

«Charitas non est nisi a Spiritu Sancto»

Augustine and Peter Lombard on Grace and Personal Righteousness

Among the graces invoked by Peter Lombard, perhaps *gratia inhabitans* had the most interesting career in later theology. Peter described it as the presence of the Holy Spirit itself and identified it with love of God and neighbour¹). The *Libri sententiarum* retained the then popular notion that *charitas* was a special virtue or habit, but Peter's mature work also insisted that love's special status was a result of the Holy Spirit's presence, a presence that did not require a mediating virtue but that directly encouraged and assisted personal righteousness. The Holy Spirit actually inhered in human righteousness²). Other theologians objected that *gratia inhabitans* referred to the gifts of the Spirit but not to the Spirit's presence and direct activity, and variations of this qualification came to obscure Peter's strict identifications of *gratia inhabitans* with the Holy Spirit and of both with love³). Qualification built upon qualification until the discussion of habitual and inhering graces became an institution, liberally endowed, as it were, with the efforts of the more scientific intelligences of the next few centuries. This is what I mean by the «interesting career» of Peter's *gratia inhabitans*. My interest, however, is in the development of Peter's notion in the context of his own commitment to reconcile grace and free choice. I want to glance back, rather than forward, from the *Sentences* to Peter's exegetical work and, behind that, to Augustine's soteriology, which provided the model for Peter's efforts⁴).

¹) *Libri sententiarum* 1. d. 17. 2 and 6. (2nd and 3rd ed. Collegi S. Bonaventurae).

²) *Ibid.*, 1. d. 1. 3.

³) Consult Artur Michael Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik*, 1.2 (Regensburg, 1953), pp. 41-56.

⁴) Ferdinand Cavallera agrees that the case for Augustine's overwhelming influence is a persuasive one, but his validation amounts to little more than counting and measuring citations in the *Libri sententiarum*. His calculations are nevertheless noteworthy. See his «Saint Augustin et le Livre des Sentences de Pierre Lombard», *Archives de philosophie* 7 (1930): 186-99. Also note J. de Ghellinck, *Le mouvement théologique du XII^e siècle*, 2nd ed. (Bruges, 1948), pp. 241-44; and the rather vigorous dissent of Otto Baltzer, *Die Sentenzen des Petrus Lombardus* (Leipzig, 1902; reprinted, Darmstad, 1972), especially pp. 61-67.

St. Paul had written of a special relationship between the Holy Spirit and the human soul (Romans 8:16: «Ipse enim Spiritus testimonium reddit spiritui nostro quod sumus filii Dei».) and Peter's commentary associated that relationship with the remission of sins and with an exalted piety. Both were the work of the divine Spirit: «The Spirit gives life». Spiritual quickening was analogous to the human spirit's life-giving power in and over all members of the human body, and this analogy not only pressed Peter's point that the Holy Spirit animated only those attached to the body of Christ but also suggested an *ex officio* transition from spiritual communication («testimonium reddit») to spiritual presence⁵).

The association of the remission of sins with spiritual quickening was something of a dispensation that freed Peter to remind his readers of the value of «spiritual labors» and to claim, in unguarded moments, that they might make the laborer worthy of divine compassion. This was rather perilous, for Gilbert of Poitiers had angered authorities earlier by insisting that virtuous works could be accomplished without justifying faith and by admitting the possibility that some form of that faith might be merited and acquired without grace. It has been said that Peter irresistably gravitated toward that outlawed position, and his appeal to Pseudo-Augustine's discussion of penance would appear to invite such a complaint.

Consider if one is worthy of mercy. I do not say of justice; justice only condemns. But one who seeks grace with his *spiritual labors*, whose courage endures shame, deserves mercy. Inasmuch as great modesty is expiation, whoever endures shame for Christ is made worthy of God's mercy. It is therefore clear that the more he will confess the infamy of his evildoing in the hope of indulgence, the more easily the grace of remission will follow⁶).

⁵) *Collectanea in epist. D. Pauli*, PL 191: 1440D-1441A: «... quam remissionem cum trinitas faciat, proprie tamen ad Spiritum sanctum intelligitur pertinere, quia Spiritus communis est Patri et Filio, amborumque unio, per quem fit societas et unitas, qua efficimur unum corpus unici Filii Dei. Unitas enim nos compaginat, quam facit charitas, et charitas non est nisi a Spiritu sancto. Ergo spiritus est qui vivificat, quia viva facit membra nec viva facit, nisi quae in corpore quod vegetat invenerit, sicut spiritus hominis non vivificat membrum, quod separatim invenerit a corpore. Haec dicuntur ut amemus unitatem, et timeamus separationem».

⁶) *Libri sententiarum* 4. d. 17. 3 (quoting Pseudo-Augustine's *De vera et falsa poenitentia* 10. 25): «Considerat enim, si dignus est, non dico justitia, sed et misericordia; justitia enim sola damnat, sed dignus est misericordia qui spirituali labore quaerit gratiam: laborat enim mens patiendo erubescantiam; et quoniam verecundia magna est poena, qui

If, by «grace of remission», Peter referred to spiritual quickening, the «spiritual labors» that precede this grace do not denote the special influence of the Holy Spirit. But it would be hard to reconstruct this passage and others like it to support unambiguously Gilbert's contention that meretorious works preceded that special influence. Shame and remorse here are spiritual labors in the proper sense. That is to say that they occur after God's pardon has been received as fact and, in part, as promise; and they are dedicated to Christ («qui erubescit pro Christo, fit dignus misericordia»). They are not then acts *de genere bonorum*, but rather they constitute a penance undertaken in the context of Christian faith and with the assistance of the Holy Spirit. Only in this mode, as the clearest manifestations of practical spirituality and as acts of both divine and human spirits, are these labors meretorious.

Unless the place of «spiritual labors» in Peter's soteriology is restored in this fashion, and upon such a restoration my own argument rests, the second book of his *Sentences*, seasoned with antipelagian declarations, makes little sense. The assumption that a first grace might be earned by human will's industry in the pursuit of good perceptibly distressed Peter who was not above challenging his favorite theologian when he supposed him to have failed in precluding that possibility. He plainly disapproved of passages in Augustine's early works that appeared to corroborate Pelagian claims. Still, he awarded Augustine the last word, and he reiterated Augustine's *Retractationes* with such regularity that the Bishop of Hippo could be considered the author of several of his articles. Peter emphatically noted that the first grace was unmerited. He contended that at every stage in the acquisition of «libertas gratiae» grace itself was operative, preparing, assisting, and perfecting human will.

The *Libri sententiarum* boast a profound esteem for the versatility and constant presence of grace. Earlier exegetical work, however, displays Peter's readiness to assign a significant, if uncertain, role to human choice in the achievement of salvation. In Philippians 3:8-9 St. Paul discounted human righteousness, but Peter's commentary deferred to Augustine's proclamation that justification involves some participation of the justified («qui te fecit sine te, non te justificat sine te»).

erubescit pro Christo, fit dignus misericordia. Unde patet, quia, quanto pluribus confitebitur in spe veniae turpitudinem criminis, tanto facilius consequitur gratiam remissionis».

Rather than relinquish his position, he deftly advanced it in the face of the strongest of the apostle's remarks to the contrary, Romans 9:16 («it depends not upon man's will»). Peter suggested that God's mercy counted nothing without human will. Hence the words «non est volentis» indicated only that nothing good comes of efforts unprepared by grace. Salvation was not exclusively or primarily attributable to human choice, but human will was dimly perceived by Peter as a force of order in the pursuit of righteousness, and human effort was presumed to have a direct bearing on the success or failure of God's visitation. Peter carefully explained that this had nothing whatsoever to do with merit. It must not be said that one was justified, «per propriam voluntatem». But Peter added, without fanfare and yet with sufficient stress to complicate the issue, that justification could not be said to proceed «sine voluntate nostra»⁷).

Johann Schupp's valuable dissertation on Peter's *Gnadenlehre* implied that the *Sentences* atoned with omissions and qualifications for Peter's earlier indiscretions⁸). Far from signaling an erosion of the initial position, however, Peter's mature work sharpened and extended it. He repeated Augustine's stipulation that the Christian was not justified «sine voluntate», and that notion formed an affirmation central to the second book of the *Sentences*. Free choice, a power («facultas») of both reason and will, could elect the good, «gratia assistente». Indeed, «sine libero arbitrio», virtue would not be translated into act and therefore righteousness. But, «gratia desistente», the will, though free, was necessarily delinquent⁹).

Human will runs afoul because it is powerless, and the sum and substance of grace's assistance, be it preparing, aiding, or perfecting, is empowerment. Human will's part, however, is more difficult to determine. Anselm of Canterbury located it with the will's aptitude for

⁷) See *Collectanea in epist. D. Pauli*, PL 191: 1361C; 191: 1460D-1461A; and 192: 245B.

⁸) Johann Schupp, *Die Gnadenlehre des Petrus Lombardus* (Freiburg, 1932), pp. 114-15, 155-59, 203-6.

⁹) *Libri sententiarum* 2. d.27. 1 and 6; and 2. d.24. 3: «Liberum vero arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis, qua bonum eligitur gratia assistente, vel malum eadem desistente. Et dicitur 'liberum' quantum ad voluntatem, quae ad utrumlibet flecti potest; 'arbitrium' vero quantum ad rationem, cuius est facultas vel potentia illa, cuius etiam est discernere inter bonum et malum. Et aliquando quidem, discretionem habens boni et mali, quod malum est eligit; aliquando vero quod bonum est. Sed quod bonum est nisi gratia adiuta non eligit; malum vero per se eligit».

righteousness, and Peter may have had this premise in mind when he reconstructed Augustine's position from the *Retractationes*. He judged that Augustine had correctly assigned the aptitude for faith and love («posse habere») to human nature and the actual possession of faith and love («habere») to grace¹⁰). But ironically, Peter came closest to the sense of Augustine's voluntarism when he was not absorbed in the transcription of the *Retractationes*, Augustine's most mature yet frankly apologetic remarks.

Augustinian conceptions of spirituality and of human will are considerably tamed by references to aptitudes and dispositions. To recover Augustine's meaning, human will must be understood in terms of «concupiscentia», its inept yearning for freedom and righteousness; and that yearning should be understood as the will's collaboration with God who prepares it for righteousness. Peter integrated both understandings with his account of human will's part in justification. He specified that a person must want to believe and to hope but that God must prepare the will for such salutary desires. Some portion of human assent («vult credere») appears to precede faith, but God's gift of faith accompanies the process of assent and may be said to precede it, «non tempore, sed causa et natura»¹¹). Earlier Peter reviewed the somewhat complex relationship between longing («concupiscentia») and desire («desiderium»).

Longing is desire, but the two are not identical. Longing pertains to things that are possessed as well as to things that are not. Desire pertains only to those things absent from this life. Note then that [the Psalmist, 119:20] says, 'he longed to desire;' he does not say that he desired [God's ordinances]. Sometimes we realize the usefulness of God's ordinances, that is, of *opera justitiae*, but because of our weakness we do not desire them¹²).

Longing is a foundational and apparently unfocused aspiration. It is a yearning after a derivative but far more focused feeling. It might be

¹⁰) Ibid., 2. d. 28. 3.

¹¹) Ibid., 2. d. 26. 4-6.

¹²) *Commentarium in Psalmos*, PL 191: 1055A-B: «Et nota quod concupiscentia est desiderium, sed non omnis, quia concupiscentia est et eorum quae habentur, et eorum quae non habentur. Desiderium vero absentium tantum est in hac vita. Nota etiam quod ait: 'Concupivit desiderare', non ait 'desideravit'. Videmus enim ratione nonnunquam quam utiles sunt justificationes Dei, id est opera justitiae sed infirmitate aliquando non desideramus. . . . » Also review the distinction between longing and desire in Augustine's discussion of the same psalm, *Enarratio in psalmum CXVIII*, PL 37: 1522.

called the primordial element in humanity's assent to grace, although pride of place is usually given to some acquired intelligence of the good. For Peter, «concupiscentia», as a movement of free choice occasioned by God but not, strictly speaking, by grace, begins the pursuit of righteousness. To the degree that this longing conflated divine and human wills, it conforms to the labors occasioned by the Holy Spirit's remission of sins and quickening of the soul and it conforms to the notion of «broad penance» suggested by some of Peter's successors and students¹³). More important still, Peter's discussions of human assent recall Augustine's discernment of his own longing and of the process by which grace enabled him «to will by all means».

Augustine filled his *Confessions* with recollections of his youthful delinquency and intellectual temerity. He distinctly remembered that his enfeebled and indecisive will had been touched and empowered and that it had therefore become possible for him «to will by all means». According to Augustine, God, of course, had sufficient power to turn the talents of the most bitter persecutor to the service of the true religion, but the *Confessions* tells a different story, the story of the redemption of a somewhat reckless yet sincerely inquiring spirit. Augustine's report of his own longing and struggle had been, for him, ground for self-reproach («I saw myself and was horrified by what I saw, yet there was no place to flee from myself»)¹⁴). For others, however, Augustine's general supplication and autobiographic hymn of thanksgiving became a tale of courage and a paean to the strength and persistence of human will.

Augustine's response to the misreadings of his tale and to the variety of inferences drawn from his treatise *De libero arbitrio* against the Manichaeans was of a single design. Against Pelagius and his disciples Coelestius and Julian, Augustine argued that sin was pervasive and that divine initiative was necessary for and prevenient to any act of righteousness. The uneven progress of his soul from its impiety to its desire to stand steadfastly in divine favor must not be calculated as cause for divine assistance. The assertion that human will was responsible for evil must not be digested as proof of the will's responsibility for good. This was to say that the *Confessions* and the *De libero arbitrio* respectively would not suffer Pelagian reconstruction. Augustine's reply was interrupted by the introduction of new arguments touching upon the conduct

¹³) See Landgraf's *Dogmengeschichte des Frühscholastik*, 1.1 (Regensburg, 1952), pp. 299-300.

¹⁴) See Augustine's *Confessions* 8. 7. 16 and 8. 8. 20.

of church authority and the administration of the sacraments, but the enduring question was the proper conceptualization of human will's captivity to sin.

Pelagian optimism has been overstated, and the extent of Pelagius' appreciation for grace and its necessity for redemption is still disputed. One could say that, in some measure, the controversy among recent analysts reenacts the fifth-century quarrel. The point beyond dispute, however, is that Pelagius inspired his lieutenants, who were perhaps more radical than he had been, with the conviction the Christian possessed freedom *from* captivity¹⁵). Augustine, in his *Confessions* and in his *De libero arbitrio*, detailed, at best, the will's freedom *in* captivity. Nothing more could be expected from this species of freedom than a primordial but ineffectual longing for righteousness that impels the Christian to seek greater assistance from God. Augustine diagnosed Pelagian heterodoxy as a pernicious naturalism, and he argued that what appeared to be the will's natural freedom was actually captivity to the lowest instincts of humankind, which, in the state of sin, were commonly the highest in authority¹⁶). Freedom for righteousness was a freedom of a different order. To achieve it, the will must be liberated, assisted, and continually blessed by God's care. Augustine's overwhelming concern with this higher order of freedom and his often immoderate attacks on his adversaries must not be permitted to abrogate what, in the context of this

¹⁵) Torigny Bohlin's *Die Theologie des Pelagius und ihre Genesis* (Uppsala, 1957) is absolutely essential for the understanding of crosscurrents in Pelagius interpretation. But also note G. de Plinval, «Points de vues récents sur la théologie de Pélagie», *Recherches de science religieuse* 40 (1958): 228-32 and Adolar Zunkeller, «Neuinterpretation oder Verzeichnung der Gnadenlehre des Pelagius und seines Gegners Augustinus?» *Augustinian Studies* 5 (1974): 209-26. Augustine's chief argument appears to be with Pelagius' more daring and tactless disciples, although he was quick to blame Pelagius himself. See Peter Brown, «Pelagius and His Supporters», *The Journal of Theological Studies* 19 (1968): 93-114; reprinted in Brown's *Religion and Society in the Age of Augustine* (New York, 1972).

¹⁶) See Augustine's *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 2. 11. 15 and his *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum* 2. 5. 9-10. Also see Alfred Vanneste, «Nature et grâce dans la théologie de saint Augustin», *Recherches augustiniennes* 10 (1975): 145 and Henri Rondet, «La théologie de saint Augustin prédicateur», *Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique* 72 (1971): 99-100. The captive individual was «free», according to Augustine, as long as the yearning for righteousness survived. See his *Contra secundum Juliani responsionem opus imperfectum* 6. 11: «Nam si, ut dicis, boni malique voluntarii possibilitas sola libertas est; non habet libertatem Deus, in quo peccandi possibilitas non est. Hominis vero liberum arbitrium congenitum et omnino inamissibile si quaerimus, illud est quo beati omnes esse volunt, etiam hi qui ea nolunt quae ad beatitudinem ducunt». Also, in this connection, consult my «The Lesson of Conversion: A Note on the Question of Continuity in Augustine's Understanding of Grace and Human Will», *Augustinian Studies* 11 (1980).

study, might be called the «privileges» of freedom *in* captivity and the importance of freely willed consent to divine grace. Augustine's clumsy and often misdirected longing for righteousness did not command divine approbation or reward, that is, the ability «to will by all means». Still, the *Confessions* established the inseparability of freedom in captivity and the gift of freedom for righteousness. «To will by all means» followed the struggle to will with no means.

Augustine's proceedings against the Pelagians as well as his early reflections on the topic in the *De libero arbitrio* (388-395) and in the *Confessions* (397-400) certify his abiding interest in the relationship between grace and personal righteousness. His principles were clearest, however, in the early chapters of his treatise *De gratia et libero arbitrio* (426/27). If the Pelagians' obstinacy had driven Augustine to rhetorical extravagances in defense of divine sovereignty, his echo from certain monks in the prosperous port of Hadrumetum provoked him to greater discretion. Evidently Augustine's counteroffensive against Pelagian claims about the significance of human freedom encouraged some persons to think of human will as utterly insignificant. The *De gratia et libero arbitrio* was addressed to them. Aware that his original adversaries would monitor his every writing, however, Augustine undertook the extremely delicate task of restoring balance to the doctrine that had tipped first to one side and then to the other in the course of his controversies. The *De gratia et libero arbitrio* imposed restrictions upon the tendency in Christian thought to parade justification *either* as self-determined or as divinely determined.

Augustine opened the treatise with a candid recognition of the problem to which he had contributed. The monks of Hadrumetum were not disaffected Christians: they represented the fact that a defense of grace that would not altogether impugn the importance of human volition had not yet been composed¹⁷). Augustine wrote that divine initiative was necessary to incline the will, that God mysteriously acted upon the soul so that it might receive other redemptive gifts and

¹⁷) *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 1. 1: «Propter eos qui hominis liberum arbitrium sic praedicant et defendunt, ut Dei gratiam qua vocamur ad eum et a nostris malis meritis liberamur, et per quam bona merita comparamus quibus ad vitam perveniamus aeternam, negare audeant et conentur auferre, multa jam disseruimus, litterisque mandavimus, quantum nobis Dominus donare dignatus est. Sed quoniam sunt quidam, qui sic gratiam Dei defendunt, ut negent hominis liberum arbitrium; hinc aliquid scribere ad vestram Charitatem, Valentine frater, et caeteri qui simul Deo servitis, compellente mutua charitate curavi».

assistance¹⁸). That reception, however, was not passive. The Christian must freely long for and pray for healing beyond that which Augustine fixed as the will's initial inclination and empowerment («De operante illo ut velimus»)¹⁹).

Augustine's scheme is deceptive. It appears to tackle the relationship between grace and personal righteousness in concrete terms, but the connection between God's first influence upon human choice and the will's alleged freedom *in* captivity was left unspecified. Some factors come to light: virtues do not mediate the blessed intervention, and the estrangement between God and the individual persists until the properly inclined will is also rendered effective and therefore obedient. Somehow, however, the unwilling and hopeless individual has become willing and hopeful, and as a result of some primordial divine and human collaboration, the individual has learned to long for righteousness.

Augustine's earliest works had been taken to license the high premium placed by Pelagians on the free choice of the will, unaided or minimally aided by grace. His later polemic against those who would have called him master had been heard as a denial of the importance of human choice. But there could be no mistake about the *De gratia et libero arbitrio*. Augustine stipulated that the ability «to will by all means» was not a human triumph over indecision, for God does not reward human effort with upright determination but rather crowns his own good work. On the other hand, strength of purpose and personal righteousness, in Augustine's judgment, were not exclusively divine accomplishments²⁰). Augustine confirmed that God directly meddled in human affairs, so to speak, because they were preeminently God's affair. But, notwithstanding his sense of the gravity and persistence of Adam's curse, Augustine joined with the Pelagians (against the Manichaeans) on one issue: God's affair had not ceased to be a human affair. He adapted for his compromise the Pelagian practice of harvesting scriptural passages suggesting that human volition figured prominently in each person's redemption²¹). He also returned to those passages that misled

¹⁸) Ibid., 6. 15; 7. 17. Also note R.P. Deman, «La théologie de la grâce», *Augustinus Magister* 3 (1954): 247-50.

¹⁹) *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 4. 6; and 15. 31.

²⁰) See Ibid., 5. 12, where Augustine's representative paraphrase of I Corinthians 15:10 («Non ego autem, sed gratia Dei mecum») avoided imputation of merit but stressed «mecum»: «...id est, non solus, sed gratia Dei mecum: ac per hoc nec gratia Dei sola, nec ipse solus, sed gratia Dei cum illo».

²¹) Ibid., e.g., 2. 2.

the monks of Hadrumetum but that still furnished a credible deterrent against overconfidence in the value of human choice; and perhaps with greater confidence he created a place in his compromise for his familiar militant endorsement of the priority of grace and the sovereignty of God. God was the source of all righteousness; without direct divine meddling, there was no righteousness and no yearning for righteousness.

One formula in the *De gratia et libero arbitrio* was widely adopted by medieval soteriology as a solution to the problem of grace and human freedom. Augustine distinguished between divine operation that began the work of salvation, inclining the will and summoning it to obedience, and divine cooperation that assisted the will and perfected its obedience. The *eruditi* were satisfied with the formula, and it flourished in latin theology. Peter Lombard acquiesced, and he prefaced his own instruction on grace and will with Augustine's distinction. But the practiced repetition of Augustine's formula, especially as competing interpretations multiplied, hardly constituted a tradition. In what has been said about Peter and Augustine, however, there is evidence that the twelfth-century bishop of Paris amply understood the spirit as well as the letter of his predecessor's work and that he succumbed to Augustine's influence in ways that have customarily gone unnoticed.

Peter and Augustine agreed that the effective prosecution of good works required liberation, that is, freedom from captivity that only grace could complete. Thorough and reasoned analysis, however, could not omit the parts played by God's mysterious influence and by human longing preliminary, and in a very loose sense preparatory, to liberation. For Peter and for Augustine, longing was a divinely moved «preparation», a conflation of divine and human wills, that removed indifference as surely as saving grace removed the otherwise indelible stain of sin. This is the first and the more recondite of two fundamental similarities between the two bishops' soteriologies. Augustine's intolerance of indifference was dramatized in his *Confessions*, expressed in his psalm commentaries in the distinction between *concupiscentia* and *desiderium*, and recreated in the tendentious compromise of the *De gratia et libero arbitrio*. Peter elaborated Augustine's distinction in his own *Commentarium in Psalmos* and made frequent, if somewhat casual, reference to preparatory righteousness in his *Sentences*.

The second similarity involves the assertions made by Peter and Augustine about continual collaboration in the *ordo salutis*. The pattern of operative and cooperative graces only symbolized the reality that

human will was completely, if mysteriously cradled in grace²²). Stripped of its mystery, the grand design of Augustine's synergism, especially the «militant compromise» of his *De gratia et libero arbitrio* but also the lesson of his *Confessions*, was radically simplified and misconstrued. For example, Augustine remained for Peter Abelard the unflinching champion of grace's absolute sovereignty, and therefore Augustine stayed on one side of Abelard's dialectic²³). For Peter Lombard, Augustine's theology of grace was marked by the ordeals of his conversion and by his later attempt to redress the balance between grace and human effort as well as by his antipelagian polemics.

Grace conferred liberation, assistance, efficiency, and ultimately perfection. Taken together with God's prevenient operation in human longing, this explanation of empowerment inspired the second book of Peter's *Libri sententiarum*, which also insisted that the prepared, liberated, and assisted will collaborated with God at every stage in its advance toward righteousness. Salvation was unattainable *sine libero arbitrio*. But, if I am correct, Peter's equally faithful and more important explication of Augustine's meaning was deposited in the first book of sentences with his discussion of *gratia inhabitans* and love. There he was more scrupulous about the preservation of the mystery of God's presence and participation in personal righteousness and therefore his debt to Augustine, a matter of tone and attitude as well as doctrine, was more profound.

If precision and ontological sophistication are measures, Peter's standpoint is hardly «academic». His commentaries on the psalms and on the Pauline epistles confessed that God's saving communication with created spirits was shrouded in mystery²⁴). Written years after the exegetical work, the *Sentences* also granted divine inscrutability, but Peter allowed that the communication involved a special and unmediated relationship with God, «known» only through love, which was itself the

²²) This impression is also created by Peter's early exegetical work. See his *Commentarium in Psalmos*, PL 191: 241C-246B. The multitude of «graces» enumerated in Peter's comments on Psalm 23, however, does not totally obscure or eliminate the role of human choice and effort. For Peter, as for Augustine, saving acts are performed according to superior causes, *non secundum naturam*, but not *contra naturam*. For an elaboration of this general contention, see Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik* 1.1, pp. 141-44.

²³) See, not only Abelard's *Sic et non* 139, but also his *Expositio in epistola Pauli ad Romanos*, book 1, PL 178: 825C and book 4, PL 178: 914D-915A.

²⁴) See, for example, *Commentarium in Psalmos*, PL 191: 960B-C and *Collectanea in epist. D. Pauli*, PL 192: 193A-B.

finest fruit of God's collaboration with man. One is obliged to say that Peter's identifications between *gratia inhabitans* and the Holy Spirit and between both and love were, at times, nearly unintelligible²⁵). Still, on another level, Peter's synergism is wholly understandable as attestation to the force and, one might deduce, the supremacy of the mystical and voluntarist factors in Augustine's soteriology, which also equated the Holy Spirit with *charitas*. Intelligibility increasingly became an issue for Peter's successors, especially after the proscription of Aristotelian natural philosophy and metaphysics was revoked in 1255 by the Faculty of Arts at Paris. Much was gained when the partnership between St. Paul and Aristotle was finally contracted, but perhaps something was lost to the medieval academies, which continued, however, to read and to gloss their Augustine and their *Sentences*²⁶).

A century before Aristotle's rehabilitation, when the significance of Aristotle's rediscovery was scarcely realized and when Augustine was still sovereign in early theological sourcebooks, it is unlikely that there was a more faithful subject than Peter Lombard. I have attempted to demonstrate that this was true, even when Peter appeared most innovative.

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²⁵) The point is persuasively argued by Schupp, *Die Gnadenlehre des Petrus Lombardus*, pp. 216-31.

²⁶) See Karl Holl, «Die *justitia dei* in der vorlutherischen Bibelauslegung des Abendlandes», in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte*, vol. 3 (Darmstadt, 1965), pp. 181-88 with special reference to later *Habituslehren*. But also consult Henri Bouillard, *Conversion et grâce chez S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris, 1944); R.P. René-Charles Dhont, *Le problème de la préparation à la grâce* (Paris, 1946); and Johann Auer, *Die Entwicklung der Gnadenlehre in der Hochscholastik*, vol. 2 (Freiburg, 1951).