that this worth comes to light and may be realised. The enemy's value as a brother is not so much a motive for loving him as love itself revealing its creative skill. "Love all human beings, even your enemies, not because they are brothers, but *so that they may be brothers (ut fratres sint)* ... love your enemy with fraternal love; he is not yet your brother, but you love him *so that he may be your brother (ut sit frater)*"[94]). In loving an enemy, then, we love what we wish him to become, that is, a person who embraces goodness, who himself becomes a lover[95]), who shares with us as a brother in life with

The first example does indeed appear to support Nygren's assertion that love finds a motive in the potential worth of the other, be he foolish or an enemy. But observing how the passage continues is not without its reward: "... stultam non talem, sed quia esse perfecta et sapiens potest: quia nec seipsum debet stultum diligere. *Nam qui se diligit stultum, non proficiet ad sapientiam*; nec fiet quisquis qualis cupit esse, nisi se oderit qualis est. Sed donec ad sapientiam perfectionemque veniatur, eo animo ferat stultitiam proximi, quo suam ferret, si stultus esset, et amaret sapientiam". This is a clear example of Augustine's understanding of loving one's neighbour as oneself. One desires wisdom for the neighbour and aids him to it.

Immediately following the second example quoted by Nygren is: "Nec eorum ames iniustitiam, *sed ipsos ideo ama, ut apprehendant iustitiam* ...". In other words, their future goodness is not so much a motive for love as, similarly to the previous example, the goal that one seeks to see realised in the other in actually loving one's enemies. It may turn out that the enemy, despite our love, chooses not to embrace goodness but rather to remain in his sins. The fact that we do not know whether the evil person's future worth, supposed by Nygren as a motivation for Augustinian love, may ever be actualised, means that for Augustine love can be elicited without their being any certainty that the grounds for its so-called motivation will be realised. The enemy's embracing goodness is nothing more than a possibility founded in the mystery of God's grace and the other's freedom. If it provides a motivation for love, it is a motivation that always remains beyond our grasp, hypothetical and unverifiable. The very changeableness of human beings makes this so. Even a friend may turn out to be an enemy; see *De Civitate Dei* 19,8 (CC 48,672. CSEL 40/2,385. ML 41,634-635); *Epistola* 73,3,10 (CSEL 34/2,277. ML 33,250): "Verumtamen ex amico intimo factus inimicus ...". On this theme of human fickleness and our uncertainty about people's future, see T.J. van Bavel, *Augustinus*, p. 32-33. This uncertainty effectively cancels the possible motivational value of an enemy's future option for the good. For Augustine this is rather an option to be kept open and worked for despite enmity and changeableness, and because the sway of God's grace on our enemy's freedom remains an unknown full of hope for us.

[94]) *In Epistolam Ioannis*, tr. 10,7 (ML 35,2059): "Omnes homines, etiam inimicos vestros diligatis: non quia sunt fratres, sed *ut fratres sint* ... Tu dilige, et fraterno amore dilige: nondum est frater, sed ideo diligis *ut sit frater*".

[95]) *Ibid.*, "... ut semper fraterno amore flagretis, sive in fratrem factum, sive in inimicum, *ut frater fiat diligendo*".

God. This is the perspective we have on his life and which determines our conduct towards him. That this future value of the enemy is a goal to be aimed at rather than a motivation reducing the risk of loss we take in loving him is shown by the examples adduced by Augustine in the continuation of the passage from tr. 8,10.

> If I am not mistaken I have already given you the example of the log of hard oak. A good craftsman sees that unhewn wood that has been cut in the forest, and he likes the look of it, even though I do not know precisely what he is going to make out of it. He likes it, but not to leave it just as it is. Because of his skill he sees all kinds of future possibilities in that wood. He doesn't remain fixed in his attachment to the wood as it is now. He already loves what he will make out of it.
>
> This was the way God loved us when we were sinners. For Christ said: "It is not the healthy who need a doctor but the sick" (Matt. 9.12). The intention of God's love was not that we should remain sinners. God, the craftsman, looked upon us as lumber from the forest. He already had in mind what he wanted to build with it, and he no longer had the wood in mind as it originally was.
>
> You should look upon your enemy like this too. Your enemy opposes you, he hurts you with his biting words, embitters you with his insults, and rails at you out of hatred. But through all this you see that he too is a human being. You perceive that all he does against you is the work of a human being. But you see the human being himself as the work of God. He has God to thank for the fact that he is a human being. The person himself is responsible for his hatred and envy of you. You should then say in your heart: God, show him your favour, forgive him his sins, make him shake with fear of you, change him. Do not love him as he now is, but as you want him to be. Therefore, when you love your enemy, you in fact love a brother[96]).

[96]) *Ibid.*, tr. 8,10 (ML 35,2042): "Dixeram aliquando Charitati vestrae, nisi fallor: Robur est ligni positum ante oculos; faber optimus vidit lignum non dolatum, de silva praecisum, adamavit: nescio quid inde vult facere. Non enim ad hoc amavit, ut semper sic maneat. In arte vidit quod futurum est, non in amore quod est; et amavit quod inde facturus est, non illud quod est. Sic et nos Deus amavit peccatores: ait enim, *Non est opus sanis medicus, sed male habentibus* (Matt. 9.12). Numquid ad hoc amavit peccatores, ut peccatores remaneremus? Quasi lignum de silva vidit nos faber, et cogitavit aedificium quod inde facturus est, non silvam quod erat. Sic et tu respicis inimicum tuum adversantem, saevientem, mordentem verbis, exasperantem contumeliis, insectantem odiis; attendis ibi quia homo est. Vides ista omnia quae adversa sunt ab homine facta; et vides in illo quod a Deo factus est. Quod autem homo factus est, a Deo factus est. Quod autem te odit, ipse fecit; quod invidet, ipse fecit. Et quid dicis in animo tuo? Domine, propitius illi esto, dimitte illi peccata; incute illi terrorem, muta illum. Non amas in illo quod est, sed quod vis ut sit. Ergo cum inimicum amas, fratrem amas". D. Dideberg, *Saint Augustin et la première*

A skilled craftsman sees all kinds of possibilities in unhewn wood. It is God the craftsman's plan that sinners should not remain sinners. Likewise, the person who loves his enemy sees through all the harassment he suffers at the hands of the enemy to 'the human being himself as the work of God'. Our prayer for the enemy is to be that God in his favour change him[97]) and, forgiving his hatred and envy, make him our brother. Our attitude towards enemies is to be based on God's patience in bringing human beings to repentance and so allowing the skilled work of his creative art to shine out; it is to be based on the appeasement of God who, even knowing those who will remain in their sins, allows his sun to shine on good and evil (Matt. 5.45). Without patience and appeasement — in other words, without becoming like God by loving our enemies as he has loved us[98]) — the danger is that inimical situations in the present will absorb all our attention and cause us to hate a person, a human being created by God, who is to reign with us in eternal happiness[99]). To hate a person is to lose the future perspective on his life

épître de saint Jean, Paris, 1975, p. 70, remarks of this love of God and Christ on which our love for enemies is to be modelled: "Mais dans le huitième *Tractatus* le caractère transformant de leur amour est fortement souligné".

[97]) See also *En. in ps.* 69,3 (CC 49,933. ML 36,868) which seeks to answer the question how martyrs who, in the words of the psalm, wish confusion and shame on their persecutors (Ps. 69(70).2), can be said to be followers of Christ who prayed that his executioners would be forgiven (Lk. 23.34). The solution given is that wishing confusion and shame on enemies is directed to their conversion. "Saulus ille qui Stephanum persecutus est, confusus est et reveritus. Anhelabat caedes, quaerebat quos adtraharet et necaret: audita desuper voce: *Saule, Saule, quid me persequeris* (Acts 9.4), confusus et prostratus, et erectus ad oboediendum qui inflammatus erat ad persequendum. Hoc ergo optant martyres inimicis suis: *Confundantur et revereantur* ... Si enim confundentur, et convertentur, quia converti non possunt, nisi confusi fuerint, et reveriti. Optemus ergo haec inimicis nostris; securi optemus". Cf. *En. in ps.* 132,8 (CC 40,1932. ML 37,1734). Stephen's rage at his executioners was motivated by an invincible love directed to their conversion: "Quare saeviebat cum audiretur? Quia mutare volebat eos a quibus audiebatur. Venientibus in se lapidibus non victa est caritas ...".

[98]) See *In Epistolam Ioannis*, tr. 9,3 (ML 35,2047): "Si ergo ad hanc perfectionem nos invitat Deus, ut diligamus inimicos nostros sicut et ipse dilexit suos; ea nobis fiducia est in die judicii, *quia sicut ille est, et nos sumus in hoc mundo* (1 Jn. 4.17): quia sicut ille diligit inimicos suos, faciendo solem suum oriri super bonos et malos, et pluendo super justos et injustos, ita nos quia inimicis nostris non possumus praestare solem et pluviam, praestamus lacrymas, cum pro illis oramus"; *En. in ps.* 39,4 (CC 38,427. ML 36,435): "Laudans ergo invoca Dominum; noli eum putare similem tibi, ut similis fias illi. *Estote enim sicut Pater vester perfecti, qui solem suum oriri facit super bonos et malos, et pluit super iustos et iniustos* (Matt. 5.48 & 45). Sic ergo lauda Dominum, ut nolis male inimicis tuis".

[99]) *Sermo* 149,18 (ML 38,807): "... Diliges proximum tuum, ibi sunt omnes homines, etiamsi fuerint inimici: quia etiam secundum spiritualem propinquitatem nescis quid tibi sit in praescientia Dei homo, qui tibi ad tempus videtur inimicus. Quia enim

that penetrates beyond his hurtful wickedness to God's work (*"quod a Deo factus est"*) and to cease to hope and pray and do what we can that he be changed and enjoy God with us, so that the Artist's plan may be fully realised. Christ, after all, instructed us to love our enemies "not so that they remain our enemies forever. That would be to propagate hatred, not love". Augustine thus invites his hearers

> (to) look at the love of Christ himself. "Father, forgive them, for they do not know what they are doing" (Luke 23.34). He did not want his executioners to remain as they were. He wished to make different people of those for whom he asked forgiveness. He wanted to make brothers of his enemies, and this is indeed what he did. Christ was put to death, he was buried, rose, ascended into heaven, and sent the Holy Spirit on his disciples. The disciples began to proclaim his name with confidence and to work miracles in the name of the crucified and slain one. Those who put Christ to death saw this. Thus, those who had shed his blood in violence later drank it in faith[100]).

Love's work, then, is to make different people of those for whom we ask forgiveness. Those, who like Stephen pray that their enemies be saved from eternal death and join God's company and theirs, walk in the way of the Lord; their prayer for forgiveness, like that of Christ on the cross, is directed to turning men of blood into men of faith[101]). But

patientia Dei ad poenitentiam eum adducit, fortassis cognoscet et sequetur ducentem. Si enim Deus ipse qui novit qui sint in peccatis perseveraturi ... tamen facit solem suum oriri super bonos et malos ... quanta sollicitudine placabilem oportet esse hominem, ne forte nesciens qualis futurus sit, cum praesentes ejus inimicitias attenderit, oderit eum cum quo in aeterna felicitate regnabit? Imple ergo praeceptum primum, Dilige proximum tuum, omnem hominem; et oderis inimicum tuum, diabolum. Imple et secundum. Dilige inimicos tuos, sed homines: ora pro eis qui te persequuntur, sed pro hominibus: bene fac eis qui te oderunt, sed hominibus".

[100]) *In Epistolam Ioannis*, tr. 8,10 (ML 35,2042): "Attende quare te monuit Christus ut diligas inimicos. Numquid ut semper remaneant inimici? Si ad hoc te monuit ut inimici remaneant, odis, non diligis. Attende quomodo ipse dilexit, id est, quia nolebat ut sic remanerent persecutores; ait, *Pater, ignosce illis, quia nesciunt quid faciunt* (Lk. 23.34). Quibus voluit ignosci, mutari illos voluit: quos voluit mutari, ex inimicis fratres facere dignatus est, et vere sic fecit. Occisus est, sepultus est, resurrexit, in coelum ascendit, Spiritum sanctum misit discipulis; coeperunt cum fiducia praedicare nomen ipsius, miracula faciebant in nomine crucifixi et occisi: viderunt illi interfectores Domini; et qui sanguinem ejus saeviendo fuderunt, credendo biberunt".

[101]) *In Epistolam Ioannis*, tr. 1,9 (ML 35,1985): "Sic dilige inimicos tuos, ut fratres optes; sic dilige inimicos tuos, ut in societatem tuam vocentur. Sic enim dilexit ille qui in cruce pendens ait: *Pater, ignosce illis, quia nesciunt quid faciunt* (Lk. 23.34) ... Mortem sempiternam ab eis expellebat, prece misericordissima, et potentia praestantissima. Multi ex eis crediderunt, et dimissus est eis fusus sanguis Christi. Primo fuderunt cum saevirent,

Stephen, following Christ, was prepared to go so far as to give up his life on behalf of his persecutors, among whom was his potential brother Saul, for whose conversion he prayed[102]). Love of enemies "so that they may embrace goodness" *("ut apprehendant iustitiam")* and become men of faith is, therefore, a matter of action, even it may be of the ultimate act of martyrdom. What can be said of the attentiveness required of love in general applies *a fortiori* to love of enemies.

> If you want to live in love, then first be aware that love is no trifling matter; it is not something cheap and easy for which nothing has to be done. One lives in love not just by being good-humoured. That's putting it too mildly. More precisely, the lazy, the indifferent, and the nonchalant are not living in love. Don't think that you love your servant just because you refrain from striking him, or that you love your child if you don't bother to teach him discipline, or that you love your neighbours if you never speak sharply to them. That is not love, but weakness[103]).

If we are not to think that we love our neighbour if we never speak to him, then how can we justify taking up an indifferent and nonchalant

nunc biberunt cum crederent ... Fixus in cruce erat, et in ipsa via ambulabat: ipsa est via charitatis, *Pater, ignosce illis, quia nesciunt quid faciunt*. Sic ergo, si didiceris orare pro inimico tuo, ambulas viam Domini".

[102]) *Ibid.*, tr. 5,4 (ML 35,2014): "Accipere autem calicem salutarem, et invocare nomen Domini, hoc est satiari charitate; et ita satiari, ut non solum non oderis fratrem, sed paratus sis mori pro fratre. Perfecta ista charitas est, ut paratus sis mori pro fratre. Hanc ipse Dominus in se exhibuit, mortuus pro omnibus, orans pro eis a quibus crucifigebatur, et dicens: *Pater, ignosce illis, quia nesciunt quid faciunt*. Sed si solus hoc fecit, non erat magister, si discipulos non habebat. Secuti discipuli hoc fecerunt. Lapidabatur Stephanus, et genu fixo ait: *Domine, ne statuas illis hoc delictum* (Acts 7.59). Amabat a quibus occidebatur, quia et pro ipsis moriebatur. Audi et apostolum Paulum: *Et ipse*, inquit, *impendar pro animabus vestris* (2 Cor. 12.15). Inter illos enim erat pro quibus Stephanus deprecabatur, quando eorum manibus moriebatur. Perfecta ergo charitas haec est. Si quis tantam habuerit charitatem, ut paratus sit pro fratribus etiam mori, perfecta est in illo charitas".

Cf. *Sermo* 319,4 (ML 38,1441): Stephen stood to pray for himself, but knelt to pray for his enemies. Was this not to go beyond the requirement of loving his neighbour as himself (Matt. 22.39)? Rather he knew that because of his enemies' wickedness he would have so much more difficulty in being heard. He thus adapted his prayer to the toughness of the intended beneficiary. In forgiving and dying for his executioners, he followed the Lamb of God whose blood takes away the sin of the world.

[103]) *In Epistolam Ioannis*, tr. 7,11 (ML 35,2034): "Si qui forte vultis servare charitatem, fratres, ante omnia ne putetis abjectam et desidiosam; nec quadam mansuetudine, imo non mansuetudine, sed remissione et negligentia servari charitatem. Non sic servatur. Non putes tunc te amare servum tuum, quando eum non caedis; aut tunc te amare filium tuum, quando ei non das disciplinam: aut tunc te amare vicinum tuum, quando eum non corripis: non est ista charitas, sed languor".

attitude towards the person of our enemy? We have no right, according to Augustine, to leave a person with a weak character *(indisciplinatus)* to his fate because we fear chastising him. It may sometimes be necessary to speak hard words to another in order to put him on the right path[104]). It is clear that Augustine presupposes that the one loving knows what the right path is; as we have seen, Augustine would be concerned to keep him away from others if he had not learned to love himself properly in loving God. It is also to be be considered that assertions of this kind in the commentary on 1 John have at least an indirect reference to the use of such measures in relation to the Donatists.

This is too wide-ranging and controversial a question to be dealt with here, but it can with safety be stated that the dispute with the Donatists brought Augustine up against real enemies, and this in part may account for his more explicit treatment of the figure of the enemy after 400. Particularly in *In Epistolam Ioannis* his desire for what is best for his enemies, that is, life with God, his exhortations to work actively for this in one's dealings with those in sin and in error, and his encouragement for reconciliation with them as brothers in love are unmistakable. These assertions give us an impression of openness and forgiveness in the face of the enemy. Trying to make of the enemy a friend and a brother is to have the same open, God-orientated perspective on his life as we have on our own. We do not condemn or simply ignore the inimical other, and thereby privatise our own relationship with God or remain within the confines of safe love of neighbour. We are prepared to deal with and to hope even for enemies as "God's work". To be sure, it is Augustine's conviction that the Donatists are wrong. In the passage quoted at the beginning of this section, although Augustine expresses that he is willing to give up the episcopacy in order to aid reunion, he does not conceal that he expects the Donatists to come over to the *Catholica*. "I wish to be yours, *if you reform*". But need the fact that he takes a convinced doctrinal and political stand make his concern for his enemies' future and his invitation to brotherhood any less

[104]) *Ibid.*, tr. 10,7 (ML 35,2059): "Dilige, non potest fieri nisi bene facias. Sed forte corripis? Amor hoc facit, non saevitia. Sed forte caedis? Ad disciplinam facis; quia amor ipsius dilectionis non te permittit negligere indisciplinatum ... Alter videt amicum suum tale aliquid facere, revocat; si illum non audiat, profert verba etiam castigationis, objurgat, litigat: aliquando venitur ad hanc necessitatem ut litiget. Ecce odium blanditur, et charitas litigat. Noli attendere verba blandientis, et quasi saevitiam objurgantis; venam inspice, radicem unde procedant quaere. Ille blanditur ut decipiat, iste litigat ut corrigat".

genuine? These are the very elements which mark an advance in emphasis over the pre-400 texts for which, in the main, love of enemies effected the personal reconciliation of the lover with God. Augustine's principle is to distinguish the error made by human beings from the human beings themselves, created by God; the latter is to be loved, not the former. And when human beings are loved as "God's work", the errors they make can be corrected and taken away[105]). This was the principle Augustine encouraged religious to be led by in dealing with wayward confreres: love for people and aversion for their faults[106]). Might Augustine himself not have been attempting the delicate task of transferring this principle to a wider public stage when, faced with hostile opponents whom he considered to be in grave and damaging error, he urged them to take advantage of the breadth of the love commandment and to acknowledge that with him they belonged to God?

> Acknowledge me as a brother. I acknowledge you as a brother. But put an end to the schism, the error, the discord. Have these set right and you are mine. Or perhaps you do not wish to be mine. I wish to be yours, if you reform. Therefore, when the error that stands between us like a wall made up of the rubble of contradiction and of division has been demolished, be my brother and I will be your brother, so that we may both belong to him who is my Lord and yours[107]).

Augustine's exhortations to those who lived in the religious communities under his direction may be summarised in the injunction, "honour God in one another, because each of you has become his temple"[108]). Just as above we found the principle of love for people and aversion for their faults, which is enshrined in the Rule, reflected in Augustine's gropings to find a most human solution to the controversy with the Donatists, so what may be taken as the Rule's essence, namely, "honour God in one another", can also be heard echoing in Augustine's approach to his Donatist enemies. For in his letter of 401 to Theodorus he writes:

[105]) *Ibid.*, tr. 7,11 (ML 35,2035): "Noli in homine amare errorem, sed hominem: hominem enim Deus fecit, errorem ipse homo fecit. Ama illud quod Deus fecit, noli amare quod ipse homo fecit. Cum illud amas, illud tollis: cum illud diligis, illud emendas. Sed etsi saevis aliquando, propter correctionis dilectionem".

[106]) *Rule* 4,10 (Verheijen, p. 428): "... cum dilectione hominum et odio vitiorum".

[107]) *Sermo* 358,4 (ML 39,1588).

[108]) *Rule* 1,8 (Verheijen, p. 420): "... honorate in vobis invicem deum cuius templa facti estis".

> But therefore we grieve for those who go astray (i.e. the Donatists) and through the love of Christ we want to win them for God ... Could we but take from our midst the evils of men and pay honour to God's good gifts in them (*et honorentur in hominibus bona Dei*), we might regain our brotherly concord and the peace we long for, the devil's promptings being overcome in men's hearts by the love of Christ[109]).

Even in enemies, therefore, God is to be honoured, for they too are "God's work" and bearers of his good gifts. The desired outcome of this paying honour to God in one another is brotherly concord and peace amongst those who had once been enemies.

II. LOVE OF NEIGHBOUR 'AS ONESELF' AND 'AS CHRIST HAS LOVED US'

A. Love of neighbour 'as oneself'

Having in a previous article given a character sketch of the self to be loved according to the Lord's commandment of Matt. 22.39, and having now in the former part of this article devoted ourselves to an investigation of the identity of the neighbour and the designations by which neighbours are referred to, we are in a position to gain some insight into what for Augustine constitutes the fulfilment of the second part of the great commandment, to love this neighbour as oneself. Of course, in marshalling the arguments to support our understanding of the figures of the self and the neighbour and of the roles Augustine perceives them playing in relation to the love commandment, we have in a sense already given the game away. If the self to be loved according to the commandment is that self which is totally, heart, mind and soul, in love with God, then to love the neighbour as the self will inevitably mean bringing him face to face with *ex toto* love for God. In the previous article, however, we were more concerned with those assertions of Augustine in which he seeks to shield the neighbour from the havoc that can be wreaked by a perverse love of self — one, that is, in which the self is not fully intent upon God and his commandment — if this is given free

[109]) *Epistola* 61,1 (CSEL 34/2,223. ML 33,229): "Sed propterea dolemus errantes, et eos per caritatem Christi lucrari Deo cupimus ... Si ergo tollantur de medio mala hominum, et honorentur in hominibus bona Dei; erit fraterna concordia, et amabilis pax, ut in cordibus hominum vincat persuasionem diaboli, caritas Christi". For this reference, and also in part for the translation, I am indebted to J. Burnaby, *Amor Dei*, p. 103.

rein to establish relationships with its neighbours similar to its relationship to itself. Our intention here is to do nothing more than to spell out the positive implications for the neighbour of a love based on sound, God-orientated love of self. But even the fruits of such a survey have not been unanticipated in this work. In endeavouring to establish the identity of the neighbour and to resolve conflicts arising from Augustine's manner of denoting neighbours, it has more often than not also been necessary to indicate to some extent what loving the neighbour means. There is, however, still a value in grouping the more important references together and offering a brief, systematic exposition of the theme, not least as a means of synthesising the results of the previous article and of the earlier part of the present one in order to enable us to approach the *magna quaestio* of the following article, i.e. in how far and in what sense does Augustine see this love of neighbour as forming a unity with love of God?

1. De Moribus 1,26,49 and parallels

> Now you love yourself in a salutary manner if you love God more than yourself. Therefore, what you do on your own behalf, you must do also for your neighbour; that is to say, *you should deal with him in such a way that he too may love God with perfect love.* For you do not love him as yourself if you do not *strive to lead him (adducere) towards that which you yourself are setting your course.* And this is the one good that is not diminished by the multitude striving to reach it with you[110]).

A text from *De Vera Religione*, written two years later, makes it quite plain that the perfect love of God to which we are to lead the neighbour we love as ourselves is a love 'with all that lives in us'.

> Thus a person becomes spiritual, judging all things, while he himself is judged by no one (1 Cor. 2.15). Such a person loves the Lord his God with his whole heart, his whole soul and his whole mind, and he loves his neighbour not according to the flesh, but as himself. *The person who loves himself spiritually, however, is the one who loves God with all that lives in him (qui ex toto quod in eo vivit,*

[110]) *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae* 1,26,49 (ML 32,1331-1332): "Te autem salubriter diligis, si plus quam te diligis Deum. Quod ergo agis tecum, id agendum cum proximo est, hoc est ut ipse etiam perfecto amore diligat Deum. Non enim eum diligis tanquam teipsum, si non ad id bonum ad quod ipse tendis adducere satagis. Illud est enim unum bonum, quod omnibus tecum tendentibus non fit angustum".

Deum diligit). For "on these two precepts the whole Law and the Prophets depend" (Matt. 22.40)[111]).

It is but a short step from this to the open assertion of *De Doctrina Christiana* that "whoever loves his neighbour rightly ought to act in his regard in such a way that the neighbour himself may also love God with all the heart, all the soul, and all the mind"[112]). In the various expressions of this idea it is crucial to understand that the primary meaning of love for neighbour is that to the best of our ability we instil in him an openness to, hope in and love for the God who demands our all and who answers self-gift by himself in his goodness becoming all in all; any approach to the neighbour's life which stifled or obscured this essential dimension would be to hate him and to encourage him to hate himself. Thus, love for neighbour may be described, as above in *De Moribus*, as leading *(ducere — adducere — perducere)* him to God, or to love God as we do[113]). Augustine provides a gloss on this formulation in *Epistola* 155: "(The person who loves himself loving God) ought therefore also to love his neighbour as himself so as to bring whomever he can *to worship God*. He does this by encouraging others with kindness, by explaining the teaching to them, and by keeping their lives in check with corrective instruction"[114]). Elsewhere, love of neighbour may be presented in terms of devoting oneself to or inspiring *(impendere)* one's neighbour so that he may love God[115]); being concerned with *(consulere)* or being of benefit to *(prodesse)* him to this end[116]); or acting

[111]) *De Vera Religione* 66 (CSEL 77,18) = 12,24 (CC 32,202. ML 34,132): "Ita fit homo spiritalis omnia iudicans, ut ipse a nemine iudicetur, diligens dominum deum suum *in toto corde, in tota anima, in tota mente* et diligens proximum suum non carnaliter, sed tamquam se ipsum; se autem spiritaliter diligit qui ex toto quod in eo vivit deum diligit. *In his* enim *duobus praeceptis tota lex pendet et prophetae*".

[112]) *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,43 (CSEL 80,19) = 1,22,21 (CC 32,18. ML 34,27): "Quisquis ergo recte diligit proximum, hoc cum eo debet agere, ut etiam ipse toto corde, tota anima, tota mente diligat deum".

[113]) Cf. *De Civitate Dei* 10,3 (CC 47,275. CSEL 40/1,450. ML 41,281): "Hoc bonum diligere in toto corde, in tota anima et in tota virtute praecipimur; ad hoc bonum debemus et a quibus diligimur *duci*, et quos diligimus *ducere*"; *Epistola* 130,7,14 (CSEL 44,55. ML 33,499): "... et ex alio praecepto proximos nostros sicut nosmetipsos ita vere diligimus, si eos ad Dei similem dilectionem, quantum in nobis est, *perducamus*".

[114]) *Epistola* 155,4,15 (CSEL 44,446. ML 33,673): "Debet ergo et proximum diligere tamquam seipsum, ut quem potuerit hominem vel beneficentiae consolatione, vel informatione doctrinae, vel disciplinae coercitione *adducat* ad colendum Deum".

[115]) *Epistola* 167,5,16 (CSEL 44,604. ML 33,739): "Nemo autem diligit proximum, nisi diligens Deum, ut hoc, quantum potest, *impendat*, quem diligit tamquam semetipsum, ut et ille diligat Deum; quem si ipse non diligit, nec se, nec proximum diligit".

[116]) *De Civitate Dei* 19,14 (CC 47,681. CSEL 40/2,399. Ml 41,642-643): "... ille in se

towards others in such a way that they too may reach God and be freed with us for eternity[117]). Sometimes the urgency of this commission is emphasised by the use of the verb *rapere*: "When therefore you have learnt to love yourself in loving God, seize your neighbour and draw him on towards God *(rape proximum ad Deum)* so that together you may enjoy the great good that God is"[118]). This is to love others "in God" *(in Deo)*, that is, so that they may cling to God without whom, in their frailty, they go their own way and are lost[119]).

A sermon from prior to 410 enriches still further our vocabulary of love for neighbour. "God will be complete to as many as you are able to persuade, to invite, to summon and to urge to love him. God will give himself wholly to all and to each one individually"[120]). This text, along with others we shall look at shortly, presents the God whom we love *ex toto* as the common, inexhaustible good, in the possession of whom there can be no jealousy or fear that sharing with others may mean less for me. The element that attracts our attention now, however, is the phrase, which in a number of forms recurs regularly in these settings, "as many as you are able" *(quantiscumque potueris)*. For example, "let us too love one another in such a way that, insofar as we can *(quantum possumus)*, we may attract one another by the solicitude of love to have God in our midst"[121]). An examination of the instances of this and similar usages

diligendo non errat, qui Deum diligit; consequens est, ut etiam proximo ad diligendum Deum *consulat*, quem iubetur sicut se ipsum diligere ..."; *De Diversis Quaestionibus* 83, q. 36,3 (CC 44A,57. ML 40,26): "Si autem placere hominibus ideo vis, ut eis *prosis* ad diligendum deum, non iam hoc (i.e. the praise of men) sed aliud cupis".

[117]) *En. in ps.* 118, *sermo* 8,2 (CC 40,1686. ML 37,1520): "Petant itaque ne abscondantur ab eis mandata Dei, per quae ab hoc incolatu liberentur, diligendo Deum, cum quo in aeternum erunt; et diligendo proximum, ut illic sit ubi et ipsi erunt".

[118]) *Sermo Denis* 17,6 (MA I,87): "Cum ergo te didiceris diligere diligendo deum, *rape* proximum ad eum, ut simul fruaris bono, et tanto bono, quod deus est". Cf. *Sermo* 90,10 (ML 38,566): "Prius diligite Deum. Extendite ad Deum; et quos poteritis, *rapite* ad Deum. Inimicus est: rapiatur ad Deum. Filius est, uxor est, servus est: rapiatur ad Deum. Peregrinus est: rapiatur ad Deum. Inimicus est: rapiatur ad Deum. Rape, rape inimicum: rapiendo non erit inimicus"; *En. in ps.* 72,34 (CC 39,1003. ML 36,929): "Ama Deum gratis: nulli invideas Deum. *Rapite* eum quotquot potestis, quotquot possessuri estis ...".

[119]) *Confessiones* 4,12,18 (Skutella 67. CSEL 33,78. ML 32,700): "Si placent animae, in Deo amentur, quia et ipsae mutabiles sunt et in illo fixae stabiliuntur: alioquin irent et perirent. In illo ergo amentur, et rape ad eum tecum quas potes et dic eis: 'Hunc amemus, hunc amemus: ipse fecit haec et non est longe'".

[120]) *Sermo Wilmart* 2,4 (MA I,677): "Quantiscumque potueris persuadere, quotquot potueris invitare, vocare, cogere ad diligendum Deum, et omnibus totus est, et singulis totus est".

[121]) *Tractatus in Evangelium Ioannis* 65,2 (CC 36,492. ML 35,1809): "Sic ergo et nos invicem diligamus, ut *quantum possumus*, invicem ad habendum in nobis Deum cura

prompts us to conclusions different from those of Gunnar Hultgren who interprets *quantum potest* expressions as weakening the force of a determined generous action by attenuating the obligation formulated by the love commandment[122]). Our view is that the intention of this qualifier associated with love in response to the commandment is threefold. Firstly, it alerts us to the fact that, for all our kindness, concern and powers of persuasion, there is a limit not only to the number of those we can help and influence to love God, but also to the extent to which our words and actions can affect another human being's decisions. In other words, Augustine hereby recognises that it is in inviolable freedom that the neighbour loves God, and this implies that our best efforts to inspire, lead and draw others to this end, our common good, may be to no avail. The sovereign freedom of the neighbour is preserved. Secondly, *quantum potest* clauses keep us mindful of the limitedness of our human resources when it comes to the highest activity of loving. Nor is Augustine unaware that we too stand in need of our neighbour's love

dilectionis adtrahamus". See also *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae* 1,28,56 (ML 32,1334): "Qui ergo diligit proximum, agit *quantum potest* ut salvus corpore salvusque animo sit ..."; *De Vera Religione* 244 (CSEL 77,62) = 46,86 (CC 32,244. ML 34,161): "Non illi (i.e. proximo) ergo invidet, ut sit quod ipse est, immo adiuvat etiam *quantum potest*"; 255 (CSEL 77,65) = 47,90 (CC 32,246. ML 34,162): "... praestat ei (i.e. proximo) *quod potest*, quia et sibi ipsi ..."; 256 (CSEL 77,66) = 47,91 (CC 32,246-247. ML 34,163): "Hic vir quamdiu est in hac vita ... utitur *quibus potest* ad beneficentiam, utitur omnibus ad benevolentiam ... pro eorum sorte hominibus consulit, si aequaliter non potest omnibus"; *Epistola* 155,4,14 (CSEL 44,444. ML 33,672): "Ad illum (i.e. Deum) *quanta opera possumus*, etiam illi ut perveniant agamus, quos tamquam nosmetipsos diligimus"; *Epistola* 155,4,15 (CSEL 44,446. ML 33,673): "Debet ergo et proximum diligere tamquam seipsum, ut *quem potuerit hominem* ... adducat ad colendum Deum ..."; *De Civitate Dei* 10,3 (CC 47,276. CSEL 40/1,45. ML 41,281): "... cum mandatur de proximo diligendo sicut se ipsum, quid aliud mandatur, nisi ut *quantum potest*, commendet diligendum Deum"; *Epistola* 167,5,16 (CSEL 44,604. ML 33,739): "Nemo autem diligit proximum, nisi diligens Deum, ut hoc, *quantum potest*, impendat, quem diligit tamquam semetipsum, ut et ille diligat Deum ..."; *Epistola* 130,7,14 (CSEL 44,55-56. ML 33,499): "... et ex alio praecepto proximos nostros sicut nosmetipsos ita vere diligimus, si eos ad Dei similem dilectionem, *quantum in nobis est*, perducamus"; *Sermo* 91,7,9 (ML 38,571): "... eroget de cellario Domini, ministret conservis cibaria, confortet fideles, revocet errantes, quaerat perditos, *quantum potest* faciat"; *Confessiones* 4,12,18 (Skutella 67. CSEL 33,78. ML 32,700): "... rape ad eum (Deum) tecum *quas* (animas) *potes* ...".

[122]) G. Hultgren, *op. cit.*, p. 178: "C'est ainsi que la force qui nous pousse à une action généreuse et déterminée se trouve affaiblie par une *atténuation de l'obligation formulée par le commandement de l'amour*. Il faut prêter aide, 'autant que cela est permis et ordonné' (*De Quantitate Animae* 34,78). Il faut aider son prochain, 'autant qu'on le peut' (*De Vera Religione* 46,86; *De Sermone Domini in Monte* 1,55,67)". These are the sole references given by Hultgren.

and may be led by it to God[123]). The third function of *quantum potest* flows from the second: it focusses our attention on the fact that drawing our neighbour to God is not only God's precept but also his gift[124]).

Quantum potest and companions, therefore, do not imply a debilitating of love, but an acknowledgement of the other's freedom, a realistic appraisal of our own contingent capacities, and the recognition that even the role we play in the neighbour's turning to God is the work of His grace. There is, however, another expression, "*quantum licet atque praeceptum est*", which occurs in *De Quantitate Animae* in relation to

[123]) *De Civitate Dei* 10,3 (CC 47,275. CSEL 40/1,45. ML 41,281): "Ad hoc bonum debemus, et a quibus diligimur duci, et quos diligimus ducere". Cf. *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,63 (CSEL 80,24) = 1,29,30 (CC 32,23. ML 34,30): "Velle tamen debemus ut omnes nobiscum diligant deum, et totum quod eos vel adiuvamus vel adiuvamur ab eis ad unum illum finem referendum est"; *Tractatus in Evangelium Ioannis* 17,9 (CC 36,175. ML 35,1532): "Cum esses languidus, portabat te proximus tuus; sanus factus es, porta proximum tuum: *Invicem onera vestra portate, et sic adimplebitis legem Christi* (Gal. 6.2) ... Porta ergo eum, cum quo ambulas, ut ad eum pervenias, cum quo manere desideras". Thus, the concluding sentence might also be addressed to the neighbour in our regard.

[124]) *Expositio Epistolae ad Galatas* 45 (CSEL 84,119. ML 35,2138): "Item diligere proximum, id est omnem hominem, tamquam seipsum, quis potest, nisi Deum diligat, cuius praecepto et dono dilectionem proximi possit implere?". A few examples of other texts in which love for neighbour is presented as a gift of God are: *De Vera Religione* 259 (CSEL 77,66) = 47,92 (CC 32,247. ML 34,163): "... cuius (i.e. dei) praecepto et dono diligit inimicos"; *De Catechizandis Rudibus* 27,55 (CC 46,178. ML 40,348): "Quam (i.e. the double commandment) non implet, nisi qui donum acceperit spiritum sanctum ..."; *In Epistolam Ioannis*, tr. 6,8.9.10 (ML 35,2024-2026); tr. 7,6 (ML 35,2032); tr. 8,12 (ML 35,2043), in all of which cases the love that is poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who is given to us (cf. Rom. 5.5) is understood to be our love for God and neighbour; tr. 10,7 (ML 35,2059): "... impetrate a Deo ut diligatis invicem"; *En in ps.* 56,1 (CC 39,694. ML 36,661) regarding the fulfilment of Jn. 15.12, i.e. to lay down one's life for one's friends: "... neque imperaret hoc Deus ut faceremus, si impossibile iudicaret ut hoc ab homine fieret ... Adest ille qui praebuit exemplum, ut praebeat et auxilum"; *De Trinitate* 6,5,7 (CC 50,235. ML 42,928): "... *servantes unitatem spiritus in vinculo pacis* (Eph. 4.3). Quod imitari per gratiam, et ad Deum et ad nos ipsos iubemur ..."; 15,17,31 (CC 50A,505-507. ML 42,1082); 15,18,32 (CC 50A,507-508. ML 42,1082-1083); and 15,26,46 (CC 50A,525. ML 42,1093), which again see love for God and for neighbour as a gift in terms of Rom. 5.5; *Epistola* 189,2 (CSEL 57,132. ML 33,854); *Epistola* 196,4,16 (CSEL 57,230. ML 33,898): "... *Diligis proximum tuum tamquam teipsum;* non viribus humanis, quasi nostram constituentes iustitiam, sed *gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum* (Rom. 7.25) ..."; *Tractatus in Evangelium Ioannis* 17,8 (CC 36,175. ML 35,1532): "Dilige ergo proximum, et intuere in te unde diligis proximum; ibi videbis, ut poteris, Deum"; 65,2 (CC 36,492. ML 35,1809): "Ad hoc ergo nos dilexit (Christus), ut et nos diligamus invicem; hoc nobis conferens diligendo nos ..."; 87,1 (CC 36,543-544. ML 35,1852) where the fruit that will last, i.e. love for one another, only flourishes on the vine (cf. Jn. 15.1-17); *En. in ps.* 118, *sermo* 14,2 (CC 40,1709. ML 37,1539) incorporating Rom. 5.5; cf. *Enchiridion* 32,121 (CC 46,113-114. ML 40,288); *En in ps.*118, *sermo* 27,6 (CC 40,1759. ML 37,1582): "Quid igitur orat, nisi ut praecepta quae Deus imponit iubendo, impleri faciat adiuvando".

helping souls related to our own who are in error and in trouble[125]). Presumably the *licet* refers to the point we have already noticed in the *Soliloquia*, the *Rule* and elsewhere that the person is to be loved, not the error; *praeceptum* indubitably connotes the commandment to love the neighbour as the self. But, one may ask, as Augustine does in *De Mendacio* (394-395 A.D.), whether for example the love of neighbour envisaged by the precept makes it permissible to tell a lie in order to save the life of another. Because "love of neighbour takes its *terminus* (limit-measure?) from one's own love of self" *("dilectio proximi ex sua cujusque terminum accepit")* and because to tell a lie is to bring eternal loss upon oneself, Augustine concludes that a person is not justified in lying, and thereby throwing away his eternal good, in order to gain temporal good for another. We might object that it is an exaggeration to say that a lie of this sort has such devastating consequences. Whether or not this is so, however, does not alter Augustine's principal thought here for he continues: "if a person loses his temporal life for another's temporal life, this is then to love the other not as himself, but more than himself, which goes beyond the rule of sound teaching *(quod sanae doctrinae regulam excedit)*. Much less, therefore, is he by lying to lose his eternal life for another's temporal life"[126]). It has been said of this text: "... there is no room for personal spontaneous sacrifice in this order, and it is this which explains the deformation of love"[127]). In fact, the "order" of reality reflected by the precept, "the rule of sound teaching", it has been claimed, favours egoism and prevents love for neighbour from developing fully[128]).

However, it is a matter for reflection how much weight should be given to this passage which occurs in a work that the Augustine of the

[125]) *De Quantitate Animae* 34,78 (ML 32,1078): "Errantibus vero cognatis animis et laborantibus, quantum licet atque praeceptum est, opem ferendam esse sciamus ...".

[126]) *De Mendacio* 6,9 (CSEL 41,426. ML 40,494-495): "Quomodo ergo quisque diligit tamquam seipsum, cui ut praestet vitam temporalem, ipse amittit aeternam? quandoquidem si pro illius temporali vita suam ipsam temporalem perdat, non est iam diligere sicut se ipsum, sed plus quam se ipsum: quod sanae doctrinae regulam excedit. Multo minus igitur aeternam suam alterius temporali mentiendo amissurus est".

[127]) G. Hultgren, *op. cit.*, p. 165: "... le sacrifice personnel spontané, l'amour vivant et actif ne trouvent point de place dans cet ordre, et c'est ce qui explique la déformation de l'amour".

[128]) *Ibid.*, p. 164: "Les égards que l'on doit à son moi peuvent fair obstacle à l'amour du prochain. *Le schéma de l'ordre des rangs* favorise en réalité l'égoïsme et empêche l'amour du prochain de s'épanouir dans toute sa plénitude. Nous en trouvons un exemple frappant dans le *De mendacio*".

Retractationes reveals that he had once decided to remove from his collection of writings and later ordered to be destroyed because he found it "obscure and complicated and altogether unbearable". At the time of the *Retractationes* he says that he chose to retain it because it contained some necessary remarks which were missing from his later work on the same subject, *Contra Mendacium*, and because, even though comprehending it demands effort, such an exercise is useful for the mind and can foster love of truth in practical matters[129]). Is the part of the work we are dealing with then to be judged "obscure and complicated and altogether unbearable", or "necessary" and helpful in the practical pursuit of truth? We can attempt an answer to this question only by indicating the dimensions of love for neighbour this passage clearly has in common with Augustine's subsequent writings, on the one hand, and the notions quite peculiar to this text, on the other. The idea that offends Gunnar Hultgren is that self-love sets a limit *(terminus)* to spontaneous love for neighbour and prevents me from performing the highest act of love, i.e. sacrificing my life so that the other may live. It is as if self-love and love of neighbour were independent entities, the borders of whose territory have to be well-defined and strictly ruspected. To give my life so that another may live on in this world, Hultgren understands Augustine to maintain, is to go beyond the limit. I consider that this conception indeeed crossed Augustine's mind, but rather as a means of emphasising his major argument that to give up one's *eternal* life to save the *temporal* life of another is to exceed the limit *(terminus — regula)* by far; and the question is complicated by his strict acceptance of the dictum: "A lying mouth deals death to the soul" (Wisdom 1.11). This conception, however, did not remain lodged in his mind as an unshakeable rule, for I have been unable to find any similar explanation of *tamquam se ipsum* in his works — that is, one which seems to tend to narrow and to pull back from love of neighbour and to use the commandment to protect oneself from the neighbour's claims[130]).

[129]) *Retractationes* 1,26 (CSEL 36,129-130) = 1,27 (ML 32,630).

[130]) Certainly, there are examples that point out that one's intention in loving one's neighbour ought not to be to please other people, especially if this involves infidelity to Christ, (see *Sermo Denis* 16,6 (MA I, 79): "Peccas propter amicum tuum, et, ne illum offendas, negas Christum ... tantum ne displiceas amico tuo, negas dominum tuum ... quoniam ipse inimicus es tibi, amicum putas inimicum tibi"), but to bring them to love God. See *De Diversis Quaestionibus* 83, q. 36,3 (CC 44A,57. ML 40,26): "Si autem placere hominibus ideo vis, ut eis prosis ad diligendum deum, non iam hoc sed aliud cupis". For Augustine, infidelity to Christ and having death dealt to the soul by pleasing others or by looking for honour and praise from them would make a person incapable of leading his neighbour to love God.

Indeed, when *regula* is later used in such contexts, it frequently has the function, as we have seen, of shielding the neighbour from distorted self-love by orientating all love of self and of neighbour not to any finite end but to God[131]). For *De Doctrina Christiana* the *rectissimus finis* of our love for self is God whom we are commanded to love totally by the "divinely constituted *rule* of love" *(regula dilectionis divinitus constituta)*. *Terminus* has been replaced here by *finis*, such that our love of self does not assign bounds to love of neighbour but provides the widest possible rule for love which calls us to seek to promote our neighbour's greatest good, that is, his eternal life with God[132]). Therefore, the neighbour should not be offended if we love him also to this end: that he too may love God heart, soul and mind[133]). For, in such a way, the neighbour is not cramped nor left out in the cold by the demands of love for self, but it is revealed to him where his true life lies and his course is set towards it.

This corresponds to a further feature of the text from *De mendacio*: a Christian ought not hesitate to give up his temporal life for the eternal life of the other, in accordance with Christ's commandment to lay down one's life lovingly for one's friends (cf. Jn. 15.12-13). For Christ, in doing what he commanded and commanding what he did, sought people's eternal salvation. With the introduction of this idea *De Mendacio* rejoins the mainstream of Augustinian thought, as will be clear when we look

[131]) See *De Disciplina Christiana* 3,3 (CC 46,209-210. ML 40,670-671); *Sermo* 278,8 (ML 38,1272); *En. in ps.* 140,2 (CC 40,2026-2027. ML 37, 1816).

[132]) In *Epistolam Ioannis*, tr. 10,5 (ML 35,2057-2058) Augustine goes in search of this "finis" of Ps. 118(119).96, i.e. "Omnis consummationis vidi finem: latum mandatum tuum valde". He finds it not in money, nor in bodily health, nor in honours and praise. "Si ibi ponis finem, finiris: sed non finiris quasi perficiaris, sed finiris ut consumaris". It is rather in the fulness of love as set forth in 1 Tim. 1.5 and Rom. 13.10. "*Finis enim Legis Christus est, ad justitiam omni credenti* (Rom. 10.4). Et quid est, *finis Christus?* Quia Christus Deus, et finis praecepti charitas, et Deus charitas: quia Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus unum sunt. Ibi tibi finis est: alibi via est. Noli haerere in via, et non pervenire ad finem. Ad quidquid aliud veneris, transi usquequo pervenias ad finem. Quid est finis? *Mihi autem adhaerere Deo bonum est* (Ps. 72.28). Adhaesisti Deo, finisti viam; permanebis in patria". Such then is the "finis" to which one wishes to bring others in loving them. Temporal goods, including life itself, are ambiguous and uncertain; therefore "opta illi ut habeat tecum vitam aeternam; opta illi ut sit frater tuus": tr. 8,10 (ML 35,2041-2042).

[133]) *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,42 (CSEL 80,19) = 1,22,21 (CC 32,17. ML 34, 27): "Si ergo te ipsum non propter te debes diligere, sed propter illum ubi dilectionis tuae rectissimus finis est, non succenseat alius homo, si etiam ipsum propter deum diligis. Haec enim regula dilectionis divinitus constituta est: *Diliges*, inquit, *proximum tuum tamquam te ipsum*, deum vero *ex toto corde, ex tota anima, ex tota mente*, ut omnes cogitationes tuas et omnem vitam et omnem intellectum in illum conferas a quo habes ea ipsa quae confers".

shortly at some usages of John 13.34 and 15.12: "you are to love one another as I have loved you"[134]). The question remains, however, whether in *De Mendacio*, the best (eternal life) is not the enemy of the good (temporal life) and whether Augustine would, for example, have considered Maximilian Kolbe, who volunteered to be executed in the place of a condemned man with a family, to have gone beyond "the rule of sound doctrine". An adequate analysis of these issues would involve, amongst other considerations, a specific analysis of the relation between the temporal and the eternal in Augustine, which as such is beyond the scope of this study, however much its elucidation might contribute to an understanding of our theme.

Augustine may not have been at his best in *De Mendacio*, which in its obscure and questionable assertions is not representative, but *De Trinitate* 8,7,10 combines the love commandments of Jn. 15.12 and Matt. 22.37-40 in a masterly fashion.

> True love, however, is this: being constantly intent upon truth "we live righteously" (Titus 2.12), and consequently we consider all that is mortal of no value in comparison to love for people by which we desire that they live righteously. For thus we will be able to prepare ourselves even to die for the good of the brethren, following the example that the Lord Jesus himself taught us[135]).

[134]) The "as I have loved you" of Jn. 13.34 & 15.12 adds a dimension to the "finis" that Augustine, everywhere apart from *De Mendacio*'s 'terminus', employs in his explanation of the "tamquam se ipsum" rule (Matt. 22.39). In *De Catechizandis Rudibus* 4,8 (CC 46,128-129. ML 40,316) (Date: 400), for example, the "finis" is presented not just as eternal life or eternal salvation, but as God's, Christ's, love for us which is to be answered with our love: "... idem Dominus Iesus Christus, deus homo, et divinae in nos dilectionis indicium est et humanae apud nos humilitatis exemplum, ut magnus tumor noster maiore contraria medicina sanaretur. Magna est enim miseria superbus homo, sed maior misericordia humilis deus. Hac ergo dilectione tibi *tamquam fine proposito*, quo referas omnia quae dicis, quidquid narras ita narra, ut ille cui loqueris audiendo credat, credendo speret, sperando amet". Thus, when we are called in *Sermo Wilmart* 2,8 (MA I,680) (Date: before 410) to love one another "propter illum (i.e. Christ, the Good Samaritan)", along with the idea of *De Doctrina Christiana* that God is the "rectissimus finis" to whom all love of self and neighbour is to be directed, is also that of God's love (the 'finis propositus') which, in humility, offers the healing remedy for our pride, and thus initiates and provides a model for our love for one another. When we love one another "propter illum", as well as being directed to community in eternal life, our love is also enabled by and orientated to the humility of God's incarnate love. The "propter illum" formula of *Sermo Wilmart* 2,8 has to be read with both these 'fines' ("rectissimus" and "propositus") in mind: "Illum omnes amemus, illum diligamus, *propter illum nos invicem diligamus*. Unum regem omnes habemus; ad unum regnum omnes perveniamus".

[135]) *De Trinitate* 8,7,10 (CC 50,284. ML 42,956): "Haec est autem vera dilectio, *ut* inhaerentes veritate *iuste vivamus* (Titus 2.12); et ideo contemnamus omnia mortalia prae

Loving one's neighbour as oneself, which for *De Moribus* meant dealing with him in such a way "that he too may love God with perfect love", is still further nuanced. Our desire for the neighbour is certainly that he love God perfectly, that he be constantly intent upon truth. But the stress is now not so much on the eternal life that flows from this as on the upright life in this world it makes possible. Urged by the example of Christ, we are prepared to give up our temporal life for others not just so that they may live, but in order that 'being constantly intent upon God, they may *live righteously*'[136]). Living righteously means being constantly intent upon the form of righteousness which one contemplates and remaining in that righteousness in one's active life by assigning to everyone his due 'so as to owe nothing to anyone except to love one another' (Rom. 13.8)[137]). This is what we desire for others in loving them. The motivation is the model or *finis* proposed by Christ's death on our behalf. Our intention is that our neighbours in turn become lovers of God and other people. And in view of our neighbours' lives in truth and righteousness, which may or may not be realised, we are not to cling jealously even to our own mortal lives.

2. De Vera Religione 243-263 and parallels

These texts open up at least four avenues of approach to the meaning of loving one's neighbour as oneself which in some instances have already been alluded to, and in every instance are complementary to the approach of *De Moribus* 1,26,49 and parallels. Firstly, there is the association of the second part of the double commandment with the Golden Rule. Secondly, fitting love for neighbour is distinguished from that which is dishonourable and exploitative. Thirdly, the fact that it is

amore hominum, quo eos volumus iuste vivere. Ita enim et mori pro fratribus utiliter parati esse poterimus, quod nos exemplo suo Dominus Iesus Christus docuit".

[136]) That the person who is intent upon truth dies in order that others may live righteously puts us in mind of *De Sermone Domini in Monte*'s 1,3,10 (CC 35,9. ML 34,1234) (Date: 394) view of the eighth beatitude (i.e. "Blessed are they who suffer persecution for justice's sake ..."). A person, who by living out the beatitudes has reached wisdom (i.e. contemplation of the truth, making the whole person peaceful and taking on the likeness of God), suffers persecution in order to make known and to prove an example of true goodness: "ut per hos gradus (i.e. the beatitudes) perficiantur et ceteri ...".

[137]) *De Trinitate* 8,6,9 (CC 50,283. ML 42,955): "Quod unde esse poterunt, nisi inhaerendo eidem ipsi formae quam intuentur, ut inde formentur et sint iusti animi ... ut ipsi iuste vivant iusteque morati sint, sua cuique distribuendo *ut nemini quidquam debeant, nisi ut invicem diligant?* (Rom. 13.8)".

the Common Good we love in loving ourselves casts out all possible envy of the progress made in righteous living by the neighbour we love as ourselves. Fourthly — and this will provide a springboard to Augustine's interpretation of Jn. 13.34 in this question — one does not love the foolishness of the other, but rather bears it in the hope that he will become what he is capable of becoming, i.e. a wise and perfect person.

1. The rule of love for neighbour then is that a person wish for the other the good he wishes to come about for himself, and that he want the other to be spared the evils he does not wish to befall himself. He is to preserve this good-will towards all people, for evil should be done to no one: "love of neighbour does not bring about evil" (Rom. 13.10). Therefore, as it is commanded, we are to love even our enemies, if we wish to be really unconquerable. For no one is unconquerable in himself, but thanks to that unchangeable law which makes only those who are subject to it free[138]).

In fact, the Golden Rule is a rare enough companion of Augustine's explication of the double commandment. In its negative form, reminiscent of Tobit 4.16 — *Quod tibi fieri non vis, alii ne feceris* — the "other" may refer just to the neighbour[139]), or both to God and the neighbour[140]). In its positive form — *Omnia ergo quaecumque vultis ut faciant vobis homines, ita et vos facite illis. Haec est enim lex et prophetae* (Matt. 7.12) — it signifies in *Epistola* 82 (Date: 404) the merciful action of Paul who made himself a Jew with the Jews; his desire to free them from error was such that he identified himself with them, knowing that he too was a man who could fall into and become captive to the same error — *tamquam ipse illo errore teneretur* — and who would then

[138]) *De Vera Religione* 245 (CSEL 77,62-63) = 46,87 (CC 32,244. ML 34,161): "Ea est autem regula dilectionis, ut quae sibi vult bona provenire, et illi velit, quae accidere sibi mala non vult, et illi nolit. Hanc voluntatem erga omnes homines servat. Nam erga neminem operandum est malum, et *dilectio proximi malum non operatur* (Rom. 13.10). Diligamus ergo, ut praeceptum est, etiam inimicos nostros, si vere invicti esse volumus. Non enim per se ipsum quisquam hominum invictus est, sed per illam incommutabilem legem cui quicumque serviunt soli sunt liberi".

[139]) *De Ordine* 2,8,25 (CSEL 63/3,164. CC 29,121. ML 32,1006): "Nemini faciant quod pati nolunt"; *En. 2 in ps.* 32, *sermo* 2,6 (CC 38,252. ML 36,281): "In his tribus caritas Dei, in septem aliis caritas proximi, ne facias alii quod pati non vis".

[140]) *De Doctrina Christiana* 3,53-54 (CSEL 80,93) = 3,14,22-3,15,23 (CC 32,91. ML 34,74): "Quae sententia (i.e. Tobit 4.16) cum refertur ad dilectionem dei, omnia flagitia moriuntur, cum ad proximi, omnia facinora. Nemo enim vult corrumpi habitaculum suum, non ergo debet corrumpere habitaculum dei, se ipsum scilicet. Et nemo vult sibi a quoquam noceri; nec ipse igitur cuiquam nocuerit. Sic eversa tyrannide cupiditatis caritas regnat iustissimis legibus dilectionis dei propter deum, sui et proximi propter deum".

appreciate the loving efforts of others to release him[141]). The positive expression is also found naturally enough in *De Sermone Domini in Monte* (Date: 393), but the explanation given is cautionary: as we would not wish to be served by others with a divided heart, nor should we serve them with a divided heart. We should rather help with a sincere and pure heart such "that whatever service one renders to another will be done with the same intention with which one wishes such service to be shown to oneself, i.e. that it not be done with the expectation of gaining temporal advantage"[142]).

2. This association of the Golden Rule with a pure intention in loving the neighbour can also be noted in the passage from *De Vera Religione* immediately following that quoted above. Exploitation of the neighbour is a vice which leads to death.

> Thus, what they (who, subject to God's unchangeable law, practise the Golden Rule even towards their enemies) love cannot be taken away from them, and that alone makes them unconquerable and perfect human beings. For if a person loves his neighbour not as himself, but as a beast of burden, or as the baths, or as a gaudy or garrulous bird, that is, in order to derive some temporal pleasure or advantage from him, he is unavoidably a slave, not to human beings, but, what is more disgraceful, to that dishonourable and detestable vice of not loving human beings as they ought to be loved. If this vice has control over him, it leads him to the lowest form of life, or rather to death[143]).

[141]) *Epistola* 82,3,28-29 (CSEL 34/2,380. ML 33,288): "Tunc autem, non mentientis astu, sed compatientis affectu, Iudaeis tamquam Iudaeus fiebat, quando eos ab illo errore ... sic liberare cupiebat, tamquam ipse illo errore teneretur; diligens utique proximum tamquam seipsum, et haec aliis faciens, quae sibi ab aliis fieri vellet, si hoc illi opus esset: quod cum Dominus monuisset, adiunxit: *Haec est enim Lex et Prophetae* (Matt. 7.12) ... sed ut in alterius delicto, quid etiam sibi accidere posset, attenderet, atque ita alteri, tamquam sibi ab altero vellet, misericorditer subveniret: hoc est non mentientis astu, sed compatientis affectu".

[142]) *De Sermone Domini in Monte* 2,22,75-76 (CC 35,173-175. ML 34,1304): "Cum vero expressius de hominibus dictum est: *Omnia ergo quaecumque vultis ut faciant vobis homines, ita et vos facite illis* (Matt. 7.12), nihil aliud dictum videtur quam: *Diliges proximum tuum tamquam te ipsum* (Matt. 22.39) ... Nemo enim fere est qui velit quemquam duplici corde secum agere. Id autem fieri non potest, id est ut simplici corde aliquid homo homini tribuat, nisi ita tribuat, ut nullum ab eo temporale commodum expectet ... et quidquid officiorum exhibet homini, hac intentione exhibet qua sibi exhiberi vult, id est ut non ab eo commodi aliquid temporalis expectet. Ita erit cor simplex et mundum, in quo quaeritur deus"

[143]) *De Vera Religione* 246 (CSEL 77,63) = 46,87 (CC 32,244. ML 34,161): "Sic enim eis quod diligunt auferri non potest, quae res una invictos facit et perfectos viros. Nam

We have already had occasion to give examples of Augustine's concern for genuine, sincere love of neighbour in watching him assure that love for self was trustworthy before he was prepared to commit the neighbour to it to be loved as the self. Texts have also been noted in which the tendency to dominate the neighbour was excoriated and in which the other's advantage was highlighted[144]). *De Vera Religione* has exposed the dishonourable and death-dealing slavery in which a person who uses the neighbour for his own temporal pleasure or advantage finds himself. What then is honourable love for the neighbour, in which he is loved not as an object of use but 'as oneself'? Augustine offers some penetrating reflections on this question in *In Epistolam Ioannis*:

> ... "Children, let us love not only in word and with the tongue, but in deed and in truth" (1 Jn. 3.18). With which deed and in which truth? Can there be any clearer deed than giving to the poor? Yet many do this out of self-interest (i.e. in order to win human praise and glory), not out of love. Can there be a more heroic act than to die for one's fellow human beings? Yet many do this in order to appear heroic in the eyes of others and to make a name for themselves, not out of love[145]).

si vel ipsum hominem homo dilexerit non tamquam se ipsum, sed tamquam iumentum aut balneas aut aviculam pictam aut garrulam, id est, ut ex eo aliquid temporalis voluptatis aut commodi capiat, serviat necesse est non homini sed quod est turpius tam foedo et detestabili vitio, quo non amat hominem sicut homo amandus est. Quo vitio dominante usque ad extremam vitam vel potius mortem perducitur".

[144]) E.g. *In Epistolam Ioannis*, tr. 8,5 (ML 35,2038). Human beings are not to be loved ('amare') in the way gourmands love their food, i.e. in order to kill and consume it. "Numquid sic *amandi* sunt homines, tanquam consumendi? Sed amicitia quaedam benevolentiae est, ut aliquando praestemus eis quos amamus. Quid, si non sit quod praestemus? Sola benevolentia sufficit *amanti*". Augustine has thus effected a transformation of the word, 'amare', which in pre-Christian Latin was limited, if not exclusively to obscene and degrading aspects, then to an exaltation of physical and physiological manifestations. On this point, see Demetrio Marin, "Charitas", in *Annali della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia*, Bari, (Volume XVII, 1974) 161-234. For Augustine and "amare", see p. 178-180. Regarding the text quoted above, Marin maintains that "S. Agostino bolla ogni *amore 'di consumo'* cioè ogni preteso amore, che si esaurisca nella diminuzione anzi nell'eliminazione dell'atro o dell'altra, per suggerire senza alcun'ombra di dubbio che l'*amore* autentico è accrescimento, esaltazione, sublimazione della propria e dell'altrui persona che si ama effettivamente".

[145]) *In Epistolam Ioannis*, tr. 6,2 (ML 35,2020): "*Filioli, non diligamus verbo tantum et lingua, sed opere et veritate* (1 Jn. 3.18). Quaerimus, In quo opere, in qua veritate? Potest esse manifestius opus, quam tribuere pauperibus? Multi hoc jactantia faciunt, non dilectione. Potest esse majus opus quam mori pro fratribus? Et hoc multi volunt putari se facere, jactantia nominis comparandi, non visceribus dilectionis".

Thus, even seemingly honourable deeds can be exploitative and not animated by truthful love for others. The real test is the following:

> It remains that the one who in fact loves his fellow human being is he who can be assured of this before God in his heart, where God alone sees. This person questions in his heart whether he really does these things for love of his fellow human beings (*propter fratrum dilectionem*), and God's vision, which penetrates the heart — where human vision cannot reach — bears him witness ...
>
> "Beloved, if our heart does not condemn us, then we may trust completely in God" (1 Jn. 3.21). The words, "if our heart does not condemn us", mean: if our heart has answered us that we truly love and that we genuinely cherish our sisters and brothers. Our love is not to be feigned but sincere, seeking nothing apart from the happiness of the other and not expecting any benefit other than his happiness. "Then we may have full confidence in God, and everything that we ask we shall receive from him, because we keep his commandments" (1 Jn. 3.21-22). We keep his commandments not for the eyes of men, but for God who reads the heart[146]).

Honourable love, therefore, is that whose deepest motivation is judged sound in the light of God's scrutiny: are our actions on behalf of others really directed by love for them and desire for their happiness *(propter fratrum dilectionem ... salutem fraternam quaerens ...)* or by the thought of our own advantage? The commentary on 1 John does speak also of one's own happiness being desired in loving in deed and in truth[147]). For Augustine there is evidently no opposition between desiring one's own happiness and desiring that of another. Desiring one's own happiness, however, is evidently more than a yearning for earthly renown, even after one's death, which is prepared to use the praise of others to its own ends[148]). This would still be a subtle exploitation of

[146]) *Ibid.*, tr. 6,2 & 6,4 (ML 35,2020-2021): "Restat ut ille diligat fratrem, qui ante Deum ubi solus videt, cordi suo persuadet, et interrogat cor suum an vere propter fratrum dilectionem hoc faciat; et perhibet illi testimonium oculus qui penetrat cor, quo homo attendere non potest ... *Dilectissimi, si cor non male senserit, fiduciam habemus ad Deum* (1 Jn. 3.21). Quid est, *cor non male senserit?* Verum nobis responderit, quia diligimus, et germana dilectio est in nobis: non ficta, sed sincera; salutem fraternam quaerens, nullum emolumentum expectans a fratre, nisi salutem ipsius. *Fiduciam habemus ad Deum; et quidquid postulaverimus, accipiemus ab eo, quia mandata ejus servamus.* Ideo non in conspectu hominum, sed ubi ipse Deus videt in corde".

[147]) *Ibid.*, tr. 6,3 (ML 35,2021): "Ante Deum es, interroga cor tuum: vide quid fecisti, et quid ibi appetisti; salutem tuam, an laudem hominum ventosam".

[148]) For the Augustine of the *Confessiones* 10,37,61 (Skutella 257. CSEL 33/1,274. ML 32,805) even the praise a person receives for his own good qualities should be used not for his own sake but for the good of the neighbour. "Ecce in te, veritas, video non me laudibus meis propter me, sed propter proximi utilitatem moveri oportere".

others which had no interest in the deepest dimension of their lives, but only in how they could boost one's own vanity and popularity. When others are genuinely loved as ourselves, however, their happiness and ours coincide in eternal salvation. 'If this vice (of not loving human beings as they ought to be loved) has control over us, it leads us to the lowest form of life, or rather to death'. It is also true for Augustine that if we love the neighbour as ourselves truly in God's sight, we orientate both his life and our own to the highest form of life, life with God. In *Epistola* 137,5,17 (Date: 411-412) the formulae of love for one another in God *(in illo)* and as orientated towards God *(propter illum)* are found in the company of God's scrutiny of love's intention:

> ... A city is not well established with the best of safeguards unless it is founded on the bond of faith and constant concord. It needs to be founded too on love for the common good, that at its highest and truest is God, and on sincere love for human beings in him (*in illo*), when they love one another as orientated towards him (*propter illum*), from whom they cannot hide the dispositions of the heart with which they love[149]).

3. This brings us to the third element in *De Vera Religione*'s presentation of love for neighbour as oneself: love of the Common Good which casts out jealousy and envy.

> Therefore, the person who loves only what cannot be taken away from a lover is indubitably unconquerable and free from the torment of jealousy. Indeed, the more people he sees coming to love and to take possession of what he loves, the more abundantly he rejoices with them. For he loves God with the whole heart and the whole soul and the whole mind, and he loves his neighbour as himself.
>
> Therefore, he does not envy his neighbour's becoming what he himself is; on the contrary, he helps him in this as much as he can. Nor can he lose the neighbour whom he loves as himself, for in himself he does not love what is perceptible to sight or to any other bodily sense. Therefore, he has the person he loves as himself with himself[150]).

[149]) *Epistola* 137,5,17 (CSEL 44,122. ML 33,524): "... neque enim conditur et custoditur optime civitas, nisi fundamento et vinculo fidei, firmaeque concordiae, cum bonum commune diligitur, quod summum ac verissimum Deus est, atque in illo invicem sincerissime se diligunt homines, cum propter illum se diligunt, cui, quo animo diligant, occultare non possunt".

[150]) *De Vera Religione* 243-244 (CSEL 77,62) = 46,86 (CC 32,244. ML 34,160-161): "Qui ergo id amat solum quod amanti eripi non potest, ille indubitanter invictus est nec ulla cruciatur invidia. Id enim diligit ad quod diligendum et percipiendum quanto plures

> To live a good life, however, is always appropriate. Therefore, everyone who loves and leads a good life not only does not envy those who imitate him, but, insofar as he can, he puts himself at their service in a most willing and kind way. Yet, he does not need them, for what he loves in them he has complete and perfect in himself.
>
> Thus, when he loves his neighbour as himself, he does not envy him, for nor does he envy himself. He gives him whatever he can, because he does this also for himself. He has no need of him, because nor has he any need of himself. The only one he has need of is God; by clinging to Him he finds happiness. No one can take God away from him. Therefore, the unconquerable person is truly and certainly the one who cleaves to God, not in order to gain from Him some good apart from Himself, but because for him there is no other good than to remain attached to God[151]).

Augustine is evidently speaking here of the perfect, unconquerable person who loves in himself and in others "the creature of God created in His image"[152]). What he loves in others he has complete and perfect in himself; he is unconquerable because he is intent upon God for no other reason than God himself. This person loves himself and his neighbour in their relationship to God. Josef Brechtken says of the second of the two

venerint, tanto eis uberius gratulatur. Diligit enim deum ex toto corde et ex tota anima et ex tota mente, et diligit proximum tamquam se ipsum. Non illi ergo invidet, ut sit quod ipse est, immo adiuvat etiam quantum potest. Nec potest amittere proximum quem diligit tamquam se ipsum, quia neque in se ipso ea diligit quae oculis subiacent aut ullis aliis corporis sensibus. Ergo apud se ipsum habet quem diligit tamquam se ipsum".

[151]) *Ibid.*, 254-255 (CSEL 77,65) = 47,90 (CC 32,246. ML 34,162-163): "Bene vivere autem semper decet. Quare quisquis hoc et diligit et facit, non solum non invidet imitantibus, sed eis se praebet libentissime atque humanissime quantum potest, nec eis tamen indiget. Nam quod in illis diligit, in se ipse habet totum atque perfectum.
Ita cum diligat proximum tamquam se ipsum non invidet ei, quia nec sibi ipsi; praestat ei quod potest, quia et sibi ipsi; non eo indiget, quia nec se ipso. Tantum deo indiget, cui adhaerendo beatus est. Nemo autem illi eripit deum. Ille ergo verissime atque certissime invictus homo est qui cohaeret deo, non ut ab eo aliquid boni extra mereatur, sed cui nihil aliud quam ipsum haerere deo bonum est".

[152]) *Ibid.*, 252 (CSEL 77,64-65) = 47,90 (CC 32,246. ML 34,162): "Quapropter cur iste non sit invictus hominem diligendo cum in eo *nihil praeter hominem* diligat, *id est creaturam dei ad eius imaginem factam*, nec ei possit deesse perfecta natura quam diligit, cum ipse perfectus est?". In 252-254, Augustine gives the example of a good singer who loves the good singer in general" ("bene cantantem quemlibet"). This person can wish that others sing well without himself losing anything of what he loves, because he remains a good singer. If he does envy others, then it is not on account of their singing, but because of the reputation they gain from it. "Qui ergo invidet bene cantanti, non amat bene cantantem; sed rursus qui eo indiget non cantat bene". This applies even more to the person living a good life. "... quo enim perveniunt bene viventes, tantundem est omnibus nec minus fit cum plures habuerint".

texts from *De Vera Religione* we have quoted above that the *tamquam se ipsum* is here interpreted exceptionally as benevolent love — not as taking the other's natural instinct for happiness into account as I take my own into account, which, according to him, is Augustine's usual procedure — but that self-love is over-interpreted as benevolent love towards oneself[153]). Whatever about overinterpretation, it has to be stated that the understanding of self-love found here — cleaving heart, mind and soul to God for himself alone — is the constant Augustinian interpretation. Augustine develops this in *De Vera Religione* by claiming that the person who is totally intent upon God — and thereby loving himself as a "creature of God created in His image" — cannot possibly lose what he loves and that therefore he cannot be a prey to jealousy out of fear that others loving God too by living good lives will threaten the intensity of his own lasting relationship with God. If he does have such fears, it is a sign that he is seeking something other than God in loving God. Loving God totally for His own sake, a person discovers Him as the Common Good "who does not become less when many have Him" *(nec minus fit cum plures habuerint)*.

This realisation plays an important role in enabling Augustine to interpret *tamquam se ipsum* here as benevolent love. But this idea of God as the Common Good and the consequent expulsion of jealousy and envy is no less constant in Augustine than that of self-love as total love for God. In this sense too then the text from *De Vera Religione* is far from being an exception. In discussing *uti/frui* we have already referred to those texts which present *frui deo* as a community of love for God the perfect enjoyment of whom is beatitude[154]). Unless goodness is shared, unless our "possession" of it is in partnership with others, it is not "possessed" at all.

A person's possession of goodness is in no way diminished by the

[153]) J. Brechtken, *Augustinus Doctor Caritatis*, p. 143-144, n. 72.

[154]) See, for example, *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,64 (CSEL 80,24) = 1,29,30 (CC 32,23. ML 34,33): "... quid nos in societate dilectionis dei agere convenit, quo perfrui beate vivere est ..."; *Soliloquia* 1,13,22 (ML 32,881): "Quem modum autem potest habere illius pulchritudinis amor, in qua non solum non invideo caeteris, sed etiam plurimos quaero qui mecum appetant, mecum inhient, mecum teneant, mecumque perfruantur; tanto mihi amiciores futuri, quanto erit nobis amata communior"; *En. in ps.* 105, 34 (CC 40,1565-1566. ML 37,1415); *Sermo Wilmart* 2,4 (MA I,677): "Quare non ergo illum possides, ubi nullas cum coherede patieris angustias?"; *Epistola* 118,25 (CSEL 34/2,689. ML 33,444); *Sermo Denis* 17,6 (MA I,87): "Cum ergo te didiceris diligere diligendo deum, rape proximum ad deum, *ut simul fruaris bono*, et tanto bono quod deus est".

> arrival, or the continuing presence, of a sharer in it; indeed, goodness is a possession which is enjoyed more widely the more harmoniously unified is the love of the partners in possessing it. In fact, anyone who refuses to enjoy this possession in partnership will not enjoy it at all; and he will find that he possesses it in ampler measure in proportion to his ability to love his partner in it[155]).

Community is the very principle of life in the Heavenly City[156]). Therefore, Augustine can claim that he does not wish to be saved without others[157]), that in the race of love no one is excluded from the prize[158]), and that to grudge the overflow of God's grace to others is a form of pride which leads to sterility[159]). Indeed, when goodness is shared,

[155]) *De Civitate Dei* 15,5 (CC 48,458. CSEL 40/2,65. ML 41,442): "Nullo enim modo fit minor accedente seu permanente consorte possessio bonitatis, immo possessio bonitas, quam tanto latius, quanto concordius individua sociorum caritas. Non habebit denique istam possessionem, qui eam noluerit habere communem, et tanto eam reperiet ampliorem, quanto amplius ibi potuerit amare consortem". English translation (with some alterations): Henry Bettenson, Penguin, p. 601.
Likewise, interior and superior goods cannot be monopolised nor are they objects of competition. *De Trinitate* 12,10,15 (CC 50A,369. ML 42,1006): "Cum ergo bona voluntate ad interiora ac superiora percipienda, quae non privatim, sed communiter ab omnibus qui talia diligunt, sine ulla angustia vel invidia casto possidentur amplexu, vel sibi vel aliis consulit ..."; *Confessiones* 8,4,9 (Skutella 160. CSEL 33/1,176. ML 32,752): "Quando enim cum multis gaudetur, et in singulis uberius est gaudium, quia fervefaciunt se et inflammantur ex alterutro".
For these references and many others related to this topic, I am indebted to John Burnaby, *Amor Dei*, p. 127-128.

[156]) *De Civitate Dei* 14,28 (CC 48,452. CSEL 40/2,57. ML 41,436): "... in hac (civitate Dei) autem nulla est hominis sapientia nisi pietas, qua recte colitur verus Deus, id expectans praemium in societate sanctorum non solum hominum, verum etiam angelorum, *ut sit Deus omnia in omnibus* (1 Cor. 15.28)"; 15,5 (CC 48,456. CSEL 40/2,62-63. ML 41,440): "Recte igitur significat Isaac, per repromissionem natus, filios gratiae, cives civitatis liberae, socios pacis aeternae, ubi sit non amor propriae ac privatae quodam modo voluntatis, sed communi eodemque inmutabili bono gaudens atque ex multis unum cor faciens, id est perfecte concors oboedientia caritatis"; 19,13 (CC 48,679, CSEL 40/2,395. ML 41,640).

[157]) *Sermo* 17,2 (CC 41,238. ML 38,125): "Sed nolo salvus esse sine vobis".

[158]) *En. in ps.* 39,11 (CC 38,434. ML 36,441): "Quotquot currunt, perseveranter currant, omnes accipiunt; et qui prior venerit, exspectat ut cum posteriore coronetur. Agonem quippe istum non cupiditas, sed caritas facit; omnes currentes amant se, et ipse amor cursus est"; *De Perfectione Iustitiae Hominis* 8,19 (CSEL 42,18. ML 44,301): "Omnes enim qui recte currunt, comprehendent, non sicut in agone theatrico omnes quidem currunt, sed unus accipit palmam (1 Cor. 9.24)".

[159]) *En in ps.* 49,30 (CC 38,597-598. ML 36,584): "... rursus si fueris quasi iustus (nam nemo iustus nisi humilis et pius), et de iustitia tua inflatus incesseris, et alios in tua comparatione contempseris, et superextuleris te tamquam glorians de meritis tuis, non me laudas"; *Tractatus in Evangelium Ioannis* 32,4 (CC 36,302. ML 35,1643): "Quid est fons, et quid est fluvius qui manat de ventre interioris hominis? Benevolentia, qua vult consulere

> God will be so all in all (1 Cor. 15.28) that, because he is Love, what each possesses becomes through love common to all. For each one, when he loves in the other what he himself has not, possesses it thus himself. Consequently, the inequality of glory (because there are many different mansions; cf. Jn. 14.1-3) will not give rise to envy, for the unity of love will reign in all[160]).

In the time of the church too, even those who have not been graced with gifts of the Spirit *ad manifestationem* (cf. 1 Cor. 12.7-10) can have them if they put aside envy and if they love the unity of the church[161]).

Actual reference to the common good in *De Vera Religione* occurs in the context of distinguishing the temporal bonds of family affection from love of the neighbour 'as oneself'. Truth demands that we hate the carnal ties of natural affection and calls us to return to our original, perfect nature[162]).

> If therefore we burn with love for eternity, we will hate temporal bonds. Let a person love his neighbour as himself. And certainly no one is his own father or son or relation by marriage or anything of the kind, but to himself a person is only a human being. Whoever, therefore, loves his neighbour as himself, ought to love in the neighbour what he is to himself. However, bodies are not what we

proximo. Si enim putet quia quod bibit soli ipsi debet sufficere, non fluit aqua viva de ventre eius; si autem proximo festinat consulere, ideo non siccat, quia manat".

[160]) *Tractatus in Evangelium Ioannis* 67,2 (CC 36,496. ML 35,1812): "... atque ita Deus erit omnia in omnibus, ut quoniam Deus Caritas est, per caritatem fiat ut quod habent singuli, commune sit omnibus. Sic enim quisque etiam ipse habet, cum amat in altero quod ipse non habet. Non erit itaque aliqua invidia imparis claritatis, quoniam regnabit in omnibus unitas caritatis". Similarly, through love, a person can share in deeds of which he himself is incapable. *En in ps.* 121,10 (CC 40,1811. ML 37,1627): "Quisquis per aliquam necessitatem non potuerit implere quod iubet Deus, amet illum qui implet, et in illo implet ... Venit in mentem quia melior est illa vita de qua dicit idem Apostolus: *Vellem omnes esse sicut meipsum* (1 Cor. 7.7). Adtendit eos qui hoc fecerunt; amat eos, et in ipsis implet quod in se non potest. Fortis res est dilectio".

[161]) *Tractatus in Evangelium Ioannis* 32,8 (CC 36,304. ML 35,1646): "Multa enim dantur ad manifestationem, sed tu forsitan eorum omnium quae dixi nihil habes. Si amas, non nihil habes: si enim amas unitatem, etiam tibi habet quisquis in illa habet aliquid. Tolle invidiam, et tuum est quod habeo; tollam invidiam, et meum est quod habes".

[162]) *De Vera Religione* 247 (CSEL 77,63) = 46,88 (CC 32,245. ML 34,161): "Itaque ad pristinam perfectamque naturam nos ipsa veritas vocans praecipit ut carnali consuetudine resistamus, docens neminem aptum esse regno dei qui non istas carnales necessitudines oderit".

It is to be recalled and taken into account that Augustine was at this time convinced that carnal (i.e. family) ties were the consequence of sin and therefore to be hated. This opinion, which he lated firmly rejected, colours his considerations here, but does not deprive the aspect of the common good of value.

> are; consequently, it is not the body that ought to be sought or desired in a human being. For here too the precept is valid: "Do not covet your neighbour's goods" (Exodus 20.17).
>
> It follows that whoever loves in the neighbour anything other than what he is for himself does not love the neighbour as himself. Human nature itself, therefore, whether it be perfect or to be perfected, is to be loved independently of its carnal condition[163]).

Augustine, conscious even then that such a view sounded repugnant, commented in explanation:

> This should not sound inhuman to anyone. For it is more inhuman to love a person not as a human being, but as our son, for then we do not love in him what is related to God, but what is related to ourselves. What wonder, then, if the person who does not love the common good but only his own good has no access to the kingdom[164])?

As applied to family relationships, we find a similar idea in the letter to the young monk, Laetus, who was tempted to leave religious life for his mother's sake. Augustine advised him to use his good offices with his mother in order to destroy in her the root of her private love for him, so that she would not give more importance to the fact that she had brought him forth from her own womb than to her being brought forth with him from the womb of the church. For in this way she becomes a sister to all who love her in the community of the church[165]). Whatever justified

[163]) *De Vera Religione* 250-251 (CSEL 77,64) = 46,89 (CC 32,245. ML 34,162): "Oderimus ergo temporales necessitudines, si aeternitatis caritate flagramus. Diligat homo proximum tamquam se ipsum. Certe enim sibi ipse nemo est pater aut filius aut adfinis aut aliquid huius modi, sed tantum homo. Qui ergo diligit aliquem tamquam se ipsum, hoc in eo debet diligere quod sibi ipse est. Corpora vero non sunt quod nos sumus; non ergo in homine corpus est expetendum aut desiderandum. Valet enim ad hoc etiam quod praeceptum est: *Ne concupiscas rem proximi tui* (Exodus 20.17).
Quapropter quisquis in proximo aliud diligit quam sibi ipse est, non eum diligit tamquam se ipsum. Ipsa igitur natura humana sine carnali condicione diligenda est, sive sit perficienda sive perfecta".

[164]) *Ibid.*, 248 (CSEL 77,63) = 46,88 (CC 32,245. ML 34,161): "Neque hoc cuiquam inhumanum videri decet. Magis enim est inhumanum non amare in homine quod homo est, sed amare quod filius est. Hoc est enim non in eo amare illud quod ad deum pertinet sed amare illud quod ad se pertinet. Quid ergo mirum si ad regnum non pervenit qui non communem sed privatam rem diligit?".

[165]) *Epistola* 243,4 (CSEL 57,571. ML 33,1056) (Date: post 395): "Nam ex quo soror est omnium, quibus est pater Deus et mater Ecclesia, tam te non impedit, quam neque me, neque omnes fratres nostros, qui eam non privata, sicut tu in domo vestra, sed publica in domo Dei caritate diligimus. Quod ergo tu illi etiam carnali necessitudine annecteris, ad sortem valere debet familiarius colloquendi, et apertiore ianua consulendi ut hoc ipsum, quo te privatim diligit, interficiatur in ea, ne quod ex utero suo genuit, pluris pendat, quam quod ex utero Ecclesiae genita est tecum".

reservations we may have about this as excessively underrating the specific relationship between mother and son as temporal and to be destroyed, we can be more sympathetic to Augustine when he goes on to castigate temporal private affection for oneself, which indeed affection for those close to us can easily turn into, and to recommend rather love for the community "of one mind and one heart" (Acts 4.32) on the way to God. One is not one's own, but together with others forms one soul, the single soul of Christ[166]).

In the *Rule* and later texts it is more this latter idea that comes to the fore. "For it is written of love that 'it is not self-seeking' (1 Cor. 13.5), that is to say, it puts the interests of the community before its own interests, and not the other way around. The more you are concerned for the interests of the community rather than for your own interests therefore indicates the measure of your progress"[167]). This is the unmistakable direction taken by the idea of *De Vera Religione* that it is more inhuman to love in a person what is related to ourselves, which would then become a way of keeping that person in our power, than to love what is related to God, which would mean releasing him for the fulness of his life. When a person loves someone only as related to himself, he seeks only his own good in loving — perhaps even in his strong and natural attachment to members of his own family — and the God-orientation of the life of the other, an appreciation of which could have led to a deeper and more comprehensive unity of human beings, would be blocked from his vision. A good expression of the contrast between the common and merely private good[168]), which puts us in

[166]) *ibid.*, (CSEL 57,571-572. ML 33,1056): "Hoc etiam quisque de anima sua cogitet, ut etiam in ipsa privatum affectum oderit, qui procul dubio temporalis est: diligat autem in ea communionem societatemque illam, de qua dictum est: *Erat illis* in Deum *anima una et cor unum* (Acts 4.32). Sic enim anima tua non est propria, sed omnium fratrum; quorum etiam animae tuae sunt, vel potius quorum animae cum tua non animae, sed anima una est, Christi unica ..."

[167]) *Rule* 5,2 (Verheijen, p. 429-430): "Caritas enim, de qua scriptum est quod non quaerat quae sua sunt, sic intelligitur, quia communia propriis, non propria communibus anteponit. Et ideo, quanto amplius rem communem quam propria vestra curaveritis, tanto vos amplius profecisse noveritis ...". Cf. *Epistola* 211,12 (CSEL 57,366. ML 33,963).

[168]) The denigration of purely private good does not mean to say that good does not accure to individuals at all. For *De Libero Arbitrio* 2,19,52,196-198 (CC 29,272. CSEL 74,86. ML 32,1268) (Date: 392-396) the unchangeable good is common; it is proper to no one. But what the soul experiences in clinging to unchangeable good is a proper good, for in this way the soul becomes wise and happy. God's being all in all means that "et omnibus totus est, et *singulis totus est*": *Sermo Wilmart* 2,4 (MA I,677) (Date: pre-410).

mind of that between false and true love of self, is given in *De Civitate Dei* 12,1. The difference between good and bad angels had its origin in their wills and desires:

> ... the one sort persisting resolutely in that Good which is common to all — which for them is God himself — and in his eternity, truth, and love, while the others were delighted rather with their own power, as though they themselves were their own Good. Thus they have fallen away from that Supreme Good which is common to all, which brings felicity, and they have devoted themselves to their own ends. They have chosen pride in their own elevation in exchange for the true exaltation of eternity; empty cleverness in exchange for the certainty of truth; the spirit of faction instead of unity in love; and so they have become arrogant, deceitful, and envious. The cause of the bliss of the others is their adherence to God; and so the cause of the misery of the apostates must be taken to be the exact contrary, their failure to adhere to him[169]).

Human beings who wish to find felicity in the Supreme Good common to all do so also by clinging to God. But because, when God will be all in all, it will not be a matter of private individuals enjoying their own goods, therefore those, who during this time of pilgrimage desire to enjoy God in communion with others, are to accustom themselves to preferring the common good to their own, seeking not their own ends but those of Jesus Christ (cf. Phil. 2.21)[170]).

4. The final aspect of *De Vera Religione*'s presentation of love for neighbour which we wish to bring to light is that which has been seen by some authors as offering a motive for love in the potential worth of the other. If, however, such worth does function as a motive for Augustine,

[169]) *De Civitate Dei* 12,1 (CC 48,355. CSEL 40/1,566. ML 41,347): "... dum alii constanter in communi omnibus bono, quod ipse illis Deus est, atque in eius aeternitate veritate caritate persistunt; alii sua potestate potius delectati, velut bonum suum sibi ipsi essent, a superiore communi omnium beatifico bono ad propria defluxerunt et habentes elationis fastum pro excelsissima aeternitate, vanitatis astutiam pro certissima veritate, studia partium pro individua caritate superbi fallaces invidi effecti sunt. Beatitudinis igitur illorum causa est adhaerere Deo; quocirca istorum miseriae causa ex contrario est intellegenda, quod est non adhaerere Deo". English translation: Henry Bettenson, Penguin, p. 471.

[170]) *En. in ps.* 105,34 (CC 40,1566. ML 37,1415): "Gloriosissima quippe illa civitas adepta promissam hereditatem, in qua nullus morietur, nullus orietur, non habebit cives qui singuli gaudeant suis rebus, quia Deus erit omnia in omnibus. Cuius societatem quisquis in hac peregrinatione fideliter et flagranter desideraverit, assuescit privatis praeferre communia, non sua quaerendo, sed quae Iesu Christi ...".

then love of self must also be seen as requiring a motive. For what one is called and commanded to love *both* in oneself *and* in others is the "original and perfect nature", "human nature either as perfect or to be perfected", "the creature of God created in his image". Two points about these formulations are to be especially kept in mind. Firstly, they constitute the goal visualised by the *commandment*: delight, freedom and invincibility in the total service of God for his own sake alone. Secondly, they are associated by Augustine with what is related to God, i.e. the common good, which is opposed to what is related to oneself. In referring to love on the basis of this latter as inhuman, Augustine, who has already made clear that human beings were not to be loved 'in order to derive some temporal pleasure or advantage from them', may already have had in mind that such love may be little more than sheer selfishness which ignores the other's vocation to perfection in God. Thus, a person is commanded to love the common good both in himself and in others. And this means clinging to God in subjection to Him, loving Him more than oneself; and bringing others also to this perfect goodness *(perfecta iustitia)* [171]).

This is the background against which the text in question has to be read.

> Let a person love a wise and perfect soul just as he sees it; let him not love a foolish soul as such, but because it is capable of being perfect and wise. For nor should he love himself as foolish. Whoever loves himself as a fool will make no progress towards wisdom; no one becomes as he wishes to be unless he hates himself as he is. But as long as he is still on the way to wisdom and perfection, let him bear the foolishness of his neighbour with the same attitude of mind that he would bear his own if he were foolish and loved wisdom [172]).

[171]) *De Vera Religione* 262 (CSEL 77,67) = 48,93 (CC 32,248. ML 34,163-164): "Quem delectat ergo libertas, ab amore mutabilium rerum liber esse appetat; et quem regnare delectat, uni omnium regnatori deo subditus haereat, plus eum diligendo quam se ipsum. Et haec est perfecta iustitia, qua potius potiora et minus minora diligimus". It is of interest that this last sentence, which is sometimes used to show that Augustinian love simply responds to values, actual or potential, in the objects loved, occurs in a context of law and subjection, as well as that of desire for freedom. I understand the expression to refer primarily to the foregoing, i.e. when one loves God more than oneself, one is perfectly good because one's love is then ordered according to God's commandment; and this determines whatever reference it may have to what follows. The expression "qua potius potiora et minus minora diligimus" does not mean that one loves better human beings more and foolish human beings less. See the following reference for the immediate continuation of this text.

[172]) *De Vera Religione* 262-263 (CSEL 77,67) = 48,93 (CC 32,248. ML 34,164):

Augustine is explaining the meaning of loving one's neighbour as oneself. The person who loves his foolish self does not make any progress towards wisdom; progress comes only when he hates himself as he is — that is, as proud and failing to love God more than himself — and desires to become what he is capable of becoming, that is, a wise and perfect person fully subject to God. In bearing the foolishness of the neighbour whom he loves as himself, therefore, he desires also that the neighbour become wise and perfectly good, overcoming pride and returning corrected to God. What he is commanded to aim for in himself, "the creature of God created in His image" and totally intent upon Him, is also to be the goal to which he seeks to lead the neighbour by love. To love the neighbour in his foolishness would mean that the latter "will make no progress towards wisdom". To love him as capable of wisdom and perfection, even while he remains foolish, may aid such progress, just as loving ourselves in this way gives us the possibility of becoming what we desire to be, i.e. in context, free servants of God loving Him more than ourselves.

B. Love of neighbour 'as Christ has loved us'

It would be possible to explore the theme of the imitation of Christ in loving by grouping Jn. 13.34 with Jn. 15.12-13 and 1 John 3.16 and thus emphasising love until death. As useful for our theme, however, as Christ's teaching and proving a model of the way of humility, is the associated figure of *Christus medicus* who bore sinners with love *(cum dilectione pertulit peccantes)*. Loving one another as he has loved us, then, means bearing with one another in love, preserving the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace (cf. Eph. 4.2-3), and bearing one another's

"Sapientem animam atque perfectam talem diligat qualem illam videt; stultam non talem, sed quia esse perfecta et sapiens potest, quia nec se ipsum debet stultum diligere. Nam qui se diligit stultum, non proficiet ad sapientiam; nec fiet quisque qualis cupit esse nisi se oderit qualis est. Sed donec ad sapientiam perfectionemque veniatur, eo animo stultitiam proximi quo suam ferret, si stultus esset et amaret sapientiam". *De Vera Religione* is here less patent of misunderstanding than *Soliloquia* 1,2,7 (ML 32,873): "Itaque tanto magis amo amicos meos, quanto magis bene utuntur anima rationali, vel certe quantum desiderant ea bene uti". This seems to make love for others dependent on their desire to use their rational souls well, even though one loves the rational soul itself of those, like thieves, who do not so desire. *De Vera Religione* is clearer in its statement of intention in this regard: no good whatsoever accrues to the neighbour when we love his foolishness, states Augustine, for thus he "will make no progress towards wisdom". Love, therefore, is not dependent for its measure on the neighbour's dispositions, but is directed towards his progress in wisdom, whether he is actually using his rational soul well or not.

burdens (cf. Gal. 6.2)[173]. In the 65th tract on John's gospel, dating from 418-421, Augustine again engages the metaphor of a doctor treating the sick to illustrate Christ's love for us as the exemplar of our love for neighbour. There are strong reminiscences here of *De Vera Religione*'s bearing with the foolishness and pride of the neighbour with a view to the neighbour's becoming a wise and perfect servant of God. But now Augustine sees not just this perfect goodness of the individual but the formation of loving community as being what Christ has done for us. Jn. 13.34 naturally gives more weight to the idea that we are following in Christ's footsteps in loving one another, and also that loving is his gift; but, in a manner that anticipates our analysis of the unity of love for God and neighbour, Augustine maintains that there is no opposition between loving others 'as Christ has loved us' and the double commandment of Matt. 22.37-40, the second part of which prescribes love of neighbour 'as oneself'.

The text *in extenso* reads:

> Sisters and brothers, do not think that when the Lord said, "A new commandment I give to you: you are to love one another", he passed over that greater commandment by which we are enjoined to love the Lord our God with the whole heart, the whole soul and the whole mind. It may indeed seem that he did leave that greater commandment out of account. For he said "love one another", as if this had nothing to do with the second part of that other commandment where it is said: "Love your neighbour as yourself". In fact he says "on these two precepts depend the whole Law and the Prophets". But for those of sound understanding each of these two commandments is found in the other. For if we love God we cannot spurn him commanding us to love our neighbour; and when we love the neighbour purely and spiritually, what do we love in him but God? This love, which is to be distinguished from all worldly love,

[173]) *Contra Epistolam Parmeniani* 3,2,5 (CSEL 51,106. ML 43,87) (Date: 400): "... et sufferendo invicem in dilectione, servarent unitatem spiritus in vinculo pacis, et invicem onera sua portantes (Gal. 6.2), implerent utique legem Christi, qua dominus noster Jesus Christus ad docendam humilitatis viam usque ad mortem crucis humiliari dignatus est (Phil. 2.8), et tamquam medicus aegrotantes, ita cum dilectione pertulit peccantes, de quibus dixerat, *Non est opus sanis medicus, sed aegrotantibus* (Matt. 9.12)". On the theme of "Christus medicus" in Augustine, see Rudolph Arbesmann O.S.A., "The Concept of 'Christus Medicus' in St. Augustine", in *Traditio* X (1954) 1-28. See also P.C.J. Eijkenboom S.J., *Het Christus-medicusmotief in de preken van sint Augustinus*, Assen, 1960. On Augustine's use and understanding of Gal. 6.2, see A.-M. La Bonnardière, "'Portez les fardeaux les uns des autres'. Exégèse augustininienne de Gal. 6.2", in *Didaskalia* I,2 (1971) 201-215.

was characterised by the Lord when He added (to "you are to love one another"): "as I have loved you". What indeed did the Lord love in us but God? He loved us not because we already had God (*quod habebamus*), but so that we might have him (*ut haberemus*): that is, so that he might lead us, as I said earlier, to that state where God will be all in all. This is also the way in which a doctor is rightly said to love the sick. Isn't it the health he wishes to restore that he loves, not the illness (*morbum*) which he comes to drive out?

Therefore, let us too love one another in such a way that, insofar as we can, we may attract one another by the solicitude of love to have God in our midst. He himself who said "Just as I have loved you, you also must love one another" gives us this love. He loved us, therefore, to this end: that we might love one another. In loving us he has granted us to be drawn together in mutual love and, with our members united by such a delightful bond, to be the body of so great a Head[174]).

Concerning the doctor metaphor in this text, Anders Nygren writes, apparently paraphrasing Augustine: "As the doctor does not strictly love *the sick man in his present miserable state*, but loves *health* which he wants to restore in him, so Christ does not strictly love us as we now are, but loves us *in consideration* of the good and perfect beings we may yet become through Him". Of this putative Augustinian position Nygren remarks: "It is obvious that this is something quite different from what the New Testament means by love. Augustine has no room for a love of neighbour which is, in the strict sense of the word, unmotivated"[175]).

[174]) *Tractatus in Evangelium Ioannis* 65,2 (CC 36,491-492. ML 35,1809): "Nolite itaque, fratres mei, putare in hoc quod ait Dominus: *Mandatum novum do vobis, ut vos invicem diligatis*, illud maius praetermissum esse mandatum, quo praecipitur ut diligamus Dominum Deum nostrum ex toto corde, ex tota anima, et ex tota mente, tamquam enim hoc praetermisso videtur dictum: *ut diligatis invicem*, velut hoc ad illud alterum non pertineat, quod dictum est: *Diliges proximum tuum tamquam teipsum. In his* enim *duobus praeceptis*, inquit, *tota lex pendet, et prophetae*. Sed bene intellegentibus utrumque invenitur in singulis. Nam et qui diligunt Deum, non eum potest contemnere praecipentem ut diligat proximum; et qui sancte et spiritualiter diligit proximum, quid in eo diligit nisi Deum? Ipsa est dilectio ab omni mundana dilectione discreta, quam distinguendo addidit Dominus: *sicut dilexi vos*. Quid enim nisi Deum dilexit in nobis? Non quod habebamus, sed ut haberemus: ut perducat nos, sicut paulo ante dixi, ubi sit Deus omnia in omnibus. Sic etiam medicus recte dicitur aegros diligere; et quid in eis nisi salutem diligit, quam cupit utique revocare, non morbum, quem venit expellere? Sic ergo et nos invicem diligamus, ut quantum possumus, invicem in nobis Deum cura dilectionis adtrahamus. Hanc dilectionem nobis donat ipse qui ait: *Sicut dilexi vos, ut et vos diligatis invicem*. Ad hoc ergo nos dilexit, ut et nos diligamus invicem; hoc nobis conferens diligendo nos, ut mutua dilectione constringamur inter nos, et tam dulci vinculo connexis membris corpus tanti capitis simus".

[175]) A. Nygren, *Agape and Eros*, p. 550 (My emphasis).

This is, however, an emasculation of the deepest intention of Augustine's thought. Nygren manages to convey the impression that Augustine sidesteps concrete concern for the sick person as a sick person, that is, for "the sick man in his present miserable state". What we actually find in Augustine, however, is that the doctor (Christ, the lover) does not love "the illness *(morbum)* which he comes to drive out". It would be difficult to object reasonably to this. The illness is obviously sin, foolishness, pride, separation from God, slavery to the vice of not loving others as they ought to be loved, and division from one another. And it is not likely that Augustine had here forgotten the distinction he was accustomed to draw earlier between love for people and aversion for their faults[176]), or that it was no longer significant for him that he had urged people 'to bear the foolishness of their neighbours with the same attitude of mind that they would bear their own if they were foolish and loved wisdom'[177]). The doctor, Christ, the lover, loves not the foolishness but the fool, not the error but the erring one.

Nonetheless, Nygren might object, it is still something other than a human being in the actual condition of life he finds himself that is loved. "Health" is loved in others; or they are loved '*in consideration of* the good and perfect beings they may yet become in God'. The phrase "in consideration of", destined to suggest that love is motivated by the potential value of the other in God, is, however, a contentious representation of the Augustinian case. We are indeed told that, when we love the neighbour purely and spiritually, we love God in him. But, in describing Christ's love for us, upon which our love for neighbour is to be based, Augustine details what loving God in the neighbour means. Christ loved us 'so that we might have God in us' *(ut haberemus)*, 'so that He might lead us to that state where God will be all in all'. In other words, Christ loved us — and thus we are to love one another — because we are gods and sons of the Most High and so that we might be his sisters and brothers[178]). On the one hand, this is the creative concrete sense of the

[176]) *Rule* 4,10 (Verheijen, p. 428): "... cum dilectione hominum et odio vitiorum". *In Epistolam Ioannis*, tr. 7,11 (ML 35,2035).

[177]) *De Vera Religione* 263 (CSEL 77,67) = 48,93 (CC 32,248. ML 34,164): "Sed donec ad sapientiam perfectionemque veniatur, eo animo ferat stultitiam proximi quo suam ferret, si stultus esset et amaret sapientam".

[178]) *Tractatus in Evangelium Ioannis* 65,1 (CC 36,491. ML 35,1809): "... sed sicut se diligunt, quoniam dii sunt et filii Altissimi omnes, ut sint Filio eius unico fratres, ea dilectione invicem diligentes, qua ipse dilexit eos ...".

doctor (Christ and ourselves) loving the health he wishes to restore: growth in God-likeness and sonship with the Son. Thus, love opens up new salutary perspectives on the life of the other and desires to help in seeing them realised for the other's sake: "*quid in eis nisi salutem diligit, quam cupit utique revocare ...*". Love is actually at work promoting the health it aims at, deifying and strengthening brotherhood with Christ. On the other hand, we encounter yet a further parallel expresssion to loving God in the neighbour "*ut haberemus*". Strangely enough, not only are we told that God loved us so that we might have him in our midst, but also that 'he loved us to this end: that we might love one another'. The delightful mutual love of the members of Christ's Body, united to Christ the Head, is even now a representation of God's being in us, of his being all in all to us, not just as individuals but as a community. In fact, according to the 83rd tract on John's Gospel, not only is real love for one another directed towards reigning with Christ *(ut regnare possimus cum Christo)*, having God in our midst *(propter habendum Deum)*, in order that God be all in all *(ut sit Deus omnia in omnibus)*, but people love God so as to love one another properly[179]). In this sense too pure and spiritual love for neighbour is to love God, both for myself — because if I fail to do so I hate myself and therefore cannot possibly love my neighbour (cf. Ps. 10.6) — and for the neighbour that he may no longer be a sinner but that God may be all in all to him. The presence of the health for which we aim, having God in our midst and Christ as Head of the Body to which we belong, offers a fresh stimulus to practise and to delight in the mutual love by which we are bound together. To this end Christ, our Head, loved us: that we might love one another, that we might take delight in and attract one another to have God is our midst and to become sisters and brothers of God's only Son.

In the long excerpt from the commentary on John's Gospel quoted above, we read that Christ "loved us not because we already had God *(quod habebamus)*, but so that we might have Him *(ut haberemus)* ...". That is to say, Christ, the Redeemer, loved us as sinners to whom he had come to restore health. But Christ's work is already effective, people are

[179]) *Tractatus in Evangelium Ioannis* 83,3 (CC 36,536. ML 35,1846): "Utquid enim diligit nos Christus, nisi ut regnare possimus cum Christo? Ad hoc ergo et nos invicem diligamus, ut dilectionem nostram discernamus a ceteris, qui non ad hoc se invicem diligunt, quia nec diligunt. Qui autem se propter habendum Deum diligunt, ipsi se diligunt; ergo ut se diligant, Deum diligunt. Non est haec dilectio in omnibus hominibus; pauci se propterea diligunt, ut sit Deus omnia in omnibus (1 Cor. 15.28)".

more or less "healthy", loving one another, and, in this sense, God is already to a greater or lesser extent present in our midst. This realisation enables us to understand a significantly different formulation which arises in two other texts, the former dealing with love of a friend, the latter with love for neighbour in general.

> Let us love God for his own sake, and ourselves in him (*in ipso*) but as orientated towards him (*propter ipsum*). For he truly loves a friend who loves God in the friend, either because God is in him or that He may be in him (*aut quia est in illo, aut ut sit in illo*)[180]).

> ... we will have God, and we will be intent upon him alone; indeed, we will be so delighted by him alone that we will seek for nothing else, because we will enjoy him together and we will enjoy (*fruemur*) him in one another. For what are we if we do not have God? And what should we love in one another other than God, either because we have him or in order that we may have him (*aut quia habemus, aut ut habeamus*) ...[181]).

According to John Burnaby, "the alternative form of phrase reflects the double connotation of *amor*, affective and conative; but it needs for its understanding the background of the doctrine of the divine image in man, its obscuration and its renewal"[182]). Christ has set the process of renewal afoot and invites human beings to continue the task both in themselves and in others by staking all their hopes on God and being totally committed to Him; this is the conative connatation which we have dealt with at length. But, to the extent that the divine image has actually been renewed in individuals and in the community — that is, to the extent that God has already become all in all to them making them perfect such that they seek the common good before their own good — one may love and enjoy God present in others. A person whose own love has been set right will be attracted and delighted by such people and

[180]) *Sermo* 336,2 (ML 38,1472): "Ipsum (Deum) amemus propter ipsum, et nos in ipso, tamen propter ipsum. Ille enim veraciter amat amicum, qui Deum amat in amico, aut quia est in illo, aut ut sit in illo",

[181]) *Sermo* 255,7 (ML 38,1189): "... quia Deum habebimus, et ipso solo contenti erimus, imo ipso solo sic delectabimur, ut nihil aliud requiramus; quia et in uno ipso fruemur, et in nobis invicem ipso fruemur: (quid enim sumus, si Deum non habemus? aut quid aliud in nobis quam Deum debemus diligere, aut quia habemus, aut ut habeamus?) ...". This alternative form of phrase is reflected in a similar context in *De Trinitate* 8,6,9 (CC 50,283. ML 42,956): "Qui ergo amat homines, aut quia iusti sunt, aut ut iusti sint, amare debet. Sic enim et se ipsum amare debet, aut quia iustus est, aut ut iustus sit; sic enim *diligit proximum tamquam se ipsum*, sine ullo periculo".

[182]) J. Burnaby, *Amor Dei*, p. 136.

groups. It is well worth reminding ourselves, however, of the many-sidedness of the terms *frui deo* and *habere deum* as we have investigated them earlier in dealing with the *uit/frui* distinction as related to our theme. For Ragnar Holte, *frui deo* is the supreme end of man which God both proposes to him and commands that he fulfil; it entails total abandonment to God in the form of love with the whole heart and soul and mind[183]). To love and enjoy God in the neighbour, therefore, can also have the meaning that in the neighbour a total claim is made upon me which calls me beyond myself to self-abandonment. It may even be there that the God, love for whom straightens self-love, in encountered. Similarly, *habere deum* has as its necessary corollary *inhabitatio dei*, a being possessed by God[184]). Thus, when I "have" God in the neighbour and delight in him there, God fills me too with himself and fulfils his promise to be "my God". Then, without jealousy, we may together delight in the God who, both to others and myself, is all in all.

A good example of the affective connotation of love — love and delight in others because God is in them — is found in Augustine's *Epistola* 73 to Jerome, dating from 404. Just as I can be a source of true benefit and joy to others only if God's image is renewed in me and I am made comely and happy by being totally intent upon him[185]), so it is with friends in my regard. They are genuinely faithful to us so long as they remain "in God". Entrusting ourselves to the love of friends is to entrust ourselves to God who is the guarantor of their fidelity.

> I confess it. I easily give myself up completely to the love of those with whom I am most intimate and friendly, especially when I am tired of the vexations of this world. I rest in their love without any preoccupation. For I feel that God is there, and in safety I give myself up to him, and safely I rest in him. In this security of love I no longer fear the insecurity of tomorrow, the insecurity of human frailty about which I complained earlier. For, when I sense that a person is enflamed with Christian love and has become a more faithful friend to me because of it, the ideas and thoughts that I entrust to this person I entrust no longer to a human being, but to

[183]) R. Holte, *Béatitude et Sagesse*, p. 280.

[184]) See R. Lorenz, "Fruitio Dei bei Augustin", in *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 63 (1950-1951), p. 104-108.

[185]) See again *De Trinitate* 14,14,18 (CC 50A,446. ML 42,1049): "... recte illi de proximo suo praecipitur, ut eum sicut se diligat. Iam enim se non perverse sed recte diligit, cum Deum diligit, cuius participatione imago illa non solum est, verum etiam ex vetustate renovatur, ex deformitate reformatur, ex infelicitate beatificatur".

God. For "God is love; and whoever remains in love remains in God, and God in him" (1 Jn. 4.16). If he were to abandon God, he would inevitably bring about sorrow in the same measure as the joy he now gives us by remaining in God[186]).

In giving ourselves up to the ease, pleasure and confidence of the love of faithful friends who love us as themselves and as Christ has loved us, we give ourselves up in trust to God who is present in such love assuring its genuineness. 'The ideas and thoughts I entrust to this person (who is enflamed with Christian love, and a faithful friend because of it) I entrust no longer to a human being but to God'. This is to bring us to the very heart of the matter: the unity of love for neighbour and love for God.

R. CANNING

[186]) *Epistola* 73,3,10 (CSEL 34/2,276-277. ML 33,249-250): "In quorum ego caritatem, fateor, facile me totum proicio praesertim fatigatum scandalis saeculi; et in ea sine ulla sollicitudine requiesco: Deum quippe illic esse sentio, in quem me securus proicio, et in quo securus requiesco. Nec in hac mea securitate crastinum illud humanae fragilitatis incertum, de quo superius ingemui, omnino formido. Cum enim hominem christiana caritate flagrantem, eaque mihi fidelem amicum factum esse sentio; quidquid ei consiliorum meorum cogitationumque committo, non homini committo, sed illi in quo manet, ut talis sit. *Deus* enim *caritas est; et qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo* (1 Jn. 4.16): quam si deseruerit, tantum faciat necesse est dolorem, quantum manens fecerat gaudium". Not only does the friend remain 'in God' but he loves us 'in God', that is, by respecting and obeying the double commandment, and he thereby truly becomes our friend. See *Epistola* 258,3-4 (CSEL 57,608. ML 33,1072) to Martianus, who had just been converted to Christianity. Augustine puts it to him that before his conversion "tu ab hac (i.e. benignitate et gratia Salvatoris nostri) alienus, quomodo esse poteras amicus meus, qui unde beatus esse possem penitus ignorabas, et non in hoc me amabas, in quo mihi ipse iam fueram utcumque amicus effectus?".