

The Augustinian *uti/frui* Distinction in the Relation between Love for Neighbour and Love for God

- I. General formulations of the *uti/frui* distinction
 - A. Apropos of *De Diversis Quaestionibus* 83, q. 30
 1. *The field of uti*
 2. *The meaning of frui*
 3. *Frui and uti in disorder*
 - B. *De Doctrina Christiana*
- II. *Uti/frui* and love for neighbour
 - A. Preliminary remarks
 - B. The state of the question prior to 396
 - C. *De Doctrina Christiana*
 1. *The neighbour as a means to our enjoyment of God?*
 2. *Frui with the neighbour and frui of the neighbour*
 3. *Discussion with Josef Brechtken in relation to De Doctrina Christiana 1,79*
- III. Anders Nygren's understanding of *uti/frui* and critique
 - A. Brief presentation of Nygren's position
 - B. Critique of Nygren on *uti/frui*
 1. *Is there no more to uti/frui than their common-sense meanings?*
 2. *Does the emphasis in "frui deo" lie on "frui" or on "deo"?*
 2. *Is the ideal of love achieved when nothing in this world is loved?*

What perspectives are opened and what difficulties raised by introducing the dialectic *uti/frui* into the discussion of the relation between love for neighbour and love for God? Our approach to this question will take the following form: Firstly, the *uti/frui* combination will be presented as it occurs in more general statements not specifically related to the issue of God and the neighbour. Hereby some clear features will be sketched, but something of the complexity of the distinction's origins and of its application by Augustine himself will also be revealed. Secondly, against this broad background, the texts and formulations of special interest for our topic will fall into place. Ragnar Holte helps us to view these texts within the perspectives suggested by the general descriptions of *uti/frui* and also by both the ontological-ethical and psychological approaches, by both the ascent and descent contexts. A particular point of interpretation advanced by Josef Brechtken will be exposed and discussed. Thirdly, the opinion of Anders Nygren regarding *uti/frui*, which basically underlies that of Josef Brechtken, (although the

latter claims to take the critique of Augustine a decisive step further), will be outlined and, with respect, what we, in line with Ragnar Holte and John Burnaby, see as its shortcomings and weaknesses will be pointed out. The tenor of the whole is that this apparently innocent couple is not so simple as it looks, which suggests great caution in assessing the role to be assigned to it in elucidating the "*magna quaestio*" of this work.

I. GENERAL FORMULATIONS OF THE UTI/FRUI DISTINCTION

A. *Apropos of De Diversis Quaestionibus 83, q. 30*

Augustine expressly considers the relation between *uti* and *frui* in the thirtieth question of *De Diversis Quaestionibus 83*, a work which was compiled between 389 and 396. *Quaestio 30* is entitled: *Utrum omnia in utilitatem hominis creata sint: Has everything been created to be useful to man?* So as to show at first hand something of the resonance and complexity of *uti/frui* in Augustine, we will quote his answer virtually in full.

The difference between enjoying and using corresponds to that between the honourable and the useful. Even though one can maintain superficially that all that is honourable is useful and all that is useful honourable, yet, because it is more exact to call "honourable" what is to be sought after for its own sake, while "useful" is that which is to be related to something else, we will follow this distinction in speaking here. However, we maintain that there is no opposition between the honourable and the useful; for sometimes one meets the ill-considered and superficial opinion that they are opposed to each other. For me, we are said to enjoy that in which we take delight; and we use whatever we relate to that in which delight is taken. Thus, all human perversion (which is also called vice) consists in wishing to use what is to be enjoyed and to enjoy what is to be used; on the other hand, all order (that is, virtue) is based on the wish to enjoy what is to be enjoyed and to use what is to be used. Now, the honourable are to be enjoyed and the useful are to be used¹).

¹) *De Diversis Quaestionibus 83, q. 30* (CC 44A,38. ML 40,19): "Ut inter honestum et utile interest, ita et inter fruendum et utendum. Quamquam enim omne honestum utile et omne utile honestum esse subtiliter defendi queat, tamen quia magis proprie atque usitatius honestum dicitur quod propter se ipsum expetendum est, utile autem quod ad aliud aliquid referendum est, secundum hanc differentiam nunc loquimur, illud sane custodientes ut honestum et utile nullo modo sibimet adversentur. Adversari enim haec sibi aliquando imperite et vulgariter existimantur. Frui ergo dicimur ea re de qua capimus

So far then, *frui* may be characterised in terms of the honourable (“*honestum*”), and that is to be sought for its own sake (“*propter se ipsum*”), while *uti* appears in connection with the useful (“*utile*”). What is useful is sought for the sake of something other than itself: “*utile autem quod ad aliud aliquid referendum est*”. *Uti* is not at odds with *frui*, but rather orientates (“*referimus*”) the objects of its activity to that in which *frui* takes delight.

The immediate continuation of *quaestio* 30 is:

I call honourableness intelligible beauty, which we properly say is spiritual; usefulness, however, I call divine providence. For which reason, although there are many visible beauties which are not properly called honourable, beauty itself, from which all that is beautiful has its beauty, is not visible. Likewise, much that is useful is visible, but usefulness itself, by which whatever is of use to us is to our advantage, and which we call divine providence, is not visible. Note that the word “visible” includes all corporeal beings. What should be enjoyed, therefore, are the invisible beauties, that is, those that are honourable; but whether all beauties should be enjoyed is another question, although it is perhaps more fitting to call honourable only those beauties which are to be enjoyed. As far as useful things are concerned, however, they are all to be used according as one has need of them. It is right to think that animals enjoy food and all physical pleasure, but only the animal endowed with reason is able to make use of something. For to know to what each thing is to be orientated is not given to beings deprived of reason, nor even to foolish rational beings. A person cannot use a thing if he does not know what it is to be orientated to; and this can be known only by a wise person. Therefore, it is usually said, and rightly, that those who do not use things well abuse them. For what is used badly is of no advantage to anyone, and what is of no benefit is evidently not useful²).

voluptatem; utimur ea quam referimus ad id unde capienda voluptas est. Omnis itaque humana perversio est, quod etiam vitium vocatur, fruendis uti velle atque utendis frui; et rursus omnis ordinatio, quae virtus etiam nominatur, fruendis frui et utendis uti. Fruendum est autem honestis, utendum vero utilibus”.

²) *De Diversis Quaestionibus* 83, q. 30 (CC 44A,38-39. ML 40,19-20): “Honestatem voco intellegibilem pulchritudinem, quam spiritalem nos proprie dicimus, utilitatem autem divinam providentiam. Quapropter quamquam sint multa pulchra visibilia, quae minus proprie honesta appellantur, ipsa tamen pulchritudo, ex qua pulchra sunt quaecumque pulchra sunt, nullo modo est visibilis. Item multa utilia visibilia, sed ipsa utilitas, ex qua nobis prosunt quaecumque prosunt, quam divinam providentiam dicimus, visibilis non est. Notum sit sane visibilium nomine omnia corporalia contineri. Oportet ergo frui pulchris invisibilibus, id est honestis; utrum autem omnibus, alia quaestio est, quamquam fortasse honesta nonnisi quibus fruendum est dici deceat. Utilibus autem

The sphere of *frui* is here further described as that of spiritual, intelligible beauty, in other words, of beauty itself which is invisible, but imparting beauty to all that is visibly beautiful. In a parallel manner, the sphere of *uti* is considered to be that of divine providence which, while invisible, assures that whatever we use well will be to our advantage. However, one has to be wise in order to use created things properly in such a way that they are truly useful as intended by divine providence; one has to know what the objects of use are to be related to ("*quo quidque referendum sit... quo referenda sit...*"). It is apparent that visible beauties are to be related to the invisible, and ultimately to the source of all honourableness, that is, to intelligible, spiritual beauty itself; while all that is useful is ultimately to be related to the source of all usefulness, that is, to divine providence.

The distinction *honestum/utile*, with which *frui/uti* is here closely related, can be traced back to Cicero. It is the Stoic distinction between the moral good (virtue) and particular objects of choice (values)³). For the Stoics, the soul has a natural instinct for seeking out objects in conformity with its nature. But the object does not constitute the moral value of an action. This comes about rather through the moral decision which brings the action into relation with the moral law and chooses it precisely because it is in agreement with the moral law. Thus, one and the same action seeks its object in the sphere of the useful ("*utilia*") but receives its moral quality from the orientation of the spirit to the moral good ("*honestum*")⁴). Ragnar Holte regards this Stoic pattern of thought as underlying Augustine's reflections on *uti* and *frui*. Consequently, for Augustine, «Love characterised by *uti* becomes moral by being related (*referri*) to the love whose act is *frui*, i.e. to the love whose immediate object is precisely the moral good or spiritual beauty

utendum est omnibus, ut quoquo eorum opus est. Et frui quidem cibo et qualibet corporali voluptate non adeo absurde existimantur et bestiae; uti autem aliqua re non potest nisi animal quod rationis est particeps. Scire namque quo quidque referendum sit, non datum est rationis expertibus neque ipsis rationalibus stultis. Nec uti quisque potest ea re quae quo referenda sit nescit; nec quisquam potest scire nisi sapiens. Quare abuti rectius dici solent qui non bene utuntur. Non enim cuiquam prodest id quo male utitur; et quod non prodest non utique utile est".

³) See R. Holte, *Béatitude et Sagesse*, p. 201-203; 263; 271 f., n. 2.

⁴) *Ibid.*, p. 263: "D'après les stoïciens l'action morale vise certains objets conformes à la nature. L'âme recherche ces objets par un instinct naturel. Mais la valeur de l'action morale n'est pas constituée par son objet, mais bien par la décision morale par laquelle l'action est référée à la loi morale et choisie en raison de son accord avec celle-ci. C'est une seule et même action qui cherche son objet dans la sphère des "choses utiles" (*utilia*), mais qui obtient sa qualité morale par l'orientation de l'esprit vers le bien moral (*honestum*)".

(*honestas, spiritualis pulchritudo*)”⁵). But Augustine goes beyond the Stoics in at least two ways. Firstly, under the influence of neo-Platonism, the moral good is transferred to a transcendent plane; *summo bono frui* no longer means the enjoyment of one’s own moral perfection, as it did for Cicero, but the enjoyment of the divine, of God⁶). Secondly, for the Stoics, the sphere of *uti* is ultimately without interest; Augustine, on the other hand, sees divine providence at work there offering men gifts which, when used properly, are taken up in the orientation of men’s whole lives to God⁷).

Plotinus, however, who had influenced the transference of the *honestum* to the transcendent plane, considered that contemplation of the divine required isolation from ordinary life in society. On this point Augustine differs decisively from neo-Platonism. The *deo frui*⁸) is, in the first instance, contemplation of the divine, but it is linked intimately to the active life, the virtuous life. Contemplation of God is love for God, and all the other virtues are but different forms of this love. Since God’s command is to love him with all the parts of the soul, not just with the highest part, moral effort becomes identical with love to God, even when it is a matter of *uti*⁹). *Deo frui* designates an unreserved act of love for God and for his law identical with himself, which embraces all the levels of human existence; it is the act of abandonment by which man gives himself and all that he has received in a sacrifice of thanksgiving to the God who creates all things to man’s advantage¹⁰). *Uti*, on the other hand, denotes a “reserved”, i.e. “referred” act of love which provides

⁵) *Ibid.*, p. 202: “... l’amour caractérisé par l’*uti* devient moral par référence (*referri*) à l’amour dont l’acte est un *frui*, amour dont l’objet immédiat est précisément le bien moral ou la beauté spirituelle (*honestas, spiritualis pulchritudo*)”.

⁶) *Ibid.*

⁷) *Ibid.*, p. 264.

⁸) Regarding the antecedents of this formula, Holte states, *op. cit.*, p. 203: “Lorenz pense cependant que la formule *Deo frui* est apparentée au *summo bono frui* de Cicéron et de Varron et remonte par ce dernier à la formule du moyen-platonisme (i.e. ὁμοίωσις θεῷ). Augustin emploie bien l’expression de ressemblance divine — c’est même une formule fréquente dans ses écrits — mais sa formule téléologique préférée reste *Deo frui* ...”. Augustine has modified Middle Platonism on this point. His emphasis is on the *receptive attitude which consists in being filled with the goodness of God*. “*Deo frui*” is “*fructus bonitatis eius*”. As we shall see, no goodness less than that of God warrants placing all our hope in it for the fruitfulness of our lives. [The article of R. Lorenz referred to by Holte is “Die Herkunft des augustinischen *FRUI DEO*”, in *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 64 (1952/53) 34-60].

⁹) See R. Holte, *op. cit.*, p. 251-261, where the first part of the double commandment is analysed in relation to the doctrine of the different parts of the soul.

¹⁰) *Ibid.*, p. 264: “Néanmoins les divers objets de l’amour d’“usage” ne relèvent pas,

the link between the active and the contemplative lives that had been missing in Plotinus. The word "*referre*" is *de rigueur* to express the meaning of *uti*. Holte, in explaining it, summarises his view of the relation of *frui/uti* to *honestum/utile*.

It (i.e. *referre*) translates the act by which external action (i.e. the use of *utilia*) is related to the moral norm, the *honestum*. This norm coincides with God. We believe this to be the central point of Augustinian morality: the morality of the love of "use" is not defined by the object loved but by the choice made for it on account of its conformity with the moral law, that is to say, by reference to the love of God. All legitimate love of "use", therefore, includes an element of love for God. And it is in this element that its morality consists¹¹).

The "*propter aliud*" that characterises all love of "use" would therefore mean: when the wise man properly orientates his life, he chooses particular courses of action because they are in conformity with the *honestum*, with the law that is God himself. A little further on we will see how this schema can also be applied to love for neighbour as referred to love for God.

For the present let us return to the reading of *quaestio 30*. In the concluding paragraph Augustine concretises the matter and brings his more general speculations to bear on points close to our theme. The passage runs as follows:

Therefore, perfect reason in man, which is called virtue, first of all uses itself to understand God, so as to enjoy Him by whom in fact it

comme c'est facilement le cas chez les stoïciens, d'une sphère au fond sans intérêt. C'est que derrière la sphère de l'"usage" (*utilitas*) Augustin voit la Providence divine qui donne aux hommes des dons excellents. Les objets auxquels s'adresse l'amour d'"usage" sont, chez Augustin, entraînés dans le mouvement d'ensemble de l'amour de Dieu, ils sont inclus dans l'acte d'abandon par lequel l'homme se donne soi-même et tout ce qu'il a reçu, en sacrifice d'action de grâces à Dieu". Holte is here drawing on his reading of texts from *De Doctrina Christiana*, especially 1,42-43 (CSEL 80,19) = 1,22,21 (CC 32,17-18. ML 34,26-27), in which he emphasises the totality of self-giving required by the double commandment.

¹¹) *Ibid.*, p. 203: "... il (*referre*) traduit l'acte par lequel l'action extérieure est rapportée à la norme morale: l'*honestum*; or cette norme coïncide avec Dieu; partant cet acte est déjà un acte d'amour de Dieu. C'est là, croyons-nous, le point central de la morale augustinienne: la moralité de l'amour d'usage ne se définit pas par l'objet aimé, mais par le choix qui en est fait pour sa conformité avec la loi morale, c'est-à-dire par référence à l'amour de Dieu; or ce choix constitue déjà un acte d'amour de Dieu. Tout amour d'"usage" légitime comprend donc un élément d'amour de Dieu. Et c'est en cet élément que consiste sa moralité".

was created. It uses other rational animals to form community, and it uses those that are irrational to stand out above them. Moreover, it orientates its life to the enjoyment of God, for thus it is happy. Therefore, perfect reason in man uses itself too; and it would certainly set in train unhappiness through pride if it were to be orientated to itself and not to God. It uses certain material things to which it has to give life, to show beneficence — for example, in this way it uses its own body; it uses other things which it has to adopt or reject for the sake of health; others again have to be borne with for the sake of patience. Furthermore, some have to be set in order for the sake of justice, and others studied in order to learn a lesson in truth. Even those from which perfect reason abstains, it uses for the sake of temperance. Thus it uses everything, both what is perceived through the senses and what is not — there is no middle way. Now perfect reason in man judges all that it uses; only about God does it make no judgment, because it is in relation to God that it judges all the rest; it does not use Him but enjoys Him. For God is not to be orientated to anything else, for all that has to be orientated to another is inferior to that to which it is to be orientated, and there is nothing higher than God — this is not meant spatially, but on account of the excellence of His nature. Therefore, all that has been created has been created for man's use, since reason, which has been given to man, uses all things in judging them. We add that, before the fall, man made no use of those things that have to be borne with for the sake of patience, and he does so after the fall only if he has been converted and has become, even before the death of the body, and to the extent that it is possible here, a friend of God, because he serves him cheerfully¹²).

¹²) *De Diversis Quaestionibus* 83, q. 30 (CC 44A, 39-40. ML 40,20): "Perfecta igitur hominis ratio, quae virtus vocatur, utitur primo se ipsa ad intellegendum deum, ut eo fruatur a quo etiam facta est; utitur etiam ceteris rationalibus animantibus ad societatem, irrationalibus ad eminentiam. Vitam etiam suam ad id refert, ut fruatur deo; ita enim beata est. Ergo et se ipsa utitur. Quae profecto inchoat miseriam per superbiam, si ad se ipsam, non ad deum referatur. Utitur etiam corporibus quibusdam vivificandis ad beneficentiam — sic enim utitur suo corpore —, quibusdam assumendis vel respuendis ad valitudinem, quibusdam tolerandis ad patientiam, quibusdam ordinandis ad iustitiam, quibusdam considerandis ad aliquod veritatis documentum; utitur etiam his a quibus se abstinet ad temperantiam. Ita omnibus et sensis et non sensis utitur; nec aliquid tertium est. Iudicat autem de omnibus quibus utitur; de solo deo non iudicat, quia secundum deum de ceteris iudicat. Nec eo utitur, sed fruitur; neque enim ad aliquid aliud deus referendus est, quoniam omne quod ad aliud referendum est inferius est quam id ad quod referendum est, nec est aliquid deo superius, non loco sed excellentia suae naturae. Omnia ergo quae facta sunt, in usum hominis facta sunt, quia omnibus utitur iudicando ratio, quae homini data est. Et ante lapsum quidem non utebatur tolerandis, nec post lapsum utitur nisi conversus, et quamquam ante mortem corporis, iam tamen quantum potest dei amicus, quia libenter servus".

A number of additional reflections are evoked by this development in the presentation of *uti/frui*.

1. The field of *uti*

Firstly, we learn of *uti* that its domain is that of all created reality, both visible and invisible, in other words, of all that is not God. It could be said that the term characterises the right relation of the human person, in God's providence, to all that is not God. The rational being, at his best, judges everything in relation to God ("*secundum Deum*"); this is the proper attitude of human being to created reality: to comprehend created beauty as stemming from and orientated towards beauty itself, to discern in all beings one meets in this world an indicator of divine providence at work for the good of man. Of course, in divine providence, there is a hierarchy of created realities, and thereby a hierarchy of right human action, with its own determined finite ends, in relation to all possible beings in the realm of *uti*. Augustine illustrates this in the passage just quoted by sketching the variety of limited ends that may be served by the material creation: "*ad beneficentiam ... ad valitudinem ... ad patientiam ... ad iustitiam ... ad aliquod veritatis documentum ... ad temperantiam ...*". Furthermore, in relation to irrational creation, the intention of divine providence is that the human person should shine out above it: "*ad eminentiam*"; and, as far as fellow rational beings are concerned, the appropriate attitude is to join them in building community: "*ad societatem*"¹³). Acting in this manner, human reason perfectly performs its function of judging everything in relation to God. By so doing, it makes that use of itself which divine providence intended for its benefit: not only does it orientate creatures in their various ways to God, but it comes to an understanding of God himself, it enters the territory of *frui*. This is at the same time *beata vita* with God, the *frui* of

¹³) J.-A. Beckaert in *Oeuvres de Saint Augustin* (Bibliothèque Augustinienne, 10), Paris, 1952, translates the corresponding sentence of *De Diversis Quaestionibus* 83 as follows: "Et elle (c'est-à-dire, la raison parfaite de l'homme) se sert des autres animaux raisonnables *comme d'une société*" (my emphasis). The impression given by this rendering is that one uses other human beings for company's sake and for the benefits of living in society. But no violence is done to the grammar if the "ad" is given a more active sense and if the sentence is thus interpreted in context in this way: the most fitting attitude of perfect human reason towards fellow creatures also endowed with reason is to strive to build a community with them; they are, after all, created beings, not God, and therefore do not belong where "*frui*" has its home. As we shall see, however, Augustine will later allow even a kind of "*frui*" of other people.

God, to whom alone it has directed its whole life in relating fittingly to creation (*uti*) in accordance with divine providence¹⁴).

2. The meaning of *frui*

Secondly, although we find general assertions in the course of *quaestio* 30 that the honourable and invisible beauties constitute the object of *frui*¹⁵), as the argument develops it becomes clear that the invisible beauty of perfect human reason, man's spiritual faculty, itself still stands under the sign of *uti*, insofar as it has been created and bears an orientation to its creator¹⁶). Ultimately only God himself stands under the sign of *frui*; human reason cannot judge God, for in his light it judges all he has created; there is none higher than God according to which he can be judged or to whom he may be orientated¹⁷). The *De Diversis Quaestionibus* 83 does not offer any detailed description of this *frui deo*, but, in order to have a broader picture of what is meant, it will be useful to note some of the conclusions of Rudolf Lorenz who has devoted a special study to the topic¹⁸). Lorenz distinguishes between *frui deo* as, on the one hand, insertion into the divine world order, and, on the other, clinging to, «possessing», God. This roughly corresponds to Gunnar Hultgren's distinction presented above, in Chapter Two, between the ontological-ethical and psychological approaches to the question of the role of the neighbour in the search for God; although, as will be seen, there are elements of each in both¹⁹). As insertion into the

¹⁴) *De Diversis Quaestionibus* 83, q. 30 (CC 44A,39-40. ML 40,20): "Vitam etiam suam ad id refert, ut fruatur deo; ita enim beata est. Ergo et se ipsa utitur (perfecta hominis ratio)".

¹⁵) *Ibid.*, (CC 44A,39. ML 40,19): "Oportet ergo frui pulchris invisibilibus, id est honestis ...".

¹⁶) *Ibid.*, (CC 44A, 39. ML 40,20): "Perfecta igitur hominis ratio, quae virtus vocatur, utitur primo se ipsa ad intellegendum deum, ut eo fruatur a quo etiam facta est ...".

¹⁷) *Ibid.*, (CC 44A,40. ML 40,20): "... de solo deo non iudicat, quia secundum deum de ceteris iudicat. Nec eo (deo) utitur, sed *fruitur*; neque enim ad aliquid aliud deus referendus est, quoniam omne quod ad aliud referendum est inferius est quam id ad quod referendum est, nec est aliquid deo superius ...".

¹⁸) R. Lorenz, "FRUITIO DEI bei Augustin", in *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 63 (1950-1951) 75-132.

¹⁹) R. Lorenz, *art. cit.*, bases this distinction on the two levels or the two-sidedness he detects in the concept of *frui* (p. 84-87). On the one hand, the "I" and its longing are stressed, and, while this form of *frui* carries traces of the physical senses, it is a matter of "unsinnliche Sinnlichkeit" (p. 121-126): 'Frui deo als Gotterfassen ist Funktion einer

divine world order, *frui deo* may be described in at least the following four ways:

1. As obedience to the eternal law²⁰).
2. As virtue in the highest degree: unconditional praise and love of God²¹). All ethical action is to be directed towards the goal of enjoying God; it prepares and promotes this enjoyment. Moral purification and striving for perfection are the path to the enjoyment of the Truth; a means, says Lorenz, to the realisation of *fruitio*²²). This way of thinking we are familiar with from our presentation of the theme of observance of the *praecepta vitae* — among which love for neighbour has a place of honour — as purifying and cleansing the heart for the contemplation of God. However, as Lorenz points out, there seems also to be a sense in which a life in conformity with the *praecepta vitae* and with the world-order established by God presupposes a certain knowledge of God and at least the beginnings of *frui*²³). In such a life *uti* does not trespass in the territory of *frui*, nor vice versa, and God's will is carried out in the realm of creation. Thus, for Lorenz, it may be said that both the contexts of ascent and descent are operative in the dialectic of virtue and *frui deo*,

geistigen Sinnlichkeit ... Die unsinnliche Sinnlichkeit ist Ausdruck der Gewissheit des Erkennens. Eine Verstärkung der 'sinnliche' Züge tritt dadurch ein, dass *frui* auch Liebe zu Gott ist": p. 126; on the other hand, the *res (ordo)* and its being accepted and observed is emphasised, with the result that "*frui* darf nicht als Sublimierung einer Sinnestätigkeit betrachtet werden" (p. 86). Lorenz characterises the former *frui* as active and the latter as passive; in his own words: "*Frui* ist sowohl von der *res* aus, wie vom Ich her bestimmt. In ihm vereinen sich Hinnehmen des Dargebotenen und Ergreifen des Ersehnten, Passivität und Aktivität" (p. 86; cf. p. 99). However, under the aspect of *frui* as insertion into the divine world order (more passive, according to Lorenz), he includes the features, obedience to the divine law, serving God, and virtue, which at the very least have active implications.

²⁰) *Ibid.*, p. 88-89: "Das Ziel und die Fülle des aus dem ewigen Gesetz geflossenen biblischen Gesetzes ist die *fruitio dei* ... Gott zur Frucht haben (this is the translation of "*frui deo*" which Lorenz, see p. 87, n. 16, has taken over from Przywara), ihm dienen, gern unter ihm sein, nennt Augustin in einem Atem ... *Frui deo* ist Rückkehr zum ursprünglichen Gehorsam".

²¹) *Ibid.*, p. 89-91.

²²) *Ibid.*, p. 89-91: "Das ethische Handeln wird jedoch auch von der *fruitio dei* als Zielgut bestimmt. Alles Tun soll darauf abgezweckt sein, das Geniessen Gottes vorzubereiten und zu fördern. Sittliche Reinigung und Vervollkommnungstreben sind Weg zum 'Genuss' der Wahrheit. Es gibt eine bestimmte Ordnung im Leben, die uns zu Gott führt ... die oben entwickelte Anschauung, dass *uti* Mittel zur Realisierung der *fruitio* ist".

²³) *Ibid.*, p. 90: "Das von der göttlichen Weltordnung geforderte *uti* ist jedenfalls erst möglich, wenn man Erkenntnis Gottes besitzt. Es hat den Anschein, dass *uti* seinerseits schon ein Gotthaben (*frui deo*) voraussetzt; dass die von Augustin mit *uti* bezeichnete Lebenshaltung nicht denkbar ist, ohne dass *frui* schon anfängt, sich zu verwirklichen".

of virtuous action and contemplation. An example of the descent context, of the impossibility of a proper *uti* if *frui deo* has not begun to be realised is already hinted at in the final sentence of the long quotation from *quaestio* 30: "... after the fall man makes use of those things which have to be borne for the sake of patience, only if he has been converted and has become, even before the death of the body, and to the extent that it is possible here, a friend of God, because he serves him cheerfully"²⁴). Conversion, friendship with God and willing service of him may be understood as the form of *fruitio dei* in this life; outside this state of being with God, the '*uti ad patientiam*' cannot attain its purpose.

3. As beatitude²⁵): in this are centered the expectations that longing will be quietened, that peace with God and peace of soul will be attained, that we will be filled with the unshakeable certainty that we are saved²⁶). Beatitude is grounded ontologically in preserving the order established by God and in sharing in God's being; this is how the expression, "having God", is to be understood: sharing in God through holding to his order which is offered to us, and through living according to the level of being one occupies in God's creation²⁷), and as being deified (*deificari*), in the sense that the image of God has been perfectly restored in us and we have been adopted as God's sons²⁸).

²⁴) *De Diversis Quaestionibus* 83, q. 30 (CC 44A.40. ML 40.20): "... (tolerandis) nec post lapsum utitur nisi conversus, et quamquam ante mortem corporis, iam tamen quantum potest dei amicus, quia libenter servus". Cf. *In Epistolam Ioannis*, tr. 8,11 (ML 35.2043) where the enemy who beats us and brings about our ruin is seen as God's instrument of care for us: "Quodammodo ferramentum Dei est quo saneris, ipse inimicus tuus. Si novit Deus *utile* tibi esse ut expoliet te, permittit illum; si novit tibi *utile* esse ut vapules, permittit illum ut caedaris: de illo te curat, opta ut ille sanetur". Such persecution cannot be accepted in a manner that is "*utile*" unless, trusting in divine providence, we are already intent upon God, living *frui deo* to the extent possible in this world.

²⁵) R. Lorenz, *art. cit.*, p. 92-95.

²⁶) *Ibid.*, p. 94.

²⁷) *Ibid.*, p. 92: "So liegt der Grund der Beseligung darin, dass wir in der *fruitio dei* die uns gebotene Ordnung innehalten und so der in Gott beschlossenen Güter teilhaftig werden. Das Erfassen Gottes ist ein Seinszustand. Sehr aufschlussreich dafür ist, dass das 'Haben' Gottes der *fruitio* letztlich ein Teilhaben (platonisch *methexis*) an Gott ist, also das Stehen auf einer bestimmten Stufe im Kosmos". Cf. p. 92, n. 5: "*frui deo* ist teilhaben an Gott: *dei solius participatione beatus homo fieri potest*, und im nächsten Satze: *deo solo fruens beatus fit cultor eius*. C. Faust. XX 5 CSEL 25, p. 539".

²⁸) *Ibid.*, p. 95: "Der Terminus *deificari* unterstreicht noch einmal, dass die Seligkeit der *fruitio dei* einem bestimmten Seinszustand angehört, dem der Weisheit — in der Sprache des gereiften Augustin: dem der vollkommenen Wiederherstellung des Gottesbildes, der Annahme zur Sohnschaft". See G. Folliet, "'Deificari in otio'. Augustin, *Epistola* 10,2", in *Recherches Augustiniennes*, II, (Paris, 1962), 225-236, who shows that Augustine owes this expression to Porphyry and that in *Epistola* 10 to Nebridius, dating

4. As *civitas dei*²⁹): *frui deo* is a community concept; it has a social character³⁰). "Truth presents itself without distinction to all souls capable of enjoying it"³¹). "In the heritage we receive from God, that is, God himself, who has seen fit to offer himself to our enjoyment, we will not suffer any restrictions on account of having the company of the saints. It is not as if God whom we love were our own private possession"³²). The God enjoyed by *frui* is the *bonum commune*.

According to Lorenz, *frui deo* as clinging to and "possessing" God may be realised in the following forms:

1. *Visio dei*³³): as such *frui* is linked with a knowledge and understanding of God³⁴). Indeed, this is an important aspect of *frui deo* referred to in our text from *quaestio 30*: "Therefore, perfect reason in man, which is called virtue, first of all uses itself to understand God, so as to enjoy him by whom in fact it was created"³⁵. But this is only one aspect; *frui deo* is wider than the mind's *visio dei*³⁶).

2. *Amor dei*³⁷): such love desires the most intimate communion with God, and may be expressed by the verbs "*inhaerere*", "*cohaerere*", "*adhaerere*". "To enjoy the wisdom of God is nothing other than to be united to Him in love"³⁸). Even though this leads the person to a certain

from 389, he still uses it in the Porphyryan sense of deifying oneself through virtuous works.

²⁹) *Ibid.*, p. 95-98.

³⁰) *Ibid.*, p. 95: "Das Geniessen Gottes vollzieht sich in der Gemeinschaft".

³¹) *Epistola* 118,4,25 (CSEL 34/2,689. ML 33,444): "... omnibus animis se frui valentibus veritas communiter praesto est".

³²) *En. in ps.* 105,34 (CC 40,1565-1566. ML 37,1415): "In cuius hereditate, quod ipse nobis est, cum ad fruendum se praebere dignatur, nullas patiemur cum sanctis societatis angustias, dilectione rei nostrae quasi privatae".

³³) R. Lorenz, *art. cit.*, p. 99-101.

³⁴) *Ibid.*, p. 100: "So stellt auch die fruitio dei als Schau ein vollkommen deutliches Erkennen und Einsehen Gottes dar".

³⁵) *De Diversis Quaestionibus* 83, q. 30 (CC 44A,39. ML 40,20): "Perfecta igitur hominis ratio, quae virtus vocatur, utitur primo se ipsa ad intellegendum deum, ut eo fruatur a quo etiam facta est ...".

³⁶) R. Lorenz, *art. cit.*, p. 101: "Visio und contemplatio dei beschreiben aber nur ein Teilmoment der fruitio. Frui ist weiter als contemplari — non hoc est cogitatione conspicere quod appetere vel etiam perfrui voluntate. Neben dem schauenden Erkennen hat frui noch Raum für andere Verhaltensweise". The Latin quotation is from *De Trinitate* 15,27,50 (CC 50A,533. ML 42,1097).

³⁷) *Ibid.*, p. 101-103.

³⁸) *De Fide et Symbolo* 9,19 (CSEL 41,24. ML 40,192): "Frui autem sapientia dei nihil est aliud quam ei dilectione cohaerere".

rest, the will remains active and continues to accompany delight. *Frui deo* might then be called paradoxically “a resting will”³⁹).

3. *Habere deum*⁴⁰): this terminology, which is present in Augustine from the beginning⁴¹), gradually changes in meaning. Initially it is related to the intellectual quest to know God⁴²). Later it is connected with God’s promise to be “my God”⁴³). Such a way of speaking reflects certain verses of the psalms, e.g. “Yahweh, my heritage, my cup» (Ps. 15(16).5); “Happy the people whose God is Yahweh, the people he has chosen for his heritage” (Ps. 32(33).12); “I have told Yahweh, ‘You are my God’” (Ps. 139(140).6); “Happy the nation whose God is Yahweh» (Ps. 143(144).15b). The expression *possidere deum* too, evidently springs from similar reminiscences from the psalms. Far from reflecting an attempt to get God, the creator and Lord, into our power, *possidere deum*, just as *habere deum*, is the formulation of a loving longing and fond hope which

³⁹) R. Lorenz, *art. cit.*, p. 102-103: “Daran, dass *fruitio* sich unter Liebe vollzieht, wird deutlich, dass der Gottes “genuß” ein willentliches Tun ist, Aktivität. Zwar kommt in der *fruitio* der strebende Wille zur Ruhe ... doch ist er nicht ausgeschaltet. Wille begleitet das Geniessen ... Bei Augustin ist es nicht so, dass das Geniessen allem Willen und allem Streben vollkommen fern stehe ... sein “Geniessen” ist nicht willensfrei. Wir müssen so die paradoxe Formulierung wagen: *Frui deo* ist ein ruhender Wille”. As indications of will’s continuing accompanying role, reference is made to: *De Trinitate* 15,27,50 (CC 50A,533. ML 42,1097): “*perfrui voluntate*”; *De Vera Religione* 70 (CSEL 77,19) = 13,26 (CC 32,203. ML 34,133): “*sed ea voluntate qua magis deum quam se diligunt (angeli), firmi et stabiles manent in illo et fruuntur maiestate ipsius, ei uni libentissime subditi*”. Note that the feature of cheerful obedience is also present here along with constancy in love; together they constitute *frui deo*. See also *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,40 (CSEL 80,19) = 1,22,21 (CC 32,17. ML 34,26-27): “... *melior est cum totus haeret atque constringitur incommutabili bono, quam cum inde vel ad se ipsum relaxatur*”. Again the constancy of intent upon God is stressed.

⁴⁰) R. Lorenz, *art. cit.*, p. 104-108.

⁴¹) See *De Beata Vita* 4,34 (CSEL 63,114-115. ML 32,976): “*Quisquis igitur ad summum modum per veritatem venerit, beatus est. Hoc est animis deum habere, id est deo perfrui ...*”; *De Ordine* 2,7,21 (CSEL 63,160. ML 32,1004): “*Cum deo item non dico, quia ipsi non habent deum. Siquidem deum habere ... placuit nihil aliud esse quam deo perfrui*”.

⁴²) R. Lorenz, *art. cit.*, p. 107: “*Deum habere und deo frui besagen somit im Munde des Philosophen Augustin die Zugehörigkeit zur intelligiblen Welt*”.

⁴³) *En. in ps.* 139,10 (CC 40,2018. ML 37,1808-1809): “*Dixi domino, deus meus es tu* (Ps. 139.7). *Illi homines sunt, et non mei; tu et deus, et meus es. Dixi domino, deus meus es tu. Magna vox orationis; movet fiduciam. Numquid illorum non est deus? ... Sed tamen proprie eorum est, qui eo fruuntur, qui ei serviunt, qui libenter sub ipso sunt ...*”. Note that the idea of having God as “mine” goes hand in hand with serving him and being cheerfully subject to him.

is founded on God's promise⁴⁴). What is possessed is received in confidence and hope⁴⁵).

Furthermore, not only do we possess God, but we are also possessed by him, as in the saying from Isaiah: "Lord, possess us" (Is. 26.13: LXX). Our being possessed by him is the condition of possessing him⁴⁶). We can be called God's estate, his house, his temple. To have God is at the same time to be had by him, to be of God, to be close to him, to be with him. God dwells in us making us his own, filling us with himself. *Inhabitatio dei* is the necessary corollary of *deum habere*⁴⁷). But God's indwelling in the soul does not make human activity in search of him superfluous⁴⁸). For the early Augustine this activity consisted in intellectual knowledge; later, such knowledge was understood to flow from faith and love⁴⁹). The God whom we "have" is already there in possession of us, waiting to be our God⁵⁰).

⁴⁴) *En. 2 in ps. 32, sermo 2,27* (CC 38,267. ML 36,294-295): "*Beata gens cuius est dominus deus eorum* (Ps. 32.12) ... Ipse sit hereditas nostra, possessio nostra. An forte temere dicimus faciendo nobis deum possessionem, cum sit dominus, cum sit creator? Non est ista temeritas; affectus est desiderii, et dulcedo spei. Dicat anima, omnino segura dicat: Deus meus es tu, qui dicit animæ nostræ: *Salus tua ego sum* (Ps. 34.3) ... Dic ergo securus, possessio tua est; *possidentibus eam* (cf. Prov. 3.18) scriptura dixit, implevit fiducia dubitationem tuam; dic securus, ama securus, spera securus. Tua etiam illa verba sint in psalmo: *Dominus pars hereditatis meae* (Ps. 15.5)".

⁴⁵) R. Lorenz, *art. cit.*, p. 104: "Es (d.h. possidere deum) ist empfangendes Besitzen".

⁴⁶) Cf. *En in ps. 145,11* (CC 40,2113. ML 37,1891-1892): "Eris tu possessio, et possidebis; possessio dei eris, et possessio tua erit deus; tu eris possessio eius, ut colaris ab eo, et ipse erit possessio tua, ut colas eum ... Ergo erit ipse possessio nostra, ut nos pascat; et erimus possessio eius, ut nos regat". To possess God then is to be ruled by him, to worship him.

⁴⁷) See references in R. Lorenz, *art. cit.*, p. 105, where the author states: "Sie (i.e. the survey of "deum habere" terminology) zeigt, dass Gotthaben auch Gehabtwerden von Gott ist und vor allem, dass das Haben Gottes für Augustinus untrennbar verknüpft ist mit der Einwohnung Gottes in der Seele ...".

⁴⁸) *Ibid.*, p. 106-107: "Bei aller Wandlung des *inhabitatio* Begriffs bleibt sich Augustinus darin gleich, dass zum 'Haben' Gottes im strengen Sinn neben seiner Einwohnung auch eine gewisse Tätigkeit des Menschen gehört ... deshalb ist eine Eigentätigkeit der Seele erforderlich, damit die Einwohnung fruchtbar wird, die Erleuchtung eintritt ...".

⁴⁹) *Ibid.*, p. 108.

⁵⁰) *Ibid.*: "Was trägt nun die Untersuchung über *habere deum* zur Erhellung des Phänomens der *fruitio dei* bei? Sie zeigt zunächst, dass die *fruitio* sich vollzieht in der Wendung der Seele nach innen, zu dem in ihren Tiefen wohnenden Gott. Es ist nicht *visio extraria*, sondern *interna*. *Frui deo* selbst als Gotthaben bedeutet Gott besitzen und ihm gehören, ihn gefunden haben und halten, Nähe zu ihm und Gewissheit über ihn, liebend in ihm bleiben. Mit einem Wort — *frui deo* heisst: *tu et deus et meus es*. Den jungen Augustin ist es Erkennen, dem alten — für das irdische Leben — *fiducia*.

The remaining forms of *frui deo* as “*Erfassen Gottes*” may be dealt with briefly:

4. *Amplexus spirituales*⁵¹): for Augustine the philosopher, the wise man already knew the embrace of God present; the bishop contented himself with the expectation of the spiritual nuptials in heaven⁵²).

5. *Manducare* and *bibere deum*⁵³): this may be understood as occurring in meditation, in listening to sermons and in reading the scriptures; in the Eucharist Christ is eaten and drunk. Through the Incarnation of Christ our human weakness is made capable of enjoying God⁵⁴).

6. *Delectari in domino*⁵⁵): both the heart’s desire for God and our sharing in God, who is delight itself, through the grace of the Holy Spirit, are involved; the psychological dimension is again brought into relation with the metaphysical⁵⁶).

The corresponding traits in God that make him open to *frui* are described variously as *dulcedo dei*, *bonus odor dei*, *melodia dei*, *lumen dei*⁵⁷). But God can be known and enjoyed only by one who has been converted to him such that his image in the person is renewed. Yet again

⁵¹) *Ibid.*, p. 108-109.

⁵²) Cf. Lorenz’s concluding section: “Gegenwärtigkeit und Zukünftigkeit der *fruitio dei*”, p. 129-131, where *frui deo* in time is considered to be possible to humble faith in such a way that it both enables a proper *uti* of the world and assures that the eschatological *fruitio* will not be lost. See especially p. 131: “So dürfen wir den Schluss ziehen, dass mit der zunehmenden Einsicht Augustins in die Unfähigkeit der menschlichen Natur das diesseitige *frui deo* die Züge des unter Gott sich demütigenden *credere* annimmt — selbstverständlich diejenigen des augustinischen ‘Glaube-zur-Einsicht’. Diese Beobachtung findet eine starke Stütze darin, dass der Bischof die irdische *fruitio dei* ein *frui per speculum vel in aenigmate* nennt. Die Annäherung an das *credere* macht das diesseitige *frui deo* geeignet zur Maxime der christlichen Moral. Die zeitliche *fruitio dei* ermöglicht das ‘Gebrauchen’ der Welt und dieses ‘Gebrauchen’ ist eine Stufe auf dem Weg zum endzeitlichen Gottesgenuss”. This is the framework within which Lorenz interprets *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,66 (CSEL 80,25) = 1,30,31 (CC 32,23-24. ML 34,30-31): “*Oritur autem hoc loco de angelis nonnulla quaestio. Illo enim fruente etiam ipsi beati sunt, quo et nos frui desideramus; et quantum in hac vita fruimur vel per speculum vel in aenigmate* (cf. 1 Cor. 13,12), *tanto eam peregrinationem et tolerabilius sustinemus et ardentius finire cupimus*”.

⁵³) R. Lorenz, *art. cit.*, p. 109-113.

⁵⁴) *Confessiones* 7,18,24 (Skutella 146. CSEL 33/1,163. ML 32,745): “*Et quaerebam viam comparandi roboris, quod esset idoneum ad fruendum te, nec inveniebam, donec amplecterer mediatorem dei et hominum, hominem Christum Iesum* (cf. 1 Tim. 2.5)...”.

⁵⁵) R. Lorenz, *art. cit.*, p. 114.

⁵⁶) Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 127-128, i.e. the section headed: “Die Metaphysik der *fruitio dei*” where the role of the Holy Spirit in uniting people to God is emphasised. Therefore, “da die Verbundenheit mit Gott, das Anhängen an ihn, *frui* ist, liegt der Schluss nahe, das für Augustin das *perfrui veritate* hier sich kraft des hl. Geistes vollzieht. Die Metaphysik der *fruitio dei* ist also von Anfang an bei Augustin vorhanden”.

⁵⁷) *Ibid.*, p. 118-121.

the psychological side to *frui* is bound up with the ontological side which Lorenz has called "insertion into the divine order of the world"⁵⁸).

Thus, for the present, sufficient has been said to give some indication of the background and range of *frui deo* in the development of Augustine's thought, and to forewarn against a too simplistic understanding of *frui* as a subjective, individualistic, private form of enjoyment which would be ultimately egoistic. What Ragnar Holte says of a mistaken understanding of Augustinian *dilectio ordinata*, according to which all beings would be assigned a value relative to their capacity to satisfy desire—a desire which comes to rest only in the *Summum Bonum*—may also be applied to a misconceived notion of *frui deo* which would represent it as sublimated selfish enjoyment. "The idea of a basic, primitively sensual human desire, which could by sublimation be directed towards spiritual values, belongs to modern popularised psychology, it is unknown to Augustine"⁵⁹). *Frui* is not then sublimated *uti*; they belong rather to distinct spheres—to that of spiritual beauty itself and to that of created beauties—and they are associated with different parts of the soul. When the functions of the other parts of the soul (i.e. *cor*, the active life, and *anima*, the life of the senses) are in accord with the highest function, *mens*, the contemplative life—that is, when *uti* is in accord with *frui deo*—one's whole life, heart, soul and mind, is given over to God⁶⁰).

3. *Frui and uti in disorder*

Understanding the relation between these terms can be aided by looking at some cases of distortion. Already in *De Diversis Quaestionibus* 83, *quaestio* 30, Augustine had asserted: "Thus, all human perversion (which is also called vice) consists in wishing to use what is to be enjoyed

⁵⁸) *Ibid.*, p. 125-126. "Wenn das Erkennen Gottes auf das Bild Gottes im Menschen zurückgeht und im Erkennen das Gottesbild sich erneuert, so ist damit schon ausgesprochen, dass auch *frui deo* auf der *imago dei* beruht. Da *frui* eine vollkommene Erkenntnis darstellt, muss ihm die Intaktheit des Gottesbildes gleichzeitig sein. *Fruitio dei* ist nur möglich, wenn der Mensch zu Gott umgekehrt ist. Hier meldet sich die Seite des Begriffs *frui*, die wir als Einfügung in die göttliche Weltordnung bezeichneten" (p. 126).

⁵⁹) R. Holte, *Béatitude et Sagesse*, p. 269: "L'idée d'un désir humain de base, primitivement sensuel, qui par sublimation puisse être dirigé vers des valeurs spirituelles, appartient à la psychologie moderne de vulgarisation; elle est étrangère à Augustin". Cf. p. 256 & 259. Love as *appetitus* in Augustine is not a simple, undifferentiated desire capable of being directed towards objects of all categories.

⁶⁰) *Ibid.*, p. 254-261.

and to enjoy what is to be used; on the other hand, all order (that is virtue) is based on the wish to enjoy what is to be enjoyed and to use what is to be used"⁶¹). Twenty-two or more years later, in the fifteenth book of the *City of God*, we find some of the implications of this kind of human perversion drawn out. Augustine is speaking of those like Cain whose gift is not acceptable to God because they give something belonging to them but fail to give themselves. He continues:

This is what is done by all who follow their own will, and not the will of God; that is, those who live with a perverted instead of an upright heart, and yet offer a gift to God. They suppose that with this gift God is being bought over to help them, not in curing their depraved desires, but in fulfilling them. And this is characteristic of the earthly city — to worship a god or gods so that with their assistance it may reign in the enjoyment of victories and an earthly peace, not with a loving concern for others, but with lust for domination over them. For the good make use of this world in order to enjoy God, whereas the evil want to make use of God in order to enjoy the world ...⁶²)

God is full of delight for us in himself ("*per se*"); temporal things are rightly sought not as absolute ends in themselves, but "on account of something else" ("*propter aliud*")⁶³). There is a link here with the terminology employed in *quaestio* 30 for which the *honestum* is to be sought for its own sake ("*propter se ipsum*") and the *utile* is to be orientated to something other than itself ("*utile autem quod ad aliud aliquid referendum est*"). Those whose *frui* is not rightly ordered,

⁶¹) *De Diversis Quaestionibus* 83, q. 30 (CC 44A,38. ML 40,19): "Omnis itaque humana perversio est, quod etiam vitium vocatur, fruendis uti velle atque utendis frui; et rursus omnis ordinatio, quae virtus etiam nominatur, fruendis frui et utendis uti".

⁶²) *De Civitate Dei* 15,7 (CC 48,460-461. ML 41,444. CSEL 40/2,69): "Quod omnes faciunt, qui non Dei, sed suam sectantes voluntatem, id est non recto, sed perverso corde viventes, offerunt tamen Deo munus, quo putant eum redimi, ut eorum non opituletur sanandis pravis cupiditatibus, sed explendis. Et hoc est terrenae proprium civitatis, Deum vel deos colere, quibus adiuvantibus regnet in victoriis et pace terrena, non caritate consulendi, sed dominandi cupiditate. Boni quippe ad hoc utuntur mundo, ut fruantur Deo; mali autem contra, ut fruantur mundo, uti volunt Deo ..."; (English translation: Henry Bettenson), Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1972, p. 604.

⁶³) *De Civitate Dei* 11,25 (CC 48,344-345. ML 41,339. CSEL 40/1,549): "Nec ignoro, quod proprie fructus fruendis, usus utentis sit, atque hoc interesse videatur, quod ea re frui dicimur, quae nos non ad aliud referenda per se ipsa delectat; uti vero ea re, quam propter aliud quaerimus (unde temporalibus magis utendum est, quam fruendum, ut frui mereamur aeternis; non sicut perversi, qui frui volunt nummo, uti autem Deo; quoniam non nummum propter Deum impendunt, sed Deum propter nummum colunt) ...".

however, — that is, those who do not give themselves in obedience to God but follow their own wills — wreak havoc by absolutising relative created ends, such as wealth, power, and freedom from annoyance, and by desiring to cajole heaven into fulfilling them. God is made to dance to the tune of self-will, with the tragic result that the neighbour too is robbed of respect and loving attention. When anything less than God becomes the object of *frui*, towards which all else is orientated, other people are reduced to mere grist for the mill as well. Their lot is to be enslaved to the unbridled lust for power of an ego that is running wild without due reverence for God, whom it wishes to incorporate comfortably into its own schemes, and without consideration for the order of reality established by him.

Obviously *frui* is here being employed in a very technical sense which cannot simply be read off what we human beings know as “enjoyment”. It has the function of reminding us that God is the only absolute so that we will beware of the temptation to fabricate and worship lesser gods. But Augustine realises that in common usage *frui* has a less restricted meaning: we can ‘make use’ of ‘fruits’ and ‘enjoy’ the ‘use’ of things⁶⁴). Perhaps it is the broader sense given to *frui* in ordinary language that allows Augustine to write to Licentius in 394 of looking forward to the day when he might enjoy his talents “in the Lord”⁶⁵), or to Jerome in 402 of his desire to enjoy having him near “in the Lord” and conversing with him⁶⁶). But, if Augustine had only the common meaning in mind, why is he careful to add “in the Lord” in both instances? Might it not be his consciousness that, strictly speaking, human talents and human company *tout court* are trespassers in the realm of true *frui*? Properly speaking, other human beings ought to be ‘used’ (*uti*) to form community⁶⁷). But this “*societas*” can, under certain circumstances,

⁶⁴) *Ibid.*, (CC 48, 345. ML 41,339. CSEL 40/1,549): “verum tamen eo loquendi modo, quem plus obtinuit consuetudo, et fructibus utimur et usibus fruimur; nam et fructus iam proprie dicuntur agrorum, quibus utique omnes temporaliter utimur”.

⁶⁵) *Epistola* 26,4 (CSEL 34/1,87. ML 33,106): “Quasi quidquam mihi dierum gratus illucescat, quam ut ingenio tuo fruar in domino ...”.

⁶⁶) *Epistola* 67,3 (CSEL 34/2,239. ML 33,237): “O si licuisset, etsi non cohabitante, saltem vicino te in domino perfrui ad crebrum et dulce colloquium!”. J. Brechtken, *Augustinus Doctor Caritatis*, Meisenheim am Glan, 1975, p. 103-104, interprets *frui* in both these cases as meaning “to draw advantage from” (“Nutzen ziehen”) and as having nothing to do with love.

⁶⁷) *De Diversis Quaestionibus* 83, q. 30 (CC 44A,39. ML 40,20): “utitur etiam ceteris rationalibus animantibus ad societatem ...”.

rightly give us delight⁶⁸); we can enjoy, in the ordinary sense of the word, this relationship between human beings which technically is classified as *uti*. However, such enjoyment is not that of the journey's end; it is more like refreshment along the way, in enjoying which we remain intent on *frui deo*. As such, the formula '*frui in domino*', the locus classicus of which is *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,79-80, retains an *uti* character precisely by orientating even the highest forms of human enjoyment and of human intercourse to God. There is then a *frui* of other human persons that is not disordered nor distorted. The customary meaning of the word is retained, but, at the same time, the technical usage which reserves it for God is not overlooked, for human happiness is viewed in a God-perspective, "*in domino*". The background to and implications of this line of thinking can be further clarified by looking to Augustine's most systematic treatment of *uti* and *frui* in *De Doctrina Christiana*.

B. *De Doctrina Christiana*

We may begin by quoting a passage from early in Book I:

Some things are to be enjoyed, others are to be used, yet others both enjoy and use. Those which are to be enjoyed make us happy. By those which are to be used we are aided in our striving for beatitude and we are, as it were, propped up by them so as to be able to reach what makes us happy and to be constantly intent upon it. Now, we who both enjoy and use have been placed between the two. If we wish to enjoy what is to be used, our progress is hindered and sometimes we are even turned aside from our path, such that either we are delayed in obtaining what is to be enjoyed or, shackled by our love for lower things, we are even drawn away from it⁶⁹).

Human beings, therefore, are in this passage pictured as standing between *frui*, beatitude, and *uti*, the realm of lower things, which, as we have seen, they properly relate to "*ad eminentiam*". With their relation-

⁶⁸) *Epistola* 130,6,13 (CSEL 44,55. ML 33,499): "Sed ii nos multum iusteque delectant, a quibus vicissim sancte casteque diligimur. Ista cum habentur, ut teneantur, cum autem non habentur, ut habeantur, orandum est".

⁶⁹) *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,7 (CSEL 80,9-10) = 1,3,3 (CC 32,8. ML 34,20): "Res ergo aliae sunt quibus fruendum est, aliae quibus utendum, aliae quae fruuntur et utuntur. Illae quibus fruendum est nos beatos faciunt; istis quibus utendum est tendentes ad beatitudinem adiuvamur et quasi adminiculamur, ut ad illas quae nos beatos faciunt, pervenire atque his inherere possimus. Nos vero qui fruimur et utimur inter utrasque constituti, si eis quibus utendum est frui voluerimus, impeditur cursus noster et aliquando etiam deflectitur, ut ab his rebus quibus fruendum est optinendis vel retardemur vel etiam revocemur inferiorum amore praepediti".

ship to one another — which in *quaestio* 30 Augustine calls ‘*uti ad societatem*’ — he is not concerned here nor in the reflections that follow. Whether that third category (*viz.* those who enjoy and use) enjoy or use one another, we will join him in discussing under another heading. In this first section of *De Doctrina Christiana*, however, *uti* designates the infra-human, i.e. corporeal and temporal things, and the expression of its orientation to *frui*, beatitude, is to be understood in that light.

To return to Augustine himself then:

Frui in fact means to be constantly intent upon something for its own sake; while *uti* is to orientate (*referre*) what one makes use of to acquiring what one loves, provided it is something that ought to be loved. For an illegitimate use is rather to be termed a waste or an abuse. Suppose, then, we were travellers in a foreign land, who could not live happily except in our own native country. Unhappy in our sojourn abroad and desiring to see an end to our unhappiness, we would plan to return home. We would, therefore, need to use certain means of transport in order to be able, either by land or by sea, to reach the country where enjoyment awaited us. But, if the pleasantness of the journey and the very movement of the vehicles were to delight us and to turn us aside to enjoy these things instead of using them, as we ought to have done, we would not wish to bring our journey to a speedy end. In the grasp of distorted pleasure we would be estranged from our native land whose pleasantness alone would make us happy. Now it is the same with the journey that we wanderers from the Lord make through this mortal life (2 Cor. 5.6). If we wish to reach our own country where we will be happy, we should use this world, not enjoy it, so that the invisible reality of God may be clearly seen, being understood through the things that are made (Rom. 1.20); that is, that through what is corporeal and temporal we may comprehend the eternal and spiritual⁷⁰).

⁷⁰) *Ibid.*, 1,8-9 (CSEL 80,10) = 1,4,4 (CC 32,8. ML 34,20-21): “*Frui est enim amore inherere alicui rei propter se ipsam, uti autem, quod in usum venerit ad id quod amas optinendum referre, si tamen amandum est. Nam usus illicitus abusus potius vel abusus nominanda est. Quomodo ergo, si essemus peregrini qui beate vivere nisi in patria non possemus, eaque peregrinatione utique miseri et miseriam finire cupientes in patriam redire vellemus, opus esset vel terrestribus vel marinis vehiculis quibus utendum esset ut ad patriam qua fruendum erat pervenire valeremus; quod si amoenitates itineris et ipsa gestatio vehiculorum nos delectaret, conversi ad fruendum his quibus uti debuimus nollemus cito viam finire et perversa suavitate implicati alienaremur a patria, cuius suavitas faceret beatos: sic in huius mortalitatis vita peregrinantes a domino, si redire in patriam volumus ubi beati esse possimus, utendum est hoc mundo, non fruendum, ut invisibilia dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciantur, hoc est, ut de corporalibus temporalibusque rebus aeterna et spiritualia capiamus”.*

Divine providence has so ordered temporal reality that, if it is used as it is intended for our ultimate well-being, if the vehicles are employed not for their own sakes but to carry us to our home-land, then we will know and become capable of realising the fulness and end of the Law and of all the divine Scriptures, i.e. love for God and for the neighbour⁷¹). Even though the Trinity is the proper object of *frui*, the neighbour enjoys the Triune God with us⁷²). Love for God *and* love for neighbour both are consequent upon an ordered use of temporal things in accordance with divine providence. The neighbour, then, is not a vehicle or instrument for bringing us to *frui deo* in the same way that other created realities are. He constitutes a very special case which cannot without further ado be inserted into the *uti/frui* framework as we have so far encountered Augustine's presentation of it in *De Doctrina Christiana*. As will become clear, it would not be accurate to apply to the neighbour the *prima facie* definition of *uti* given in the passages just quoted, as if Augustine's thought on the matter could be summed up like this: the neighbour is to be made use of, i.e. he is to be related to our gaining possession of God whom alone we rightly love for his own sake⁷³). Even the 'use' with the end of building community ('*uti ad societatem*') of *quaestio* 30 shows the inadequacy of this representation. But, how then does Augustine deal with love of neighbour in the context of the *uti/frui* discussion in *De Doctrina Christiana*?

II. UTI/FRUI AND LOVE FOR NEIGHBOUR

A. Preliminary remarks

If Ragnar Holte is right in interpreting *frui/uti* in Augustine against

⁷¹) *Ibid.*, 1,85 (CSEL 80,30) = 1,35,39 (CC 32,29. ML 34,34): "Hoc (i.e. legis et omnium divinarum scripturarum plenitudo et finis esse dilectio rei qua fruendum est et rei quae nobiscum ea re frui potest) ergo ut nossemus atque possemus, facta est tota pro nostra salute per divinam providentiam dispensatio temporalis qua debemus uti, non quasi mansoria quadam dilectione et delectatione, sed transitoria potius tamquam viae, tamquam vehiculorum vel aliorum quorumlibet instrumentorum, aut si quid congruentius dici potest, ut ea quibus ferimur propter illud ad quod ferimur diligamus". Cf. *De Vera Religione* 65-66 (CSEL 77, 18) = 12,24 (CC 32,202. ML 34,132).

⁷²) *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,10 (CSEL 80,10) = 1,5,5 (CC 32,9. ML 34,21): "Res igitur quibus fruendum est, pater et filius et, spiritus sanctus, eademque trinitas una quaedam summa res communisque omnibus fruentibus ea ...".

⁷³) Cf. *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,8 (CSEL 80,10) = 1,4,4 (CC 32,8. ML 34,20): "Frui est enim amore inherere alicui rei propter se ipsam, uti autem, quod in usum venerit ad id quod amas optinendum referre, si tamen amandum est".

the background of the Stoic distinction *honestum/utile* and the characteristic feature of Stoic ethics that the morality of an act is determined not by its object but by its being chosen because it is in accordance with the *honestum*, i.e. God, the moral law, then *uti* ought not to be understood as a means to *frui*, the end of man conceived eudaimonistically. As we have seen, there is another way of understanding *uti*'s relation to *frui* and the terms which designate it, *referre* and *propter aliud*. This will also be the case with the *uti* that is love for neighbour. In attributing the neighbour to the realm of *uti* Augustine is not saying the opposite of Kant for whom the neighbour ought always be regarded as an end, never as a means to be used. It is to confuse the issue to view Augustine's assertions on *uti/frui* in relation to the neighbour in the context of a Kantian statement of the problem. This warning will have to be kept in mind in approaching the texts that are presented in this section. Otherwise, a superficial reading may make us inclined to accept that Augustine has placed love for neighbour under the sign of egoism and that K. Holl was correct in calling him "the corrupter of Christian morality"⁷⁴). On the basis of the underlying Stoic distinction, however, R. Holte can speak of love for neighbour as *uti* in this way:

Considered in relation to its direct object it (i.e. love of neighbour) is a love of 'use'; considered in relation to its moral quality it is love of God. Its moral quality therefore is not constituted by its direct object, but by the decision by which the action is referred to God. The action is chosen because it is in accord with the eternal law (*lex aeterna*) which is identical with moral good (*honestum*) or with intelligible, spiritual beauty (*spiritualis pulchritudo*) identical to God⁷⁵).

But again, in distinction to the Stoic view, God's providence ("*utilitas*") is operative in this field of action allowing people to work with Him at their neighbour's and their own improvement, and intending that all virtuous action, all human participation in the advancement of goodness and beauty, should be embraced in the gift of the whole self to God,

⁷⁴ K. Holl, "Der Neubau der Sittlichkeit", in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte* I, Tübingen, 1921, p. 139. See R. Holte, *Béatitude et Sagesse*, p. 275.

⁷⁵ R. Holte, *op. cit.*, p. 263-264: "Sous le rapport de son objet direct c'est un amour d'usage"; sous le rapport de sa qualité morale c'est un amour de Dieu. Sa qualité morale n'est donc pas constituée par l'objet direct mais par la décision par laquelle l'action est référée à Dieu, c'est-à-dire choisie parce qu'elle concorde avec la loi éternelle (*lex aeterna*), laquelle est identique au bien moral (*honestum*) ou à la beauté intelligible spirituelle (*spiritualis pulchritudo*) et identique à Dieu".

heart, soul and mind. The contexts both of descent and ascent are called into play⁷⁶).

Yet, Augustine's choice of the word *uti* for the neighbour may appear if not shocking, then at least unfortunate. In Ciceronian Latin, however, *uti* is one of the normal terms to designate friendly human interchange, somewhat similar to the French, "*en user bien avec quelqu'un*". It need not bear a pejorative, impersonal meaning in the sense of making use of things for the accomplishment of our own ends⁷⁷). It is surely in this sense that the "*utitur autem ceteris rationalibus animantibus ad societatem*" of *quaestio* 30 is to be translated: we are to associate with other rational living beings, our own equals, to build community. We will have to see if *uti* can credibly be understood as having a similar meaning in other texts in which it is encountered in conjunction with the neighbour.

In what follows it will be our contention that *uti*-love for rational creatures has special status, distinct from other types of *uti*. Although Ragnar Holte sees love for neighbour along with legitimate self-love as the highest form of good and beautiful action that people can accomplish in the context of God's creation, love for neighbour remains for him a relative end, an *utile*⁷⁸). He does not pay great attention to *frui*-love for neighbour in Augustine which would bring the neighbour, albeit with great caution, into the realm of the *honestum*⁷⁹). And even though he

⁷⁶) When the neighbour is loved in obedience to God's law, man is also working at his own perfection in accordance with the creative will of God. Cf. R. Holte, *op. cit.*, p. 180: "Mais c'est justement en exerçant la vertu que l'homme remplit la fin que Dieu s'est proposée pour lui, l'abandon total à Dieu sous la forme de l'amour de l'esprit, du cœur et de l'âme inférieure, en un mot la *fruitio Dei*. En réalisant les fins relatives l'homme réalise aussi la fin suprême".

⁷⁷) *Ibid.*, p. 279. According to C.T. Lewis and C. Short, *A Latin Dictionary*, Oxford, 1879 (reprinted 1975), p. 1947, as well as the more familiar senses, "*uti*" can also mean "to enjoy the friendship of anyone", "to be familiar or intimate with", "to associate with a person". For example, Cicero in *Oratio pro Cluentio* 16,46 has: "his Fabriciis semper est usus Oppianicus familiarissime".

⁷⁸) R. Holte, *op. cit.*, p. 279-280.

⁷⁹) Such love for neighbour crops up undeniably for the first time in *De Doctrina Christiana*. Although this work was begun in 396, it was not completed until after 420. Hence, Holte, in explicitly limiting himself to the writings of the years 386-399, may have felt justified in considering it as a later idea, and therefore as going beyond his brief. "Les recherches présentes s'appuient sur les toutes premières œuvres augustiniennes, les écrits des années 386-399 ... Nous avons mis l'accent sur les premières œuvres parce qu'on peut y percevoir plus nettement Augustin aux prises avec les problèmes philosophiques. Par contre dans les écrits où la pensée d'Augustin a pris sa forme définitive, il n'est pas toujours facile de découvrir immédiatement d'où proviennent les différentes pierres avec lesquelles est

warns against a Kantian-influenced misinterpretation in terms of means and ends of *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,8 (i.e. “*uti* is to orientate what one makes use of to acquiring what one loves”: “*uti autem quod in usum venerit ad id quod amas optinendum referre*”), he does not point out that in context this definition of *uti* is not directly related to love for neighbour at all⁸⁰). Nonetheless, despite his neglect of *frui* in love for neighbour, Holte’s analysis is invaluable in that it shows how *uti* can be applied to the neighbour without an absurd confusion of concepts and without necessarily disparaging the human person. Furthermore, the discovery he attributes to Gösta Hök of Augustinian *caritas* as love for the law allows him to discern a unity between the scriptural motivation of love for neighbour, i.e. God’s *agape*, and the philosophical motivation, *fruitio Dei*. *Frui*, in fact, entails total submission to the law of God which includes love for neighbour⁸¹).

The presentation of Holte’s understanding of the distinction between love for neighbour and love for God as related to the doctrine of the different parts of the soul and the hierarchy among them ought to be re-read in this connection⁸²). Only the *mens*, man’s highest faculty, has God as its direct object. Thus it alone is capable of contemplation, of *frui deo*. Man’s active life, the realm of love for neighbour, ought to be subject to it and to be in conformity with it. This hierarchy is clear in the text we have already seen from *Contra Faustum Manichaeum*:

Therefore, as the soul is superior to the body, so in the soul itself reason is superior by the law of nature to the other parts which are found also in beasts; and in reason itself, which is partly contemplation and partly action, contemplation is unquestionably the superior part. For in it is the image of God by which we are renewed through faith to vision. Rational action ought therefore to be subject to rational contemplation, which is to be exercised in faith while we are absent from the Lord, as it will be hereafter by vision, when we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is. Then in a spiritual body we shall by his grace be made equal to angels ...

A man, therefore, who acts in obedience to the faith which obeys

construite sa synthèse. Dans les toutes premières œuvres, les éléments empruntés ici et là ne sont pas encore aussi systématiquement fondus dans l’ensemble de la pensée augustinienne. En retournant aux origines de sa pensée, on a une vue plus nette de la problématique qu’Augustin vise à résoudre»: p. 68. Still, in the whole of Augustine’s work, “*frui proximo*” forms an important element of this question that Holte fails to deal with.

⁸⁰) R. Holte, *op. cit.*, p. 275.

⁸¹) *Ibid.*, p. 276-277.

⁸²) *Ibid.*, p. 251-261.

God, restrains all mortal affections, and keeps them within the natural limit, giving precedence to what is better over what is inferior according to an ordered love⁸³).

The intelligible reality man seeks to contemplate is regarded as the norm of action. He who contemplates the truth possesses wisdom, but, he who possesses wisdom has re-established order in himself, and, by so doing, has subordinated his active life to the truth. This occurs now in the obedience of faith. One adheres to truth with an unreserved act of love, a *frui* properly evoked only by God. Constancy in submitting oneself to the truth frees one from sin and death; «the truth will set you free», says St. John⁸⁴). Consequently, the nihilism of the passions is weakened and human activity, *uti*, is freed for the good⁸⁵). If, however, there is no full commitment of the *mens* to God, all fruitful activity ceases: “*qui nihil approbat, nihil agit*”⁸⁶). *Fruitio Dei*, then, is not to be understood as an orientation towards one’s own comfort and pleasure as in perverted *frui* which, desiring to dominate others, wants to make use of God in order to

⁸³) *Contra Faustum Manichaeum* 22,27 & 28 (CSEL 25/1,621-622. ML 42,418-419): “Proinde sicut anima corpori, ita ipsius animae ratio ceteris eius partibus, quas habent et bestiae, naturae lege praeponitur: inque ipsa ratione, quae partim contemplativa est, partim activa, procul dubio contemplatio praecellit. In hac enim et imago Dei est, qua per fidem ad speciem reformamur. Actio itaque rationalis contemplationi rationali debet oboedire sive per fidem operanti, sicuti est, quamdiu peregrinamur a domino, sive per speciem, quod erit, cum similes ei erimus, quoniam videbimus eum, sicuti est, effecti etiam in spiritali corpore ex gratia eius aequales angelis eius ... Quapropter hominis actio serviens fidei servienti deo refrenat omnes mortales delectationes et eas coercet ad naturalem modum meliora inferioribus ordinata dilectione praeponens”. Cf. *Tractatus in Evangelium Ioannis* 101,5 (CC 36,593. ML 35,1895) where the terminology associated with *uti*’s relation to *frui* is employed of action’s relation to contemplation: “... quoniam ad istum fructum contemplationis cuncta officia referuntur actionis. Solus est enim liber; quia *propter se* appetitur, et non *refertur ad aliud*. Huic servit actio: ad hunc enim *refertur* quidquid bene agitur, quia propter hunc agitur; ipse autem non *propter aliud*, sed propter semetipsum tenetur et habetur. Ibi ergo finis qui sufficit nobis. Aeternus igitur erit; neque enim nobis sufficit finis, nisi cuius nullus est finis”.

Even though contemplation is here through a glass darkly (cf. 1 Cor. 13.12-13), it keeps our action evenly balanced such that Christ’s promise to us may be realised: “He who loves me will be loved by my Father; and I shall love him and show myself to him” (Jn. 14.21); “and your joy no one will take from you” (Jn. 16.22).

⁸⁴) *De Libero Arbitrio* 2,13,37,143 (CSEL 74,73. CC 29,262. ML 32,1261): “Haec est libertas nostra, cum isti subdimur veritati; et ipse est deus noster qui nos liberat a morte, id est a condicione peccati. Ipsa enim veritas etiam homo cum hominibus loquens ait credentibus sibi: *Si manseritis in verbo meo, vere discipuli mei estis et cognoscetis veritatem et veritas liberabit vos* (Jn. 8.31-32). Nulla enim re fruitur anima cum libertate nisi qua fruitur cum securitate”.

⁸⁵) R. Holte, *op. cit.*, p. 276.

⁸⁶) *Contra Academicos* 3,15,33 (CSEL 63/3,72. CC 29,54. ML 32,951).

enjoy the world⁸⁷). Nor is it to be interpreted in a too passive quietist sense. Rather, bringing with it the fulness of being and of virtue and the maximum level of freedom of action, it liberates human activity, making people capable of submitting themselves to the will of God and of accomplishing his law which is summarised in the precepts of love for God and love for neighbour. Holte concludes:

In this way love for the neighbour is found to be *included* in love for God; it is indissolubly *united* and *subordinated* to it. Love of neighbour is the *active* life, the love of *use*, which flows from the virtue with which God clothes the soul and from the divine life which gives to the soul its form when the latter hands itself over to God in a love of unreserved contemplative "joy". Augustine calls this state "the faith which acts through love" (cf. Gal. 5.6)⁸⁸).

The reference in the last sentence is to the quotation from *Contra Faustum Manichaeum* above, in which context Gal. 5.6 is cited and adapted. Faith gives access to that contemplation which teaches and enables a proper love of use in the active life.

Thus, we have a well-reasoned frame of reference within which to situate the *uti/frui* discussion as it affects love for neighbour. To be sure, Holte overlooks the elements of neighbours' enjoying God with one another and enjoying one another in God, but, as far as *uti* and the neighbour are concerned, his theory seems to provide an acceptable alternative to the widespread view that the neighbour is really of minimal importance for what is taken as Augustinian eudaimonism. Let us further test this in looking to the texts themselves.

B. *The state of the question prior to 396*

As far as *frui* is concerned, from the time of the early philosophical dialogues Augustine insisted that only wisdom, the highest and true good, God himself, was to be loved on his own account ("*propter se*"). All else and all others, including one's friends, were desirable only insofar as they promoted this love of wisdom and beauty. But the aim was not an

⁸⁷) See *De Civitate Dei* 15,7 (CC 48,460-461. ML 41,444. CSEL 40/2,69).

⁸⁸) R. Holte, *op. cit.*, p. 277: "De cette manière l'amour du prochain se trouve inclus dans l'amour de Dieu, et lui est indissolublement uni et subordonné: l'amour du prochain, c'est la vie active, l'amour d'"usage", qui découle de la vertu dont Dieu revêt l'âme, et de la vie divine qui donne à l'âme sa forme, lorsqu'elle se livre à Dieu dans un amour de 'jouissance' contemplative sans réserve. Augustin appelle cet état 'la foi qui agit par l'amour'".

individualistic, jealously-guarded enjoyment of wisdom, but a love that sought others to share in its enjoyment (“*perfruantur*”). Then, all being eagerly intent on the one beloved, they would become more deeply friends of one another⁸⁹). Gunnar Hultgren warns against attaching too much importance to these ideas found in a passage of the *Soliloquia*, because, he says, they occur infrequently and are not basic to Augustine’s conception of love for neighbour⁹⁰). We will have then to be on our guard in approaching later texts to see whether this is a fair appraisal. Josef Brechtken also seeks to limit the significance of the passage as an example of disinterested love for others in our love for God, the common

⁸⁹) *Soliloquia* 1,13,22 (ML 32,881): “Iam certe ostendi nihil aliud me amare, siquidem quod non propter se amatur non amatur. Ego autem solam propter se amo sapientiam, cetera vero vel adesce mihi volo, vel desce timeo propter ipsam: vitam, quietem, amicos. Quem modum autem potest habere illius pulchritudinis amor, in qua non solum non invideo ceteris, sed etiam plurimos quaero qui mecum appetant, mecum inhient, mecum teneant, mecumque perfruantur; tanto mihi amiciores futuri, quanto erit nobis amata communior”.

Cf. *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae* 1,26,48 (ML 32,1331): “Siquidem ille se satis diligit, qui sedulo agit, ut summo et vero perfruatur bono ...”. If the presumption that this enjoyment of the Supreme and True Good in *De Moribus* should be interpreted individualistically is to be tenable, we would have to accept that only a year or two after the *Soliloquia* Augustine had quite forgotten the communitarian dimension he had there given to the enjoyment of Beauty.

Regarding the first sentence of the quotation from the *Soliloquia*, Augustine will not long hold to the position that only what is loved “propter se” is really loved. See *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,45 (CSEL 80,19) = 1,23,22 (CC 32,18. ML 34,27): “Cum ergo quattuor sint diligenda, unum quod supra nos est, alterum quod nos sumus, tertium quod iuxta nos est, quartum quod infra nos est, de secundo et quarto nulla praecepta danda erant”. Or, to approach the matter from another angle, there are later texts in which Augustine holds that friendship is to be sought for its own sake, along with wisdom and health (“propter se ipsam”). See *De Bono Coniugali* 9,9 (CSEL 41,199. ML 40,380) and *Epistola* 130,6,13 (CSEL 44,54. ML 33,499). These texts will be presented in more detail shortly, witnessing to a development on the position of the *Soliloquia* for which friends are desired “propter ipsam (sapientiam)”.

⁹⁰) G. Hultgren, *Le commandement d’amour chez Augustin*, p. 59: “La seconde partie du commandement d’amour se présente, elle aussi, sous un jour nouveau du fait que Dieu est conçu comme un *commune bonum* qui réunit les hommes dans l’amour de lui-même et dans celui de leurs prochains, et cela sans aucune jalousie. Il faut toutefois, se garder d’attribuer une trop grande importance à ces raisonnements. En réalité on les rencontre isolés, et ils ne font pas partie des pensées essentielles qui forment la base de la conception d’Augustin”. It is a little difficult to reconcile this with the first statement Hultgren makes with regard to our passage: “Le morceau que nous venons de citer constitue le point central et culminant dans l’exposition d’Augustin”. It is true that this study is limited to those works written before 400 A.D. However, “il nous semble, en effet, qu’à cette date la conception d’Augustin de l’amour était relativement achevée dans ses grandes lignes” (p. IX), i.e. for Hultgren, without neighbours sharing together in the *bonum commune* being fundamental.

good, by stressing that it is only the solidarity of a relationship between *friends* that can yield such concern for other people in the face of our own enjoyment of the highest good⁹¹). It will have, therefore, to be investigated if this restriction applies in all Augustinian texts that exclude jealousy in one's enjoyment of wisdom and beauty, which is also the common good. As regards the present text, however, it is clear that, if Augustine is referring to "friends", there are many of them ("*plurimos*"). "Love of that beauty can have this criterion: not only do I not envy others, but I seek that many (*plurimos*) may desire it with me ... that they may enjoy it with me". One may then rightly inquire how extensive this "many" is, or who, if anyone, is excluded from becoming a friend in the longing for and the enjoyment of one and the same beloved. We may note already that Augustine's mature conception of friendship is wide enough to embrace even enemies⁹²).

With regard to *uti* it is well to look to a text from *De Vera Religione*, written around 390. It concerns the man who is truly unconquerable because he is united to God and finds his good there alone.

So long as he is in this life this man 'uses' his friends to return their love, he 'uses' enemies for patience's sake, as many as he can he 'uses' in such a way as to do them good, he 'uses' all people in the

⁹¹) J. Brechtken, *Augustine Doctor Caritatis*, p. 95-96, who sees the "fruitio-Genuss" in this case as "eine Sache von solidarisch-freundschaftlicher Aktion mit gemeinsamen Erfolg, also offensichtlich ganz ernst gemeint im Sinne des gleichrangigen Interesses der anderen, wohl ohne Hintergedanken an den zusätzlichen Nutzen für den eigenen Weisheits-Genuss". Brechtken bases this restriction to "friends" on his reading of *Soliloquia* 1,2,7 (ML 32,873). Friends, however, are loved because they are "aliquid Deo simile", i.e. because they have rational souls. Thus, a thief too is a potential friend, even though one may hate the way he abuses the rational soul one loves. "Et homines sunt, et eos amo, non eo quod animalia, sed eo quod homines sunt; id est, ex eo quod rationales animas habent, quas amo etiam in latronibus. Licet enim mihi in quovis amare rationem, cum illum iure oderim qui male utitur eo quod amo. Itaque tanto magis amo amicos meos, quanto magis bene utuntur anima rationali, vel certe quantum desiderant ea bene uti".

⁹²) See *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,65 (CSEL 80,24-25) = 1,29,30 (CC 32,23. ML 34,30): "Ad quem (i.e. the good we love) si conversi fuerint (inimici), et illum tamquam beatificum bonum et nos tamquam socios tanti boni necesse est ut diligant". Cf. *Epistola* 130,6,13 (CSEL 44,54-55. ML 33,499): "itemque amicitia non angustis finibus terminanda est ... pervenit usque ad inimicos, pro quibus etiam orare praecipimur". Also *En. in ps.* 39,4 (CC 38,248. ML 36,436): "Inimicus tuus, quia malus est, inimicus est; fit bonus, et amicus erit, et socius erit; ut simul velis possidere quod amabas, iam frater erit". An early indication of the openness of friendship for Augustine is found in *De Diversis Quaestionibus* 83, q. 71,6 (CC 44A,205. ML 40,82): "Nullius itaque repudianda est amicitia sese ingerentis ad amicitiam copulandam ...".

sense that he is benevolent towards all. And although he does not love temporal things, he uses them rightly and he takes care of people according to their conditions of life, even if he is unable to be equally mindful of all people⁹³).

Perhaps it would make for a less stilted translation if *uti* were to be rendered here as “relates to” or “associates with” or “conducts himself in such a way towards”. This is in line with the Ciceronian meaning considered earlier. As many different translations may be needed as there are groups of people to whom *uti* applies, such that, for example, we might paraphrase the first sentence quoted above: “so long as he is in this life this man relates to his friends in returning their love, his attitude towards his enemies is to bear with them for patience’s sake, to as many as he can he does good, he wishes well to all”. In the second sentence it is as if the right use of temporal things (“*recte utitur temporalibus*”) were paralleled in its own order by care for other people (“*hominibus consulit*”). Care for other people which can take the forms of reciprocal love, patiently bearing with enmity, beneficence and benevolence, is the proper work of *uti* in relation to human beings. Only the person totally intent upon God, that is, the person who has not misplaced his *frui*, is capable of *uti* of this kind⁹⁴). His *uti* of others is in accordance with divine providence and with the order of the world established by God. Before *De Doctrina Christiana*, therefore, Augustine knows an *uti* of the neighbour which is unselfishly directed to his benefit. Josef Brechtken claims that this is the *only* place in which selfinterest has been overcome in Augustinian love of neighbour. The passage from *De Vera Religione* is for him an absolute exception without any bearing on the main object of Augustine’s ethic; perhaps Augustine is here merely noting a way of

⁹³) *De Vera Religione* 256 (CSEL 77,66) = 47,91 (CC 32,246-247. ML 34,163): “Hic vir quamdiu est in hac vita, utitur amico ad rependendam gratiam, utitur inimico ad patientiam, utitur quibus potest ad beneficentiam, utitur omnibus ad benevolentiam. Et quanquam temporalia non diligit, ipse recte utitur temporalibus, et pro eorum sorte hominibus consulit, si aequaliter non potest omnibus”. Regarding the “temporalia non diligit”, we find Augustine in *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,45 (CSEL 80,19) = 1,23,22 (CC 32,18. ML 34,27) stating that even “quod infra nos est” is to be loved, but then, of course, ‘propter aliud’.

⁹⁴) The sentence preceding the quotation above is: “Ille ergo verissime atque certissime invictus homo est qui cohaeret deo, non ut ab eo aliquid boni extra mereatur, sed cui nihil aliud quam ipsum haerere deo bonum est”; and shortly after our quotation: “Tractat enim tempori deditos tanto melius quanto ipse minus obligatus tempore”: *De Vera Religione* 255-256 (CSEL 77,65-66) = 47,90-91 (CC 32,246-247. ML 34,163).

speaking he had come across in the philosophical tradition⁹⁵). In any case, Brechtken disqualifies this *uti* of selfless concern for others from having any decisive influence on the *uti* applied to human beings in *De Doctrina Christiana*. The latter he judges to be totally caught up in the quest for its own beatitude⁹⁶). However, the *uti* of *De Vera Religione* is undoubtedly to be compared with that of *De Diversis Quaestionibus* 83, q. 30, in which conduct towards other human beings is described as '*uti ad societatem*'⁹⁷), and *frui* is reserved strictly for God. In both cases, as

⁹⁵) J. Brechtken, op. cit., p. 143, n. 72; p. 147: "Das aber würde heissen ... dass es sich auch hier in *De vera religione* mit dem neuen *uti* in der Nächstenliebe (i.e. for Brechtken, in comparison to *De Doctrina Christiana*) überhaupt nur um einen kurzfristigen Gedankenflug handelt, um eine absolute Ausnahmebestimmung, ohne jede weitere Wirkung auf den Hauptgegenstand seiner Ethik, vielleicht überhaupt nur ein kurzes Notiznehmen von einem Stück Überlieferung". We are directed to the *Diatribai* III, 20, 9f. of the Stoic, Epictetus (50-138 A.D.), which contain "etwas Ähnliches". In fact, *Diatribai* III, 20 deals with the question: whether it is possible to derive advantage from all exterior things (ὅτι ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς ἔστιν ὠφελεῖσθαι). This puts us more in mind of Augustine's *quaestio* 30, i.e. "Utrum omnia in utilitatem hominis creata sunt", than of the passage from *De Vera Religione* with which we are concerned. In *Diatribai* III, 20, 9-12 (see text in J. Souilhé and A. Jagu, *Epictète, Entretiens*, III, Collections des Universités de France, Paris, 1963, p. 64), Epictetus explains how it is even possible to derive advantage from other people's insults. Those insulting us are like trainers exercising our patience, calm and docility by having us lift heavy burdens for our own good. A bad neighbour, a bad father, or indeed sickness, death, penury, harm, condemnation, can all be to our advantage in this way, as if we were applying to them the rod of Hermes: "Touch what you wish and it will turn to gold".

It is clear that this comparison with Epictetus is valid for only one of the usages of *uti* we have met in *De Vera Religione* 256, namely, the "*utitur inimico ad patientiam*". It may also be seen as having similarities with the '*utitur tolerandis ad patientiam*' of *De Diversis Quaestionibus* 83, q. 30 (CC 44A, 40. ML 40, 20). But it can hardly be said to bolster very strongly the suggestion that the '*uti ad societatem*' of *quaestio* 30 and the "*utitur amico ad rependendam gratiam ... utitur quibus potest ad beneficentiam, utitur omnibus ad benevolentiam*" of *De Vera Religione* 256 are merely a nod on Augustine's part in the direction of the Stoic philosophical tradition and that the selflessness implied by them is therefore not integrated into his ethical thought.

⁹⁶) *Ibid.*, p. 147: "... (there are grounds for the suspicion that Augustine) hier in *De doctrina christiana* doch mehr oder weniger stark immer auf den appetitus rekurriert, also in der Nächstenliebe den appetitus mitberücksichtigt, oder besser: die Nächstenliebe im appetitus untergebracht wissen will. Es scheint also, dass hier in *De doctrina christiana* von allem Anfang an ein appetitus-transzendentes *uti/frui* gar nicht zur Debatte stand, auch nicht als etwas, das, vorher schon bekannt, nun zu widerlegen oder zurückzunehmen gewesen wäre".

⁹⁷) In the light of *Soliloquia* 1, 13, 22 (ML 32, 881): "tanto mihi amiciores futuri, quanto erit nobis amata communior", this "*societas*" may be understood not just of the relationships of human beings amongst themselves but also of their common desire for and enjoyment of the one God. Cf. *De Doctrina Christiana* 1, 64 (CSEL 80, 24) = 1, 29, 30 (CC 32, 23. ML 34, 30): "quid nos in *societate* dilectionis dei agere convenit, quo perfrui beate vivere est ...".

later in *De Civitate Dei*, the God-direction of *frui* preserves *uti* from distortion and debilitation. Is it not possible to understand the *uti* of *De Doctrina Christiana* in this way too? If one does not take sufficient note of the distinction made by Augustine between the things that are to be enjoyed, the things that are to be used, and those who enjoy and use⁹⁸), the result may be that the definition of *uti* with regard to infra-human, temporal reality⁹⁹) will be too readily transferred to the particular *uti* which is involved with other human beings. Is there anything truly distinctive about love for neighbour in *De Doctrina Christiana* that might reflect the spirit of *De Vera Religione* and *quaestio 30*, or is Augustine trapped into absorbing the neighbour in large part into an *uti* that ultimately treats the personal and infra-personal alike?

C. *De Doctrina Christiana*

Somewhat further on in Book I than the texts we presented above as general formulations of the distinction, Augustine rehearses the relation he has already established between *frui* and *uti*. Only the eternal and unchangeable are to be enjoyed; other things are to be used in such a way that we are able to attain the full enjoyment of the eternal and unchangeable¹⁰⁰).

But we who enjoy and use other things are ourselves things of a certain kind. For man is a noble being created in the image and likeness of God, not insofar as he is confined by the mortal body, but in that the dignity of his rational soul makes him superior to brute beasts. Hence, the great question is: whether men should use or enjoy themselves, or both. For we have been commanded to love one another, but the question is whether one human being is to be loved by another for his own sake or whether love for him is to be orientated to something else. If indeed he is to be loved for his own sake, we enjoy him; if love for him is to be orientated to something else, we use him. It seems to me, however, that love for another

⁹⁸) *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,7 (CSEL 80,9) = 1,3,3 (CC 32,8. ML 34,20): "Res ergo aliae sunt quibus fruendum est, aliae quibus utendum, aliae quae fruuntur et utuntur".

⁹⁹) *Ibid.*, 1,8 (CSEL 80,10) = 1,4,4 (CC 32,8. ML 34,20): "... uti autem, quod in usum venerit ad id quod amas optinendum referre, si tamen amandum est".

¹⁰⁰) *Ibid.*, 1,39 (CSEL 80,18) = 1,22,20 (CC 32,16. ML 34,26): "In his igitur omnibus rebus illae tantum sunt quibus fruendum est, quas aeternas atque incommutabiles commemoravimus; ceteris autem utendum est ut ad illarum perfructionem pervenire possimus". Remember, however, that the eternal and unchangeable is the Triune God who is the common good of all who enjoy him. See *Ibid.*, 1,10 (CSEL 80,10) = 1,5,5 (CC 32,9. ML 34,21).

person is to be orientated to something other than the person. For if something is to be loved for its own sake, we found our life's happiness on it. Although this happiness is not yet a reality for us, still hope for it consoles us in this present time. But, "cursed is he who places his hope in man" (cf. Jer. 17.5)¹⁰¹).

Augustine once more reveals that he is acutely conscious of the special status of human beings, endowed with rational souls, created in the image and likeness of God. How one relates to oneself and others properly is the question of great importance. What is the fitting form of self-love and what the form of love for neighbour envisaged by the Lord's commandment? Does it suffice to found my life's happiness on myself or on another human being, to place my hope in myself or in another human being? Am I myself the criterion in the light of which all else is judged? Are other rational creatures this criterion for me? If so, and only if so, can I or others simply be said to be the object of *frui*. But what this would involve is the effective denial that there is any being superior to the self or others; it would put the self and others in the place of God¹⁰²). Since Augustine has already defined *frui* in such a way that it can only properly be applied to our love for the true God with all the heart, all the soul and all the mind, he has then only *uti* at his disposal when it comes to the great question of love for self and love for neighbour. To enjoy one's own power would be a perversely proud imitation of God leading to one's diminution as a human being¹⁰³); while to enjoy others would be to orientate one's whole life to them in the

¹⁰¹) *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,39-40 (CSEL 80,18) = 1,22,20 (CC 32,16-17. ML 34,26): "Nos itaque qui fruimur et utimur aliis rebus, res aliquae sumus. Magna enim quaedam res est homo, factus ad imaginem et similitudinem dei, non in quantum mortali corpore includitur, sed in quantum bestias rationalis animae honore praecedat. Itaque magna quaestio est, utrum frui se homines debeant an uti an utrumque. Praeceptum est enim nobis ut diligamus invicem, sed quaeritur, utrum propter se homo ab homine diligendus sit an propter aliud. Si enim propter se, fruimur eo; si propter aliud, utimur eo. Videtur autem mihi propter aliud diligendus. Quod enim propter se diligendum est, in eo constituitur beata vita, cuius etiamsi nondum res, tamen spes eius nos hoc tempore consolatur. *Maledictus autem qui spem suam ponit in homine*".

¹⁰²) Cf. *De Diversis Quaestionibus* 83, q. 30 (CC 44A,40. ML 40,20): "Iudicat autem de omnibus quibus utitur; de solo deo non iudicat, quia secundum deum de ceteris iudicat. Nec eo utitur, sed fruitur; neque enim ad aliquid aliud deus referendus est, quoniam omne quod ad aliud referendum est inferius est quam id ad quod referendum est, nec est aliquid deo superius ...".

¹⁰³) *De Libero Arbitrio* 3,25,76,262-263 (CC 29,320. CSEL 74, 153. ML 32,1308): "Si autem tamquam obvis sibi placet sibi ad perverse imitandum deum ut potestate sua frui velit, tanto fit minor quanto se cupit esse maiorem. Et hoc est *Initium omnis peccati superbia et Initium superbiae hominis apostatare a deo* (Ecclus. 10.14)".

sense of expecting them alone to fulfil one's deepest hope for happiness¹⁰⁴). This too would be a distortion.

Augustine, therefore, does no offence to the self and to the neighbour when he claims that they are not to be loved on their own account or for their own sake (*"propter se"*). What he means is that they are not in themselves as created beings to be made the goal of life towards which all else is to be orientated and in the light of which all else is to be judged. Even Christ himself, insofar as he is our way to the Father, does not wish to hold and detain us but to direct us to God¹⁰⁵). There is a sense then in which we can, with the necessary circumspection, say of Christ that he wishes to be loved not for his own sake but as pointing us to the goal of true freedom in God, i.e. *"propter aliud"*. To translate *"propter aliud"* as "for the sake of something else" or "for another reason" can give the misleading impression that Augustinian love for neighbour amounts to a violation of another's dignity, a denigration of his personal uniqueness, even an insult. Therefore, we have preferred to paraphrase this expression such that love for neighbour is presented as having a goal beyond the other individual's present limited existence (which does not imply that the concrete situation of the neighbour is overlooked)¹⁰⁶). That goal, that *"aliud"*, may be the formation of community (*"uti ad societatem"*) as in *quaestio* 30, or it may as here be God himself in whom there is true life. In loving our neighbour, therefore, we relate him and our love for him to God, who is our common good. Such love is in accordance with the order of creation established by divine providence. This interpretation is, I believe, closer

¹⁰⁴) Certain proud creatures will be well pleased to have such hope placed in them. Cf. *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,77 (CSEL 80,28) = 1,33,36 (CC 32,26-27. ML 34,32): "Nam si in nobis id facimus (i.e. if we enjoy one another not in God, but in ourselves), remanemus in via et spem beatitudinis nostrae in homine aut in angelo conlocamus. Quod et homo superbus et angelus superbus arrogant sibi atque in se aliorum spem gaudent constitui".

¹⁰⁵) *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,82-83 (CSEL 80,29-30) = 1,34,38 (CC 32,28. ML 34,33-34): "Sic enim ait: *Ego sum via et veritas et vita* (Jn. 14,6), hoc est, per me venit, ad me pervenitur, in me permanetur ... Ex quo intellegitur quam nulla res in via tenere nos debeat, quando nec ipse dominus, in quantum via nostra esse dignatus est, tenere nos voluerit, sed transire, ne rebus temporalibus, quamvis ab illo pro salute nostra susceptis et gestis, haereamus infirmiter, sed per eas potius curramus alacriter, ut ad eum ipsum, qui nostram naturam a temporalibus liberavit et conlocavit ad dexteram patris, provehi atque perveni mereamur".

¹⁰⁶) See e.g. *De Vera Religione* 258 (CSEL 77,66) = 47,91 (CC 32,247. ML 34,163): "Et si quando forte alicuius periculo vel errore vel dolore commovetur, usque ad illius auxilium aut correctionem aut consolationem, non usque ad suam subversionem valere patitur".

to the truth of the matter than a reading that would view the neighbour as only grudgingly admitted to our love "for another reason", or indeed as actually slighted by our skipping beyond him "for the sake of something else", (that is, ultimately, for the sake of our own happiness in the enjoyment of God). Of course, this has yet to be shown in greater detail; but it should already be emerging with some clarity why Augustine was not at liberty, within the admittedly straitening terms of *uti/frui* as he himself defined them, to maintain that the neighbour was to be loved simply for his own sake ("*propter se*"). This would do violence both to the one loving and the one loved; idolatry and pride would stifle human growth. At the same time, we think that there is an adequately arguable case for asserting that, in Augustine's conception, to love another person "*propter aliud*" is not necessarily to conjure up the crude image of the neighbour serving only as a means by which we can love God and thereby achieve happiness for ourselves with him. What then is the nature of this orientation of love for neighbour to God? As we shall see, Augustine, after initially and tentatively opting for *uti* in *De Doctrina Christiana* I, 40 eventually finds this category, without further nuance, too restrictive for the human neighbour.

1. *The neighbour as a means to our enjoyment of God?*

Firstly, then, let us address the question of the neighbour as means. A careful reader of the first book of *De Doctrina Christiana* will fail to discover any statement to the effect that the neighbour is to be used with a view to attaining our own individual happiness in the enjoyment of God. Certainly there are assertions that look as if this is their meaning, but a closer examination of them in their context reveals that they are general definitions of *uti*, related to temporal as contrasted with and orientated towards eternal things. That is, they do not without further ado cover the case of human beings created in the image and likeness of God. Thus, if the affirmation: "other things (which are not eternal and unchangeable) are to be used in such a way that we are able to attain the full enjoyment of the eternal and unchangeable"¹⁰⁷), could also simply

¹⁰⁷) *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,39 (CSEL 80,18) = 1,22,20 (CC 32.16. ML 34,26): "... ceteris autem utendum est ut ad illarum (i.e. aeternarum et incommutabilium) perfructionem pervenire possimus". J. Brechtken, *Augustinus Doctor Caritatis*, p. 97, translates: "Das übrige aber müsse gebraucht werden (utendum), damit wir zum Vollgenuß (perfructio) von jenem (also dem Erstgenannten) gelangen". Similarly, the French translation offered by G. Combès and J. Farges in *Œuvres de Saint Augustin*,

be referred to rational creatures, why does Augustine proceed to distinguish them from other beings, to declare that it is a question of great importance to know whether they are to be enjoyed or used or both, and

(Bibliothèque Augustinienne, 11), Paris, 1949, p. 203, is: "Les autres sont ceux dont nous devons user pour parvenir à la pleine jouissance des premiers". It may be noted that neither of these two renderings translates "possimus", thereby making a direct jump from use of temporal things to the enjoyment of the eternal without taking any explicit account of an idea that may well be lurking in the shadows, namely, that only a proper relation to temporal things in accordance with divine order, i.e. only a proper *uti*, makes the fullness of *frui* ("perfructio") a possibility for us. Our translation of *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,39 has been made in the light of this. For, indeed, further on in Book 1 of *De Doctrina Christiana* Augustine specifically brings *uti* into connection with divine providence. See 1,84-85 (CSEL 80,30) = 1,35,39 (CC 32,28-29. ML 34,34): "Hoc (i.e. that the fullness and end of the Law and the Scriptures is love for God and neighbour) ergo ut nossemus atque possemus, facta est tota pro nostra salute per divinam providentiam dispensatio temporalis qua debemus *uti* ... ut ea quibus ferimur propter illud ad quod ferimur diligamus". In relating properly to temporal realities, i.e. *uti*, not using them as ends in themselves, but accepting in divine providence to be aided by them, propped up and borne along by them in their orientation to God, we are made capable ("possemus") of perfect love of God and neighbour. For 1,39, however, it is as yet the enjoyment of the eternal and the unchangeable we are made capable of ("possimus") by proper *uti*. Against the background of the idea found in 1,84-85, then, the meaning of *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,39 would be: if we relate to temporal things in accordance with the order established by divine providence and sanctioned by divine law, there will be no hindrance to our enjoying the eternal.

Now, even though the *uti* of 1,39 is not, just as it is, applied to the human neighbours, it is well to be aware that the expression in which it occurs can be understood against the background of God in his providence ordering all creation for the good of man as well as against that of the human quest for happiness in possession of the Supreme Good. For the tenor of the French and German translations quoted could easily lead the unsuspecting reader to overlook the dimension of divine providence disposing temporal reality for the usefulness, the good and the salvation of human beings which we have met in the *uti* of *quaestio* 30 and of *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,84-85. The danger then is that the idea of desire achieving satisfaction in the possession of the Highest Good will be unwarrantedly allowed to predominate as the standard interpretation, thereby giving a far-reaching bias to the understanding of the relation between *uti* and *frui*. This bias may well prove impossible to shake off when we do find Augustine applying *uti* specifically to the neighbour. Therefore, it is imperative to counter it at its roots and in all its manifestations. Otherwise, when Augustine, as we shall see, broadens the range of *uti* to include the love of God for us (*De Doctrina Christiana* 1,73-76 = 1,31,34-1,32,35), it will be impossible to follow him and he will stand accused of startling inconsistency. When *uti/frui* is read exclusively in the light of undifferentiated desire seeking fulfilment, *uti* as a description of God's love for us would be absurd and *uti* as characterising our love for neighbour would be horrific.

But isn't the grammar of 1,39 against our translation: "other things (which are not eternal and unchangeable) are to be used in such a way that we are able to attain the full enjoyment of the eternal and unchangeable?" Surely the "ut" should be rendered "in order that", introducing a clause of purpose? This is the obvious road taken by the French and German translations; and, admittedly, it does seem to accord better with the definition of "uti" in *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,8 (i.e. "... uti autem, quod in usum venerit ad id quod amas optinendum referre, si tamen amandum est") where the idea of purpose in one's use is unquestionably stronger than in 1,39. [Note, however, that even 1,8 does not exclude an understanding of *uti* in line with divine order and providence. In accordance with God's

to wrestle at length with the implications of this question? The same question may be asked apropos of other general expressions of *uti* in *De Doctrina Christiana* not directly involved in the presentation of love for neighbour.

Uti, however, does occur in a form for which what we have seen so far may appear to have left us unprepared. Augustine begins by admitting that there are some matters which cannot comfortably be catalogued under one category or the other, *uti* or *frui*¹⁰⁸). All is not yet quite clear. This admission follows these considerations:

The precept by which we are to love God is distinct from love for neighbour because the divine essence is superior to and above our nature. For He (i.e. God) shows us compassion because of His own goodness; we however show compassion to one another because of His goodness. That is to say, He has compassion on us so that we may fully enjoy Him; but indeed we have compassion on one another so that we may fully enjoy Him¹⁰⁹).

We have already adverted to the strangeness of this comment in that *God's love for us* and our love for neighbour are contrasted where we might have expected the terms to be our love for neighbour and *our love for God*. Furthermore, the compassion we show to one another is directed towards our full enjoyment of God. Is this not really more or less the same as saying that others, even in our service of them, our '*uti ad beneficentiam*', are used as a means to our own enjoyment of God? We claimed earlier that there was no statement of this nature in *De Doctrina Christiana*. And indeed, even in this context, it is ultimately God's goodness towards and compassion for us that enables us to enjoy him

will, the human being orientates ("referre") what he uses to *frui deo* described in terms of acquiring what one loves]. However, according to C.T. Lewis and C. Short, *A Latin Dictionary*, p. 1943, "ut" can mean "in such a way that" in clauses of manner even without antecedents. An example is given from Cicero's *De Amicitia* 24,90: "cujus aures clausae veritatis sunt ut ab amico verum audire nequeat, hujus salus desperanda est". It is, therefore, not grammatically out of the question that my version, which is less susceptible to the distortions of a one-sided reading of *uti/frui* in the context of individualistic desire and enjoyment, may come closer to the truth of the matter.

¹⁰⁸) *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,73 (CSEL 80,27) = 1,31,34 (CC 32,25. ML 34,32): "Quapropter adhuc ambiguum videtur esse, cum dicimus ea re nos perfrui quam diligimus propter se ipsam, et ea re nobis fruendum esse tantum, qua efficimur beati, ceteris vero utendum".

¹⁰⁹) *Ibid.*, 1,72 (CSEL 80,26-27) = 1,30,33 (CC 32,25. ML 34,31-32): "Sed quoniam excellentior ac supra nostram naturam est divina substantia, praeceptum quo diligamus deum, a proximi dilectione distinctum est. Ille enim nobis praebet misericordiam propter suam bonitatem, nos autem nobis invicem propter illius, id est, ille nostri miseretur ut se perfruamur: nos vero invicem nostri miseremur ut illo perfruamur".

through our love for one another. But, before giving a fuller account of ourselves on this point, let us look in some detail at what for Augustine is not yet clear in the mapping of relations between God and man, between man and man, according to *uti* and *frui*.

For God loves us and Holy Scripture often mentions his love for us (cf. Rom. 5.8). How then does he love us: in such a way as to use us or to enjoy us? If he enjoys us, he needs a good that is ours. No sane person will say this because our every good is either he himself or it comes from him (cf. James 1.17). To whom is it obscure or doubtful that light has no need of the brightness of those things it has illuminated? The prophet says very clearly: "I have said to the Lord, you are my Lord, for you have no need of my goods" (Ps. 15.2). God therefore does not enjoy us but uses us. For if he neither enjoys nor uses us, I cannot discover how he loves us¹¹⁰).

Just as in the case of our relationship to fellow human-beings, Augustine has here to make a choice between *frui* and *uti*. Again, because man is not God, *frui* is obviously excluded; otherwise we would have the absurd situation of the creator being dependent on and hoping in his creation¹¹¹). Thus, only *uti* remains at Augustine's disposal to characterise the love of God for us. Evidently, *uti* as it stands, unmodified, is incapable of serving this purpose. God's *uti* is not the same as ours; "for we orientate the things we use, (i.e. things in general; therefore, not specifically other human beings), to our full enjoyment of the goodness of God, while God orientates his relation to us to his own goodness. For, because he is good, we are; and insofar as we are, we are good"¹¹²). The difference, then, between God's *uti* and human *uti* is that God orientates

¹¹⁰) *Ibid.*, 1,73-74 (CSEL 80,27) = 1,31,34 (CC 32,25-26. ML 34,32): "Diligit enim nos deus, et multum nobis dilectionem eius erga nos divina scriptura commendat. Quomodo ergo diligit? ut nobis utatur an ut fruatur? Sed si fruitur, eget bono nostro, quod nemo sanus dixerit. Omne enim nostrum bonum vel ipse vel ab ipso est. Cui autem obscurum vel dubium est, non egere lucem rerum harum nitore quas ipsa inlustraverit? Dicit apertissime etiam propheta: *Dixi domino, dominus meus es tu, quoniam bonorum meorum non eges* (Ps. 15.2). Non ergo fruitur nobis, sed utitur. Nam si neque fruitur neque utitur, non invenio quem ad modum diligit".

¹¹¹) In another context, however, Augustine does see Christ as dependent on his creatures. See e.g. *Sermo* 239,6,7 (ML 38,1130): "Ille dives (i.e. Christus) egens est usque in finem saeculi". We will develop this in tackling Augustine's interpretation of Matthew 25.31-46.

¹¹²) *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,75 (CSEL 80,27) = 1,32,35 (CC 32,26. ML 34,32): "... nam nos res quibus utimur ad id referimus ut dei bonitate perfruamur, deus vero ad suam bonitatem usum nostrum refert. Quia enim bonus est, sumus; et in quantum sumus, boni sumus".

his relation to human beings to himself, i.e. to Goodness itself and the source of all good. All his dealings with people, his love for them, begin from, are directed by, and reach fulfilment in him who is Good. As far as a human being's dealings with the world are concerned, however, the objects of *uti* he finds there he properly orientates not to his own being and goodness but to God who gives both life and goodness.

This distinction is further developed in the following paragraph, I,76, and here for the first time in *De Doctrina Christiana* human *uti* of one's fellow-men is given a more detailed specific meaning¹¹³). At the same time this passage can throw some light on the problematic sentence we encountered a little earlier: "we have compassion on one another so that we may fully enjoy Him".

Therefore, God orientates the use he is said to make of us not to his own but to our advantage; it is not to his advantage but only to his goodness that he orientates it. When we show compassion to a person and are mindful of his interests, we do so to his advantage and it is this we look out for. But — I don't know how — such action benefits ourselves also. For God does not leave unrewarded the compassion we show to the needy. Now, our greatest reward is that we may enjoy Him perfectly and that all of us who enjoy Him may perfectly enjoy one another in Him¹¹⁴).

Uti is here brought into relation with *utilitas*, as in *quaestio* 30, where the latter is associated with divine providence¹¹⁵). Of course, it is strictly

¹¹³) This does not mean to say that Augustine has not specifically dealt with love for neighbour up to this. He has done so, and at length. See 1,41-47, 59-72, texts which, because they do not employ the terms *uti/frui*, will be more appropriately dealt with under other headings. However, apart from reassuring us that the neighbour belongs amongst those objects of *uti* which are also to be loved ("Non autem omnia quibus utendum est diligenda sunt, sed ea sola quae aut nobiscum societate quadam referuntur in deum, sicut est homo vel angelus, aut ad nos relata beneficio dei per nos indigent, sicut est corpus. Nam utique martyres non dilexerunt scelus persequentium se, quo tamen uti sunt ad promerendum deum": 1,44 (CSEL 80,19) = 1,23,22 (CC 32,18. ML 34,27)), he has not clearly formalised love for neighbour in terms of *uti*. He does this here in showing how it differs from God's *uti* of human beings.

¹¹⁴) *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,76 (CSEL 80,27-28) = 1,32,35 (CC 32,26. ML 34,32): "Ille igitur usus qui dicitur dei quo nobis utitur, non ad eius sed ad nostram utilitatem refertur, ad eius autem tantummodo bonitatem. Cuius autem nos miseremur et cui consulimus, ad eius quidem utilitatem id facimus eamque intuemur, sed nescio quo modo etiam nostra fit consequens, cum eam misericordiam quam impendimus egenti, sine mercede non relinquit deus. Haec autem merces summa est ut ipso perfruamur, et omnes qui eo fruimur, nobis etiam invicem in ipso perfruamur".

¹¹⁵) *De Diversis Quaestionibus* 83, q. 30 (CC 44A,38. ML 40,19): "Fruendum est autem honestis, utendum vero utilibus. Honestatem voco intellegibilem pulchritudinem, quam spiritalem nos proprie dicimus, utilitatem autem divinam providentiam".

speaking impossible to identify *utilitas* in this passage with divine providence. But there is no doubt that the idea of divine providence is the guiding idea of that of advantage, as we have tentatively translated *utilitas*. God obviously does not fall within his own providence. His *usus* of others then cannot possibly be to his own advantage, but only to theirs, insofar as he relates to them in such a way as to make them more fully partners in his goodness¹¹⁶. But human beings when they look to one another's interests are destined in God's providence to enjoy Him perfectly and to enjoy one another perfectly in Him. This adds an

¹¹⁶) J. Brechtken, *Augustinus Doctor Caritatis*, p. 5, remarks of Augustine's presentation of God's *uti*: "Er nimmt den *uti*-Begriff, modifiziert ihn total und verwendet das Wort — man könnte sagen: als reine Begriffshülse — für den appetitus-sprengenden Sachverhalt, wonach es Gott in seiner Liebe nur darum gehe, den Nutzen des anderen, des Geliebten, zu bewirken, wörtlich: den anderen zu dessen eigenen Vorteil zu "gebrauchen" — also gerade umgekehrt gegenüber dem ursprünglichen *uti*-Sinn: im letzten ein absurder Begriffsgebrauch von *uti* selbst".

Brechtken presupposes that real interest in anything or anyone other than the individual self is essentially excluded from the idea of *uti*. This, however, ignores the range Augustine has given to *uti* in *De Vera Religione* and in *quaestio 30*. He can speak there of '*uti ad beneficentiam*' and '*uti ad societatem*'. In God's providence all created things have been created to man's advantage ("*utilitas*"). But this does not in itself exclude that the one with whom our relationship is that of *uti* may himself be advantaged, in other words, that our *uti* be to his *utilitas*, "*ad beneficentiam*", as well as to our own. The point in this passage is that God's *uti* of us is different again in that it is only to the advantage of the receiver, because God as God stands in no need of advantage from himself. This is absurd only if *uti* is arbitrarily restricted to an ascent context according to which all that is not God would be used in order to attain God. But, even in the passage we are dealing with, the reward of enjoyment of God is evidently not an automatic consequence of compassionate action on behalf of others, but the mysterious gift of God. We do not enjoy God as a result of others having proved useful to us for this purpose, but because God wills and has so disposed creation that through relating to one another compassionately we should come to Him.

To be sure, in *De Doctrina Christiana* 3,38 (CSEL 80,89) = 3,10,16 (CC 32,87-88, ML 34,72), "*utilitas*" occurs specifically in the sense of the advantage that accrues to a person who loves himself properly, and is distinguished from the "*beneficentia*" that advantages others. "Et haec sunt duo genera omnium peccatorum, sed flagitia priora sunt ("*Flagitium*" is the corruption of one's own soul and body that results from unbridled "*cupiditas*"). Quae cum exinaniverint animum et ad quamdam egestatem perduxerint, in facinora prosiliunt, quibus removeantur impedimenta flagitiorum aut adiumenta quaerantur. Item quod agit caritas quo sibi prosit, *utilitas* est; quod autem agit ut prosit proximo, *beneficentia* nominatur. Et hic praecedit *utilitas*, quia nemo potest ex eo quod non habet prodesse alteri. Quanto autem magis regnum cupiditatis destruitur, tanto caritatis augeatur". "*Facinus*" is the harm self-seeking "*cupiditas*" causes others. This "*utilitas*", therefore, i.e. right love of self, is not out of kilter with the trend we have already observed in Augustine's thought. If I neglect my own "*utilitas*", i.e. the God-orientation of my life, I cannot deal with my neighbour in such a way as to be of benefit to him. It does not mean that I selfishly put my own interests first.

important element to the expression we saw above: "we have compassion on one another so that we may fully enjoy Him". The perfect enjoyment of one another in God is new and rather surprising in view of Augustine's earlier attribution of the neighbour to the realm of *uti*. But even then his question had been whether men are to be enjoyed or to be used, or both, and his first option for *uti*, love *propter aliud*, had been provisional¹¹⁷). This now becomes clearer still. Augustine did not consider that he had given a definitive, completely nuanced answer to the question in that earlier statement. The *propter aliud* in itself could lead one to think that people loved in this way were of very little interest in comparison to God. But it is Augustine's conviction that we are destined to share the enjoyment of God with them, yes, even to enjoy one another in enjoying God. The model is not that of an individual but of a common quest for God: people of one mind and one heart on the way to God¹¹⁸). The substance of the *propter aliud* retains its force in that others are not made the sole object of our deepest hopes for happiness¹¹⁹), but what seemed to be its consequences prove to be vastly less disagreeable than might have been thought.

2. *Frui with the neighbour and frui of the neighbour*

Towards the end of Book I of *De Doctrina Christiana* Augustine sums up its main argument:

Therefore of all that has been said here since we began our treatment of *things* the chief point is that we understand that the fulness and end of all Holy Scripture is love (cf. Rom. 13.10) for that being who is to be enjoyed and for the being who is able to enjoy Him with us; for there is no need to command people to love themselves. In order that we might know this love and be capable of it, divine providence has created for our salvation the whole temporal economy (*dispensatio*) which we should use (*uti*). We ought not use it with a love and a joy that, as it were, stay put, but

¹¹⁷) *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,40 (CSEL 80,18) = 1,22,20 (CC 32,16-17, ML 34,26): "Itaque magna quaestio est, utrum frui se homines debeant an uti an utrumque ... si propter aliud (diligendus), utimur eo. Videtur autem mihi propter aliud diligendus".

¹¹⁸) *Praeceptum* 1,2 (editor: Luc Verheijen, *La Règle de Saint Augustin, I. Tradition Manuscríte*, Etudes Augustiniennes, Paris, 1967, p. 417): "... et sit vobis anima una et cor unum in deum".

¹¹⁹) *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,80 (CSEL 80,29) = 1,33,37 (CC 32,27, ML 34,33): "Si vero inhaeris atque permanseris, finem in ea (i.e. delight in the presence of the loved one) ponens laetitiae tuae, tunc vere et proprie frui dicendus es. Quod non faciendum est nisi in illa trinitate, id est summo et incommutabili bono".

rather with a love that is passing, as we might delight in the road we travel, or in our means of conveyance, or in anything else that is of assistance to us. Or it may be possible to express more fittingly this love we are to have for the things by which we are carried along for the sake of the goal towards which we are carried¹²⁰).

Augustine concludes by acknowledging that his formulation of love for temporal things may leave something to be desired. Nonetheless, it is clear that, insofar as the neighbour is to be understood as falling under the temporal economy and as being of assistance to us in reaching our goal, he does so in conformity with the dispositions of divine providence for our salvation, and indeed similarly to Christ the Way who wishes not to detain us in the temporal things he has taken on and borne for our sake but to direct us to God¹²¹). Moreover, just as Christ is not alone the Way but also the Truth and the Life to which it leads ("*ad eum ipsum*"), so it is the calling of human beings not only to be of help and cheer to one another in the transitory matters of this life, but to love each other as beings destined to share in the enjoyment of God. If one discerns God's purpose in his temporal creation, one will learn and become capable of such love for others. Judging all things with honesty and without prejudice and ordering love accordingly¹²²), one will see the supreme importance of "love for that being who is to be enjoyed and for the being who is able to enjoy Him with us". This is the goal of God's plan for humanity. Therefore, «it should be our will that all men and women (even those whom we are not otherwise able to assist) love God with us (*nobiscum diligant*), and all the help we give them or receive from

¹²⁰) *Ibid.*, 1,84-95 (CSEL 80,30) = 1,35,39 (CC 32,28-29. ML 34,34): "Omnium igitur quae dicta sunt, ex quo de rebus tractamus, haec summa est, ut intellegatur legis et omnium divinarum scripturarum plenitudo et finis esse dilectio rei qua fruendum est et rei quae nobiscum ea re frui potest, quia ut se quisque diligit praecepto non opus est. Hoc ergo ut nossemus atque possemus, facta est tota pro nostra salute per divinam providentiam dispensatio temporalis qua debemus uti, non quasi mansoria quadam dilectione et delectatione, sed transitoria potius tamquam viae, tamquam vehiculorum vel aliorum quorumlibet instrumentorum, aut si quid congruentius dici potest, ut ea quibus ferimur propter illud ad quod ferimur diligamus".

¹²¹) *Ibid.*, 1,82-83 (CSEL 80,29) = 1,34,38 (CC 32,27-28. ML 34,33-34): "... nec ipse dominus, in quantum via nostra esse dignatus est, tenere nos voluerit, sed transire ...".

¹²²) *Ibid.*, 1,59 (CSEL 80,23) = 1,27,28 (CC 32,22. ML 34,29): "Ille autem iuste et sancte vivit qui rerum integer aestimator est. Ipse est autem qui ordinatam habet dilectionem, ne aut diligit quod non est diligendum, aut non diligit quod diligendum est, aut amplius diligit quod minus diligendum est, aut aequè diligit quod vel minus vel amplius diligendum est. Omnis peccator in quantum peccator est, non est diligendus, et omnis homo in quantum homo est, diligendus est propter deum, deus vero propter se ipsum".

them ought to be orientated to that one end (i.e. that they love God with us)"¹²³). Thus, because human beings as endowed with rational souls are capable of enjoying God ("*et potest nobiscum alius homo deo perfrui*")¹²⁴), we come together into a community of love for God the perfect enjoyment of whom is beatitude¹²⁵). Since all men and women are commended to our love in this way, the community of unselfish love is obviously meant to embrace more than just friends in the narrow sense of that word.

For Augustine, furthermore, enjoyment of God with one another is complemented by enjoyment of one another in God. We have discovered this expression for the first time in *De Doctrina Christiana* I,76: "*et omnes qui eo fruimur, nobis etiam invicem in ipso perfruamur*". If we were to take this full enjoyment in ourselves ("*in nobis*"), we would misplace our hope of beatitude. This would mean wanting to make our final abode in what was intended as a resting place along the way and clinging absolutely to created beings who have themselves received the where-withal to be of benefit to us from God. The other rightly directs us to continue our journey to God in whom he himself places his hope and who alone is to be worshipped as sovereign Lord¹²⁶).

However, when you enjoy a man in God, you enjoy God rather than the man. For you enjoy Him who makes you happy and you will rejoice when you have come to Him in whom you place your hope of coming. Thus, Paul said to Philemon: "Yes, brother, may I enjoy you in the Lord" (Philemon 20). If he had not added "in the Lord" and had said only "may I enjoy you", Paul would have placed hope for his happiness in Philemon. Yet "to enjoy" is very close to saying "to use with love". (*Quaquam etiam vicinissime dicitur frui cum dilectione uti*). For the presence of the beloved inevitably brings delight. If you pass beyond this and orientate it to the journey's end where you are to fix your abode, you are using it and it would not be correct or proper to say that you enjoy it. If you cling to it and make

¹²³) *Ibid.*, 1,63 (CSEL 80,24) = 1,29,30 (CC 32,23. ML 34,30): "Velle tamen debemus ut omnes nobiscum diligant deum, et totum quod eos vel adiuuamus vel adiuuamur ab eis ad unum illum finem referendum est".

¹²⁴) *Ibid.*, 1,60 (CSEL 80,23) = 1,27,28 (CC 32,22. ML 34,30).

¹²⁵) *Ibid.*, 1,64 (CSEL 80,24) = 1,29,30 (CC 32,23. ML 34,30): "... quid nos in societate dilectionis dei agere convenit, quo perfrui beate vivere est, et a quo habent omnes qui eum diligunt et quod sunt et quod eum diligunt ...".

¹²⁶) Cf. *Ibid.*, 1,77-78 (CSEL 80,28) = 1,33,36 (CC 32,27. ML 34,33): "Atque (nos) ita reffectos in illum (deum) compellunt, quo fruente pariter beati sumus ... Et angelus hominem se adorantem monet ut illum potius adoret, sub quo ei domino etiam ipse conservus est".

it the goal of your joy as a permanent dwelling-place, you may truly and rightly be said to enjoy it. But this joy should be sought only in the Trinity, the supreme and unchangeable good¹²⁷).

There is a certain ambiguity in this text, as a glance at the variants indicates. William Green's edition in the CSEL has, as here, "*cum dilectione uti*", while the other editions read "*cum delectatione uti*". Making a choice in this matter is by no means easy. From the point of view of internal criteria it is virtually impossible to opt for one or the other, although "*cum dilectione uti*" is the less obvious reading in the context of the sentence in which it occurs. We would be less surprised to hear that "to enjoy" is very close to saying "to use with delight". Indeed, in *De Trinitate* 10,11,17, there is a phrase which comes quite close to this: "*frui est autem uti cum gaudio non adhuc spei sed iam rei*"¹²⁸). However, because the terminology is used there in relation to a theme rather different from our own — to wit, the use of the will with regard to memory and intelligence — the comparison is not immediately, and certainly not definitively, illuminating. Within *De Doctrina Christiana* itself both readings, "*cum delectatione uti*" and "*cum dilectione uti*", are possibilities. In 1,85, for instance, we find "*uti*" with both "*dilectione*" and "*delectatione*"¹²⁹), but nothing is said there of any closeness to "*frui*". It may appear that, when in 1,44 Augustine states that not everything which is used is to be loved ("*non autem omnia quibus utendum*

¹²⁷) *Ibid.*, 1,79-80 (CSEL 80,28-29) = 1,33,37 (CC 32,27. ML 34,33): "Cum autem homine in deo frueris, deo potius quam homine frueris. Illo enim frueris quo efficeris beatus, et ad eum te pervenisse laetaberis, in quo spem ponis ut venias. Inde ad Filemonem Paulus: *Ita, frater, inquit, ego te fruar in domino*. Quod si non addidisset *in domino* et *te fruar* tantum dixisset, in eo constituisset spem beatitudinis suae. Quamquam etiam vicinissime dicitur frui cum dilectione uti. Cum enim adest quod diligitur, etiam delectationem secum necesse est gerat. Per quam si transieris eamque ad illud ubi permanendum est rettuleris, uteris ea et abusive, non proprie diceris frui. Si vero inhaeseris atque permanseris, finem in ea ponens laetitiae tuae, tunc vere et proprie frui dicendus es. Quod non faciendum est nisi in illa trinitate, id est summo et incommutabili bono".

¹²⁸) *De Trinitate* 10,11,17 (CC 50,330. ML 42,982-983): "Iam vero usus tertius in voluntate est pertractante illa quae memoria et intelligentia continentur, sive ad aliquid ea referat sive eorum fine delectata conquiescat. Uti est enim assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis; *frui est autem uti cum gaudio* non adhuc spei sed iam rei. Proinde omnis qui fruitor utitur; assumit enim aliquid in facultatem voluntatis cum fine delectationis. Non autem omnis qui utitur fruitor si id quod in facultatem voluntatis assumit non propter illud ipsum sed propter aliud appetivit".

¹²⁹) *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,85 (CSEL 80,30) = 1,35,39 (CC 32,29. ML 34,34): "... facta est tota pro nostra salute per divinam providentiam dispensatio temporalis qua debemus uti, non quasi mansoria quadam dilectione et delectatione, sed transitoria potius ...".

est diligenda sunt"), he will go on to limit "*cum dilectione uti*" to the personal. His intention, however, is rather to limit it to the good; the martyrs did not love the crime of their persecutors but they used it in such a way as to come to God¹³⁰). The infra-human creation, therefore, may also be seen as belonging to the sphere of "*cum dilectione uti*"¹³¹). Thus, we have to conclude that this expression is not already a stock-in-trade of Augustine's for designating love of human beings specifically, even though, if it be the genuine reading in the text we have quoted from 1,79-80, "*cum dilectione uti*" would refer there in the first instance to interpersonal love. Because of its less evident appropriateness in the actual context of its own sentence, however, "*cum dilectione uti*" is perhaps slightly to be preferred to "*quamquam etiam vicinissime dicitur frui cum delectatione uti*". It makes quite good sense in view of the forgoing and the following. Indeed since the passage goes on: "for the presence of the beloved (*quod diligitur*) inevitably brings delight", some mention of '*dilectio*' in the forgoing would not be improbable; this is lacking if we read "*delectatione*". For a resolution of the question, however, we have to appeal to external evidence, and this, as presented by William Green¹³²), permits us to work confidently with the reading "*cum dilectione uti*".

When Augustine states then in *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,79-80 that "*frui*" is very close to "*cum dilectione uti*", he appears to mean that associating with those we love properly brings delight inevitably. But, while the delight loving neighbours find in one another is very nearly "*frui*", strictly speaking "*frui*" is reserved for our relationship of enduring love for the Trinity in whom alone hope for final blessedness

¹³⁰) *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,44 (CSEL 80,19) = 1,23,22 (CC 32,18. ML 34,27).

¹³¹) *Ibid.*, 1,45 (CSEL 80,19) = 1,23,22 (CC 32,18. ML 34,27): "Cum ergo quattuor sint diligenda, unum quod supra nos est, alterum quod nos sumus, tertium quod iuxta nos est, quartum quod infra nos est ...".

¹³²) See Green's "Praefatio" in CSEL 80, especially II. *De codicibus* (p. XIII-XXIV); and III. *De cognitione codicum* (p. XXIII-XXIV). Of the eleven extant pre-900 A.D. codices to be found today in European libraries only two have the reading "*cum delectatione uti*". E.A. Lowe informed Green that the oldest codex, i.e. Corbie (C), now in Leningrad, dates from the fifth century, and perhaps even earlier; therefore, it is not sheer speculation to consider it as stemming from the scriptorium at Hippo Regius itself (p. VIII-IX, XV: "olim fortasse Hipponensem"). This codex reads "*cum dilectione uti*". The Maurini, in preparing their 1680 edition, used both C and the second Corbie codex (D), dating from 796-810 and now found in Paris (p. XVI-XVIII). Thus, the Maurini's option for "*cum delectatione uti*" is surprising. For, of the pre-900 codices, only the Palatinus (P), in the Vatican Library, which contains many mistakes, and the 2nd Palatinus (Q) witness to "*delectatione*". Not one of the fourteen post-900 manuscripts used by Green to prepare his edition has this reading.

ought to be placed. Because the neighbour is not God, love for the neighbour still stands at least partially under the sign of “*uti*”, even though this love has very definite “*frui*” characteristics. It would in fact be an abuse of language to bridge the gap, however narrow it may be at this point, and to speak simply of a “*frui*” of one another. In order to refer correctly to an enjoyment of the neighbour, the “*frui*” has to be qualified as it is in this case by the formula Augustine quotes from the letter to Philemon: to enjoy a man in God or in the Lord (“*homine in deo frueris*”; “*ita, frater, ego te fruar in domino*”). A similar qualification turns up in Book III of *De Doctrina Christiana*. “I call *caritas* the movement of the soul to enjoy God for his own sake and to enjoy the self and one’s neighbour as orientated to God (“*ad fruendum ... se atque proximo propter deum*”); *cupiditas*, on the other hand, I call the movement of the soul to enjoy oneself and the neighbour and any body apart from their orientation to God”¹³³). In *De Trinitate* we find the same formula as in *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,79, with the addition that the enjoyment of the self is also to be “in God”: “*Et nobis ergo et fratribus in domino fruamur*”¹³⁴). The exact intention of “*in deo*” and

¹³³) *De Doctrina Christiana* 3,37 (CSEL 80,89) = 3,10,16 (CC 32,87. ML 34,72): “*Caritatem voco motum animi ad fruendum deo propter ipsum et se atque proximo propter deum; cupiditatem autem motum animi ad fruendum se et proximo et quolibet corpore non propter deum*”. Again we have translated “*propter deum*” with “as orientated (or related) to God” because of the misleading nature of the English expression “for the sake of God” (as if the neighbour precisely as himself were not loved at all), and, more importantly, because the formula “*propter deum*” is obviously very closely related to “*referre ad*” and “*referre in*”, e.g. *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,41-43 (CSEL 80,18) = 1,22,21 (CC 32,17-18. ML 34,26-27): “*Si autem se propter se diligit, non se refert ad deum, sed ad se ipsum conversus non ad incommutabile aliquid convertitur. Et propterea iam cum defectu aliquo se fruitur, quia melior est cum totus haeret atque constringitur incommutabili bono, quam cum inde vel ad se ipsum relaxatur. Si ergo te ipsum non propter te debes diligere, sed propter illum ubi dilectionis tuae rectissimus finis est, non susceat alius homo, si etiam ipsum propter deum diligis ... Sic enim eum diligens tamquam se ipsum totam dilectionem sui et illius refert in illam dilectionem dei quae nullum a se rivulum duci extra patitur, cuius derivatione minuatur*”.

Similarly 2,18 (CSEL 80,38) = 2,7,10 (CC 32,37. ML 34,39): “... diligendum esse deum, et illum quidem ex toto corde, ex tota anima, ex tota mente, proximum vero tamquam se ipsum, id est, ut tota proximi sicut etiam nostri dilectio *referatur in deum*”. An examination of these and other texts in which “*referre in (ad)*” occurs shows that it has the important function of preventing love closing in on itself by making the self or the neighbour the object of *frui*. The fact that it is *God* who is the real object of *frui* is accentuated, not the *fruitio* itself.

¹³⁴) *De Trinitate* 9,8,13 (CC 50,304. ML 42,968): “*Cum ergo aut par nobis, aut inferior creatura sit, inferiore utendum est ad deum; pari autem fruendum, sed in deo. Sicut enim te ipso, non in te ipso frui debes, sed in eo qui fecit te; sic etiam illo quem diligis tamquam te ipsum. Et nobis ergo et fratribus in domino fruamur, et inde nos nec ad*

"*propter deum*" will have to be further clarified in the contexts they occur, for it is impossible to give a fair assessment of the thought of a man on the basis of a collection of his formulae alone. For the present, however, let us limit our attention to the quotation from Philemon 20 that occurs in our passage and to the tantalising suggestion that "to enjoy" is very close to saying "to use with love".

3. Discussion with Josef Brechtken in relation to *De Doctrina Christiana* I,79

According to Josef Brechtken, familiarity with Philemon 20 blinded Augustine to the real problem of love for neighbour and perhaps made him incapable of subjecting the "*appetitus*" starting-point of his ethic (i.e. deprived being seeking fulfilment in beatitude) to examination. It inclined him to take over all too uncritically the total perspective of ancient ethics' quest for beatitude and ultimately made him unable to free himself from it¹³⁵). Augustine could not decide whether love for neighbour was to be designated as *uti* or *frui*. Therefore, the discovery of Philemon 20 would have been a God-send to help him out of this impasse. But "*homine in deo frueris*" turns out to be a meaningless compromise formula¹³⁶). It is, to begin with, a mistaken interpretation

nosmetipsos remittere, et quasi relaxare deorsum versus audeamus". Likewise, *De Civitate Dei* 19,13 (CSEL 40/2,395. CC 48,679. ML 41,640): "... pax caelestis civitatis ordinatissima et concordissima societas fruendi deo et *in*vicem *in deo*, pax omnium rerum tranquillitas ordinis ...". And, around the other way, *Sermo* 255,7,7 (ML 38,1189): "Ipso solo sic delectabimur, et nihil aliud requiramus; quia et in uno ipso fruemur, et *in nobis in*vicem *ipso fruemur* ... Quid aliud in nobis quam Deum debemus diligere".

¹³⁵) J. Brechtken, *Augustinus Doctor Caritatis*, p. 135: "In dieser Diskrepanz von Denkunabhängigkeit einerseits und unkritischer Fixierung auf die absolute Autorität der hl. Schrift andererseits liegt hier wohl der eigentliche Grund für den folgenreichen Missgriff in der Bestimmung der Nächstenliebe: folgenreich insofern, als das berühmte-berühmte Schriftzitat mit seinem "*frui in deo*" Augustin geradezu blind gemacht hat für das eigentliche Problem der Nächstenliebe, vielleicht aber insgesamt sogar unfähig zur Überprüfung seines ethischen *appetitus*-Ansatzes; es hat ihn vielmehr eher geneigt gemacht, allzu unkritisch die Total-Perspektive des Glückseligkeitsstrebens aus der antiken Ethik zu übernehmen oder besser: beizubehalten, so dass man sagen kann: Wenn es je eine Möglichkeit für Augustin gegeben haben sollte, das *appetitus*-System überhaupt in Frage zu stellen, nach seiner Bekanntschaft mit diesem "Schriftbeweis" war es damit ein für allemal aus".

¹³⁶) *Ibid.*, p. 5-6: "Es wird sich zeigen ... dass Augustin in der theoretischen Behandlung der Nächstenliebe keine überzeugende Lösung findet, dass er sich vielmehr nach einer lange durchgehaltenen Unentschiedenheit — ob *frui* oder *uti* — schliesslich auf die ebenso problematische wie äusserst unsinnige Kompromissformel "den Nächsten in Gott geniessen" (*frui proximo in deo*) festlegt, wozu er zum Unglück auch noch durch ein

of the scriptural verse it claims as authority; the Greek of Philemon 20 has the verb *ὀνινάσαι* which, according to Brechtken, means “*Freude haben*” in the sense of “to draw use from”, “to find help or support”, (and in Brechtken’s view, Augustine himself employs *frui* in this way in the letters to Licentius and Jerome already mentioned)¹³⁷). In *De Doctrina Christiana* I, 79, however, Brechtken sees Augustine as wanting to interpret it in line with the Greek verbs *ἀπολαύειν* and *τυγχάνειν*, corresponding to the Middle Platonic doctrine of the good and the final goal of life, that is to say, in an “*appetitus*” framework¹³⁸). Since the text of Philemon 20 gives no warrant for this, Augustine’s appeal to Scripture to support a *frui*-love for neighbour must be declared invalid. Indeed, love that enjoys the neighbour, which had become an *idée fixe* of Augustine, has no common ground with the biblical idea of love for neighbour which, founded on unselfish service and self-sacrifice, totally excludes the fruitive aspect¹³⁹). Furthermore, the idea that “to enjoy” is

missverständenes Bibelwort angeregt worden ist”. Further, p. 104: “Der Lateiner Augustin, dessen ganzes ethisches System durch das spezifische *frui-uti* der antiken Ethik bestimmt ist, findet als Theologe bei seiner “schwierigen Frage” um die ethische Systematisierung der Nächstenliebe — ob *frui* oder *uti* homine — zufällig im Text des Neuen Testaments ein “*frui te*” (*frui* homine), nimmt es in seiner Ratlosigkeit gern und willig auf, weil er darin eine gottgewollte Lösung in einer für ihn unentscheidbaren Sache findet, ein “*frui* homine”, das zudem mit seiner Anfügung “in domino” (in deo) auch noch einer Kompromiss enthält, der Augustin auch von der Sache her als durchaus logisch konsequent erscheinen mag. Dies alles aber zeigt, dass Augustins Berufung auf die genannte Paulus-Formel sinnlos ist und an sich nichts nützt”.

¹³⁷) *Epistola* 26,4 (CSEL 34/1,87. ML 33,106) to Licentius; *Epistola* 67,3 (CSEL 34/2,239. ML 33,237) to Jerome. See J. Brechtken, *op. cit.*, p. 103-104.

¹³⁸) J. Brechtken, *op. cit.*, p. 103, in which he is quoting from R. Lorenz, “Die Herkunft des augustinischen *FRUI DEO*”, in *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 64 (1952/53), p. 34-60. Numbers in brackets refer to pages in Lorenz.

“Er (Lorenz) weist im einzelnen nach, dass Augustin das *frui deo* wie das Begriffspaar *frui-uti* überhaupt ‘durch die philosophische Schriftstellerei des Marcus Terentius Varro vermittelt’ bekommen hat (60), und vor allem, was schon die Sache selbst unmittelbar betrifft: ‘*Frui Deo* hat seinen Ursprung in der philosophischen Güterlehre und Zielbestimmung des Lebens und leitet sich aus der mittelplatonischen *ὁμοίωσις θεῷ* her’ (59), und die griechischen Wörter und Begriffe, die in diesem System Verwendung finden, lauten dementsprechend: *ἀπολαύειν*, *τυγχάνειν* (48). Wir sehen: Das Wort *ὀνινάσαι*, Aktiv- oder Mediumform, wie es im Paulus-Brief an Philemon gebraucht wird, kommt hier gar nicht vor”.

¹³⁹) J. Brechtken, *op. cit.*, p. 133: “Augustin hält im äussersten immer noch an der fixen Idee einer letztlich doch irgendwie fruitiven Nächstenliebe fest, Augustin ist auch als Christ und Theologe noch so sehr durch die fruitive Perspektive der antiken Erosliebe bestimmt, dass dieser Aspekt immer wieder durchschlägt. Und dazu muss man nun sagen: Darin läge ja eigentlich auch das letzte Stückchen Logik für ein echtes *frui* in der Nächstenliebe, für den Theologen Augustin freilich gebremst durch das “in deo” (*propter deum*), — wenn dies nicht in fundamentalem Gegensatz zu neutestamentlichen Liebesidee

very close to saying “to use with delight” (“*cum delectatione uti*”) in fact amounts to the reduction of *frui* to *uti*, but to an *uti* in which the aspect of taking pleasure in the neighbour is retained¹⁴⁰).

Although Brechtken warns that even the serious scholar of Augustine may be gravely tempted to downplay the significance of the appeal to Philemon 20 in *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,79¹⁴¹), I consider that he has at least overestimated it and wrongly associated it exclusively with what he sees as the underlying Augustinian system, the “*appetitus*” ethic. We have been at pains to show that Augustine’s reflections on love for neighbour need to be read against the background of the order of creation ruled by God’s providence and law as well as against that of desire’s search for beatitude; and that they have an objective communitarian dimension. We have noted Ragnar Holte’s presentation of the complex history of the *uti/frui* distinction in its association with the Stoic *utile/honestum* and of its relation to the subordination of the active to the contemplative life. Furthermore, there are in Augustine other expressions of the relation of love for neighbour to God which certainly cannot be understood in a context of selfish desire in quest of its own beatitude¹⁴²). These are general comments. More particularly,

stünde, wenn die echt biblische Nächstenliebe ... den fruitiven Aspekt nicht restlos ausschliessen würde”.

¹⁴⁰) *Ibid.*, p. 101: “Die erste Überraschung über das plötzliche Auftauchen eines *frui* homine (den Menschen genießen) wird dadurch schon gemildert, ja sogar fast wieder aufgehoben, dass Augustin hier eine vom ursprünglichen *frui*-Begriff abweichende *frui*-Definition beiläufig mitliefert, nämlich *frui* als “mit Freude gebrauchen” (*cum delectatione uti*). Es scheint gerade das Paulus-Zitat zu sein, was ihn hier zu dieser Bemerkung veranlasst, wo *frui* fast auf *uti* reduziert scheint ...”. Note that Brechtken is not working with the reading “*uti cum dilectione*” given in Green’s edition in CSEL.

¹⁴¹) *Ibid.*, p. 106: “So wäre es denn für jeden Augustin-Verehrer, aber wohl auch für den sachlich motivierten, seriösen Augustin-Forscher eine grosse Versuchung, die Bedeutung seiner Berufung auf das Neue Testament in bezug auf dieses Zitat aus dem Paulus-Brief herunterzuspielen, wo doch alles auf so unglaublich simple Weise verkehrt ist”.

¹⁴²) E.g. In *Epistolam Ioannis*, tr. 6,2 (ML 35,2020); “*Filioli, non diligamus verbo tantum et lingua, sed opere et veritate* (1 Jn, 3,18). Quærimus, In quo opere, in qua veritate? Potest esse manifestius opus, quam tribuere pauperibus? Multi hoc jactantia faciunt, non dilectione. Potest esse majus opus, quam mori pro fratribus? Et hoc multi volunt putari se facere, jactantia nominis comparandi, non visceribus dilectionis. Restat ut ille diligat fratrem, qui ante Deum ubi solus videt, cordi suo persuadet, et interrogat cor suum an vere propter fratrum dilectionem hoc faciat ...”.

Ibid., tr. 6,4 (ML 35,2021): “*Quisquis ergo habuerit charitatem fraternam, et coram Deo habuerit, ubi Deus videt, corque eius interrogatum sub justo examine, non ei aliud responderit, quam germanam ibi esse radicem charitatis, unde boni fructus existant; habet fiduciam apud Deum, et quidquid postulaverit, ab eo accipiet, quia mandata eius servat*”.

Ibid., tr. 5,3 (ML 35,2013-2014): “*Qui facit contra charitatem et contra dilectionem*

Brechtken, in commenting on *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,79, consistently works with the reading "*cum delectatione uti*" for that which may be said to be very close to "*frui*". As a result, it seems to him that "*frui in deo*" as applied to the neighbour amounts almost to the same thing as "*cum delectatione uti*" "*in deo*". Because it is scarcely adequate to the New Testament notion of love as self-giving, Brechtken views with great suspicion the expression "*cum delectatione uti*" as a description of love for neighbour. Although it may be open to a benign interpretation, he seizes upon it eagerly as further evidence of Augustine's "*appetitus*" ethic. Then, the addition of "*in deo*" to "*cum delectatione uti*" as giving a further nuance to love for neighbour, far from reassuring Brechtken that a more acceptable Christian statement of the case has been reached, only heightens his conviction that a basic *eros-appetitus* framework is operative. For God, the Supreme Good, could be seen as eminently more capable of slaking the thirst of desire's quest for happiness than are human beings, for all the delight they may give.

As we have seen, however, William Green, basing himself on the evidence of the manuscript tradition, prefers the other reading, "*cum dilectione uti*", in his edition published in the CSEL. Following this version through, we can arrive at an interpretation of "*frui in deo*" as "*cum dilectione uti*" "*in deo*", which is considerably less at variance with the New Testament doctrine on love for neighbour than Josef Brechtken's heavily "*appetitus*"-coloured "*cum delectatione uti*" "*in deo*". On Green's reading, what most closely approaches "*frui*", which as such is still the preserve of the sovereign Lord, is "*cum dilectione uti*", i.e. to relate to reality with the love God wishes us to have for it, and here, *a fortiori*, to relate with love to other human beings. Is it not precisely in this "*uti*" that human beings come closest to loving God, to "*frui*"? To be sure, this "*cum dilectione uti*" of human beings does bring delight. But does delight *a priori* exclude self-giving? Does love have to be stripped of all joy in order to be Christian in the New Testament sense? Is pleasure so suspect that the delight that comes when we genuinely love one another ("*sancte casteque*") must be declared selfishness¹⁴³? Augustine is well aware that this enjoyment of others that

fraternam, non audeat gloriari, et dicere *natum* se esse *ex Deo*: qui autem in dilectione fraterna constitutus est, certa sunt peccata quae non potest admittere, et hoc maxime ne oderit fratrem".

¹⁴³) For Augustine, to receive the love of those whom we love is quite rightly a cause of great delight. See *Epistola* 130,6,13 (CSEL 44,55. ML 33,499): "Sed ii nos multum iusteque delectant, a quibus vicissim sancte casteque diligimur".

accompanies "*cum dilectione uti*" might tempt us to abandon ourselves to it absolutely; therefore, he keeps this love open to God by adding "*in deo*", for we are commanded to love only God totally and unreservedly with heart and soul and mind. True enjoyment is consequent on total self-giving to God. To put one's final hope in another human being would be to make a god of him; this would be either to destroy him with a burden he is unable to bear or to tempt him to arrogant exploitation of our naive trustfulness. In any case, the delight we properly find in others is God's doing; it is God himself. For "*when you enjoy a man in God, you enjoy God rather than the man*"¹⁴⁴). This, however, does not mean to say that, in enjoying God rather than others, others are not really loved or enjoyed at all. It does not mean to say that God shoulders others out of their rightful place because he is ultimately more enjoyable. On the contrary, the purpose of the "rather than" is not to urge us to greater love for God than for our neighbour, as if the text had read: "*when you love a man in God, you love God rather than the man*". It is designed rather to indicate that *frui* in the absolute sense of a self-giving which embraces all the dimensions of one's being is properly spoken of with regard to God. The application of *frui* terminology to the neighbour is a strange twist which embodies possibilities both awesome and wonderful. The former Augustine seeks to exclude as disastrous distortions. The latter he is not reluctant to encourage. For it is in relating to others with a love that is open to God ("*cum dilectione uti*" "*in deo*") and in enjoying them with a delight that closes off neither their nor our orientation to God ("*homine in deo frueris*"), that we come closest to enjoying *tout court* (*frui deo*), being given over heart, mind and soul to God himself.

Even if Augustine's understanding of Philemon 20 does not exactly correspond to the intention of Paul — but, indeed, it may not be so far

A. Vergote, *Dette et désir. Deux axes chrétiens et la dérive pathologique*, Paris, 1978, p. 178-179, confirms the soundness of Augustinian psychology in this matter: "Pour notre part, nous estimons que l'opposition entre désir et amour relève d'un faux spiritualisme qui, par culpabilité, méconnaît un désir toujours présent. Il n'existe pas d'amour qui ne soit pas aussi désir d'être aimé et de promouvoir, dans l'échange du don, l'élargissement et la confirmation de soi-même comme de l'autre. Nous refusons l'opposition dualiste entre éros et agapé, entre amour-désir et amour-oblatif".

¹⁴⁴) *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,76 & 79 (CSEL 80,28) = 1,32,35 & 1,33,37 (CC 32,26-27. ML 34,32-33): "... sed nescio quo modo etiam nostra fit consequens, cum eam misericordiam quam impendimus egenti, sine mercede non relinquit deus. Haec autem merces summa est ut ipso perfruamur, et omnes qui eo fruimur, nobis etiam invicem in ipso perfruamur ... Cum autem homine in deo frueris, deo potius quam homine frueris".

wide of the mark as Brechtken thinks¹⁴⁵) — this is not to disqualify Augustine totally from having any valid recourse to the New Testament for his doctrine of love for neighbour¹⁴⁶). His Christian credibility on this point does not stand or fall on whether the formula “*homine in deo frueris*” can be shown to have scriptural backing in precisely the same sense as he adopts it. The Augustine we encounter in *De Doctrina Christiana* is the theologian at work, testing ideas, trying out ways of expressing the relationship between God and man. He ought not then to be pictured as a scatterbrain who cannot make up his mind whether love for neighbour should be *uti* or *frui*, and, whatever he chooses, doomed

¹⁴⁵) J. Brechtken, *Augustinus Doctor Caritatis*, p. 103-104, says of Philemon 20 that “Das *frui* hier aber kann, wie aus dem ganzen Zusammenhang hervorgeht, ganz und gar nicht etwa im Sinne von lieben verstanden werden, vielmehr: Augustin möchte an seinem Freund “Freude haben”, aus seinen geistigen Anlagen und aus seinem Lebenswandel “Nutzen ziehen”, und das kann er nur, wenn er den Partner für seine, also für die gute Sache gewinnt”. For Brechtken, the same applies to “*frui*” and “*perfrui*” in the letters to Licentius and Jerome: *Epistolae* 26.4 and 67.3. But has the “*frui*” of Philemon 20 nothing at all to do with Paul’s love for Philemon? In v. 1 Paul calls Philemon *our beloved and our helper*: “τῷ ἀγαπητῷ καὶ συνεργῷ ἡμῶν”; he also says of Onesimus, the slave, that he will become Philemon’s, his master’s, *beloved brother in the Lord*: “ἀδελφὸν ἀγαπητόν ... ἐν κυρίῳ” (v. 16). Paul wants Philemon to deal with Onesimus and with himself according to the love he is renowned for: v. 5,7 (“*I had great joy and comfort in your love ...*”: “χαρὰν γὰρ πολλὴν ἔσχον καὶ παράκλησιν ἐπὶ τῇ ἀγάπῃ σου”), 9 (“*I am appealing to your love*”), 20b (“*put new heart into me in Christ*”: “ἀνάπαυσόν μου τὰ σπλάγχνα ἐν Χριστῷ”).

In other words, what Paul is pleading with Philemon for in v. 20: “*ego te fruar in domino*”, is a work of love on the basis of love, not just a helping hand or a delightful favour. As Paul had great joy and comfort in hearing of the love of Philemon that had put new heart into the saints (v. 7), now he appeals to that same love to put new heart into himself “in Christ” (v. 9 & 20b). It is then not just to a helper who will bring some advantage to him but to a Christian full of love that Paul addresses himself. Paul calls him “beloved” (v. 1) and hopes that “in the Lord” the delight of seeing the work of love he asks for performed will not be withheld. In this light is “*uti cum dilectione*” which brings delight very wrong in describing the relationship between Paul and Philemon? Of course, it would have been impossible to deduce this from the use of *ὀναίμην* in v. 20 alone.

¹⁴⁶) J. Brechtken, in his treatment of love for neighbour in the second part of *Augustinus Doctor Caritatis*, p. 85-155, limits himself in large measure to the theoretical discussion in *De Doctrina Christiana*. See e.g. p. 120: “Wir können uns dabei weitgehend auf die Schrift *De doctrina christiana* beschränken, weil die referre ad-Formel dort in jeder denkbaren Verwendungsmöglichkeit vorkommt, von daher also hinreichend zu erkennen ist, ganz abgesehen davon, dass hier ja unser Hauptproblem zu lokalisieren ist”. Further, p. 126-130, where five of the eight “für die Nächstenliebe irgendwie relevant erscheinenden Stellen” quoted are from *De Doctrina Christiana*. Of the 78 references to Augustine in Part II of Brechtken’s monograph forty-three are to this work. Although *De Doctrina Christiana* is of great importance, particularly regarding the theme of the present chapter, Augustine’s whole understanding of love of neighbour cannot be sought there alone, and certainly not just in the passages that have to do with *uti* and *frui*.

from the start to fall short of the New Testament. The fact that the question is posed in non-scriptural terms is not in itself sufficient to pre-judge the argumentation and the attempts to find an answer as foreign to the true Christian conception of love. Augustine saw that the neighbour represented a special case to which one could not just apply a simple *uti* or *frui*. His search for a middle way, then, is not a sign of indecisiveness provoked by the clash of Christian love for neighbour with an opposed and unyielding ethical system, but an acknowledgement that *uti/frui*, not only in its common-sense meaning but also in its normal technical acceptance, has to be transformed in order to cope fully with human reality¹⁴⁷). If the result of this attention to the neighbour is to bring *uti* and *frui* very close together such that "*quamquam etiam vicinissime dicitur frui cum dilectione uti*", might this be an indication not of meaninglessness and confusion but that love for neighbour very nearly approaches love for God? 'Approaches', Augustine is careful to say, not usurps and takes the place of.

¹⁴⁷) J. Brechtken, *op. cit.*, p. 133, appears to require of Augustine a formal recognition of this point, and, failing to find it, feels justified in concluding that self-interest (the use of the neighbour as a means) overlays all seeming disinterest in Augustinian love.

"Vor allem aber: Man muss erklären können, warum Augustin in der von *beneficentia* und *misericordia* bestimmten Nächstenliebe, wenn dies schon der eigentliche Gesichtspunkt sein soll, nicht dieselben Konsequenzen zieht wie in der göttlichen Liebe und irgendwann, irgendwo einmal ausdrücklich eingesteht, dass es sich hier nicht um das normale *frui* oder *uti* handelt. Dass Augustin dies nicht tut, diese Parallele zur göttlichen Liebe also nicht voll durchzieht, erst recht nicht ausdrücklich, hat doch einen handfesten Grund — und dies berechtigt uns, die Nächstenliebe im oben genannten Text im Widerspruch von Eigennutz und selbstloser Güte, als Überlagerung des letzteren durch das erste zu deuten ...".

I take the extended discussion itself of the "*magna quaestio*" in *De Doctrina Christiana* as evidence that "*uti*" cannot be applied to the neighbour as it is applied to infra-human reality. The fact that "*frui*" is also used of the neighbour means that there is an "*honestum*" present in love for him as well as an "*utile*". Thus, the "*uti cum dilectione*" which is very close to "*frui*" has an essential dimension which is lacking to simple "*uti*" of lower things, and certainly to "*uti*" as Brechtken conceives it. See p. 114-115 of *Augustinus Doctor Caritatis* for the latter: "'Gebrauchen' lässt sich doch nur, wenn ich etwas haben, etwas in die Hand bekommen, über etwas verfügen will, um etwas anderes zu erreichen, zu bewirken, zu machen. Das Gebrauchte oder Zugebrauchende ist immer Mittel, Mittel zum Zweck, natürlich für einen anderen Zweck, der nicht mit dem Mittel selbst zusammenfallen kann. Ich gebrauche ein Auto, um zu fahren, um ein Ziel zu erreichen. Das Gebrauchte steht deshalb auch als Gebrauchtes immer irgendwie 'unter' dem Zielwert, wozu es gebraucht wird. Das Gebrauchte ist immer Zeug 'zu' etwas, z.B. Handwerkszeug u. dgl. Von daher kommt es dann ja auch, dass z.B. im zwischenmenschlichen Bereich das 'Gebrauchen' eigentlich völlig unvorstellbar ist oder wenigstens sein sollte, es sei denn im Sinne von Ausbeutung, Sklaverei, kurz: Unmenschlichkeit. Ganz in Übereinstimmung mit diesem alltäglich-geläufigen Sinn von Gebrauchen steht ja dann auch das 'erste', das eigentliche *uti* bei Augustin, so wie wir es oben kennengelernt haben, wenn auch allzusehr eingeengt auf die reine appetitus-Perspektive".

III. ANDERS NYGREN'S UNDERSTANDING OF UTI/FRUI AND CRITIQUE

A. Brief presentation of Nygren's position

Anders Nygren's characterisation of New Testament *agape* as spontaneous and unmotivated, indifferent to value, creative and community-building, is accepted by Josef Brechtken with full approval and it is sharply contrasted with the putative Augustinian view for which individual beatitude would be central: "our freedom for our own sake"¹⁴⁸). Nygren, however, continues to talk of a *caritas*-synthesis in Augustine, even though he sees the *eros*-motif as dominating and love for neighbour as a special case either of love to God or of self-love, both of which are basically acquisitive desire seeking rest. If *agape* is made to suffer so much, asks Brechtken, how can it still in any sense be considered compatible with *eros*? He suggests that Nygren has seen only the dominant *motif* of *eros* in Augustine but has not adverted to the fact that this motif is central to an already established ethical system, individualistic self-seeking eudaimonism, which governs the whole of Augustine's thought on love for neighbour¹⁴⁹). Be this as it may, Nygren is hardly less critical of the radical *eros* dimension than Brechtken is of the all-pervasive ethical system¹⁵⁰). Furthermore, both authors are guided by the same fundamental notion of love in Augustine: that of an indeterminate acquisitive desire seeking rest, an indifferent longing craving for satisfaction and fulfilment¹⁵¹). Ragnar Holte has ably shown that

¹⁴⁸) See J. Brechtken, *op. cit.*, p. 90-93. For the formula, "unsere Freiheit um unserer selbst willen", cf. p. 90. Brechtken gives no reference to Augustine for this, here or elsewhere. Because of his emphasis on God, Wisdom, as *bonum commune* even from the time of the *Soliloquia*, I consider it highly unlikely that Augustine would ever have used such an expression in the sense purported by Brechtken.

¹⁴⁹) *Ibid.*, p. 9-10.

¹⁵⁰) While Brechtken limits himself largely to the *uti/frui* discussion of love for neighbour in *De Doctrina Christiana*, Nygren is somewhat more wide-ranging. The latter's criticism is also less brash and, for all that it finds unsatisfactory in Augustine, refrains from cries of exasperation and horror.

¹⁵¹) See J. Brechtken, *op. cit.*, p. 3: "Wir können diese Ethik deshalb der Grundstruktur nach, die im Streben nach der Behebung von Seinsmängel und in der so bewirkten Glückseligkeit ihr Spezifikum hat, im folgenden kurz als appetitus-Ethik bezeichnen".

A. Nygren, *Agape and Eros*, p. 482: "(1) All love is *acquisitive* love. (2) This *acquisitive* love is the most elementary and fundamental phenomenon in human life"; p. 494: "For Augustine love is a longing *indifferent* in itself, whose quality is *determined* by the object to which it is directed ... Love is the elementary motive power in all human action, good and bad alike ... The idea that love is an ethically *indifferent* force which becomes ethical or unethical according to the nature of the object it desires ..."; p. 495,

this is a serious over-simplification that disregards the differentiated and complex Augustinian psychology of love¹⁵²). Holte's position has been presented earlier in this work.

It is not surprising, however, that when love is seen as acquisitive, *uti/frui* can be easily accepted as means and end. Nygren evidently is of this opinion. "The relation between *Frui* and *Uti* is therefore that between ends and means ... when I 'use' an object ... because in the last resort I love something else, (I) regard the object I am using as a means to obtain the enjoyment of this"¹⁵³). For Nygren's Augustine the right form of *caritas* is love for God and this excludes all other love. God, who is alone the supreme and immutable good, cannot suffer anything to be loved beside himself. But, Nygren puts the question: "Can we not conceive of such a love for the creature as would simply be an expression of our love for God, and which, so far from diverting from Him anything of the stream of love, would actually, *though by a detour*, conduct it in its completeness to Him"¹⁵⁴)? *Uti* enables us to do precisely this; it "has the important task of making love relative so that it can be directed to the creature as well, without sin"¹⁵⁵). *Frui*, on the other hand, "has the important task of preventing God being made into a means to some other end"¹⁵⁶). The relative, including the neighbour, are to be loved relatively, the absolute, God, absolutely. In fact, only God, whom we have a real right to love, can be loved absolutely freely — that is, without our seeking to gain something else through loving him. Thus, according to Nygren, there will always be an element of self-interest in *uti*, and consequently in love for neighbour. The desire for rest in God will properly predominate. Besides, *uti* love for neighbour is actually only a *detour*. Although

n. 2: "Augustine is the starting-point of the tradition according to which the meaning of conversion is the transference of *desire* to a new *object*".

¹⁵²) R. Holte, *Béatitude et Sagesse*, p. 256, 259 & 269. For a critique of Nygrenian and Brechtkenian presentations of Augustine's eudaimonism from another angle, see A. Becker, *De l'instinct du bonheur à l'extase de la béatitude. Théologie et pédagogie du bonheur dans la predication de saint Augustin*, Paris, 1967, p. 280-316.

¹⁵³) A. Nygren, *op. cit.*, p. 504. See further, p. 505; 507: "For *Caritas* ... "uses" the world, and loves it only as a means for ascending to God ..."; 510, 555: "What sense could there be in saying that God's love to us means that *He uses us, employs us as a means*". In his section on *uti/frui*, p. 503-512, Nygren is not dealing explicitly with love for neighbour, but the neighbour is obviously not an absolute, an end, an object of true *frui*, and must therefore be seen as sharing in what Nygren says of things in the world.

¹⁵⁴) *Ibid.*, p. 504. The underlining is mine.

¹⁵⁵) *Ibid.*, p. 509.

¹⁵⁶) *Ibid.*, p. 508.

we can devote a certain relative love to things in the world, yet this is nonetheless evidence of the weakness of our love of God ... The ideal would be to have no need to devote any time or thought to temporal things. If we really loved God as we ought, we should not love anything *at all* in the world — that is Augustine's final word on this question¹⁵⁷).

In the long run, however, even love for God shares the fate of love of neighbour by becoming relative, a means to my enjoyment in *possessing* the highest good¹⁵⁸). *Frui* ultimately fails to fulfil its task, such that Nygren can conclude:

Not even the ideas "Uti" and "frui" were able to deliver Augustine from the prevalent Hellenistic Eros theory. When he says we are to use the world in order to attain the enjoyment of God, he has the same idea as Plato had in urging us not to be captivated by the beautiful things in this world, but to use them as a ladder on which to ascend to the higher world¹⁵⁹).

B. Critique of Nygren on *uti/frui*

In the light of the texts we have examined in this chapter, the following further comments can be made with regard to Nygren's position. They apply in great measure also to that of Brechtken.

1. Is there no more to *uti/frui* than their common-sense meanings?

The constant pre-supposition of both authors is that *uti/frui* mean simply — or in Brechtken's case, ought to mean — 'use' and 'enjoy', more or less as we now understand the terms in everyday speech, with the possible additional element that 'use' in Augustine is seen as the means of procuring my enjoyment. This pre-supposition, however, is not justified. Just as, in seeing love as acquisitive desire that is ethically determined by

¹⁵⁷) *Ibid.*, p. 510.

¹⁵⁸) *Ibid.*, p. 510: "Augustine defines "Frui" thus: "*amore alicui rei inhaerere propter se ipsam*". Love, amor, is here plainly a means to an end". I find the conclusion that love for God is "plainly" a means to an end, which Nygren draws from the definition of "frui" quoted, 'plain' only if one assumes that the emphasis in "frui" should be on 'my enjoyment' rather than on 'enjoyment of God'. This indeed appears to be Nygren's assumption; see p. 505: "The purpose of our love to God must therefore be enjoyment of God, 'fruitio Dei'". R. Holte, on the other hand, stresses that it is *God* who is to be enjoyed. For him, total love for God is itself "fruitio Dei"; God alone can bear the fulness of our hope and command our complete obedience.

¹⁵⁹) *Ibid.*, p. 512.

the value of the object to which it turns in quest of *quies*, the differentiated Augustinian psychology that corresponds to the *dilectio ordinata* was ignored, so here too *uti/frui* is not adequately judged in the light of its antecedents and its contemporaries. Ragnar Holte, working on a clue given by Augustine's association of *uti/frui* with *utile/honestum* in *quaestio* 30, adduces a possible Stoic background to the former distinction, which incorporates the corollaries, *referre* and *propter aliud*, in the sense of orientating all *uti*-action to the *honestum*, the moral norm; all *uti* is to be in accordance with the *honestum* which is the equivalent of God's law. He brings this reasoning also into relation with the texts of Augustine himself which posit a hierarchy of faculties in man and require the submission of the active (*uti*) to the contemplative life (*frui*). The affinity between *uti* and *utilitas*, which in *quaestio* 30 is identified with divine providence, must also be taken into account.

To say the least, the distinction is more complicated in its origins than either Nygren or Brechtken acknowledge. Holte may not be absolutely right — as stated above, he pays scant attention to *frui* love for neighbour — but he does offer a credible alternative to the solely eudaimonistic interpretation and shows how it is possible to speak of the neighbour in terms of *uti* without causing shudders of dismay. Furthermore, the accepted Ciceronian meaning of the word *uti* itself puts a new complexion on the matter. Neither in *De Vera Religione* nor in *quaestio* 30 is any violence done to the text if *uti* is translated "to associate with" or "to relate to" rather than "to use as a means". If the texts of *De Doctrina Christiana* are read against the purported Stoic ethical background, such a translation is not an unlikely possibility in that case either. As we have seen, however, in that work, Augustine is careful to keep rational beings, the self and the neighbour, distinct from other objects of *uti*. Nygren fails to take sufficient account of this special status of *uti*-love for neighbour which brings it very close to *frui*; Brechtken, because of his attachment to *uti* as means to an end, is bound to consider any reference to *uti*-love for neighbour that is to the neighbour's advantage ("*ad eius utilitatem*") or that approaches *frui*, an absurd confusion of concepts. In both there is a certain disregard for the many-sided subtleties of *uti* and for the complexity of *frui* as described by Lorenz and Holte. The *uti/frui* distinction is far from being as clear or as clear-cut as it seems to twentieth century commonsense, and this is sometimes complicated in Augustine by a lack of certainty as to what extent he is employing this terminology in accordance with his own strictly technical definitions. If then in *De Doctrina Christiana* and later,

he breaks the bonds that restrict *frui* to God and speaks surprisingly, albeit with reservations, of a *frui*-love for neighbour, is this not again to emphasise the special role love for neighbour plays for him? To determine that role more closely we will have to look to other texts that are less patent of grave misunderstandings than those involving *uti* and *frui*.

Such texts will be adduced in abundance in the course of the forthcoming chapters. However, in order to make it quite clear from the outset what Augustine does and does not understand by *uti*-love of neighbour, and how *frui*-love for neighbour comes to play a special role for him, we may anticipate by quoting a few short classic passages from outside the explicit *uti/frui* spectrum. Regarding the former, that is, *uti*-love for neighbour, we read in tract 8,5 of the commentary on the first letter of John:

All love presupposes a certain benevolence towards those we love ... For we may not and cannot love people in the same way that a gourmet declares that he likes roast thrush. For all that the gourmet is interested in is killing and eating. If he says that he likes roast thrush, then it is not really the thrush itself he likes, because he doesn't leave it live but destroys it. We only like food in order to consume it and to build up our strength again. But we may never let our love for people resemble our liking for consumer goods. Friendship is a matter of benevolence; it is to be willing to give something to those whom we love. But what then if we have nothing to give? That is not really important, for benevolence alone is enough for those who love.

The passage goes on to eschew all domination of others, and draws our attention to the danger of wanting to get those who are dependent on us into our power. Augustine, therefore, shuns outright the *uti* of exploitation and with it any trace of spiritual consumerism. In love it is not *my* enjoyment that counts most, but "let it be your wish that every person be your equal so that we might all equally be subject to the One to whom we can give nothing"¹⁶⁰). Regarding the latter, that is, *frui*-love for

¹⁶⁰) In *Epistolam Ioannis*, tr. 8,5 (ML 35,2038-2039): "... tamen omnis dilectio, fratres carissimi, utique benevolentiam quamdam habet erga eos qui diliguntur ... non sic debemus amare homines, quomodo audimus gulosos dicere: Amo turdos. Quaeris quare? Ut occidat, et consumat. Et amare se dicit, et ad hoc illos amat ut non sint, ad hoc amat ut perimat. Et quidquid ad cibandum amamus, ad hoc emamus, ut illud consumatur, et nos reficiamur. Numquid sic amandi sunt homines, tamquam consumendi? sed amicitia quaedam benevolentiae est, ut aliquando praestemus eis quos amamus. Quid, si non sit quod praestemus? Sola benevolentia sufficit amanti ... Opta aequalem, ut ambo sub uno sitis cui nihil praestari potest".

neighbour, we have already noted a development in Augustine. In the *Soliloquia* 1,13,22 (Date: 386-387) friends were to be sought not "*propter se*", but "*propter ipsam (sapientiam)*". In at least two later texts, however, we meet a shift of emphasis which to a certain extent parallels the movement we have witnessed in *De Doctrina Christiana* from the *uti* of fellow human beings to "*frui homine*", albeit "*in deo*", where "*frui*" is said to be very close to "*uti cum dilectione*". In 401 A.D. we find Augustine maintaining that not only wisdom but also health and friendship are to be sought for their own sakes ("*propter se ipsa expetenda sunt*"); other things such as doctrine, food, drink, sleep and marital relations are necessary for the sake of the former ("*propter aliud*")¹⁶¹). Similarly, in *Epistola* 130, dating from 411 A.D., we read: "Thus, of all that exists, human wholeness and friendship are desired for their own sakes (*propter se ipsa appetuntur*) ...". Other necessities are rightly sought as orientated towards wholeness and friendship¹⁶²). Doesn't friendship here — not to speak of health and wholeness — usurp God's rightful privilege of alone being sought on his own account? Presumably Augustine does not mean that human beings in love may now place their hopes for final salvation in one another, that is to say, that they no longer need an open orientation to God and that they are not any more in this sense still bound to relate to one another '*propter aliud (i.e. Deum)*'. But the fact that this almost ineffable formula is now applied to friendship remains. What could have brought the walls limiting "*propter se*" to God by himself tumbling down except the recognition that in human friendship the very God to be loved "*propter se*" is concretely found¹⁶³)?

¹⁶¹) *De Bono Coniugali* 9,9 (CSEL 41,199. ML 40,380): "Sane videndum est alia bona nobis deum dare, quae propter se ipsa expetenda sunt, sicut est sapientia, salus, amicitia, alia, quae propter aliud sunt necessaria, sicut doctrina, cibus, potus, somnus, coniugium, concubitus ...".

¹⁶²) *Epistola* 130,6,13 (CSEL 44,54. ML 33,499): "In his itaque omnibus incolumitas hominis et amicitia propter se ipsa appetuntur, sufficientia vero rerum necessarium non propter se ipsam sed propter duo superiora quaeri solet cum decenter quaeritur". Cf. *Sermo* Denis 16,1 (MA I,75) where friendship, together with life, are said to be the goods 'necessaria in hoc mundo'; all others are called "superflua". "Fecit deus hominem, ut esset et viveret: salus est; sed, ne solus esset, amicitia quaesita est".

¹⁶³) J. Mausbach, *Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus*, 2nd edition, Freiburg, 1929, vol. 1, p. 224, claimed that the development from the *Soliloquia* to *De Bono Coniugali* and *Epistola* 130 goes by way of *De Doctrina Christiana*'s '*frui homine in deo*'. J. Brechtken, *Augustinus Doctor Caritatis*, p. 153-154, claims that Mausbach's case for a development is based on a number of misunderstandings. For (i) Mausbach has missed the appetitus-intent of *uti/frui* in *De Doctrina Christiana*; therefore (ii) he can paraphrase *Epistola* 130,6,13: "... das

2. Does the emphasis in “*frui deo*” lie on “*frui*” or on “*deo*”?

Even love for God is reduced by Augustine to a means, according to Nygren. The end is not love but possession of our highest good which quenches our relentless desire for rest. Thus, “perfect *fruitio Dei* means in principle the cessation of love”¹⁶⁴). We possess blessedness “*non amando sed fruendo*”, Nygren quotes from *De Civitate Dei*¹⁶⁵). It seems that, in speaking of *fruitio Dei*, Nygren wishes to emphasise the *fruitio* more than the fact that it is “of God”. And the type of *fruitio* he envisages is tranquil possession, almost the inertia of the goal achieved,

eigene Leben wie auch die Freunde rechnet er zu den Gütern, die man um ihrer selbst willen lieben soll” (p. 224); but, retorts Brechtken, there is no question of love here, only appetitus-striving; and (iii) Mausbach fails to see that it is friendship (“*amicitia*”) that is sought in these later texts “um seiner selbst willen”, not friends themselves whose good would be sought. Thus, says Brechtken, “*amicitia*” plays not such a dissimilar role here to that of “*sapientia*” in the *Soliloquia* 1,13,22.

Regarding Brechtken’s points (i), (ii) and (iii) against Mausbach, sufficient has been said elsewhere to unmask and to throw into question the presuppositions on which they are based. With regard to point (iii) in particular, however, we might ask whether the fact that friendship is to be sought for its own sake necessarily excludes, as Brechtken implies, that friends be loved in their own right and with a view to their advantage. Indeed, can friendship be sought for its own sake without giving priority to the interests of others? Does Augustine’s *Rule* for monks not counsel such love and make it the measure of spiritual growth? “*Caritas enim, de qua scriptum est quod non quaerat quae sua sunt, sic intelligitur, quia communia propriis, non propria communibus anteponit. Et ideo, quanto amplius rem communem quam propria vestra curaveritis, tanto vos amplius profecisse noveritis*”. *Praeceptum* 5,2 (ed. L. Verheijen, p. 430). And doesn’t the text we have quoted above from *In Epistolam Ioannis*, tr. 8,5 speak of friendship in terms of pure benevolence and of desire for the other’s ultimate good with us in God? “*Opta aequalem, ut ambo sub uno sitis cui nihil praestari potest*”.

Perhaps Augustine avoids the expression ‘friends for their own sakes’ (friends “*propter se*”) lest we be led to place our hope of final salvation in this or that friend. But friendship, because it can remain eternally and because it is open to all (cf. on this latter point, *Sermo Denis* 16,1 (MA I,75): “*Incipit ergo amicitia a coniuge et filiis, et progreditur usque ad alienos ... Inimicus est? fiat amicus*”), brings close the God who is the proper object of “*frui*” and who is properly to be our hope of salvation.

In a lyrical passage entitled “*Amitiés*”, Françoise Mallet-Joris in her book, *Maison de Papier*, Grasset, 1970, p. 175-176, shows that the idea of friendship for its own sake, rather than friends for their own sake, may, even still in 1970, be understood as congruent with benevolence towards and gratitude for having known ‘friends’. The passage reads: “*Les amis, oui. Nous en avons qui nous sont très chers, qui viennent et qui reviennent dîner avec nous, les dimanches soir, et dont nous partageons les espoirs, les soucis, les travaux. Mais peut-être à ces dîners, parce que nous ne savons jamais combien nous serons, ceux qui passent sont-ils plus importants encore que ceux qui reviennent. Ou du moins, le fait qu’ils passent ... Ceux qui passent. Parfois ils ne reviennent jamais. Je m’en suis affligée. Puis: ce ne sont pas les amis qui importent, c’est l’amitié*”.

¹⁶⁴) A. Nygren, *op. cit.*, p. 511.

¹⁶⁵) *Ibid.*, p. 511, n. 2. The reference is to *De Civitate Dei* 8,8.

the satisfaction of psychological release. Let us then look at the context of Nygren's proof-formula ("*non amando sed fruendo*") in order to see whether it really bears out his contention that love for God disappears when He is enjoyed, such that the emphasis comes to rest on enjoyment conceived as individualistic heavenly bliss.

But it remains true that no one is happy without the enjoyment of what he loves. Even those who love things which ought not to be loved do not suppose their happiness to consist in the loving, but in the enjoyment (*non se beatos putant amando sed fruendo*). If anyone then enjoys what he loves, and loves the true Supreme Good, only the most miserable would deny his happiness. Now this Sovereign Good, according to Plato, is God. And that is why he will have it that the true philosopher is the lover of God, since the aim of philosophy is happiness, and he who loves God will be happy in the enjoyment of Him¹⁶⁶).

Augustine is here pointing out the superiority of Platonic moral philosophy to other moral philosophies, because Plato has located the good which conveys blessedness in the right place. It is not then surprising that the question as to the Sovereign Good is framed in the terms of ancient philosophy and the expressions are Platonic. Nevertheless, the text does not offer certain proof that love ceases when enjoyment begins. "If anyone then enjoys what he loves, and loves the true Supreme Good, only the most miserable would deny his happiness"; "and he who loves God will be happy in the enjoyment of Him". In the sentences just quoted there is nothing to indicate that both love and enjoyment of the true Supreme Good, in which happiness is found, cannot be present together. Now, in the "*non amando sed fruendo*" sentence it is to be observed that the case put forward is that of those loving "things which ought not to be loved" and thinking to find their happiness in enjoying such things. It may be that the thought of enjoyment of such things, because it is a case of distorted *frui* and therefore a passive orientation towards one's own pleasure¹⁶⁷), may

¹⁶⁶) *De Civitate Dei* 8,8 (CSEL 40/1,368. CC 47,225. ML 41,233): "... nemo tamen beatus est, qui eo quod amat non fruitur, Nam et ipsi, qui res non amandas amant, non se beatos putant amando, sed fruendo. Quisquis ergo fruitur eo, quod amat, verumque et summum bonum amat, quis eum beatum nisi miserrimus negat? Ipsum autem verum ac summum bonum Plato dicit Deum, unde vult esse philosophum amatorem Dei, ut, quoniam philosophia ad beatam vitam tendit, fruens Deo sit beatus qui Deum amaverit". English translation: Henri Bettenson, Penguin, p. 311, with slight changes.

¹⁶⁷) See *De Civitate Dei* 15,7 (CSEL 40/2,69. CC 48,460-461. ML 41,444).

seem to imply the vanishing of love once one's cup is full. But, as Holte has shown, we pay scant respect to the complex Augustinian psychology of love, which posits a correspondance between the different parts of the soul and the hierarchy in the order of reality established by God, if we treat Augustinian love for God, the Sovereign Good, as if it were just an elevated form of that same acquisitive love which had wrongly sought its happiness in "things which ought not to be loved". The structure of distorted *frui*, directed to one's own enjoyment, is significantly different from that of *fruitio Dei*, which Holte describes as the supreme end of man, that is, complete abandonment to God in the form of love with the whole heart and soul and mind¹⁶⁸). Is it not therefore possible that, contrary to the way distorted *frui* operates, ordered *frui* at the highest level may go hand in hand with love that remains? Without inconsistency with the remainder of the passage, the key "*non amando sed fruendo*" sentence could then be paraphrased insofar as it refers to lovers of God: those who love God do not suppose their happiness to consist in the loving alone, but also in the enjoyment, in the sense of being completely enthralled by, steadfastly attached and subject to the object of love¹⁶⁹).

Nygren himself acknowledges that this "opposite idea" is present in Augustine along with "*non amando sed fruendo*". But, as far as we can see, *De Civitate Dei* 8,8 does not absolutely enjoin us to apply the latter to the love and enjoyment of God. It refers specifically in these terms only to distorted *frui*. *Frui deo*, on the other hand, seems not necessarily to require the same exclusion of love. As such it need not stand so far off from that so-called "opposite idea" that love for God does not cease in the state of beatitude in eternal life; that love for neighbour does not cease there either, we were able to show in the previous chapter. The fact that Nygren's proof-text is at least open to question, both in its own context and in the light of other evidence, gives a jolt to his attachment to a narrow conception of *frui deo* as the enjoyment of God conceived eudaimonistically, as tranquil, almost inert, possession. Against this notion we have seen the evidence adduced by Lorenz to show that

¹⁶⁸) R. Holte, *Béatitude et Sagesse*, p. 280.

¹⁶⁹) The angels continue loving and submitting cheerfully to God, while enjoying his majesty. See *De Vera Religione* 70 (CSEL 77,19) = 13,26 (CC 32,203. ML 34,133): "sed ea voluntate qua magis deum quam se diligunt (angeli), firmi et stabiles manent in illo et fruuntur maiestate ipsius, ei uni libentissime subditi". Similarly, Augustine sees love growing, increasing, and being perfected in the state of contemplation. See *Sermo Lambot* 4 (*Revue Bénédictine* 49 (1937) p. 260): "... quoniam fidei species succedit, spei res succedit, caritati nulla res succedit; ipsa crescit, ipsa augetur, ipsa illa contemplatione perficitur".

Augustine emphasises the role and activity of God in *frui deo*. Lorenz insists that *frui deo* for Augustine involves insertion into the divine world order as well as "possessing God", and that the latter is primarily a being-possessed by God and the outcome of God's fidelity to his promise to be "my God"¹⁷⁰). Furthermore, apart from blessedness fully achieved, which as "perfect *fruitio Dei*" is the element upon which Nygren concentrates, there is, according to Holte, another aspect to *frui deo* in Augustine. At the time of *De Fide et Symbolo*, dating from 393, Augustine would still have been of the mind that perfect enjoyment of God was possible in this life. Then it would be possible even here "to enjoy the wisdom of God (which) is nothing other than to be united to Him by love"¹⁷¹). Enjoyment would accompany the union that properly ordered love effects. And in this state of properly ordered love, whereby *frui* is concentrated upon God and not upon things that ought not to be loved, and whereby God's law is observed and the soul is totally enthralled by Him, stability and calm reign, the passions are no longer an obstacle, the soul is liberated and graced with the resources it needs for fruitful action and for making its contribution to God's continuing creation¹⁷²). Even though by 397-398 Augustine no longer considered that God could be perfectly enjoyed on earth, an anticipatory measure of contemplation, of *frui deo*, with its bountiful consequences for the active life, remains within the capacity of those who are obedient in faith¹⁷³).

¹⁷⁰) R. Lorenz, "FRUITIO DEI bei Augustin", in *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 63 (1950-1951) 75-132. See especially p. 104-108.

¹⁷¹) *De Fide et Symbolo* 9,19 (CSEL 41,24. ML 40,192): "Frui autem sapientia dei nihil est aliud quam ei dilectione cohaerere; neque quisque in eo quod percipit permanet, nisi dilectione ...".

¹⁷²) R. Holte, *op. cit.*, p. 261 & 277.

¹⁷³) *Contra Faustum Manichaeum* 22,27 & 28 (CSEL 25/1,621-622. ML 42,418-419): "Actio itaque rationalis contemplationi rationali debet oboedire sive per fidem operanti, sicuti est, quamdiu peregrinamur a domino, sive per speciem, quod erit ... Quapropter hominis actio serviens fidei servienti deo refrenat omnes mortales delectationes et eas coeret ad naturalem modum meliora inferioribus ordinata dilectione praeponens".

On the relation between the "otium" of contemplation in this life, in which truth is sought and found, and the action demanded by the needs of the church and government of the peoples, see G. Folliet, "'Otiosa dignitas'. Une réminiscence cicéronienne dans *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* 1,2,2", in *Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes* XVII/1-2 (1971) 59-67. The principal texts considered are *Contra Faustum Manichaeum* 22,56-58; *Epistola* 48,1 to the monks of Capraria; and *De Civitate Dei* 19,19: "otium sanctum quaerit caritas veritatis, negotium iustum suscipit necessitas caritatis". See also *Sermo* 78,6 (ML 38,492-493) on Peter's wanting to remain with Christ on the mountain of transfiguration: "Nemo quod suum est quaerat, sed quod alterius. Ait (Apostolus) de se ipso: *Ego autem non quaerens quod mihi utile est, sed quod multis, ut salvi sint* (1 Cor. 10,24,33). Hoc Petrus nondum

That the *frui* union with God be initiated even here in faith is of the greatest importance for love of neighbour, for it assures that one's role in God's loving providence in the neighbour's regard will be worked out.

God is the only proper object of *frui*, be it in faith or in vision; only He is the *honestum*, the norm in the light of which all else is to be judged, only He is able to promise the realisation of our life's hope, only He may rightly command the gift of self with all the dimensions of one's being. This is where the accent lies in *frui deo*. This formula has the function of preventing love from closing in upon itself or upon another. A few texts which relate self-love to love for God, distinguishing distorted *frui*-love for self from proper *frui*-love for God, make this abundantly clear:

(Perfect reason in man) orientates its life to the enjoyment of God, for thus it is happy. Therefore it uses itself too; and it would certainly set in train unhappiness through pride if it were to be orientated to itself and not to God¹⁷⁴).

A person should not love himself for his own sake but as orientated towards Him who is to be enjoyed. A man is perfect when with all that lives in him he advances towards unchangeable life and is constantly intent upon God with all his love. If, however, he loves himself for his own sake, he does not orientate himself to God, but, turned back on himself, he is not turned towards something unchangeable¹⁷⁵) ...

In contemplating supreme wisdom — which, being unchangeable, is certainly not the soul — the changeable soul also gives attention to itself and somehow comes into its own mind. This is only possible because, while there is a difference separating the soul from God, it is still something which, after God, can be a source of delight. But it is better for the soul when it forgets itself in comparison with the preciousness of the unchangeable God or utterly despises itself in

intelligebat, quando in monte vivere cum Christo desiderabat. Servabat tibi hoc, Petre, post mortem. Nunc autem ipse dicit: Descende laborare in terra, servire in terra, contemni, crucifigi in terra. Descendit vita, ut occideretur; descendit panis, ut esuriret; descendit via, ut in itinere lassaretur; descendit fons, ut sitiret: et tu recusas laborare? Noli tua quaerere. Habe caritatem, praedica veritatem: tunc pervenies ad aeternitatem, ubi invenies securitatem”.

¹⁷⁴) *De Diversis Quaestionibus* 83, q. 30 (CC 44A, 39-40. ML 40,20): “Vitam etiam suam ad id refert, ut fruatur deo; ita enim beata est. Ergo et se ipsa utitur. Quae profecto inchoat miseriam per superbiam, si ad se ipsam, non ad deum referatur”.

¹⁷⁵) *De Doctrina Christiana* 1,41 (CSEL 80,18) = 1,22,21 (CC 32,17. ML 34,26): “... nec se ipsum debet propter se ipsum diligere, sed propter illum quo fruendum est. Tunc est quippe optimus homo, cum tota vita sua pergit in incommutabilem vitam et toto adfectu inheret illi. Si autem se propter se diligit, non se refert ad deum, sed ad se ipsum conversus non ad incommutabile aliquid convertitur ...”.

comparison with Him. If, on the other hand, it gets in its own way, so to speak, and takes delight in itself by a perverse imitation of God in its desire to enjoy its own power, then the more it wants to be greater, the more it becomes less. Thus, "pride is the beginning of all sin" and "the beginning of pride is man's apostasy from God" (Ecclus. 10.15 & 14)¹⁷⁶).

In *frui deo*, therefore, the emphasis is on the fact that this total selfgiving is the right relationship of a human being to God, not on my enjoyment. To give oneself totally to oneself is pride; *frui deo*, as we shall see in the following chapter, keeps the God-orientation of the self open. To give oneself heart, soul and mind to the neighbour, as if he were God, is recklessness; '*frui homine in deo*', as we shall see later, keeps the God-orientation of the other open. If locating my *frui* correctly means that I become more and freer, this growth in being and in freedom is the consequence of profound self-forgetting humility and is not just the acquisition of a good for myself.

3. *Is the ideal of love achieved when nothing in this world is loved?*

Nygren implies that to love the neighbour, according to the Augustinian system of *uti/trui*, is evidence of the weakness of our love for God. If we really loved God as we ought, he maintains, we should not love anything *at all* in the world¹⁷⁷). It is instructive to note the proof-text for this assertion: "If we love God worthily, we will not love money (*nummos*) at all"¹⁷⁸). The passage continues immediately: "Your money

¹⁷⁶) *De Libero Arbitrio* 3,25,76,261-263 (CC 29,320. CSEL 74,152-153. ML 32,1308): "Ut autem in contemplatione summae sapientiae (quae utique animus non est; nam incommutabilis est), etiam seipsum, qui est commutabilis, animus intueatur, et sibi ipse quodammodo veniat in mentem, non fit nisi differentia qua non est quod Deus, et tamen aliquid est quod possit placere post Deum. Melior est autem cum obliviscitur sui prae caritate incommutabilis Dei, vel seipsum penitus in illius comparatione contemnit. Si autem tamquam obuius sibi placet sibi ad perverse imitandum Deum, ut potestate sua frui velit, tanto fit minor, quanto se cupit esse maiorem. Et hoc est, *Initium omnis peccati superbia*, et *Initium superbiae hominis apostatare a Deo*". Translation substantially owing to Robert P. Russel O.S.A.: *The Fathers of the Church*, vol. 59, p. 233: Cf. *De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae* 1,12,20-21 (ML 32,1320): "Et si maxime ei propinquat subiectione ista qua similis fit, longe ab eo fiat necesse est audacia qua vult esse similior. Ipsa est qua legibus Dei obtemperare detractat, dum suae potestatis esse cupit ut Deus est ... Dilectione igitur reddit in Deum, qua se illi non componere, sed supponere affectat. Quod quanto fecerit instantius ac studiosius, tanto erit beator atque sublimior, et illo solo dominante liberrimus".

¹⁷⁷) A. Nygren, *op. cit.*, p. 510. The emphasis is Nygren's.

¹⁷⁸) *Tractatus in Evangelium Iohannis* 40,10 (CC 36,356. ML 35,1691): "Non amat multum nummum, qui amat Deum. Et ego palpavi infirmitatem, non ausus sum dicere:

will be a means, something of use to you during your pilgrimage; not something provoking you to self-seeking; you will make use of it for what is necessary to you, you will not enjoy it for your own pleasure. Love God if what you hear and praise has effected anything in you. Use the world, do not become its slave"¹⁷⁹). God's call and his promise lead us beyond the world (in this text both "*saeculum*" and "*mundus*", i.e. temporal, transitory things) to God as the certain goal of our hope. Loving money, the world, temporal things, in search of pleasure for oneself and as ends in themselves, is totally at odds with love for God. But, using temporal things rightly in order to provide for earthly necessities during this time of pilgrimage is in conformity with genuine love. When people work in the world in accordance with God's law, this love reveals itself, as the following passage from the Rule of Augustine makes clear.

The intention behind all this is that no one will seek his own advantage in his work. Everything you do is to be for the service of the community, and you are to work with more zeal and more enthusiasm than if each person were merely working for himself and his own interests. For it is written of love that "it is not self-seeking" (1 Cor. 13.5), that is to say, it puts the interests of the community before its own interests, and not the other way around. The more you are concerned for the interests of the community rather than for your own interests therefore indicates the measure of your progress. Thus, through all the passing needs of men's lives something sublime and permanent reveals itself, namely love (cf. 1 Cor. 12.31 & 13.13)¹⁸⁰).

Non amat nummum; sed: non multum amat nummum; quasi amandus sit nummus, sed non multum. O si Deum digne amemus, nummos omnino non amabimus!". J. Burnaby, "Amor in St. Augustine", in C.W. Kegley (editor), *The Philosophy and Theology of Anders Nygren*, Carbondale and Edwardsville, 1970, p. 177. n. 10, has anticipated our comment on Nygren's reading of this text.

¹⁷⁹) *Tractatus in Evangelium Ioannis* 40,10: "Erit tibi nummus instrumentum peregrinationis, non irritamentum cupiditatis; quo utaris ad necessitatem, non quo fruaris ad delectationem. Deum ama, si aliquid in te egit quod audis et laudas. Utere mundo, non te capiat mundus".

¹⁸⁰) *Praeceptum* 5,2 (ed. L. Verheijen, p. 429-430): "Ita sane, ut nullus sibi aliquid operetur, sed omnia opera vestra in commune fiant, maiore studio et frequentiori alacritate, quam si vobis singulis propria faceretis. Caritas enim, de qua scriptum est quod non quaerat quae sua sunt, sic intelligitur, quia communia propriis, non propria communibus anteponit. Et ideo, quanto amplius rem communem quam propria vestra curaveritis, tanto vos amplius profecisse noveritis; ut in omnibus quibus utitur transitura necessitas, superemineat, quae permanet, caritas".

As use of the world as God intends it to be used is not out of step with love for God, much the less is love for neighbour a distraction from it and a sign of weakness. In the text from the Rule love for neighbour gives form to and manifests the sublime and permanent love.

Finally, let us note a couple of texts in which the world and all that is changeable and passing are set in opposition not to God but to brotherly love. In the first instance, 1 Jn. 3.13, i.e. "Do not fear, brothers, if the world hates you", is the subject of comment. Augustine proceeds: "In its pejorative sense "world" means: those who love the sinful world. Those who love the world in that way cannot love their brother"¹⁸¹). In the second instance we would expect the mortal to be contrasted with the immortal God. But a text from *De Trinitate* reads:

True love, however, is this: being constantly intent upon truth "we live righteously" (Titus 2.12), and consequently we consider all mortal things of no value in comparison to love for people by which we desire that they live righteously. For thus we will be able to prepare ourselves even to die for the good of the brethren, following the example which the Lord Jesus Christ himself taught us¹⁸²) ...

The mortal is not scorned in itself, but we are prepared to give it up in our own death if our brother's good requires it. Both the texts referred to date from around 407. In the same year, during an anti-Donatist sermon, Augustine interpreted the new commandment to love one another (Jn. 13.34) as follows: "Therefore, the whole earth sings a new song. There the house is built. The whole earth, therefore, is the house of God. If the whole earth is the house of God, whoever fails to hold fast (*haeret*) to the whole earth is a ruin, not a house"¹⁸³). Augustine is here thinking of the communion of the churches throughout the entire world and the love that fosters unity. Whereas previously he had exhorted people to "hold fast" (*haerere*) to God, the unchangeable Truth and Wisdom, here his admonition is to hold fast to one another. In its similarity to the application of *frui* to love for neighbour this alerts us once again to the

¹⁸¹) *In Epistolam Ioannis*, tr. 5,9 (ML 35,2017): "Mundus autem in malo, amatores mundi sunt. Qui amant mundum, fratrem amare non possunt".

¹⁸²) *De Trinitate* 8,7,10 (CC 50,284. ML 42,956): "Haec est autem vera dilectio ut inhaerentes veritati *iuste vivamus*, et ideo contemnamos omnia mortalia prae amore hominum quo eos volumus iuste vivere. Ita enim et mori pro fratribus utiliter parati esse poterimus, quod nos exemplo suo dominus Iesus Christus docuit ...".

¹⁸³) *En. in ps.* 95,2 (CC 39,1343. ML 37,1227-1228): "Omnis ergo terra cantat canticum novum, ibi aedificatur domus. Omnis ergo terra est domus Dei. Si omnis terra domus Dei, qui non haeret omni terrae, ruina est, non domus ...".

elusive strangeness of the neighbour for whom *uti* is the only proper designation and yet too little, and who, in a way that has to be further investigated, may represent God and glory in the God-words, *haerere* and *frui*. The "*magna quaestio*" poses itself anew.

RAYMOND CANNING O.S.A.