

«Augustinianism»? A Critical Assessment of the So-called «Medieval Augustinian Tradition» on Justification

The later medieval understanding of justification has been the subject of much scholarly interest during the present century, chiefly as a consequence of the attempt to relate Martin Luther's theology of justification to his theological context, both within the Augustinian Order, to which he belonged, and the "Nominalism" within which he was educated¹). In the first decades of the present century, A.V. Müller argued that Luther stood within a school of theologians which represented a theology more Augustinian than that of St. Thomas Aquinas or St. Bonaventure²). In particular, his theology of the "double righteousness" could, in Müller's view, be traced back to a theological school which included Hugolino of Orvieto (†1374), Agostino Favaroni (†1443) and Jacobus Perez of Valencia (†1470). A similar thesis was defended, albeit for different reasons, by Eduard Stakemeier, who argued that the doctrine of double justification associated with Girolamo Seripando during the Tridentine proceedings *de iustificatione* represented an Augustinian theological tradition which could only be properly understood when set in the context of the theological tradition of the Order of the Hermits of St. Augustine — to which Luther also belonged³). It is, however, quite impossible to sustain the thesis that Luther and Seripando both, in their doctrines of justification, represent possible outcomes of a characteristically "Augustinian" approach to the matter⁴). Not only does Luther's implacable hostility to the doctrine of

¹) For a full discussion of the development of the doctrine of justification within the Western theological tradition from its beginnings to the present day, see A.E. McGrath, *Iustitia Dei. A history of the Christian doctrine of justification* (3 volumes: James Clarke, Cambridge, U.K., to be published shortly).

²) A.V. Müller, *Luthers theologische Quellen* (Giessen, 1912).

³) E. Stakemeier, *Der Kampf um Augustin auf dem Tridentinum* (Paderborn, 1937), esp. p. 53. This work was subjected to a devastating criticism on its appearance by H. Jedin: see *Theologische Revue* 36 (1937) 425-30.

⁴) H. Jedin, *History of the Council of Trent* (2 volumes: Edinburgh, 1957-61) Vol II p. 258.

double justification exclude such a thesis from the outset⁵); the important study of Henninger has shown that Augustine himself knew nothing of a doctrine of double justification, such as that advocated by Seripando⁶), so that the epithet "Augustinian" must be considered quite inappropriate to describe such a theology. However, the understanding of justification in the later Middle Ages is a subject of considerable interest in its own right, and not merely as a prelude to Reformation or Tridentine studies. In the present study, we are concerned with the simple question of whether it is in any sense legitimate to speak of a "medieval Augustinian tradition" in relation to the doctrine of justification. Although this question is of considerable interest in itself, it will be evident that it is not without relevance to students of the Reformation or of the Council of Trent.

The "medieval Augustinian tradition" is usually conceived as an anti-Pelagian movement, asserting a doctrine of justification which, particularly in its assessment of the condition and abilities of fallen man, approximates more closely to the authentic thought of St. Augustine than that of their contemporaries⁷). It has become a commonplace for scholars of late medieval theology to contrast "Nominalism" and "Augustinianism" as two movements opposed in their theologies of justification. It must be appreciated that this dichotomy is at least partly due to the activities of Luther scholars, who have projected aspects of Luther's intellectual experience back onto the preceding era. Thus a conflict has been detected between the "Augustinianism" of Luther's teacher and friend, Johannes von Staupitz, and the "Nominalism" of Gabriel Biel, with which Luther was satiated during his university days; and, on the basis of this generalisation, such a conflict has been assumed to exist in the preceding centuries — or at least since the death of Duns Scotus. However, a study of the interaction between the so-called "Augustinians" and "Nominalists" in the fourteenth century suggests that this dichotomy is more easily posited than demonstrated. The highly

⁵) See W. von Loewenich, *Duplex iustitia: Luthers Stellung zu einer Unionsformel des 16. Jahrhunderts* (Wiesbaden, 1972).

⁶) J. Henninger, *S. Augustinus et doctrina de duplici iustitia* (Mödling, 1935).

⁷) E.g. Francis Clark, *Eucharistic sacrifice and the Reformation* (London, 1960) pp. 301-2 "There was also a current of Augustinian thought, sometimes called the *Schola Aegydia*, After Giles of Rome, sharply opposed to what its defenders deemed the 'Pelagianism' of many of their Ockhamist contemporaries ... it was a tradition continued by individual theologians, mostly within the Augustinian Order, who devoted special study to the writings of St. Augustine".

questionable methods of Reformation historiographers have resulted in an estimation of pre-Reformation Catholicism being presented which is based solely upon a study of contemporary German theologians, while neglecting their Spanish or Italian counterparts. This has led to the extrapolation of the results of studies on German universities in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries to the whole of Europe during the same period — and the possibility that the “Nominalism” against which Luther rebelled was a purely localised phenomenon cannot be excluded with quite the ease that is often assumed. Whilst it is quite possible — though certainly not proven — that many of the theologians in Germany in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century knew no theology other than that which Luther knew — i.e. Ockhamism⁸⁾ — the same is not necessarily true of Spain or Italy, which must be regarded as the centres of Catholic thought in the period. Thus the prelates assembled at Trent, drawn chiefly from Italy and Spain, appeared to be conspicuously hostile to “Nominalism”.

However, the use of the term “Nominalist” to describe theologians whose doctrines of justification are allegedly “Pelagian” or “semi-Pelagian”⁹⁾ has obscured the simple fact that the term refers to an epistemological, rather than a soteriological, position. The fundamental contention of Nominalism (in the strict and proper sense) is that all things which exist are only particulars — there is no genuine or objective reality in things which are not in themselves identical. This denial of universals, and this alone, is what constitutes Nominalism¹⁰⁾. There is no *a priori* reason why the rejection of universals should necessarily result in a “semi-Pelagian” theology of grace. Indeed, the simple description of Ockham’s thought as “Nominalist” is actually seriously misleading, as his Nominalism arises from his distinction between real and rational knowledge, leading to his rejection of universals simply because they are rational¹¹⁾. And, as G. Lang has pointed out, many of those who accepted Ockham’s Nominalist epistemology were less than

⁸⁾ H. Denifle, *Luther und Luthertum* (2 volumes: Mainz, 1904-6) Vol II p. 588 n. 2.

⁹⁾ We have criticised this opinion: A.E. McGrath, The anti-Pelagian structure of “nominalist” doctrines of justification, *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses* 57 (1981) pp. 107-119.

¹⁰⁾ D.M. Armstrong, *Nominalism and Realism: universals and scientific realism* (Cambridge, 1978) Vol I pp. 12-57.

¹¹⁾ See G. Leff, *William of Ockham* (Manchester, 1977) 239-40; E. Hochstetter, *Studien zur Metaphysik und Erkenntnislehre Wilhelms von Ockham* (Berlin/Leipzig, 1927), *passim*.

enthusiastic about his theological opinions¹²). The seriously inadequate nature of the term "Nominalism" is amply demonstrated by the simple fact that it is quite possible to hold both "Nominalist" and "Augustinian" positions. Thus Gregory of Rimini¹³), Hugolino of Orvieto¹⁴) and William of Ockham are all Nominalists in the strict, epistemological sense of the word, as judged by their position on the question of universals — the first-named to the extent that he was described by an earlier generation of scholars as *antesignanus nominalistarum*. However, it is manifestly obvious that the three writers have very different theologies of justification: Gregory of Rimini and Hugolino of Orvieto have strongly anti-Pelagian doctrines of grace, with a pessimistic view of human nature, whilst Ockham's doctrine of justification is often — though in our opinion incorrectly¹⁵) — considered to be "semi-Pelagian", with an optimistic view of human nature. It is possible to be a Nominalist without committing oneself to any particular doctrine of justification: indeed, it is evident from a consideration of fourteenth century thought in general, that there were many doctors sharing common nominalist epistemological presuppositions who otherwise had little, if anything, in common. The total impropriety of applying the term "Nominalist" to a writer's doctrine of justification may be considered amply demonstrated by the remarkable fact that Martin Luther himself appears to have retained a nominalist epistemology! In an aside on the term *humanitas*, Luther indicated that he rejected the understanding of humanity as "a common humanity which is in all men"¹⁶), an opinion which he associated with the Thomists; Luther considered that the "Terminists" — by which the "Nominalists" were also known — to be correct when they asserted that *humanitas* names all men individually. This discussion of the difference between Thomist and Terminist — which is substantially correct — indicates that he was almost certainly a Nominalist in his epistemology; had he any particular interest in epistemological, as opposed to soteriological matters, this might be more

¹²) A. Lang, *Die Wege der Glaubensbegründung bei den Scholastikern des 14. Jahrhunderts* (Münster, 1931) p. 131.

¹³) M. Schüler, *Prädestination, Sünde und Freiheit bei Gregor von Rimini* (Stuttgart, 1934).

¹⁴) A. Zumkeller, *Hugolin von Orvieto und seine theologische Erkenntnislehre* (Würzburg, 1941), esp pp. 257-61.

¹⁵) See note 9.

¹⁶) WA.TR V.653.1

prominent in his works. The fact that Luther, Gregory of Rimini, Hugolino of Orvieto, William of Ockham and other "nominalists" can all subscribe to the rejection of universals demonstrates that it has no inherent connection with their doctrines of justification whatsoever.

This rejection of the term "Nominalist" in connection with later medieval theologies of justification is becoming increasingly accepted among both students of the Reformation and of late scholasticism¹⁷). However, it is not generally appreciated that this has important consequences for the so-called "medieval Augustinian tradition". This is usually defined *in relation to* "Nominalism", in that the "Augustinians" adopted theologies of justification which were closer to the teaching of St. Augustine than those of the "Nominalists". However, once the rejection of the term "Nominalist" is accepted, the point of reference for "Augustinianism" vanishes. The distinction between "Augustinianism" and "Nominalism" arose from the research of an earlier generation of scholars who saw the two as mutually exclusive: one was either an "Augustinian" or a "Nominalist" — but not both. However, the vast amount of research that has been undertaken since then has shown beyond any doubt that such a dichotomy is untenable: a phenomenally wide spectrum of theological opinion existed at the time, and the use of the terms "Augustinian" and "Nominalist" is quite inadequate to characterise it. The term "Nominalist" is now falling out of favour — but the term "Augustinian" has been retained. We wish to demonstrate that the continued use of this term, in the absence of the correlative "Nominalist", is unjustified. The remainder of this study is a statement of the case against the existence of the so-called "medieval Augustinian tradition".

The situation has been somewhat confused by the ambiguity surrounding the term "Augustinian". It is clear that this could be taken to refer *either* to a theology which represents, in essence, the characteristic position associated with St. Augustine, *or* to a theology which is characteristic of the theologians of the Order of the Hermits of St. Augustine. It is therefore necessary to consider both possibilities: we begin by considering whether any theologians of the later Middle Ages can be said to represent a return to the thought of St. Augustine.

It must be asked precisely what is meant by "an Augustinian

¹⁷) See the now classic study by E. Hochstetter, *Nominalismus?*, *Franciscan Studies* 9 (1949) 370-403.

doctrine of justification". It is clear that a distinction must be made between the *dogmatic content* of St. Augustine's theology, and the terms in which he chose to express it. Augustine's theology, particularly in his anti-Pelagian writings, often resulted from a polemical context, in which the bishop was obliged to defend the Catholic position against its opponents. In such situations, this often resulted in Augustine's response being determined by the questions posed by his opponents. Thus instead of a systematic exposition of — e.g. — the concept of grace, we find a series of Pelagian propositions being attacked, with occasional distinctions being introduced to counter Pelagian conclusions. Thus the famous distinction between operative and cooperative grace results from the Pelagian insistence upon the goodness of the will in moral acts. The great theological renaissance of the twelfth century was based, almost in its entirety, upon the works of St. Augustine. However, it was clear that, as it stood, Augustine's theology was unsuitable for the needs of the new era in theology. It lacked clarity and precision — and so the great task of systematising St. Augustine began. This necessitated the introduction of distinctions unknown to the African bishop — for example, the distinction between *gratia gratis data* and *gratia gratum faciens*, and between *gratia creata* and *gratia increata*. In all this, the intent was to retain the essence of Augustine's theological position, whilst expressing it in a more systematic and consistent form. This may be illustrated by two examples. The thoroughly Augustinian dogmatic statement "Man cannot merit his justification" was recognised as being inadequate to stand as it was. The term "merit" required careful definition if the statement was to have any value within the new systematic theology that was emerging¹⁸). This led to the distinction between merit *de congruo* and merit *de condigno*, so that Augustine's statement that "Man cannot merit justification" became "Man cannot merit justification *de condigno*". Similarly, Augustine's definition of grace was far from satisfactory, as it appeared to fail to distinguish between God's original gift of creation, and his subsequent and additional gifts. This need to distinguish the *naturalia* and *gratuita* was to lead to the celebrated concept of *supernature*, which first appears in the works of Philip the Chancellor. Again, whilst the dogmatic content of Augustine's theology was preserved, his definitions were regarded as unsatisfactory.

¹⁸) See H. Cloes, *La systématisation théologique pendant la première moitié du XII^e siècle*, *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses* 34 (1958) 277-329.

The essential point that we are making is this: by the thirteenth century, the dogmatic content of Augustine's theology had been re-expressed in terms of concepts unknown to Augustine himself. The rediscovery of Aristotle had led to the introduction of the habit in theological speculation, thereby providing a solution to vexed problems such as the nature of the *fides infantium* in infant baptism; grace had been defined according to whether it was actual or habitual, operative or cooperative; the number of the sacraments had been fixed. Once such developments had been introduced and generally accepted, there was no real possibility of abandoning them. By the later Middle Ages, other terms — such as the *concursus generalis Dei* — had also been introduced, thereby removing theological discussion still further from the vocabulary employed by St. Augustine. Thus the only theologians of the later Middle Ages who can lay any claim to the epithet "Augustinian" are those who were sufficiently reactionary, not merely to hold theological opinions which, in their dogmatic content, were identical to those of the African bishop, but who also abandoned the terminology of scholasticism and returned to the terms that Augustine himself used. Augustine's theological vocabulary may have been adequate to meet the exigencies of the Pelagian or Donatist controversies — but it was quite inadequate to meet the theological questions posed by the theologians of the thirteenth or fourteenth centuries. The theologians who wished to express opinions which were closer in sentiment to those of St. Augustine than their opponents were obliged to use the theological vocabulary of the day if they wished to engage in dialogue with their contemporaries.

Thus the term "Augustinian" must be used in a qualified sense, meaning "retaining the dogmatic content, if not the conceptual forms, of Augustine's theology". However, there are certain serious objections to even this modified definition. The most important of these relates to the numerous pseudo-Augustinian works circulating during the Middle Ages¹⁹), some of which are "semi-Pelagian" in outlook. The frequent reference to the semi-Pelagian pseudo-Augustinian *Hypognosticon* in the dogmatic works of the thirteenth century as an authentic Augustinian source appears to have led theologians of the period to teach what

¹⁹) H.A. Oberman, "Tuus sum, salvum me fac": Augustinréveil zwischen Renaissance und Reformation, in *Scientia Augustiniana. Studien über Augustinus, den Augustinismus und den Augustinerorden*, edited C.P. Mayer and W. Eckermann (Würzburg, 1975), pp. 349-94; esp. 364-5; M. de Kroon, Pseudo-Augustine im Mittelalter, *Augustiniana* 22 (1972) 511-30.

approached a "semi-Pelagian" doctrine of justification as *Augustinian*, unaware of the bibliographical error they were committing. Furthermore, the general tendency amongst theologians to use collections of "Sentences", rather than consulting original works at first-hand, inevitably led to Augustinian citations being used out of context, and therefore misleadingly. A classic example of this has been documented by Oberman in the case of Gabriel Biel²⁰). While considering the relation between grace and free will in justification, Biel employs Augustine's image of a rider and horse as an illustration. However, by apparently confusing this image with a similar image from the pseudo-Augustinian *Hypognosticon*, a total inversion of Augustine's meaning results. Oberman explains this remarkable inversion of Augustine's meaning by arguing that "Biel must have read Augustine with Scotistic spectacles"²¹): it is more probable that Biel did not read Augustine at all, but merely used an illustration at second-hand from a passage in Scotus. As Auer has noted, Scotus' discussion of the same question also employed the Augustinian illustration of horse and rider, with the same reversal of Augustine's meaning²²). This observation has the salutary effect of demonstrating that the use of an Augustinian illustration or citation does not necessarily result in an Augustinian doctrine of justification!

Scholars of the later Middle Ages have often defined the "Augustinian tradition" according to whether theologians allowed that anything in man can be said to cause his justification. The rejection of any such *ratio iustificationis ex parte creaturae* on the part of a writer is usually taken as evidence of his "Augustinianism". However, it must be pointed out that this "Augustinianism" can arise on account of thoroughly non-Augustinian reasons. This may be illustrated in the case of the English secular Thomas Bradwardine (†1349), who is generally regarded as "Augustinian" in his theological outlook²³). In his celeb-

²⁰) H.A. Oberman, *The Harvest of medieval theology* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963) pp. 160-65, especially pp. 163-4.

²¹) Op. cit., p. 163.

²²) J. Auer, *Die Entwicklung der Gnadenlehre in der Hochscholastik: II Teil. Das Wirken der Gnade* (Freiburg, 1951) p. 200; with reference to Scotus' *Lectura Prima* I dist XVII (Wien Nat. Bibl. 1449, fol. 53a.).

²³) See the study by H.A. Oberman, *Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine: a fourteenth century Augustinian* (Utrecht, 1957). It may be noted that Oberman (p. 145 n.1) is of the opinion that Augustine's most characteristic thought on predestination is *praedestinatio gemina*, which may help explain his too-easy identification of Bradwardine's theology with "Augustinianism". As Loewenich points out, doctrines such as double predestination or irresistible grace are "tatsächlich bedenkliche Elemente in Augustins Gnadenlehre" (W. von Loewenich, *Von Augustin zu Luther* (Witten, 1959) p. 111).

rated work *de causa Dei contra Pelagianum*, Bradwardine makes one of the most vigorous anti-Pelagian protests known in later scholasticism²⁴). His total rejection of the thesis that anything in man is the cause of his justification is, however, more due to Aristotelian than to Augustinian considerations. God is cause (efficient, formal and final), conservator and principal co-agent in all that his creatures do, as the following conclusions from *de causa Dei* make clear²⁵).

Prima, quod nihil potest quicquam movere sine Deo idem per se et proprie commovente. Secunda, quod nihil potest quicquam movere sine Deo immediate idem movente. Tertia, quod nihil potest quicquam movere sine Deo idem movente immediatius alio motore quocunque. Quarta, quod nulla propositio tribuens quodcunque creatum cuicunque causae secundae est immediate simpliciter.

The end result of this Aristotelianism is an "Augustinian" doctrine of justification — but the route by which this is derived owes nothing to Augustine. Furthermore, it will be evident that the concept of causality employed raises certain questions about the rôle of the Fall in Bradwardine's theology. Bradwardine does not see the Fall as a watershed for man: man's need for grace is a consequence of his creatureliness, rather than of his sinfulness as a consequence of the Fall. There is no fundamental difference between man's pristine and fallen states, as in both man is a creature, unable to do anything good without grace. The importance of the Fall within the context of St. Augustine's theology is well-known, and it is inconceivable that any theology which does not allot a similarly important rôle to the Fall could be styled "Augustinian". It is almost certain that Bradwardine is the *unus modernus doctor* criticised by Gregory of Rimini for his un-Augustinian views on the Fall²⁶); Gregory himself, by contrast, saw the Fall as of decisive importance to the discussion of man's justification, thus reproducing this important aspect of Augustine's thought — however, it is important to note that Gregory declines to follow Augustine in his identification of original sin with concupiscence²⁷). As Augustine's

²⁴) The edition used is that of Sir Henry Savile (London, 1618).

²⁵) Op. cit., p. 174.

²⁶) *In II Sent* dist XXIX ql al (Venetiis, 1522). The name "Bradwardine" is found in the margins of two manuscripts: Paris Bib. Nat. lat. 15891, and Mazarine 914.

²⁷) See R.M. Martin, *La controverse sur le péché originel au début du XIV^e siècle* (Louvain, 1930); C.O. Vollert, *The doctrine of Hervaeus Natalis on primitive justice and original sin* (Roma, 1947). Peter Lombard had retained the Augustinian identification of the essence of original sin with concupiscence: *II Sent* dist xxx cap 10 Ex his datur intelligi,

concept of original sin is almost exclusively framed in terms of concupiscence, it is difficult to see how even Gregory of Rimini could be allowed to be "Augustinian" in this respect. With Gregory, as with most theologians of the later Middle Ages, one can point to elements in his thought which may be considered "Augustinian", at least in inspiration — however, the development of theology, both in its concepts and its terminology, was such that it is impossible to characterise his theology as a whole, or even his theology of grace in particular, as "Augustinian". Indeed, as all medieval theology is inspired by the writings of St. Augustine, directly or indirectly, the most that can be said is that there existed in the later Middle Ages a bewilderingly wide spectrum of theological opinions which, though of basically "Augustinian" provenance, differed greatly in the extent to which it depended upon Augustine and in the extent to which his opinions were modified to meet the theological exigencies of the period. To style any such portion of that spectrum of theological opinion as "Augustinian" raises questions which cannot be answered with great conviction — for example, which aspect of Augustine's theology is most characteristically "Augustinian" — e.g. his illuminationist epistemology, his theology of grace, or his ecclesiology? Hus' theology of grace is basically Augustinian — but his ecclesiology (which is basically Donatist) is certainly non-Augustinian. To describe Hus as an "Augustinian" — as some have done — is to assume that Augustine's theology of grace is somehow more important than his ecclesiology.

A second possible definition of "Augustinianism" is a putative school of theological opinion existing within the Augustinian Order. Indeed, those who support the existence of a medieval Augustinian *school* (in the strict sense) generally regard the Augustinian Order as providing its backbone. It is certainly true that the current of thought which developed during the fourteenth century, usually considered to be

quid sit originale peccatum, scilicet vitium concupiscentiae, quod in omnes concupiscentialiter natos ... However, Anselm of Canterbury, followed by Scotus and Ockham, had rejected this identification, seeing original sin primarily as the absence of original righteousness. A mediating position, associated with Aquinas and Bonaventure, is that the absence of original righteousness is the *form*, whilst concupiscence the *matter*, of original sin: however, it is quite probable that this is merely to accommodate the more conservative elements, such as Anselm of Laon, who insisted upon identifying original sin and concupiscence.

"Augustinian" in cast, was sometimes known as the *schola Aegidiana*²⁸), suggesting that Giles of Rome was regarded as a theological authority by those who followed in his footsteps. Thus Dionysius de Burgo regarded Giles of Rome and St. Thomas Aquinas as being authorities of equal importance, although his occasional preference for *doctor noster Aegidius* is noticable²⁹). Thomas of Strassburg refers to Giles as *doctor noster* with sufficient frequency to indicate that he regards him as a theological authority³⁰), and Johannes von Retz, the second member of the Augustinian Order to become professor of theology at Vienna, cited both Giles and Thomas frequently, the latter *in extenso*³¹). John Hiltalingen of Basel considered that the theologians of his, the Augustinian, Order represented a distinct theological school³²), although it is not clear quite what features of their theology led him to make such an assertion. Recently, considerable scholarly attention has been paid to the doctrines of justification associated with the theologians of the Augustinian Order³³), and we are now in a position to evaluate such a claim in the specific case of justification. However, some preliminary remarks are in order.

²⁸) See K. Werner, *Der Augustinismus in der Scholastik des später Mittelalters* (Wien, 1883), especially pp. 234-300. The excellent study of A. Zumkeller is of particular importance: *Die Augustinerschule des Mittelalters: Vertreter und philosophisch-theologische Lehre, Analecta Augustiniana* 27 (1964) pp. 167-262.

²⁹) D. Trapp, Augustinian theology of the fourteenth century, *Augustiniana* 6 (1956) pp. 146-274, especially pp. 156-7.

³⁰) *In I Sent* dist xvii q2 (Venetiis, 1564) p. 72r.

³¹) See A. Zumkeller's edition of Retz, in *Augustiniana* 22 (1972) pp. 540-82; Textbeilage 126 (p. 577), citing Thomas *In II Sent* dist xxviii, xxix ql a3.

³²) Trapp, op. cit., p. 248.

³³) See: M. Schüler, *Prädestination, Sünde und Freiheit bei Gregor von Rimini* (Stuttgart, 1934); P. Vignaux, *Justification et prédestination au XIV^e siècle* (Paris, 1934) pp. 141-75; O. Müller, *Die Rechtfertigungslehre nominalistischer Reformationsgegner Bartholomäus von Usingen OESA und Kaspar Schatzgeyer OFM über Erbsünde, erste Rechtfertigung und Taufe* (Breslau, 1940); A.V. La Valle, *La giustizia di Adamo e il peccato originale secondo Egidio Romano* (Palermo, 1939); A. Zumkeller, Hugolino von Orvieto über Urstand und Erbsünde, *Augustiniana* 3 (1953) pp. 35-62; 165-93; 4 (1954) pp. 25-46; Hugolino von Orvieto über Prädestination, Rechtfertigung und Verdienst, *Augustiniana* 4 (1954) pp. 109-56; 5 (1955) pp. 5-51; N. Toner, The doctrine of original sin according to Augustine of Rome (Favaroni), *Augustiniana* 7 (1957) pp. 100-17; 349-66; 515-30; The doctrine of justification according to Augustine of Rome (Favaroni), *Augustiniana* 8 (1958) pp. 164-89; 299-327; 497-515; W. Werbeck, *Jacobus Perez von Valencia: Untersuchungen zu seiner Psalmenkommentar* (Tübingen, 1959); D.C. Steinmetz, *Misericordia Dei: the theology of Johannes von Staupitz in its late medieval setting* (Leiden, 1968); A. Zumkeller, Johannes von Retz: seine Lehre von Urstand, Erbsünde, Gnade und Verdienst, *Augustiniana* 22 (1972) pp. 118-84.

In an important study, Ritter drew attention to the distinctive methodologies employed in the German universities during the fifteenth century: one methodology could be styled the *via antiqua*, the other the *via moderna*³⁴). This distinction is of considerable importance in the definition of "Nominalism", as it locates the distinction between the "nominalists" and their theological opponents — such as "Augustinians" — not so much in the theological systems which they developed, as in the methods they employed in establishing them. The term *schola moderna*, first suggested for the "nominalists" by Prantl³⁵), conveys the fact that the distinguishing feature of the "nominalist" school was its logico-critical, rather than historico-critical, attitude — i.e. a theological *method*, rather than a theological *system*. However, in an important study, Trapp has shown that there existed precisely such a logico-critical school within the Augustinian Order during the fourteenth century³⁶). The *antiqui* regarded the *moderni* as being eclectic and unduly logico-critical, whilst the *moderni* considered that they had a mission to correct the errors of the past, using such "modern" tools as the principle of the *potentia Dei absoluta*. Thus within the Augustinian Order there already existed considerable theological and philosophical diversity, as seen in the existence of both conservative and modern traditions. The question of methodology underlies all theology, and although it can be shown that both the *moderni* and *antiqui* regarded Augustine with respect, and cited him with increasing accuracy as their direct knowledge of his works increased³⁷), the uses to which they put him differed according to the theological method employed. The historico-critics were concerned with the establishing of Augustine's meaning, whilst the logico-critics were concerned with the "correction" of Augustine by the critical theological tools now at their disposal — tools, such as the dialectic between the two powers of God, which undoubtedly owe more to Ockham than to Augustine³⁸). Thus, from the outset, the probability of a coherent tradition on the question of justification within the Augustinian Order must be considered remote.

However, it can be shown that there existed considerable theological

³⁴) G. Ritter, *Studien zur Spätscholastik II: Via antiqua und Via Moderna auf den deutschen Universitäten des XV. Jahrhunderts* (Heidelberg, 1922) p. 17.

³⁵) C. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik* (4 volumes: Leipzig, 1927) Vol IV p. 194.

³⁶) Trapp, *op. cit. passim*.

³⁷) *Ibid.*, pp. 264-5, for a useful characterisation of the Augustinian *moderni*.

³⁸) See K. Bannach, *Die Lehre von der doppelten Macht Gottes bei Wilhelm von Ockham* (Wiesbaden, 1975).

diversity within the Augustinian Order on questions on which theologians were not polarised according to their methodological preferences. This is most clearly demonstrated in the field of Mariology, and supremely in the controversy between the maculists and immaculists³⁹). The earlier Augustinians, such as Giles of Rome, Albert of Padua, Augustinus Triumphus of Ancona and Gregory of Rimini⁴⁰) were strongly maculist in their Mariological persuasions. However, it can be shown that, from the middle of the fourteenth century, a decisive shift in opinion occurred, so that the Augustinian Order as a whole came to adopt the immaculist position. Thus beginning with John Hiltalinger of Basel, Henry of Friemar⁴¹) and Thomas of Strassburg, and continuing into the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries with Jacobus Perez of Valencia⁴²), Johannes de Paltz⁴³) and Johannes von Staupitz⁴⁴), the Augustinian theologians adopted a position more characteristic of Gabriel Biel than of Giles of Rome. This represents a decisive rejection on the part of the later Augustinians of the teachings of their earlier masters. The point at issue is not without relevance to the understanding of justification within the Augustinian Order, as it raises the question of the extent of Christ's redeeming work. However, it is noted here merely to demonstrate theological diversity within the Augustinian Order, in addition to the polarisation between the logico- and historico-critical parties.

At the time of his death, Gregory of Rimini was Superior General of the Augustinian Order. He is a remarkable example of the ability of fourteenth century theologians to combine an "Augustinian" theology of justification with a nominalist epistemology⁴⁵). Thus Oberman cites Gregory as an example of "nominalist diversity", a "right-wing nominalist who is one of the representatives of a school of late medieval Augustinianism"⁴⁶). One of the most important aspects of his doctrine

³⁹) For an introduction to the subject, see: I. Brady, The development of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception in the fourteenth century after Aureoli, *Franciscan Studies* 15 (1955) 175-202; F. de Guimareans, La doctrine des théologiens sur l'Immaculée Conception de 1250 à 1350, *Etudes Franciscaines* 3 (1952) pp. 181-203; 4 (1953) pp. 23-51; 167-87.

⁴⁰) On this, see H.A. Oberman, *The harvest of medieval theology* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963) pp. 286-92.

⁴¹) Werbeck, op. cit., pp. 214-5, especially n. 1.

⁴²) Loc. cit.

⁴³) R. Weijenborg, Doctrina de Immaculata Conceptione apud Ioannem de Paltz OESA, Magistrum Lutheri Novitii, *Virgo Immaculata* 14 (Roma, 1957) pp. 160-83.

⁴⁴) Steinmetz, op. cit., pp. 146-7.

⁴⁵) See Schüler, op. cit.; W. Dettloff, *Die Entwicklung der Akzeptations- und Verdienstlehre von Duns Scotus bis Luther* (Münster, 1963).

⁴⁶) Oberman, op. cit., pp. 196, 204.

of justification is his rejection of naturalism. The concept of the *influentia generalis* had been interpreted by Durandus in a purely deist sense; in opposition to this, Gregory insisted upon the necessity of a further *influentia specialis*⁴⁷). The *influentia generalis* is present in all creatures and all acts, but the *influentia specialis* is given only to man for the performance of moral and meritorious acts. This special aid is utterly gratuitous, and may therefore be considered as grace⁴⁸). In this, we may see an instance of Gregory's "Augustinianism" — the need to distinguish the *naturalia* and *gratuita* which represents an attempt to preserve the dogmatic content of Augustine's doctrine of justification within a quite different ideological framework.

Gregory's doctrine of justification is probably best approached *via* his doctrine of predestination. Gregory defines predestination as the decision to grant eternal life, and reprobation as the decision not to grant it⁴⁹). In this, he may be regarded as following in the general Augustinian tradition of understanding predestination as something *positive*, leading to justification. Predestination is utterly gratuitous, and is not based upon foreknowledge of the use made of the free will, or of whether an obstacle will be placed in the way of grace⁵⁰). God is active, not passive, in both predestination and reprobation. However, the most important aspect of Gregory's discussion of justification relates to the question of the *formal cause of justification*. He distinguished two modes by which a soul is accepted by God⁵¹):

- a) an *intrinsic* mode, by a habit of grace informing the soul;
- b) an *extrinsic* mode, by which the divine will accepts the soul to eternal life.

Grace may therefore be understood either as an intrinsic created gift, or as the extrinsic divine acceptance. The former, however, is contingent, and must itself be considered as a secondary cause of acceptance. God is at liberty to do directly what he normally does indirectly, through contingent secondary causes. Thus God normally

⁴⁷) *In II Sent* dist xxvii, xxviii ql al (Venetiis, 1522) fol 931 ... homo non potuit absque speciali Dei auxilio facere aliquem actum moralem non cupabilem.

⁴⁸) *In II Sent* dist xxix ql al; fol 109M.

⁴⁹) *In I Sent* dist xl, sli ql a2; fol 157M.

⁵⁰) fol. 158B.

⁵¹) *In I Sent* dist xvii ql a2; fol 85D ... dico quod aliquis potest dici gratus dupliciter; uno modo denominatio intrinseca, ab habitu scilicet gratiae informante animam eius; alio modo denominatio extrinseca, a voluntate divina acceptante ipsam ad vitam aeternam nisi postea ipse peccaverit.

acceptes on the basis of created grace informing the soul of the *viator*; however, as God himself is the prime cause of the secondary cause of acceptation (i.e. created grace), he is at liberty to by-pass this, and accept the soul directly. Indeed, it is not a contradiction to assert that God might *not* accept a soul in possession of a habit of created grace or charity⁵²). This distinction between created and uncreated grace allows Gregory to state that the uncreated gift itself (i.e. the Holy Spirit) is itself sufficient for acceptation without the need for any form or habit. If an example of this is required, Gregory points to the case of Jesus Christ himself, who did not possess a habit of created grace. Thus Gregory is able to maintain the possibility of a purely extrinsic justification by simple acceptation⁵³). It is a contradiction of the divine freedom to argue that the possession of a habit requires God to accept the soul possessing it; if God accepts, it is an utterly gratuitous act. A habit bestowed upon the *viator* does not bestow any worth that cannot be attributed to the Holy Spirit himself⁵⁴).

The importance of this discussion of the formal cause of justification can be seen when it is compared with the treatment accorded it by Thomas of Strassburg. Thomas states explicitly that the formal cause of justification is the habit of created grace: *nullus potest esse formaliter Deo gratus, nisi sit informatus gratia a Deo creata*⁵⁵). The possibility of a purely extrinsic acceptation is rejected, on the grounds that a real change must occur in man, and that precisely such a change is effected by grace⁵⁶). Grace is *aliquid creatum in anima*, which alone renders us acceptable to God⁵⁷). This disagreement over the formal cause of justification was to continue throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, with theologians such as Hugolino of Orvieto and Dionysius of Montina favouring the extrinsic acceptation, and others, such as Johannes von Retz, the intrinsic.

Hugolino of Orvieto (†1373) is distinguished as one of the most

⁵²) *In I Sent* dist xvii ql a2; fol 870.

⁵³) Vignaux, *op. cit.*, p. 145; *In I Sent* dist xvii ql a2; cited Vignaux. *loc.cit.*, n.1.

⁵⁴) *In I Sent* dist xvii ql a2; fol 86F-G.

⁵⁵) *In II Sent* dist xxvi, xxvii al ql (Venetiis, 1564) fol 178rb.

⁵⁶) Fol 178va (contra Durandum).

⁵⁷) Fol 178 rb Quantum ad primum ponam duas conclusiones. Prima est, quod gratia gratificans nos Deo, vel per quam nos grati sumus Deo, est aliquid creatum in anima. Secunda est, quod naturali cognitione nullus potest certitudinaliter in se cognoscere huiusmodi, quamviscunque realiter creatus sit in anima sua.

conservative, anti-Pelagian theologians of the Augustinian Order⁵⁸). In many respects, his doctrine of justification resembles that of Gregory of Rimini, to whom he refers frequently. Like Gregory, he defines predestination as God's decision to grant eternal life to a soul, resulting in the following *ordo salutis*⁵⁹): *praedestinatio* → *condonatio* → *vocatio* → *iustificatio* → *perseveratio* → *glorificatio*.

As with both Gregory and Thomas, Hugolino excludes the possibility of certitude of election, either of oneself or of another⁶⁰). Hugolino shares Gregory's concern to preserve the divine freedom in respect of created habits of grace, asserting the primacy of an act of divine will over a habit of grace. No created grace, actual or habitual, can render a man *gratus*, *carus* or *acceptus ad vitam aeternam* before God as its formal effect⁶¹). Thus, in common with Gregory of Rimini, Hugolino understands the formal cause of justification to be the *denominatio extrinseca*, the purely external divine acceptance to eternal life⁶²). Thus the effects of predestination, such as habitual or actual grace, must be seen as arising from, and a consequence of, the divine will, and not themselves as causing or influencing the divine will. Hugolino makes the customary distinction between created and uncreated grace, noting that it is possible to possess the latter, but not the former⁶³). If the possession of a habit of charity⁶⁴) were the formal cause of justification, it would follow that a creature (i.e. the habit of charity) would effect what was appropriate to the Holy Spirit⁶⁵) — which is clearly unacceptable. Thus Hugolino assigns a minimal rôle to charity in his discussion of justification, tending to see justification as a direct, personal act of God himself, without the use of any created intermediates. This emphasis upon the divine acceptance is again evident in his discussion of merit: the meritorious character of an act depends upon its acceptance by God. This discussion of the primacy of uncreated over created grace involves

⁵⁸) See references in note 33. Zumkeller refers to him as the "Vertreter eines ausgesprochenen Augustinismus" (*Augustiniana* 4 (1954) p. 110).

⁵⁹) *In I Sent* dist xli ql al; cited Zumkeller, art. cit., p. 119 n. 37.

⁶⁰) *In IV Sent* dist xliii q3 a3 prop. 4; cited Zumkeller, art. cit., p. 120 n. 43.

⁶¹) *Nulla gratia creata habitualis vel actualis reddit mentem, quam informat, gratam seu caram vel Deo acceptam ad vitam aeternam sic, quod effectus formalis eius.*

⁶²) Zumkeller, op. cit., pp. 120-1.

⁶³) *Ibid.*, pp. 135-9.

⁶⁴) The fact that Hugolino criticises the importance of charity in justification is itself a departure from any true "Augustinianism" — cf the discussion of the same question in Agostino Favaroni, below.

⁶⁵) See Zumkeller, op. cit., p. 140 n. 110 for a discussion of this point.

frequent use of the dialectic between the two powers of God, which raises the question of "nominalist" influence on Hugolino's doctrine of justification. However, as Zumkeller has established⁶⁶), it is difficult to establish any positive "nominalist" influences in his discussion of justification. Whilst he uses the dialectic between the two powers in his discussion, and employs the extrinsic denomination of the *acceptatio divina* as the formal principle of justification, it appears that his use of these can be traced to Bonaventure or Scotus, rather than to Ockham. Hugolino's teaching was developed by his junior in the Order, Dionysius of Montina, who lectured on the *Sentences* at Paris in the academic year 1371-2⁶⁷). However, whilst retaining the emphasis upon the *acceptatio divina*, he hardens Hugolino's teaching in two important respects, both relating to predestination. Whilst Hugolino had conceded a form of justification which could be considered an *acceptus formaliter sed non ad vitam aeternam*, Dionysius refused to allow justification of any sort apart from predestination⁶⁸). Likewise, he rejected the possibility of merit apart from predestination, again hardening Hugolino's teaching on the matter⁶⁹).

A quite different opinion can be found in the writings of Johannes von Retz († post 1404), the second member of the Augustinian Order to become professor of theology at the University of Vienna⁷⁰). It is clear that Retz was aware of the stress laid upon the *acceptatio divina* by fellow-members of his Order: however, although he refers to Hugolino of Orvieto frequently, he does not adopt his solution to the problem of the formal principle of justification⁷¹). Retz' solution lies along more Aegidian lines, following in the footsteps of Giles of Rome and Thomas of Strassburg, both of whom he cites frequently, the latter *in extenso*. Retz can be regarded as representing an authentically Aegidian tradition,

⁶⁶) Zumkeller, op. cit., p. 144.

⁶⁷) A. Zumkeller, *Dionysius de Montina: ein neuentdeckter Augustinertheologe des Spätmittelalters* (Würzburg, 1948), especially pp. 76-81.

⁶⁸) Op. cit., p. 78. For Hugolino's teaching on the matter, see Zumkeller, *Augustiniana* 4 (1954) p. 119.

⁶⁹) Zumkeller, *Dionysius de Montina*, p. 77.

⁷⁰) For his life and works, see A. Zumkeller, *Der Wiener Theologieprofessor Johannes von Retz OSA: seine Leben und Schriften*, *Augustiniana* 21 (1971) 505-40. For his doctrine of justification, see the articles referred to in note 33.

⁷¹) Zumkeller, art. cit., *Augustiniana* 22 (1972) p. 184 "Wie wenig Johannes von Retz trotz dieser Zitate durch die Lehrrichtung des Hugolin beeinflusst wurde, zeigt sich schon darin, dass er der *acceptatio divina* in der Rechtfertigungs- und Verdienstlehre so gut wie keine Bedeutung einräumt".

mediated through Thomas, on many questions: for example, he rejects the opinion that Adam possessed *gratia gratum faciens* before the Fall, citing Thomas of Strassburg in support⁷²). Likewise, his discussion of the transmission of original sin is also heavily dependent upon Giles of Rome⁷³). Also following Giles, he rejects the opinion that man can prepare himself for justification by his own natural powers. Justification involves a transition from form to matter. Just as a natural form is converted to natural matter by the action of a natural agent, so the transition from supernatural form to supernatural matter requires the action of a supernatural agent moving the soul. This argument, which stems from Giles, was also used by Thomas, and it is easily demonstrated that here, as elsewhere, Retz is dependent upon him⁷⁴). It is therefore unremarkable that Retz should retain the concept of habitual grace as *aliquid creatum in anima*⁷⁵), which informs the soul, thereby making it pleasing to God⁷⁶). It is this habit of created grace, and not external divine acceptance, which is the formal principle of justification. Justification arises through the possession of an intrinsic quality of the soul, not through an extrinsic acceptance⁷⁷). Retz' use of Giles and Thomas suggests that he stood within a common Augustinian tradition, which gives his insistence upon the necessity of the habit of created grace as the formal principle of justification considerable importance to our study.

In addition to the two "majority opinions" on the nature of the formal principle of justification within the Augustinian Order, some of its individual theologians appear to have adopted somewhat idiosyncratic positions — for example, Agostino Favaroni and Johannes von Staupitz. In his discussion of justification, Favaroni (†1443) insists on

⁷²) See Zumkeller's edition of Retz, in *Augustiniana* 22 (1972) pp. 540-82, cited as *Textbeilage* 126 (p. 577), citing Thomas of Strassburg *In II Sent* dist xxviii, xxix q1 a3. On Giles, see La Valle, op. cit..

⁷³) Zumkeller, op. cit., p. 124.

⁷⁴) *Textbeilage* 117; cf Thomas, *In II Sent* dist xxviii, xxix q1 a3.

⁷⁵) *Textbeilage* 44-46, citing Thomas, *In II Sent* dist xxvi, xxvii q1 a1.

⁷⁶) *Textbeilage* 48. (nullus) potest esse formaliter carus vel gratus nisi informatus gratia a Deo creata. Sed quilibet iustus fidelis est formaliter Deo gratus. Cf Thomas, *In II Sent* dist xxvi, xxvii q1 a1.

⁷⁷) *Textbeilage* 55. Item falsum assumitur in ista minori quia effectus formalis praecedit formam, cuius est effectus. Sed esse gratum Deo est effectus formalis gratiae. Ex hoc enim homo formaliter Deo gratus est, quia gratia informatus est. Cf Thomas, *In II Sent* dist xxvi, xxvii q1 a1.

the priority of charity over all other theological virtues⁷⁸). Far from teaching justification *sola fide* — as an earlier generation of scholars appear to have assumed⁷⁹) — Favaroni comes close to teaching justification *sola caritate*: it is charity alone by which man is justified⁸⁰). Indeed, justifying grace and charity are often identified by Favaroni⁸¹). It seems that Favaroni allots to *caritas* the function of *gratia creata* in the theology of Giles of Rome, so that, in effect, charity becomes the formal principle of justification. By contrast, in his sermons on *Job*, von Staupitz (†1524) emphasised the priority of *gratia increata* over *gratia creata*: the movement of the soul towards God in justification is effected by the indwelling Holy Spirit⁸²). Indeed, as Steinmetz has pointed out, Staupitz later appears to abandon the doctrine of the *habitus* altogether, with increasing emphasis being placed upon the indwelling of the Holy Spirit⁸³). However, Staupitz appears to have been an eclectic at this point, for his discussion of merit makes it clear that the *ratio meriti* is the extrinsic denomination of the divine acceptance⁸⁴).

The question of the formal cause of justification is of considerable importance in establishing whether a definite tradition, or school of thought, can be said to exist within the Augustinian Order in the later Middle Ages. Four possibilities may be noted as the formal cause, or principle, of justification:

1. the habit of created grace, informing the soul;
2. the extrinsic denomination of the divine acceptance;
3. the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit;
4. the habit of charity.

Of these, the first two are the most frequently mentioned; the first may be regarded as of Thomist, the second of Scotist, provenance. It is possible to show that there existed a definite tradition within the

⁷⁸) On Favaroni, see works referred to in note 33. Lutheran tendencies in his writings were alleged by an earlier generation of scholars — see A. V. Müller, *Agostino Favaroni e la teologia di Lutero* (Roma, 1914). On the priority of charity, see *de merito Christi*, cited Toner, art. cit., *Augustiniana* 8 (1958) p. 309 n. 52.

⁷⁹) See Müller, op. cit.; also his *Luthers theologische Quellen* (Giessen, 1912) p. 11.

⁸⁰) Toner, op. cit., p. 312 *Sola caritas in homine est per essentiam suam vera iustitia per quam homo iustificatur et iuste vivit coram Deo.*

⁸¹) Op. cit., p. 316 n. 82 ... *de gratia iustificante quam frequenter nominat caritatem que est gratia gratum deo reddens et accepta.*

⁸²) Steinmetz, op. cit., p. 106. Staupitz appears to come close to identifying grace with the Holy Spirit at points.

⁸³) Steinmetz, op. cit., pp. 106-7.

⁸⁴) cited Steinmetz, op. cit., p. 95 n. 3. It appears that Gerson is the source of this doctrine of acceptance.

Augustinian Order for both these opinions, involving not merely the acceptance of the opinions of earlier doctors, but also reference to and citation from their works. The two chief schools of thought within the Augustinian Order during the fourteenth century may be represented thus:

1. (Aquinas) → Giles of Rome → Thomas of Strassburg → Johannes von Retz;
2. (Scotus) → Gregory of Rimini → Hugolino of Orvieto → Dionysius of Montina.

In addition, other opinions — such that those of Favaroni or Staupitz — may be noted, which cannot be accommodated to these.

It is clear, therefore, that one cannot speak of a single tradition on this question within the Augustinian Order of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. There existed at least two main bodies of opinion, each of which reflects the different concepts of grace which are often thought to be characteristic of the “Thomist” and “Scotist” schools. Whilst each body was concerned with the refutation of Pelagianism, the means by which they chose to refute it were different. One is therefore faced with the very difficult question of whether the doctrines of justification associated with the Augustinian Order in the period are Thomist or Scotist in origin, but influenced to an unusual extent by “Augustinian” considerations, or whether they can be said to represent “Augustinian” doctrines of justification influenced to various degrees by Thomism or Scotism. Furthermore, it will be evident that the spectrum of opinion existing within the Augustinian Order on this, and other, matters, makes it impossible to speak of a “medieval Augustinian tradition” within the Order — for no such single tradition exists. Whilst one can point to a generally anti-Pelagian stance on the part of the theologians of the Order, it must also be pointed out that certain of its theologians — such as Bartholomäus von Usingen — appear to adopt doctrines of justification very similar to that of Gabriel Biel⁸⁵).

In conclusion: we have examined the evidence for the existence of a “medieval Augustinian tradition” on justification, and have found instead a perplexingly broad spectrum of opinion, itself reflecting the theological diversity of the later Middle Ages. Any attempt to describe one particular section of this spectrum as “Augustinian” must be regarded as imposing a precision upon the term which it is incapable of

⁸⁵) His doctrine of justification “is clearly Pelagian”: Oberman, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

bearing. Considerable diversity has already been demonstrated within the Augustinian Order on epistemological matters⁸⁶), and on the methodology to be followed in the theological enterprise. It should therefore come as no real surprise that a similar diversity exists on the question of justification. Whilst it is permissible to speak of anti-Pelagian theologies of justification in later scholasticism, it is not proper, on the basis of the evidence available, to refer to this as a "school" or "tradition" — both of which imply considerably greater coherence than is actually found. As Zumkeller has shown, the imperfection of human works was a frequent theme in later medieval preaching⁸⁷), thereby dispelling "die Fabel von der katholischen Werkheiligkeit"⁸⁸) — but the actual means employed in refuting any such *Werkheiligkeit* varied considerably. Considerably more work must be done before the question of "the medieval Augustinian tradition on justification" can be considered to have been definitely answered: however, at this stage, the evidence appears to suggest that there actually existed so many medieval traditions, each claiming to be Augustinian, that the term really has no value to the historian or the theologian, and therefore ought to be abandoned. We suggest that the choice of an alternative term to describe the movements in question could profitably be deferred until scholarship has established with greater accuracy what leading features, if any, are characteristic of them.

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⁸⁶) See Zumkeller, *Die Augustinerschule des Mittelalters*.

⁸⁷) A. Zumkeller, *Das Ungenügen der menschlichen Werke bei den deutschen Predigern des Spätmittelalters*, *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 81 (1959) 265-305.

⁸⁸) *Ibid.*, p. 305.