

Hegel's Conception of Self-Knowledge Seen in Conjunction with Augustine's*

Hegel was explicitly aware of the fragmentary, unsystematised nature of the Aristotelian corpus. "A general view of his philosophy does not give the impression of its being in construction a self-systematised whole, of which the order and connection pertain likewise to the notion (dem Begriffe); for the parts are empirically selected and placed together in such a way that each part is independently recognised as a determinate conception (Begriff), without being taken into the connected movement of the science"¹). Nevertheless it is perfectly clear that that element of Aristotle's teaching on thinking and self-thinking, which had been so systematically developed by neo-Platonist thinking, was also developed further by Hegel, and while his interpretation might seem idiosyncratic he would have justified it as being the logical completion of what Aristotle and Plotinus had left incomplete.

Passages selected from the *Metaphysics* and the *De Anima* as translated and commented in the section on Aristotle in his *History of Philosophy* reveal many themes which are recognisable as central to Hegel's thinking: the Notion (Begriff) as "principium cognoscendi ... and also principium essendi";²) "the direction of thought on all kinds of objects thus transforming them into thoughts"³); that "it is only in thought that there is present a true harmony between objective and subjective; that constitutes me"⁴); that "the universal is, to a certain

* See also *Augustiniana* 27 (1977), pp. 70-132, 364-401; 28 (1978), pp. 183-221; 29 (1979), pp. 97-124.

¹) Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie II, Sämtliche Werke = SW (ed. by H. Glockner, Stuttgart 1949³ ff.) vol. 18, p. 298. Translation (HALDANE and SIMPSON, London-New York 1892-1896) II, p. 118.

² SW 18, p. 330; translation p. 147: Hegel's comment on *Metaphysics* XII, 7 (1072 a30 - b8). He makes out that Aristotle identifies the Notion with God: 'er spricht es als Gott aus', plausible if all thinking is 'divine'. But behind this lies his idea that νοῦς is already νοητόν: 'Hier im Denken ist so diese Identität vorhanden; das, welches bewegt wird, und welches bewegt, ist dasselbe' (SW 18, p. 329; translation p. 146): an identification which might render Aristotle consistent — but at the loss of authenticity.

³) SW 18, p. 332; translation p. 149: 'Alles denkend zu betrachten, in Gedanken zu verwandeln' (Hegel's characterisation of Aristotle's speculative philosophy).

⁴) SW 18, p. 333; translation p. 150: 'Nur im Denken ist wahrhafte Uebereinstimmung des Objectiven und Subjektiven vorhanden; das bin Ich' (interpreting Aristotle: truth is measured by the Begriff).

extent, in the soul itself as substance"⁵); that sense perception is simultaneously a separation as well as a union⁶); a tendentious explanation of the passive νοῦς of *De Anima* III, 4, that "the ideas are at first only quiescent forms (in the soul), not activities, and so Aristotle is not a realist"⁷); but, above all, his development of the idea of absolute Geist from the conception of thought thinking on thinking: "Absolute thinking (he calls this the divine νοῦς), Geist in its absoluteness, this thinking is a thinking of what is best, what is the ultimate end, this is precisely the self-thinking νοῦς"⁸). Through paraphrases, which were really new interpretations and commentary, Hegel gave a coherence to the epistemology of *Metaphysics* XII and *De Anima* III on the basis of the complete and pre-existing identity of thought and thinker because they were divine.

The νόησις νοήσεως of *Metaphysics* XII, "became for Hegel simply (or, if you wish, mediated infinitely in a dialectic way) and in general 'the entelechy of thinking'"⁹) and it appears as such, particularly in a number of places in the *Enzyklopädie*: the conception of the idea as being its own object, and the union of the two being absolute idea¹⁰); of "free mind (Geist) ... which sunders itself ... into a limitless knowing, and on the other hand into the object that is identical with that knowing"¹¹); of thinking which becomes what "it was only supposed to be", "self-

⁵) SW 18, p. 377; translation p. 187: Hegel's translation of *De Anima* II, 5 (on sensation): "... die empfindene Thätigkeit auf das Einzelne geht, das Wissen dagegen auf's Allgemeine; diess aber ist gewissermassen in der Seele selbst als Substanz". That intellectual knowledge should pre-exist in the soul would only be possible if the soul were the divine, timeless νοῦς. This position is reached at the cost of jettisoning the characteristic teaching of *De Anima* III that νοῦς creates intelligibles.

⁶) SW 18, p. 384; translation p. 194: a comment on *De Anima* III, 2, 427a 9-14. 'Separation' in that each sense receives only its proper sensations; 'union' in that the common sense unites them.

⁷) SW 18, p. 389; translation p. 199. A commentary on 429a 27-29: the soul as being potentially (δυνάμει) the ideas. Hegel's interpretation of 'potentially' disregarded completely the place of the active νοῦς in creating the νοητά which are then passively received: 'd.h. die Ideen nur erst ruhende Formen, nicht als Thätigkeiten. Aristoteles ist so nicht Realist'.

⁸) SW 18, 390. (The translation circa p. 200 does not correspond as it is based on a later edition).

⁹) W. KERN, Die Aristotelesdeutung Hegels. Die Aufhebung des Aristotelischen 'Nous' in Hegels 'Geist', in: *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 78, 1971, p. 258.

¹⁰) System der Philosophie (Enzyklopädie) I Die Logik, 236 and z: SW 8, p. 446; translation (WALLACE, Oxford 1892²) p. 373-4.

¹¹) System ... III Die Philosophie des Geistes 440 z. SW 10 p. 295; translation (WALLACE and MILLER, Oxford 1971) p. 179.

knowing truth"¹²). But it was no longer the remote νοῦς of Aristotle; either actually or potentially it was prepared to embrace every content, in its individuality and universality together¹³).

For Hegel the original conception of Aristotle had revived in Kant's unity of apperception, which had the quality of self-thinking without the capacity to penetrate to the reality of things: "On the other side and independent stands a self-apprehending thought, the principle of freedom, which Kant has in common with ordinary and bygone metaphysics, but emptied of all that it held, and without being able to give it anything new"¹⁴).

Plotinus had given self-thinking νοῦς the simultaneous content of the transcendent One and the νοητά; individual things were grasped only by ψυχή, the emanation from νοῦς. For Hegel the soul was immaterial, but "the sleep of mind — the passive νοῦς of Aristotle"¹⁵. This ingenious, but inauthentic, interpretation of Aristotle, by reducing the noetic of neo-Platonism to one principle with the contents of two, allowed its development into two spheres where Plotinus was not concerned. Firstly in the relationship of Geist with the external material world in which it recognised itself, so that its cognition of material things was also a realisation of its self-consciousness. Secondly, in its historical manifestations, so that not only the formally historically related works (*Geschichte der Philosophie*, *Philosophie der Religion*, and *Philosophie der Geschichte*), but also the more loosely historically related works (*Phänomenologie des Geistes* and *Philosophie des Rechts*, and even the non-historically related works (*Wissenschaft der Logik* and *System der Philosophie (Enzyklopädie)*) are centred on the process of Geist coming to know itself. Even though self-thinking was developed for Hegel in other directions, neo-Platonism was of great significance for him. In Plotinus "The distinction between thought and an external God is thus doubtless at an end"¹⁶); and had he known of Porphyry's proposals to transmute religion into what he thought it essentially was — philosophical con-

¹²) *ib.* 467 z: and 440 z.

¹³) Kern (*op. cit.* p. 259) quotes a dictum of K. LÖWTH: 'Hegel united the Aristotelian νοῦς with the Λόγος of the Gospel of St. John in the notion of absolute spirit' ('Das Böse', Studien aus dem C.-G.-Jung-Institut, XIII, Zürich 1961, p. 219).

¹⁴) System I, 60. SW 8, p. 161; translation p. 118.

¹⁵) System III, 389. SW 10, p. 53: 'nur der Schlaf des Geistes — der passive νοῦς des Aristoteles, welcher der Möglichkeit nach Alles ist'. Translation p. 29.

¹⁶) Geschichte III. SW 19, p. 56. Translation II, p. 421.

templation, he would have been even more impressed¹⁷); but little of Porphyry's writing was available to him.

W. Beierwaltes has recently considered the relation of Hegel to neo-Platonism¹⁸). He proposes that Hegel can be related to Plotinus in the following ways¹⁹). Firstly, that Hegel rationalised Plotinus's conception of ecstasy; there was to be an ascent into self-thinking-being: not an ecstasy into non-thinking (non-)being in the One. Secondly, although there is some similarity with Hegel's conception in the way in which Plotinus's *voûç* unites diversity (thinking objects) and sameness (thinking itself), the unification of diverse objects into self-thinking Geist is by the ever extending *process* of negation and synthesis. Thirdly, that both systems are in a way speculative syntheses of the Aristotelian conception of the divine substance (thinking on thinking) and Parmenides' identity of thought and being. In Hegel the Absolute becomes wholly united with itself though by a dialectical process. In Plotinus the unification of thinking and being through *voûç* is not complete: it needs the activity of Soul as well; but Geist in Hegel is to bring everything into an absolute unity. Beierwaltes even goes so far as to say that Hegel "recognised the logical-speculative meaning of neo-Platonic philosophy, and founded his own thinking on it"²⁰). However, for Hegel the past pointed to the present, but did not determine it; the contemporary stage of philosophy posed the important questions, which were quite unthought of in earlier times. So Plotinus had his place in the history of philosophy — as did the more important Proklos — but the importance of his thought has been superseded.

¹⁷) Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion I. SW 15, p. 37: 'die Philosophie ist in der That selbst Gottesdienst'. Translation (SPEIRS and SANDERSON London 1895) I, p. 20. cf. *ib.* I. SW 15, p. 86: 'Der Cultus ist also überhaupt der ewige Process des Subjects, sich mit seinem Wesen identisch zu setzen'; translation I, p. 70. Also, II. SW 16, p. 126; translation II, p. 256, and *ib.*, p. 136; translation *ib.*, p. 267.

¹⁸) W. BEIERWALTES, *Platonismus und Idealismus. Philosophische Abhandlungen* 40, Frankfurt 1972. A previous work by K.H.E. DE JONG, *Hegel und Plotin*, Leiden 1916, is a short study of the text of the History of Philosophy on Plotinus.

¹⁹) *Op. cit.*, p. 146 ff.

²⁰) Plotinus was accessible especially through the Ficino editions of the *Enneads*, printed in the sixteenth century and later. But there was an undoubted revival of interest in Hegel's time. He was a friend of Creuzer, the editor of Plotinus's text. Plotinus's relationship to Goethe and Schelling has been studied by P. HADOT in: *L'apport du néoplatonisme à la philosophie de la nature en occident*, in: *Eranos Jahrbuch* 37, 1968; and X. TILLIETTE's study: *Schelling: une Philosophie en Devenir*, Paris 1970, gives references to the contemporary knowledge of Plotinus (v. esp. I, pp. 306-7, n. 3).

Since Hegel like Augustine re-interpreted the thought of Plotinus the question arises whether he and Augustine, as characteristic philosophers of Western innerness and yet as belonging to seemingly widely different traditions within it, might be speculatively related to each other on the ground of their both being interpreters of Plotinus. Hegel has left almost no evidence of direct knowledge of Augustine's writings²¹). If he

²¹) Given the importance of Augustine, as also the presumption of the presence of a Lutheran-Augustinian tradition at the Tübingen Stift, this is surprising. In a personal letter to the writer dated 1 June, 1973, the Director of the Hegel-Archiv at Bochum, Dr. H. Schneider, could add nothing to the few negligible references under the entry 'Augustin' in the index to the Glockner edition, SW 24. The recent and comprehensive book on Hegel's Tübingen theological training, H.S. HARRIS, 'Hegel's Development: Toward the Sunlight 1770-1801', Oxford 1972, gives no indication of courses on Augustine as such, though we can infer that he was not unmentioned in the courses of Chancellor Lebrun on Church History and Controversial questions 'De Mediis Gratiae'. (*op. cit.*, pp. 89-90). Perhaps Hegel felt himself absolved from reading Augustine by the judgements on him by historians of philosophy. For J. BRUCKER '... quamvis se hominem fuisse, non in primo philosophorum ordine numerandum demonstravit, manebit tamen ingens ... in Ecclesia memoria' (*Historia Critica Philosophiae* III, Leipzig 1743, p. 507). And D. TIEDEMANN considered him a lesser Plotinus: 'Plotin und seiner Nachfolger ... Mit seiner Alexandriner setzt Augustinus als ausgemacht voraus ...' (*Geist der Spekulativen Philosophie* III, Marburg 1793, pp. 462-3). Surprising though it may seem there may be in Hegel's theory of grace a trace of Augustine's thought. Although he gives a conventional view of grace in a way which crudely represents his thinking: 'something foreign to consciousness ... which man has to acquiesce in as something foreign to his own nature, and his relation to which is of a passive sort (fremd ... die der Mensch als ein Fremdes sich gefallen lassen müsse und gegen die er sich passiv verhalte' *Religion* II, SW 16, p. 195; translation E.B. SPEIRS and J.B. SANDERSON, London 1895, II, p. 332), it seems as if he attempted to formulate the Augustinian idea in a better way than this in which the element of 'foreignness' were removed, though the basis of the idea preserved. 'In this way the external divine existence, as something divorced from existence within the subjective spirit, is abrogated, and thus God is, as it were, called to mind within the sphere of subjectivity' (Dadurch also ist das äusserliche göttliche Daseyn als ein Getrenntseyn vom Daseyn im subjectiven Geist aufgehoben und somit Gott in die Subjectivität hinein erinnert. *ib.* SW 16, p. 126; translation II, p. 256). cf. 'it is possible also from the standpoint of consciousness to reach this subjectivity, this feeling that the object is not foreign to consciousness' (*ib.*, p. 195; translation p. 332). The original formulae of Augustine did not envisage such an immediate opposition to be overcome, but rather a profound continuity between man's action and God's. In this way Hegel's formula is more Augustinian than its conventional representation. cf. 'In (bonis) etiam (Deus) operetur et velle ... Subventum est igitur infinitati voluntatis humanae, ut divina gratia indeclinabiliter et inseparabiliter ageretur' (*De Correptione et Gratia* XII, 38; PL 40. 939-40). Much more likely than Hegel knowing Augustine is the occurrence of comparable themes arising in both from a common source in St. Paul, as argued by E. DE' NEGRI, L'elaborazione hegeliana di temi agostiniani, in: *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 6, 1952, pp. 62-78. e.g. 'Entäusserung' may derive from the Lutheran translation of 'exinanivit' in *Phil.* 2. 7: 'sondern äusserte sich selbst' (version of G.F. SEITER, Erlangen 1781) (*op. cit.*, p. 67). But de' Negri's suggestion that Hegel could have found the idea in Augustine's commentaries on St. Paul (*ib.*, p. 68) is not so convincing.

had read and understood the Augustinian critique of Plotinus in the way in which it unequivocally asserted the independence of the individual it might have sharpened his awareness of the ambivalence (necessary in the dialectic of the individual and the universal) of the Aristotelian-Plotinian $\nu\omicron\delta\varsigma$ as one and yet many, which was taken over into his conception of Geist. Given the historical axiom of the processive self-disclosure of Geist it is likely that he would have re-interpreted the thinking of Augustine as containing so many elements pointing toward a philosophical position of which he himself held the key. Plotinus's transcendent thinking identified human Geist and absolute Geist; but there were other nearer sources of this kind of totality-thinking who were far more important (Spinoza in particular²²) which did not, as Plotinus, find reality graduated from the noetic as most real to the material as least real. Hegel's conception of the end of thought and the end of history was of a complete refusion of mind and matter which spurned such gradations. Hence his insistence that Geist and the world were not strangers to each other²³), and his philosophising on objective forms taken by Geist (rights and property, family, civil society and State) are quite foreign to Plotinus's conception of what was important.

Concentration on their common ground would run the risk of neglecting the material interests of Hegel, to which Augustine's practical concerns are nearer than Plotinus's desire to escape from the body. Whilst noting that both Augustine and Hegel re-interpreted some Plotinian themes, it seems better to undertake a direct comparison between them. And the most convenient way of carrying this out is to propose the interpretation of Augustine's position on self-knowledge which Hegel himself would have made. The Hegelian reflections on self-knowledge, in their richness and subtlety, can find a place for the Augustinian statement.

²²) A sterile debate can be found in eighteenth century histories of philosophy over whether Plotinus was a Spinozist. The controversy may be pursued from the references in *Bibliotheca Graeca* of J.A. Fabricius, edited by G.C. HARLES, V, Hamburg 1746, pp. 693-4.

²³) cf. *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, SW 2, p. 336; translation (BAILLIE, London-New York 1949²) p. 458: '(Geist) is the *self* of the actual consciousness, to which (Geist) stands opposed, or rather which appears over against itself, as an objective world that has lost, however, all sense of strangeness for the self (für das Selbst alle Bedeutung eines Fremden), just as the self has lost all sense of having a dependent or independent existence by itself, cut off and separated from that world'.

There is no enormous difficulty in outlining the hermeneutic of Augustine which Hegel would have made. It would have judged his conception of thinking, self-thinking and thinking of God as something which later speculative thinking had surpassed, but whose true elements it would be willing to incorporate. It would doubtlessly have the generosity to indicate the elements in his thought which might have become related to each other and developed into a 'modern' system of thinking. Incompletion through an inappropriate search for a transcendent principle and an unnatural turning away from the world into a self-enclosed innerness, the soul in Augustinian thought was bound to the frustration of not coming to its union with the truth for which it was by its inner nature destined. And this would explain the sense of failure of Augustine which he felt over his inability to define a continuity between the image of God in the soul and its creator²⁴). The frustration of the Notion because it had been unable to fulfil the law of its universal nature! No doubt Hegel would insist that the experience of thought in Augustine was limited to a past and circumscribed view, whilst it was axiomatic that 'modern' thinking could explain and absorb all that was significant in him.

A HEGELIAN HERMENEUTIC OF AUGUSTINE

1) General Considerations

The foremost question here is the historical context of Augustine's thinking. He belonged to a period when epistemological problems were problems about the objective world particularly about the status of universal ideas, whereas in modern times this problem had been supplanted by other problems which seemed more important, if far more difficult, which follow on from the previously not deeply analysed presence of the subjectivity of the knower.

Hegel's position on this matter can be seen in the first part of the *Enzyklopädie* on logic where he gives a critique of three former attitudes on the question of objectivity and subjectivity²⁵), after which he proposes his own solution.

²⁴) *De Trinitate* XV, 26, 45: '... in ipso intellectu conatum me senserim magis habuisse quam effectum ... tria unius personae non sicut humana possit intentio, tribus illis personis convenire potuerunt'.

²⁵) System I, Vorbegriff, A, B, and C; translation chapters II, III, IV and V.

The first attitude was the pre-Kantian "old metaphysical system", characterised by 'finitude' and 'abstraction', in which the object was considered the only important thing and with which thought must identify itself in order to be true. The second attitude, exemplified by Kant, was perilously to separate subject from object: it was to be found in scepticism and, its seeming opposite, transcendental idealism. The third, of Hegel's romantic contemporaries, was to look inside oneself to discover there the truth directly present, thereby safe from the possible deceptions to which Kant had drawn attention. Then follows a fourth possibility: Hegel's development of suggestions put forward by Fichte and Schelling: that the total truth of a material object was that given to it by mind because the *ratio essendi* and the *ratio cognoscendi* of the thing were the same²⁶). "The Idea is truth in itself and for itself — the absolute unity of the notion and objectivity"²⁷). And not only is the certainty, but also the condition of the certainty rooted in self-knowledge: "Truth is contained in the certainty of spiritual pure self-consciousness, and is inseparably identical with it"²⁸). "It is manifest that behind the so-called curtain, which is to hide the inner world, there is nothing to be seen unless we ourselves go behind there, as much in order that we may thereby see, as that there may be something behind there which can be seen"²⁹). As every consciousness is self-consciousness³⁰) self-consciousness "will take into itself" the determinations belonging to the object of consciousness³¹) and go on until it "had produced those elements out of itself and thereby reinstated them once more as objects of consciousness"³²).

²⁶) Supposedly present in ARISTOTLE, v. supra: p. 221.

²⁷) System I, 213. SW 8, p. 423; translation p. 352. cf. *ib.*, 172 z: 'Truth ... lies in the coincidence (Uebereinstimmung) of the object with itself, that is with its notion': SW 8, p. 372; translation p. 305.

²⁸) Religion I, SW 15, p. 223; '... in der Gewissheit des geistigen reinen Selbstbewusstseyns die Wahrheit selbst enthalten und untrennbar identisch mit ihr ist'; translation I, p. 213.

²⁹) Phänomenologie. SW 2, p. 138; translation p. 121.

³⁰) Religion I, SW 15, p. 221: 'denn jedes Bewusstseyn ist Selbstbewusstseyn'; translation I, p. 211. cf. Phänomenologie, SW 2, p. 137: 'dass nicht allein das Bewusstseyn vom Dinge nur für ein Selbstbewusstseyn möglich ist, sondern dass diess allein die Wahrheit jener Gestalten ist'; translation p. 211-2.

³¹) Phänomenologie. SW 2, p. 527: 'sie durch sein Thun sich vollkommen angeeignet'; translation p. 697.

³²) *ib.* SW 2, p. 612: 'sie aus sich erzeugt und damit für das Bewusstseyn zugleich wieder hergestellt hat'; translation p. 800.

Because "consciousness distinguishes itself from something to which at the same time it relates itself"³³), two things are involved in the thinking process of which pre-Kantian metaphysics did not conceive. Firstly, there is an awareness that knowledge, as well as making for a union between subject and object, also establishes a discontinuity between them, so that knowledge no longer has about it the innocence of immediacy. Secondly, the mind has to go deeper into its "inner core ... (of) self-conscious consciousness"³⁴) to discover that the real truth of the object is the notion, which it has grasped at first obscurely, and at the same time to realise that when the notion is grasped it is "a moment of a connected whole"³⁵). And this connected whole is not an abstract identity: opposition and contradiction as well as any kind of difference can only exist because Geist, having created these differences, now holds them together in order to resolve them. "Mind endures contradiction because it knows that it contains no determination that it has not posited itself, and consequently that it cannot in turn get rid of"³⁶. "It is the essential nature of subjectivity to unite opposite principles within itself ... that they are set free"³⁷), for it is in the nature of mind both to create opposition and to reconcile it at depth³⁸). So there is a correspondence between the degree of externalisation and degree of difference of the objects united and the degree of interiorisation in which the unity comes about³⁹).

³³) *ib.* SW 2, p. 75; translation p. 139.

³⁴) *ib.* SW 2, p. 271; 'deren Inneres und Wesen es selbst ist (Selbstbewusstseyn)'. BAILLIE's translation (p. 374) is probably justified.

³⁵) Religion II. SW 16, p. 159; 'als Moment eines Zusammenhanges fassen'; translation II, p. 291.

³⁶) System III, 382 z. SW 10, p. 32: 'Der Widerspruch wird aber vom Geist ertragen, weil dieser keine Bestimmung in sich hat, die er nicht als eine von ihm gesetzte und folglich als eine solche wüsste, die er auch wieder aufheben kann'; translation p. 16.

³⁷) Religion II. SW 15, p. 438-9: '... in sich zu vereinen ... diesen Widerspruch zu ertragen und in sich aufzulösen ... dass sie losgelassen werden'; translation II, pp. 86-7.

³⁸) *ib.* III. SW 16, p. 280: 'der Geist ist das sich Unterscheiden, das Setzen von Unterschiedenen'; translation III, p. 70. *ib.*, p. 212: 'Geist ist nur diess selbst, im Gegensatz unendlich zu erfassen'; translation II, p. 352. (The development of a systematised conception of knowing based on the Aristotelian analysis of the common sense will be recognised behind the second quotation though not behind the first). For 'depth' (Tiefe) of opposition v. *ib.*, p. 270; (translation III, p. 59) and p. 277 (translation III, p. 66). Geist also becomes mediation between the extremes in the triadic tradition (*ib.*, p. 315; translation III, p. 107).

³⁹) Wissenschaft der Logik II. SW 5, p. 349: 'Jede neue Stufe des Aussersich gehens ... ist auch ein in-sich-gehen ...'; translation (JOHNSTON and STRUTHERS, London-New York 1929, II, p. 483). cf. Phänomenologie. SW 2, p. 191; translation p. 282.

This interiorisation is a particular characteristic of the modern spirit: "the grandeur of the modern world ... (is) the going down of the subject into itself whereby the finite (das Endliche) knows itself to be infinite (unendliches)"⁴⁰). But this process of subjectivisation also creates its problems. The principal one is that it has to find a properly subjective content for its objective data, and here the old epistemology cannot help it. "... (philosophy formerly) created an experience permeated through and through by universals. In modern times, however, an individual finds the abstract form ready made ... the production of the universal is abridged Nowadays the task before us (is) ... the very opposite: it consists in actualising the universal and giving it spiritual vitality by the power of breaking down and superseding fixed and determinate thoughts"⁴¹). There is also the reverse problem of "translating subjective purpose into objectivity"⁴²), for mere inwardness or mere self-consciousness is insufficient and one-sided, as among other reflections, a number of figures of the *Phenomenology* shows. And "a personality (which is) ... inherently infinite and universal (in sich unendlich und allgemein)" just cannot stand over against the world: it must "claim that external world as its own"⁴³).

But the perfection of self-consciousness is not obtained just by the fact of adjusting this one-sidedness and recognising itself in the external world: self-consciousness has to take possession of itself. "This taking possession (Besitznehmen) of oneself ... is the translation into actuality of what one is according to one's concept In that translation one's self-consciousness for the first time becomes established as one's own, as one's object also and distinct from self-consciousness pure and simple"⁴⁴).

⁴⁰) Religion III. SW 16, p. 212; translation II, p. 351.

⁴¹) Phänomenologie. SW 2, p. 35: '... durch das Aufheben der festen bestimmten Gedanken das Allgemeine zu verwirklichen und zu begeistern'; translation p. 94.

⁴²) Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts § 8: SW 7, p. 61; translation (KNOX, Oxford 1952) p. 24.

⁴³) *ib.* § 39: SW 7, p. 61; translation p. 38. (For an explanation of the self as universal v. System I, 24 z., and as infinite (by virtue of being self-related) *ib.*, 95 and 96 z.

⁴⁴) Recht § 57: SW 7, pp. 110-111; translation pp. 47-8. Some of the other incomplete forms of self-consciousness may be mentioned. Empirical self-consciousness: 'I am thoroughly immersed in determinateness, and am in the strict sense of the word subjective only, without objectivity and without universality', Religion I. SW 15, p. 139; translation I, p. 127. cf. Wiss. Log. II. SW 5, p. 266; translation II, p. 418. Also, Religion II. SW 16, pp. 122-3; translation p. 253. Abstract self-consciousness which 'isolates itself from itself' ... 'an inward trembling' (nur ein Zittern in sich ist), *ib.* II. SW 16, p. 151;

Self-consciousness discovers its identity with reason (Vernunft)⁴⁵), and that "when consciously certain of itself, it is all reality"⁴⁶). A parallel principle is given in terms of "die reine Personlichkeit": "The highest and acutest point is simple personality, which, by virtue alone of the absolute dialectic which is its nature, equally holds and comprehends everything within itself because it perfectly liberates itself — becomes simplicity which is first immediacy and universality"⁴⁷).

It is then able to exercise its universality and fulfil itself in accordance with its notion of making explicit the cognitional union of itself with everything else. "Self-consciousness then purifies its object, content and aim and raises them to universality"⁴⁸): it communicates its own universality to its object⁴⁹). This universality is more than the Aristotelian conception of universality, a rigid quality created by the understanding (Verstand): something that is merely held in common⁵⁰), abstract and contentless⁵¹), a common characteristic⁵²), something merely descriptive, a means of classification⁵³). As the universal is

translation II, p. 283. With this compare *ib.*, III. SW 16, p. 267, translation III, p. 56; also 'self-consciousness in the sense of a bare empty unit of the person ... empty universality' ('... als das reine leere Eins der Person ... leere Allgemeinheit') *Phänomenologie*. SW 2, p. 369; translation p. 503. Compare also the various more or less deliberate withdrawals from the world: 'it is ... the very nature of (Geist) to develop itself, to differentiate itself until it reaches the worldly sphere' (*bis zur Weltlichkeit*) (*Religion* III. SW 16, p. 342; translation III, p. 137); 'I can withdraw into myself ... in chains I can be free' (*Recht* ø 48 comment: SW 7, p. 102; translation pp. 43-44); Stoicism and scepticism as forms of self-consciousness (*Phänomenologie*. SW 2, pp. 158 ff; translation pp. 242 ff); the unhappy consciousness of unreconciled religious attitude (*ib.*, pp. 166 ff; translation pp. 251 ff); the 'beautiful soul' which flees all contact with reality: 'its light dims and dies within it, and it vanishes as a shapeless vapour dissolving into thin air' (*ib.*, p. 504; translation p. 667).

⁴⁵) *Phänomenologie*. SW 2, p. 183; translation p. 272.

⁴⁶) *ib.*, p. 301: 'in der Gewissheit seiner selbst alle Realität zu seyn'; translation p. 414.

⁴⁷) *Wiss. Log.* II: SW 5, p. 349; translation II, p. 483.

⁴⁸) *Recht* ø 21 comment: SW 7, p. 73; translation p. 30.

⁴⁹) *Religion* I. SW 15, p. 31: 'Den Gedanken, Vorstellungen, die ich mir zu eigen mache, denen gebe ich die Bestimmung, die ich selber bin' (that is, as universal: 'Ich, als einfach *allgemein*...') (*loc. cit.*). The sequel is undoubtedly an allusion to the Aristotelian subjectivity structure of *De Anima* III, 2, 427a 9-14: 'Ich bin dieser einfache Punkt und das, was für mich ist, will ich in dieser Einheit erkennen'. Translation p. 13.

⁵⁰) *System* I, 163 z. 1: SW 8, p. 358; translation p. 292.

⁵¹) *Religion* I, p. 205; translation I, p. 195. The context is of God, but the principle applies to any universal which is known.

⁵²) *Recht* ø 24 comment: SW 7, p. 75: 'die Gemeinschaftlichkeit oder die Allheit'; translation p. 31.

⁵³) *Phänomenologie*. SW 2, p. 193; translation pp. 244-5.

known in the particular⁵⁴), a complete knowledge of the universal must bring the individual and the universal together — in the “concrete universal”⁵⁵). For example, every self-consciousness in both universal (in Hegel’s sense) and particular⁵⁶).

The end of the process of knowledge, the arriving at the truth in the notion, is the recreation of an immediacy deeper than that which the process of self-conscious cognition broke up; self-consciousness has incorporated all otherness into itself and it can now go on to express this unseparated content in an objective form. Absolute knowledge is the perfect union of subjectivity and the objectivity which self-consciousness, with deliberation, has created from itself. In the religious sphere Absolute religion is described as “infinitely substantial subjectivity which makes itself both object and content”⁵⁷).

Augustine’s *De Trinitate* is, by Hegel’s criteria, a metaphysical treatment of self-knowledge like his own: not an empirical treatment⁵⁸). And yet, for all the comparable interest in self-knowledge in human knowing and in the Godhead, Augustine’s analysis would have to be located in the initial stages of Hegel’s dialectical approach. For in Augustine, the divine and the human remain distinguishable, the human not being absorbed into unity with the divine, and the human mind remaining at the stage of ingenuous immediacy: unaware that its object is in fact thought, and therefore, for all its self-knowing, really un-self-conscious. The dialectical process which could go on to produce absolute knowledge has not made the first detachment of itself from its object: attention — *intentio* — is not so much aware of making this break as setting on one side at the *acies mentis* the clamouring other demands on itself. Therefore, according to Hegel’s point of view, self-consciousness in Augustine would not really have begun to possess itself. So, Augustine, the most interior and subjective of the fathers of the Christian Church,

⁵⁴) Religion II. SW 15, p. 331: ‘im Endlichen das Unendliche, im Einzelnen das Allgemeine zu wissen’; translation I, p. 324.

⁵⁵) cf. *Phänomenologie*. SW 2, p. 229: ‘... jene wahre Allgemeinheit auf die Seite der Einzelheit, die dadurch eine lebendige ist’; translation p. 324: ‘True universality (is) ... organic concrete singleness’.

⁵⁶) *Recht* 7 comment: SW 7, p. 57; translation p. 23.

⁵⁷) Religion III. SW 16, p. 197; translation II, p. 334.

⁵⁸) System III, 377 and z.: SW 10, pp. 9 ff; translation pp. 1-2: ‘the knowledge ... of man’s genuine reality — of what is essentially and ultimately true and real — of mind as the true and essential being ... (and not the knowledge of) the peculiarities, passions and foibles of other men’.

would not have come near the end of the evolution of self-consciousness which Hegel thought possible and desirable!

Hegel himself was very conscious of the change of attention from objectivity to subjectivity and of its significance for religion and theology. "The object of theology as generally understood is to get to know the merely objective God, who is absolutely separated from the subjective consciousness, and is thus an outward object just as the sun, the sky, etcetera, are objects of consciousness, and here the object is perfectly characterised as an other, as something external. In contrast to this the notion of the absolute religion can be so presented as to suggest that what we have got to do is not anything of this external sort, but religion itself, i.e. the unity of the idea which we call God with the conscious subject (*die Einheit dieser Vorstellung, die wir Gott heissen, mit dem Subject*).... We cannot know God as object or get a real knowledge of him, and the main thing, what we are really concerned about, is merely the subjective manner of knowing him and our subjective religious condition. We may recognise this standpoint as described in what has just been said. It is the standpoint of the age, but at the same time it represents a most important advance by which an infinite moment has had its due value recognised, for it involves the recognition of the consciousness of the subject as constituting an absolute moment. The same content is seen to exist in both sides, and it is this potential or true Being of the two sides which is religion. The great advance which marks our time consists in the recognition of subjectivity as an absolute moment, and this is therefore essentially determination or characterisation (*Bestimmung*). The whole question, however, turns on how subjectivity is determined or characterised"⁵⁹).

By Hegel's standards Augustine's looking for images of the Trinity in the soul in terms of thinking and willing would be a subjective investigation much like his own. But by the same standard Augustine would lack the subjective awareness of what he was doing, and it would therefore not be surprising that he should be discontented with his incomplete interrelationship between the mind and God. In common with pre-Kantian thinkers Augustine did not notice that the God whom he described as being "*sine indigentia creatorem*"⁶⁰) was already in that statement reconstructed in his mind with a relationship to creation which

⁵⁹) Religion III. SW 16, pp. 194-5; translation II, pp. 330-1.

⁶⁰) *De Trinitate* V, 1, 2.

was not put out of sight, perhaps never put out of sight. The Hegelian critique would go on to point out that already God and creation, the two opposites, had been noetically united; and recognition of the fact of this already unitive thinking would have provided the means of interrelationships between God and man: rather, would have been a discovery of the existence in mind of this interrelationship. Even in the matter of worship, which both Augustine and Hegel see as the practical way in which this union is attained, whereas Augustine's speculation halts before the incomprehensible, Hegel's speculation sees a union in Geist⁶¹). That this facility would have been obtained at a cost which Augustine would not have been willing to pay, and at a place which happens to be the vulnerable point of Hegelian dialectic, we shall see.

2) Particular Questions

i) The *Cogito* and *Mens et notitia sui*

The presence of the *cogito* in Augustine's thinking would no doubt have put Hegel in mind of its appearance in Descartes, from whom he dated the beginning of the 'new' period of philosophy⁶²). But to use it merely to provide an assurance against the temptation to complete scepticism and not as a principle which established the transcendent certainty of thinking would have been to have failed to pursue the principle to its completeness⁶³).

Augustine's assertion of the identity in equality of mind, self-knowledge and self-love would have provided the chance of regarding mind and self-knowledge as equivalents. This should have made possible the defining of *mens* in its self-conformity (through self-knowledge) as universal and infinite. Augustine's line of argument which leads on to the

⁶¹) cf. *ib.* XIV, 1, 1: 'cultus Dei sapientia est hominis'. Hegel: v. Religion I. SW 15, p. 86: 'Der Cultus ist also überhaupt der ewige Process des Subjects, sich mit seinen Wesen identisch zu setzen'; translation I, p. 70. cf. *ib.*, p. 221: 'diese concrete Einheit hervorzubringen'; translation I, p. 210. Also II. SW 16, p. 126; translation II, p. 256; and *ib.*, p. 136: 'der Mensch muss beim Empfang der Gabe die Negation des subjectiven Selbstbewusstseyns leisten'; translation p. 267; *Phänomenologie*. SW 2, p. 411: 'durch das Aufheben des sinnlichen Wissens und Thuns das Bewusstseyn der Einheit mit dem an-und-fürsichseynenden Wesen hervor'; translation p. 556.

⁶²) *Gesch. Phil.* III. SW 19, p. 334: 'mit Descartes beginnt die neue Epoche der Philosophie'; translation III, p. 223.

⁶³) *ib.*, p. 338: 'Ich hat die Bedeutung als Denken, nichts Einzelheit des Selbstbewusstseyns'; cf. translation (of another edition) p. 227. By contrast, Augustine's *cogito* does certify to the self in its singleness.

statement that consciousness presupposes self-consciousness might then be regarded as an insight into the universal nature of the *mens* and the relationship of all knowledge to its infinite capacity. But the reasoning of Augustine would have seemed hesitant: more intuitive than thoroughly analysed.

So there would appear to be two principles capable of providing the foundation of a system of subjectivity, but which remained as disconnected fragments. Still, if this development was not made both principles themselves could be seen as pointing out the path that Geist was taking, fully within the central stream of its tradition.

ii) The necessity of a centre of consciousness and the place of memory

Even though Hegel's commentary on *De Anima* III, 2 in the *Geschichte der Philosophie* about sense perceptions coming together as at a point⁶⁴) does not extend the principle to intellectual knowledge we have seen that he does so elsewhere⁶⁵). The need of a centre of reference to relate different objects, even opposites together, not absent from Aristotle, more greatly preoccupied Hegel who gave this matter a thoroughly systematic dialectical development. But while Hegel respected the distinctness of sensation from thought, his comprehensive treatment did not show hesitation at their division; the union of knowledge of singulars with knowledge of universals was made to be a more penetrative type of intellectual knowledge. Sense perception is raised into the higher degrees of cognition⁶⁶). But Geist itself "is not an abstractly simple entity, but a system of processes"⁶⁷), and in the last resort it is Geist itself, embracing all differences and contradictions and all experience, yet processual and not unmoved, which is the place where all knowing becomes interrelated until it is total in depth and extension. Geist is the locus of meaningful knowledge because it is the place of the

⁶⁴) v. supra n. 6.

⁶⁵) v. supra n. 49.

⁶⁶) Religion II. SW 16, p. 118: '... als aufgehobenes ... Der Gedanke soll für die Anschauung seyn was geoffenbart wird, ist einerseits die sinnliche Weise, und dasjenige, was wahrgenommen wird, ist zugleich der Gedanke, das Allgemeine'; translation II, p. 248. cf. *Phänomenologie*. SW 2, p. 337: 'Alle bisherigen Gestalten des Bewusstseyns sind Abstraktionen desselben (Geist) ... Der Geist ist also Bewusstseyn überhaupt, was sinnliche Gewissheit Wahrnehmen und den Verstand in sich begreift'; translation p. 459.

⁶⁷) *Phänomenologie*. SW 2, p. 254: 'der Geist selbst nicht ein Abstrakt-einfaches ist, sondern ein System von Bewegungen'; translation p. 353. cf. *Recht* § 343: SW 7, p. 447: '(Geist) ist nur, was er that'; translation p. 216.

unification of all experience. But, according to Hegel, total experience meant not only unity but negation and distinction in Geist, which must not be thought of as apart from its own processes. A system of centralisation of knowledge as in the common sense or the memory of Augustine dealt more with how experience ought to come together, in a hazily conceived otherness; it did not bear the mark of the distinguishing and contrasting which characterised the real processes of thought, and it was necessary to go beyond it. The way in which experience should be interrelated was not (in the Hegelian sense) 'abstract' and in terms of an imagined centre, but processual.

Yet, even if it is processual the process needs to be internalised. And here Hegel's remarks on memory — 'Erinnerung' — do have some remarkable likeness to Augustine's on *memoria*. This is found in the sections on Erinnerung, Einbildungskraft and Gedächtnis in the third part of the *Enzyklopädie*⁶⁸): particularly in the former. In the treatment of Gedächtnis he is more concerned to consider the relationship of remembered words to their thought content; and this will be considered later.

As with Augustine's *memoria*, the process of Erinnerung is not just the process of recollection. It is concerned with the incorporation of an external object within the knower so that it can be considered "in a space and time of (the subject's) own"; not in "the particularity of space and time to which, in its immediacy it is tied and on which I, too, am dependent in feeling and intuition"⁶⁹). So, as in Augustine, reception of an object into the memory is not distinguished from the initial cognition, and is made the beginning of knowledge. Though memory is not the overall centre of cognition with Hegel, it has to be remembered that its functions continue in its sublation into Geist. And further, while accepting the existence of an external measure of time, Hegel has some interesting remarks on subjective time relatable to Plotinus's conception, as also to Augustine's, of time as a *distensio animae*. Thus, "all that happens possesses duration for us only when it is taken up by intelligence (vorstellende Intelligenz), whereas whatever happenings are deemed unworthy of being so taken up become things wholly of the past.... In intuition (Anschauung) time becomes short for us when we have plenty to perceive, but long when the lack of given content drives us to the

⁶⁸) System III, 452 ff: SW 10, 330 ff; translation p. 203 ff.

⁶⁹) *ib.*, 452 z.; translation p. 203.

contemplation of empty subjectivity ... conversely, in mental representation (*Vorstellung*), those things, those times in which we were occupied in various different ways appear long to us, whereas those times in which we were not very busy seem to be short"⁷⁰). In much the same way as in the thought of Plotinus and Augustine, lack of concentration and dissipation of attention are linked with a wearisome passage of time. Hegel expresses the same pattern in a more general way, and adds to it the human observation that experience does not *seem* to be like this from outside.

In his examination of the laws of association in the imagination⁷¹) he gives more than the formal account in Aristotle and Augustine⁷²): the fundamental fact of the identity of self-consciousness with all reality gives the possibility of making an explanation of why there should be any association at all.

iii) Self-Knowing as a Basis of Consciousness

It will be recalled that in Augustine, self-knowledge was stated to be the condition of any knowledge, and this was because of the identification of *mens* and *notitia sui*⁷³), Augustine's humanistic location of self-knowing *νοῦς*.

The interrelation of consciousness and self-consciousness is of cardinal importance for Hegel, and is a constant theme. The essence of the position in the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* is as follows. From the infinitude of its capacity for knowing there comes about in mind a virtual unification of itself with its object — of which the distinction which consciousness makes between itself and its object is a contradiction in the self-consciousness which knows itself to be all things⁷⁴). Yet in fact it needs this otherness of being all things: "When for self-consciousness the distinction (of itself from the world of sense and perception) does not have the shape of being, it is not self-consciousness. For self-consciousness, then, otherness is a fact, it does exist as a distinct moment; but the unity of itself with this difference is also a fact for self-

⁷⁰) *ib.* Translation pp. 203-4.

⁷¹) *ib.*, ø 455: p. 335 ff; translation p. 206 ff.

⁷²) v. *De Memoria et Reminiscentia* 2; *De Trinitate* XI, 4, 7 and XII, 14, 23.

⁷³) *De Trinitate* IX, 4, 5: '... non amor et cognitio tamquam in subjecto insunt menti, sed substantialiter etiam ista sunt sicut ipsa mens'.

⁷⁴) *Phänomenologie*. SW 2, p. 136-7: 'es ist Unterscheiden des Ununterschiedenen, oder Selbstbewusstseyn'; translation p. 211.

consciousness, and is a second distinct moment. With the first moment, self-consciousness occupies the position of consciousness and the whole expanse of the world of sense is conserved as its object, but at the same time only as related to the second moment, the unity of self-consciousness with itself⁷⁵). And he is able to produce his own foundation, substantially in accord with that of Augustine, and, like his, deriving from the Aristotelian legacy of νόησις νοήσεως.

"... not merely is consciousness of a thing only possible for a self-consciousness, but ... this self-consciousness alone is the truth of those attitudes. But it is only for us (who trace this process) that this truth is actually present; it is not yet so far the consciousness immersed in the experience"⁷⁶).

The process is described in greater clarity in the *Enzyklopädie*:

"I have in the one and same consciousness myself and the world ... in the world I find myself again, ... and conversely, in my consciousness I have what is, what possesses objectivity".

Upon this realisation, the first reaction is to suppose that self-consciousness is something distinct from the outer world, and is confined to self-knowing: "abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness"⁷⁸). From this realisation arise two processes: the abstract self-consciousness which has detached itself from the outer world must give itself content and objectivity, and it must shed any sensuous aspects (*Sinnlichkeit*) from its knowing in order to identify the object with itself. "The two processes are one and the same, the identification of consciousness and self-consciousness"⁷⁹); and so "self-consciousness thus reaches the stage where it does not have consciousness alongside it, is not externally connected with it, but truly pervades it and contains it dissolved within it"⁸⁰).

The Augustinian self-consciousness was never self-consciously aware that its object as thought was always noetically related to and

⁷⁵) *Phänomenologie*. SW 2, p. 141; translation pp. 219-220.

⁷⁶) *ib.*, p. 137. BAILLIE's translation (pp. 211-2) which makes "für uns", a normal expression in Hegel, stand for the *philosophic* investigator is unnecessarily restrictive. "... nicht allein das Bewusstseyn vom Dinge nur für ein Selbstbewusstseyn möglich ist, sondern dass diess allein die Wahrheit jener Gestalten ist. Aber für uns nur ist diese Wahrheit vorhanden, noch nicht für das Bewusstseyn". cf. *Religion I*. SW 15, p. 221: "jedes Bewusstseyn ist Selbstbewusstseyn"; translation I, p. 211.

⁷⁷) *System III*, 424 z: SW 10, p. 273; translation p. 165.

⁷⁸) *ib.*, 425: p. 273; translation *ib.*

⁷⁹) *ib.*, p. 274; translation p. 166.

⁸⁰) *ib.*, z.

absorbed by itself. So it remained a *condition* of the knowledge of other things, not the *substance* of that knowledge. Certainly it did not find itself in the material world. The self-consciousness of the triads of self-knowing, both the deep, underlying one of self-remembering, self-knowing and self-loving, as well as the knowing of itself as object in act, reach no further, in Hegelian terms, than abstract self-consciousness. Even when self-consciousness realises that 'it has never not known itself', the other-than-self is not a factor in its discovery which is purely inward-turning; and therefore this self-consciousness is steadfastly orientated by Hegelian standards to a position of incompleteness.

The position of Hegel that self-consciousness knows itself implicitly in the object of its consciousness has two developments that are of interest in a comparison with Augustine.

Firstly, Hegel's conception that self-consciousness finds itself in its object gives a place for a function of the will, with a possible extension to include love⁸¹). Both 'Begierde' and 'Trieb' have the function of correcting the 'one-sidedness' of subjectivity when self-consciousness has discovered its underlying unity with its object. Thus through 'Begierde' the 'seeming independence' of the object is nullified because it "is, in fact, a being which neither merits nor is capable of an existence of its own, but must succumb to the real power of the subject"⁸²). And 'Trieb', assured that the mind's "contents are at once potentially existent and are the mind's own", brings it about both that the content of knowledge is objective and in the knower, and what it conceives shall come about objectively⁸³). So here are a number of subtle variants of a triadic epistemic pattern, somewhat more psychologically conceived than Augustine's. More will be said below of Augustine's triads as proto-dialectical structures in Hegel's sense. But it is worth pausing to consider the implications of Hegel's teaching on 'Begierde' and 'Trieb'. If absolute

⁸¹) Hegel's conceptions of desire, will and any other conception which can be related to Augustine's idea of love are distinguished by the degree of self-conscious consciousness involved. Thus 'Begierde' (appetitive or instinctive desire) is related to consciousness (System III, 426 ff: SW 10, p. 276 ff; translation p. 107 ff), whilst 'Trieb' (impulse) is denied to consciousness, but is in fact attributed to mind — both theoretical (in its craving to know) and practical (= will (Wille)), as it objectifies its subjective determinations (*ib.*, 443 z., p. 302 ff; translation p. 185). With love Hegel's thought is primarily union with another (cf. 'seine sich empfindende Einheit, die Liebe': Recht 158, SW 7, p. 237; translation p. 110); with Augustine self-love is the condition of love of another.

⁸²) System III, 426 z: SW 10, p. 277; translation p. 168.

⁸³) *ib.*, 443 and z: *ib.*, pp. 302-3; translation pp. 184-5.

Geist were to become present in the world in the totality of its self-conscious consciousness, there would be no limits to its universal power of knowing and loving, and it would unite itself to whatever it wished. Universality of knowing and universality of satisfied desire in consequence would entail complete unification in the same absolute thought-being, together with everything else. Augustine clearly rejected a similar unification in the thought-being of Plotinus, but, to Hegel the pointers to this development would already exist in Augustine. The identity of *mens* with its *notitia sui* established its infinitude, with which its *amor sui* would be commensurate.

Secondly, it shows an interest in an area where philosophically Augustine reveals none, though he treats the same reality in the setting of charity and the nature of the Church. That is to say, that the universality of the identification of self-knowledge with every other object has to include other self-consciousness. Thus 'self-conscious recognition' (das anerkennende Selbstbewusstsein) is taken as a basis for social life, such that the mutual recognition of self-consciousness goes, *pari passu*, with the development of individual self-consciousness.

"In the state of universal freedom, in being reflected into myself, I am immediately reflected into the other person, and conversely, in relating myself into the other person I am immediately self-related"⁸⁴).

iv) The knowledge triads as proto-dialectical structures

On the grounds that it does not take into account "the activity of the Notion — an activity which it is implicitly but not consciously" (nur an sich ist, aber nicht für sich)⁸⁵), Hegel sets himself against an Aristotelian principle "nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerat in sensu" which he restates as "nihil in sensu quod non fuerat in intellectu"⁸⁶). He explains

⁸⁴) *ib.*, 436 z: *ib.*, p. 290; translation p. 176-7. cf. *Phänomenologie*. SW 2, p. 146; translation p. 226: 'self-consciousness only attains satisfaction in another self-consciousness'; Religion III. SW 16, p. 239 and translation III, pp. 24-5: 'In friendship I give up my abstract personality and receive it back as concrete personality'. For Hegel on the love of the 'Spiritual Community', which transcends the particularity of friendship, v. *ib.*, pp. 313 ff. and translation pp. 105 ff.

⁸⁵) System I, 226 z: SW 8, p. 436; translation p. 364.

⁸⁶) *ib.*, 8: p. 52; translation p. 15.

in *Geschichte der Philosophie* II⁸⁷) that the opposite dictum misrepresents Aristotle's true position, and is but one example how well-known examples and dicta supposedly drawn from Aristotle do not contain the whole truth.

His translation of *De Anima* III, 5 — "Now it has already been said that passivity is so determined that understanding is in potentiality all that thought is exercised on: but at the same time it is in actuality nothing before the exercise of thought", — allows him to make the interpretation, "thought is implicitly the content of the object of what is thought, and in coming into existence it only coincides with itself"⁸⁸). If the Hegel translation could be allowed, his dialectical interpretation of knowing would be little more than the meaning of Aristotle: the difference between subject and object is sublimated into the pre-existing, implicit unity in thought. The basis of the dialectical relationship between subject and object — "I relate myself to an object ... but consciousness is at the same time the relation of these two independent things to each other, a relation in which they appear as one"^{88a}) — is the discovery by the subject that it is already in the object: "There is something in its object concealed from consciousness if the object is for consciousness something 'other', or something alien, and if consciousness does not know the object as itself"⁸⁹).

Although the process of cognition can be expressed in terms which do not involve the will, it can be more fully expressed in this way: in an

⁸⁷) v. Second edition of Hegel's Werke (Berlin 1840-44), *Geschichte der Philosophie* II, vol. 14, pp. 341-3; translation (which follows this edition) pp. 193-7.

⁸⁸) *ib.*, p. 342: 'Nun haben wir das Leiden vorhin überhaupt so bestimmt, dass der Verstand der Möglichkeit nach alles Gedachte ist: aber zugleich der Wirklichkeit nach nichts, ehe gedacht worden'; translation p. 196. KERN has studied Hegel's translation of *De Anima* III, 4-5 and included a transcription of a handwritten translation found among Hegel's papers in his doctorate dissertation: *Hegels Aristoteles-Vorlesungen* (Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana) Rome 1955. The same writer has drawn attention to the significant alteration which Hegel made to Aristotle's thought by his omission of 'πῶς' — 'in some way'. "The nous is all noeta", says Hegel in 1819. But does not Aristotle say the same: ἡ ψυχὴ ὄντα πῶς ἐστὶ πάντα? Just this 'πῶς' which calls for a modification has been omitted by Hegel. And also the νοῦς παθητικός is essentially related to the material world, which conditions its receptivity (a sign of which is its changeableness). Again it is not said that the νοῦς which is universally able to receive all things is identical with the raising into universality of what is potential into the activity of Geist' (Die Aristotelesdeutung ..., p. 254).

^{88a}) Religion I. SW 15, p. 120; translation I, p. 107.

⁸⁹) Phänomenologie. SW 2, p. 577; translation p. 759.

act of deliberate identification of subject with object, which implies as well a recognition of their separation. "... the separation of subject and object makes its first appearance as will" (im Willen)⁹⁰). Hegel wrote a particularly sensitive description of the nature of attention ('Aufmerksamkeit'), the equivalent of Augustine's *intentio* — though the comparable situation to Augustine's (where there is a need to fix the attention on something else as one's own, with the implication that it is other) merits the description of attention as "a mental, i.e. an abstract, externality ... that is still quite formal, without content"⁹¹). But having broken up the immediacy of knowledge by its assertion of a separation between subject and object, the will "annuls the contradiction between subjectivity and objectivity"⁹²); and at a later stage, through its collective realisation in society and the state, translates subjectivity into objectivity⁹³).

The Augustinian cognitional triad depends on the distinct existence of the will as well as the distinct existence of subject and object, in a unity which, especially in external cognition, was admittedly imperfect, an aggregation of factors. The interrelation of will and mind by Hegel was more nuanced. According to him, they are separate from each other in ordinary thinking⁹⁴). But, unlike ordinary consciousness, the higher philosophical consciousness sees their identity in what is the reverse of the sublation of will into mind by Plotinus: "thought determines itself into will and remains the substance of the latter"⁹⁵). It does not matter for the Hegelian process that will should be distinct from the mind at the level of ordinary consciousness and united with it at a higher level, and that the clearcutness of the distinction between object and subject should be both posited and then sublated. But it is necessary for the Augustinian process that subject, will and object should be distinct if they are to make up an image of the divine Trinity. This pattern demands that they should remain a paradoxical unity in division; and its resemblance to a dialectical unity, because it is also triadic, is only superficial: the basis of the dialectical unity in the Hegelian sense is absent — the self-conscious

⁹⁰) Religion I. SW 15, p. 220; translation I, p. 210.

⁹¹) System III, 448 z: SW 10, p. 322; translation p. 198.

⁹²) Recht ø 28: SW 7, p. 78; translation p. 32. cf. Wiss. Log. II. SW 5, p. 275; translation II, p. 425.

⁹³) Recht ø 109: SW 7, p. 168; translation p. 77. cf. ø 110-113.

⁹⁴) System III, 468 z: SW 10, p. 364; translation p. 228.

⁹⁵) *ib.*, cf. Recht ø 5.

consciousness of mind into which, a pre-existing unity, subject and object resolve.

The turning point in Augustine's *De Trinitate* from triads of outward cognition (with internal triad of memory) to inner cognition is the group of triads of faith. It is only after them that Augustine turns to triads of purely speculative thinking, and ultimately (still in a speculative and not fideistic way) to cognitional triads which have God as object. Even so the speculative triads are not divorced from the phenomena of faith. The cognitional triads, which become more unitary relative to their degree of interiorisation, have the religious aspect of bringing out increasingly in the knower the image of God. The genre of the *De Trinitate* is the same as Hegel's: a speculative reflection into the divine object of Christian faith and the divine elements which arise in human nature. Though they seem arranged according to a simple schema of increasing unification, and interiorisation, there is no evidence in the text to warrant an interpretation of the triads of the *De Trinitate* by which they would be connected dialectically with each other; there is nothing more to interrelate them than the course of a typical Augustinian 'elevation'. That the faith triads have the place they do, and that they are followed by the triad of self-knowledge, does not mean that subjectivity arises in a dialectical way out of an abstractly objective conception of God. Rather they affirm, at the appropriate place in this elevation, that all that follows about the inner man should be seen in the context of belief, and that an interiority without real belief is an incomplete interiority.

That the first two triads of faith distinguish between 'the memory of the sound of words' in which it is embodied and 'the understanding of the meaning of those words' constitutes a parallel to Hegel. It is sometimes assumed by writers on both Augustine and Hegel alike that the word is sufficient in itself, as a vehicle of meaning and thought. Yet in Augustine's thinking the nature of the *verbum cordis*, precursor of the *verbum oris*, is such that it need not be a complex of words. It is often said of Hegel that for him there is no thinking outside of the medium of written, spoken or thought words. It is as well to know that Hegel explicitly considers the case when words are used but a thought-content does not automatically become present:

"Just as the true *thought* is the very thing itself, so too is the *word* when it is employed by genuine thinking. Intelligence, therefore, in filling itself with the word receives into itself the nature of the

thing. But this reception has, at the same time, the meaning that intelligence thereby takes on the nature of a thing and to such a degree that subjectivity, in its distinctness from the thing, becomes quite empty, a mindless confusion of words, that is, a mechanical memory"⁹⁶).

So in the passage into inwardness it is true that Augustine does show a passing interest in what is in fact a problem of subjectivity. But the contrast between the inner triads that follow and the subjectivity structure of Hegel could not be greater. For Hegel, subjectivity is one-sided until it has re-created an objective content for itself; in Augustine subjectivity turns its back on the world — on objectivity. However Augustine's inner triads do find a different kind of objectivity: the more developed of the faith triads find their object of knowledge and love in the God, whose being 'beyond' knowledge Hegel rejects; but the purely speculative approach falters, and Augustine confesses his sense of failure — at his inability, speculatively, to cross the divide which faith has already crossed.

Augustine's triad of self-knowledge in *De Trinitate* XIV, VI, 8 does have some approximation to a dialectical form in so far as an existing self-knowledge is presupposed⁹⁷); it is the nearest he comes in his triads to the sense of separated things being united together by the power of mind, an explanation offered in order to exhibit the essential simplicity of the self, even in the act of self-knowledge, against the neo-Platonist duality. But its significance in the Hegelian scale is limited: its product is only abstract self-consciousness. By deliberate intention it has as its content itself as separate from the external world. But according to Hegel this deliberate self-restriction would prevent it from experiencing its own universality to the full. This kind of self-knowledge is not mind taking possession of itself in self-consciousness. It is merely "self-certainty"⁹⁸).

"In it self-consciousness has arrived at a consciousness of its own substance. At the same time, as we find self-consciousness here, it is a consciousness of its substance which has arisen, and hence is immediate; and this is the specific way in which we find

⁹⁶) System III, 462 z: SW 10, p. 355-6; translation p. 221.

⁹⁷) 'Nec ita sane gignit istam notitiam suam mens, quando cogitando intellectus se conspicit, tamquam sibi ante incognita fuerit'.

⁹⁸) *Phänomenologie*. SW 2, p. 310: 'nur die Gewissheit seiner selbst in ihrer Wahrheit'; translation p. 425.

spirit at the present stage: it has not reached its truly real substance"⁹⁹).

That is, it has not realised its presence in everything; in particular, it has not realised the nature of its presence to other self-consciousnesses in the giving and receiving of recognition. That Augustine expects the individual to suppose that others are like himself rather than allow their recognition of him in society to contribute to his own development would be taken by Hegel as an indication of faulty orientation¹⁰⁰).

In the highest and most god-like triad — in which man looks not at himself but at God — Augustine's analysis reverts to the triad of acts of memory, intelligence and willing which he found first in the triad of inner self-knowledge¹⁰¹). Augustine seemed to be developing his thought under the impetus of a desire to establish the continuity of human activity with the divine counterparts with which it corresponded, until he realised that this would lead him into a heretical position, appropriating the three activities to separate Persons and thus making their Personality incomplete¹⁰²). Hegel reflected on precisely this problem, and it was an integral part of his system that Geist was in fact relating and thus uniting the human and divine in a continuity which would be quite clear to a truly self-conscious consciousness; he rejected the existence of a supra-sensible 'beyond' as 'the error of a one-sided, empty ratiocination'¹⁰³), a characteristically limited and abstract creation of the understanding¹⁰⁴).

For him, it was necessary to understand that God and man are opposites who are to be related to each other through Geist. For "(Geist) is not something having a single existence, but is (Geist) only in being objective to itself and beholding itself in its 'Other' as itself"¹⁰⁵). "It relates itself as within itself to itself, and it relates itself to things, which things are for it universal independence"¹⁰⁶). But Geist and its other have to be brought together.

"In so far as I know certainly that God is, knowledge is a connection between myself and this content; as certainly as I exist

⁹⁹) *ib.*, p. 315; translation p. 431.

¹⁰⁰) 'Unde enim mens aliquam mentem novit si se non novit' (*De Trinitate* IX, 3, 3).

¹⁰¹) The triad is found in *De Trinitate* XIV, 12, 15 and XV, 20, 39.

¹⁰²) *ib.* XV, 26, 45.

¹⁰³) Recht (Vorrede): SW 7, p. 32-33; translation p. 10.

¹⁰⁴) *Phänomenologie*. SW 2, p. 518; translation p. 686.

¹⁰⁵) Religion, Einleitung: SW 15, p. 82; translation I, p. 66.

¹⁰⁶) *ib.* II. SW 15, p. 359; translation II, p. 5. Things attain independence by existing in a self-consciousness in a universal way and therefore freely.

so certainly does God exist. My being and the being of God are thus connected together in one, and the relation is Being; this Being is simple, and at the same time double or two-fold"¹⁰⁷).

It is true that there are many texts in Hegel in which this being is described as simple, without its simultaneous duality, thus "(Geist) is accordingly the living process by which the implicit unity of divine and human natures becomes actual and comes to have definite existence"¹⁰⁸). But the edge of pantheistic accusation is blunted when it is seen that the dialectical relationship involves a difference as well as an identity: "God is self-consciousness, He knows himself in a consciousness which is *distinct* from him ... *Finite* consciousness knows God only to the extent to which God knows himself in it"¹⁰⁹). The dialectical unity in duality is ambiguous by the standards of older metaphysics, but yet it is an insistence on the necessary diversity of objects within subjectivity, correlative to their unity at a point in consciousness which is the structure we have followed from Aristotle through neo-Platonism: for Hegel the opposition between objects in knowledge is as essential as the point which unites them. Refusing to accept 'abstract' entities outside the processes of mind, it follows that infinite Geist 'needs' its opposite, finitude, in order to be what it is, and must have this opposite within itself¹¹⁰). Quite aware of the paradox, Hegel's intention was in itself unambiguous: it was to propose a way in which mind binds differences together, and therefore to make possible an understanding of what would otherwise be independent and therefore meaningless and unintelligible.

¹⁰⁷) *ib.* I, pp. 172-3; translation p. 161: '... diess Seyn ist ein einfaches und zugleich ein zweifaches'. The whole of the Hegelian ambiguity rests in this sentence: not some recondite thought, but an expression of the dialectical principle of his system. From texts like those quoted below the charge of 'pantheism' has arisen, which, in an oriental sense, would be wide of the mark, and also the charge of 'panpsychism', which is nearer. But to give Hegel the justice of a complete presentation it is necessary to point out that unity of and division between God and man exist together. A. CHAPPELLE, has collected the texts in which Hegel makes a distinction between God and man — reassuring for orthodox believers, but not giving Hegel the justice of a complete account (v. Hegel et la Religion III. Paris 1971, pp. 131-135 and Notes, especially Note 74).

¹⁰⁸) *ib.* III, p. 210; translation p. 349.

¹⁰⁹) *ib.* III. SW 16, p. 192: 'Gott ist selbstbewusstseyn, er weiss sich in einem von ihm verschiedenen Bewusstseyn'; translation II, p. 327.

¹¹⁰) *Phänomenologie*. SW 2, p. 53; translation p. 115.

v) Speculative theories about the Trinity

In his speculative account of the Trinity, Augustine used familiar conceptions firstly, for reasons of instruction, to draw analogies with quite basic and well known aspects of the human mind, and secondly, for reasons of orthodoxy, because the fixity of these conceptions — memory, understanding, will — were appropriate for expressing in an image the distinctness of the Persons. Even so, the paradoxical quasi-dialectical unity in diversity achieved was greater than in the neo-Platonist subordinationism. Hegel's principle account of the Trinity¹¹¹) begins with a statement on the limitations of the understanding (*Verstand*) and its rigid categories: "the absolute independence of the unit or this idea of absolute separation and rupture"¹¹²). The hermeneutic divide between Augustine and Hegel prevents any certain parallels being drawn between the two Trinitarian systems. The distinction between the dead, classifying activity of the *Verstand* and the creativity of the *Vernunft* was quite unknown to Augustine, and in place of a dialectical unity which was the product of *Geist* revealing the unity in division which it already contained, an activity perfectly in conformity with its nature, Augustine's triads were, from the point of view of their unity, mere paradoxes. If anything, Augustine's terminology would tend to the rigidity which Hegel thought that *Geist* at its highest would transcend; and this rigidity matched the need of his system to regard the divine persons as really distinct. For example, when Augustine spoke of a person he meant a distinct thinking being; but when Hegel spoke of a person he emphasised the qualities which were the opposite of this: "it is the nature or character of what we mean by person or subject to abolish its isolation, its separateness"¹¹³).

This is understandable only in a system of thinking, in which the individual is conceived of as universal self-consciousness, communicating his own universality to everything he knows. Particularly it presupposes what Augustine never for a moment entertained, that there is an absolute *Geist* which will ultimately contain all determinations within itself:

¹¹¹) Religion III. SW 16, especially pp. 236 ff.; translation p. 21 ff. cf. *ib.* II. SW 15, p. 448 (translation II, p. 97); *ib.* p. 468 (translation p. 118); *ib.* SW 16, p. 51 (translation II, p. 176); *ib.* III. SW 16, p. 308 (translation III, pp. 99-100); *ib.*, pp. 314-5 (translation p. 107); *Phänomenologie*. SW 2, p. 410 (translation p. 554); *ib.*, p. 583 (translation p. 767); *System* III, 383 z: SW 10, pp. 34-5 (translation p. 17).

¹¹²) Religion III. SW 16, p. 238; translation III, p. 23.

¹¹³) *ib.*, p. 239; translation p. 24.

which poses all divisions, but at the same time has the power of reuniting them within itself. For Augustine the presupposition is that there are so many sensible and supra-sensible objects which happen to be known in thought. They are all created, but they have an existence in themselves, and though they may give rise to thinking by a particular individual, they remain detached from it. Thus, the trinitarian theory of Hegel proposes realities and categories which went beyond the subject matter of Augustine and mental experiences of which he had never conceived. Although the hermeneutical divide between them prevents a meaningful complete comparison being made there is one respect in which their reflections have some equivalence, though in Augustine this occurs in the first part of the *De Trinitate*, before that which has been looked at in detail. It is the notion of the Holy Spirit as Love uniting the other two Persons.

The conception of the Son as *Verbum Patris* was very much developed by Augustine: not surprisingly, for it was a deeply Biblical theme: the Father as mind, the Son as the thought of Himself. In this conception, now become quite commonplace in the tradition of Christian theology Hegel saw the characteristic of Geist: that it knew itself in its other, which in this case was still itself (and therefore could still be different from the other 'other' of creation)¹¹⁴). If Geist always knows *itself* in its other the basis of a unity in diversity is there. In this distinguishing between itself and its other, which was yet no distinguishing, the love of the Spirit comes, as it does in Augustine, to link the distinguished, yet undistinguished, elements together¹¹⁵). So, "the difference is actually shown to be no difference, and thus the One is at home with itself in its Other. The fact that this is so is just what is meant by (Geist), or expressed in terms of feeling, by eternal love. The Holy Spirit is eternal love.... For love implies a distinguishing between two, and yet these two are, as a matter of fact, not distinguished from one another. Love, this sense of being outside of myself, is the feeling and consciousness of this identity. My self-consciousness is not in myself, but in another; but this Other in whom alone I find satisfaction and am at peace with myself ... just because it is outside of me, has his self-consciousness in me"¹¹⁶).

¹¹⁴) v. supra notes 105 and 106.

¹¹⁵) v. *De Trinitate* VI, 5, 7.

¹¹⁶) Religion III. SW 16, pp. 226-7; translation III, pp. 10-11.

The Hegelian conception of the Trinity goes much further than this, but even here it will be seen that he conceives of self-knowledge in a different way from Augustine. This difference stems from different ways of explaining how self-thinking takes place. Augustine insists on the existence of the unity in the same self between subject known and object known; Hegel insists on the need of the thinking subject to have an other, with which it is already united. In the first case there is an exact equivalence through identity; in the second there is dialectical division and unity.

vi) The Divine-human relationship

In contrast with the Augustinian divide between the perfection of the divine transcendent mind and everything else (including the human mind) which is related to it — in Platonist terms — as participation, Hegel's system is a development of the Aristotelian conception of the divine νοῦς, elevating everything known to a universal mode of existence like its own, within which activity the free mind, as self-conscious reason, progressively discovers that it is identical with everything else: not the remoteness of Aristotle's divine original thought thinking on thinking, but a content which embraces everything. It bears the contradictions which it has originally created between one and many, self and other, universal and individual, in order to bring them back into unity. Its work is towards the creation of a totality: not the single substance-totality of Spinoza, but a process-totality in which contradictions are resolved by a deepening internalisation in which nothing is destroyed but everything is incorporated into and raised to the universal self-consciousness in which it finds its place and fulfilment.

From this conception of theoretical self-knowledge arises a conception of ethical life: altogether a system of thought with an application to problems which Augustine never considered, and in categories of which he never conceived. By the Hegelian measure Augustine's thought hardly ever strayed out of an uncritical immediacy and the barely even proto-dialectical contemplation of the paradoxes of certain rigid diverse conceptions in unity: nor could it, because the basic postulates of subjectivity in self-consciousness, as an interpretation of νόησις νοήσεως with the ultimate incorporation of every reality into self-consciousness, was unknown to him. The νόησις νοήσεως which he knew was that of neo-Platonised Aristotelianism: not supposed to draw

everything into its own immanence as Hegel's Geist, but to draw everything into the highest intellectual transcendence ever conceived.

Fragile by comparison does Augustine's speculation on self-consciousness seem: able to be swallowed up by a greater whole, to which some of its elements could be interpreted as seeming pointers.

Yet the *De Trinitate*, such a comparatively ingenuous work though so analogous in its speculative treatment of Christian dogma to Hegel's, has not so much a hermeneutical critique which it can make in return as a point which it makes through its ingenuously simple witness. Augustine did not show an awareness that his data were known to him only as incorporated into thought, and therein subject to development by the laws of thought. Even with the resolution of his pre-conversion absolute scepticism in the *cogito* he did not have the kind of philosophical self-consciousness which Hegel appropriates to the period after Kant. But particularly in the area of speculation, the idealism of Hegel with its development of objects through their sublimation into thinking depends on the presence of sources, such as Augustine, which have the ingenuousness not to question whether they are dealing with things independent in themselves or as reconstructed in the mind's own way and replaced in the mind's own relationships. Unless such sources exist, though there might be a logic there could not have been any Hegelian theology or even speculation on mind. Whilst tangible things may be accepted within the mind from its contact with what is outside itself, the number of philosophical reflections which may be derived from within the mind itself is, in fact, very few.

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