

Notes on the Tübingen Edition of Gregory of Rimini

II

Which Augustine is Gregory's? Which Augustinianism? Which God? Is Gregory the Authenticus Augustinianus? The Authenticator of the sprawling Augustinianism of his day¹)?

Gregory was not an Augustine of the 14th century as Anselm had been in the eleventh, who 250 years before Gregory had laid down the Augustinian lines of thought for all theological generations of the Middle Ages.

Gregory was not a second Peter Lombard, that most successful programmatic and encyclopedic Augustinian schoolmaster who had dictated Augustinian reading material for the interpretation of 300 years of theology. A careful examination of the *divisiones textus* [Petri Lombardi], left in later theological manuscripts, at least in rudimentary form, furnishes absolute proof that Lombard remained in the mainstream of theology throughout the Middle Ages, dipping the scale of Augustinian or non-Augustinian influence overwhelmingly in favor of the first with a ratio of 8:10.

Gregory is the Authenticator of that Augustinianism which from Anselm and Peter Lombard had taken its inspiration, and from Augustine himself during 250 years of medieval theology had received successive impulses of development. Gregory is the authentic follower of Augustine, the doctor gratiae, and of Augustine, the nominalist²).

Before the time of Gregory of Rimini the name of Augustine had been on all lips. Many a text passage of his had been copied and inserted into scripts of minor thinkers, who by incorporating them, had to follow

¹) Another of the seven-volume edition of Gregory of Rimini has appeared in print: *Gregorii Ariminensis OESA Lectura super Primum et Secundum Sententiarum* edidit A. Damasus Trapp O.S.A., Tomus V, Super Secundum (Dist. 6-18). Elaboraverunt: A. Damasus Trapp, Venicio Marcolino, Manuel Santos-Noya. Walter De Gruyter Berlin New York, 1979, herausgegeben von Heiko A. Oberman, in: *Spätmittelalter und Reformation Texte und Untersuchungen*. I-VI, pp. 1-382; Index Generalis 383-392.

²) Cf. the first set of notes on the Tübingen Edition in: *Augustiniana* 29 (1979) 239-241.

lines of thought similar to Augustine's, had to accommodate theirs to his, even eliminating thoughts of their own when found contrary or contradictory to the copied passages from Augustine. But as 'foliation' (we would say 'pagination') of manuscripts sources were poorly organized, and the chapters of books not numbered, before the 14th century, true and genuine quotations from Augustine could not show up with the required scientifically neat accreditation, as the indication of chapter and verse, or book and page, could not be given. Nor could pretended quotations from Augustine be unmasked³).

Within the 14th century, at the very dawn of protohumanism, a greater historic-mindedness grew up in the schools, and a number of scholars, Augustinians especially, saw to it that handwritten works of famous authors were foliated, their chapters numbered, their quotations 'verified in the sources', and checked for genuineness, in order to do the quoted author no injustice, that, finally, the many pretended quotations were unmasked, or returned to their true paternity.

As said above, many of the auctoritates in that bestseller of medieval schoolbooks, Peter Lombard's *Sententiae*, were Augustinian quotations (eight out of ten) but often lacked precise source indication. Augustinians like John Klenkok OSA (1354 Oxford) provided what was lacking⁴); Augustinian friars also published an Augustine Encyclopedia called *Milleloquium D. Augustini* (ca 1345) with an attitude scientific enough to usher in the more patristic studies on Augustine. Gregory of Rimini, perhaps the greatest Augustinian scholar of his age, watched with Argus eyes over the Augustinian reasonings expounded by his fellow-theologians in this Augustinian world; and by following each one of them, step by step, he showed his anxiousness to lay bare the true

³) Cf. D. TRAPP, Hiltalinger's Augustinian Quotations, in: *Augustiniana* 4 (1964) 412-449.

⁴) Cf. *idem*, Augustinian Theology of the 14th Century, in: *Augustiniana* 6 (1956) 146-274, esp. 153 ff; *idem*, Dreistufiger Editionsprozess und dreierartige Zitationsweise bei den Augustinertheologen des 14ten Jh.? in: *Augustiniana* 25 (1975) 282-293; *idem*, Notes on John Klenkok O.S.A. († 1374), in: *Augustinianum* 4 (1964) 358-404; in regard to *Milleloquium* cf. Vincent Fitzpatrick, Bartholomaeus of Urbino: The Sermons Embraced in his *Milleloquium S. Augustini*, Diss. Cath. Univ. Washington 1954, I-III + 1-65 + 1*-56*: interesting research on bibliography, biography, structure and composition of *Milleloquium*. — R. ARBESMANN O.S.A., The Question of the Authorship of the *Milleloquium Veritatis S. Augustini*, in: *Paradosis ... in Memory of E. A. Quain*, Fordham U. Press, New York (1976) 169-187. This scholarly article will also appear in: *Analecta Augustiniana* 1980.

Augustinian roots, with painstaking care, and to eradicate, when necessary, the wild offshoots of pseudo-Augustinianism.

Although other Augustinian friars might have deserved special recognition for this modern attitude towards scientific progress, it was Gregory of Rimini that was honored by the special title of Authenticus, for his exemplary pursuit and program of having Augustinian quotations not only neatly accredited by chapter-and-verse indication, but, even more so, for his herculean efforts not to let Augustinian contexts and backgrounds be misrepresented, betrayed, or falsified by writers of minor caliber, who might wildly criss-cross the lines of Augustinian thought where they avowedly pretended to follow them faithfully.

The by-name Authenticus was already accepted as a matter of course then years after Gregory's death († 1358) by scholars like John of Basel OSA (ca 1365 Paris) and by Simon of Cremona OSA (likewise about 1365 Paris)⁵); the nickname Gregory's, namely Tortor Infantium, on the other hand, was derived originally from the family name of Gregory who belonged to the Tortoricci [literally: 'Tortores Infantes']. This nickname was given to Gregory for having dared to mention Augustine's unequivocal principle that without baptism there cannot be any salvation for unbaptized children. Though Gregory this time left complete freedom to his readers in regard to acceptance or rejection of Augustine's principle, his contemporaries would simply not believe Gregory's 'un-Augustinian' stance, and stubbornly insisted on calling him Tortor Infantium, though we need not doubt the sincerity of Gregory, because Gregory was great enough to see that quite a number of conclusions are rather poorly conclusive, and thus open for further discussion. But the nickname given him by these mockingbirds, is somewhat of a confirmation for the fact that Gregory's honorary title of Authenticus should be interpreted to mean Authenticus Augustinianus, because even when Gregory said that he hesitated to follow Augustine in a given case, being otherwise recognized as Authenticus Augustinianus, he was never allowed not to toe the line of the great Augustine, even in cases when prudence might suggest otherwise.

Gregory's own quotations from Augustine are rich and authentic, as

⁵) Cf. D. TRAPP, Simonis de Cremona O.S.A. *Lectura super 1-4 Sent.* in: *Augustinianum* 4 (1964) 123-146, where 36 neat quotations from Gregory are given; on fol 8v of MS Cremona 118, Gregory is called 'Doctor noster Authenticus Magister Gregorius'. The same title, in the same year, Gregory is given by John of Basel (cf. my article on *Theol. of 14th c.*, page 247; Gregory of Rimini is dealt with in this article on pages 183-213.

anyone can see in the six or seven volumes which are being published at Tübingen. This has already been known to be certainly the case whenever Gregory follows in the footsteps of Augustine the doctor of grace; but what might be overlooked, is the other equally plain fact that Gregory, when he acts as surveyer and interpreter of the philosophical and theological systems of his nominalistic 14th century is equally anxious to follow true Augustinian lines and patterns, in order to be loyal to Augustine. This eyebrow raising second statement concerning the exclusively Augustinian standards of Gregory's every opinion, every position, and every stance, needs clarification because it implies that Gregory traced the spiritual paternity of nominalism back to the great Augustine, and fought in the name of the founder against deviations of the followers.

Even within the tenets of this nominalism, Gregory demanded faithfulness to the lines which by Augustine had been traced, and often been warped by nominalistic epigones.

Before more eyebrows are raised, it must be stated that, if Augustine had been father of what we have become accustomed to call nominalism, and what the theologians of the 14th century used to call modernism, we must be prepared to admit that the theology or philosophy of the Moderni (that is the name they called themselves) could never have been so weakly, so sickly, tired, skeptical, or paganizing from the beginning as it appeared towards the end, though any amount of un-Augustinian tendencies began to show in flamboyant Oxford in the twenties, and at the university of Paris in the forties of the 14th century, and, as a natural reaction, called warriors like Thomas Bradwardine in Oxford⁶⁾, and Gregory of Rimini in Paris, upon the Augustinian battlefields.

What are the mainlines Gregory saw in Augustine? Gregory, with Augustine, postulated that theology start with an authentic sentence from Scripture as premiss, philosophy with 'experientia' (direct infallible contact with reality, whether material outside reality, or spiritual inner reality); that both theology and philosophy develop by our God-given power of reasoning in the light of evidence.

Long reasonings, especially the ones which schoolmasters had drilled into the consciousnesses, with chainlinked obligatory steps of proof, Gregory disliked like a Heidegger, whether these steps were called

⁶⁾ Cf. HEIKO A. OBERMAN, Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine, a 14th cent. Augustinian (Utrecht 1957).

formalities, modalities, essentialities, or whatever you wanted to call them. Gregory desired to get straight to the divine moment when he *could see*, simply *see* quia ita est. If in that divine moment he was formulating his intuition for himself, he called it *incomplexe significabile*; if he spoke to someone else about his experience, his formulation might sound to the listener first like a *complexe significabile*, a sentence to *become* meaningful, and if the listener intuitively checked up within himself, it would be a full *incomplexe significabile* with an actual meaning. A listener was supposed to be able to relive the other's experience, and *see* for himself; if he stored away any *complexe significabilia* in his memory, it was only for the purpose of future reliving and reviewing.

To be able to *see*, to intuit by intuition, when confronted by inner or outer reality, that is Gregory's most Augustinian fundamental.

Intuition in Augustine and in Gregory means the possibility of taking direct and infallible contact with reality; it is self-understood that Augustine's and Gregory's 'reality' is 'created' reality, a polarized reality that has to be dealt with the triadic prism of memory-intelligence-will. Augustine, on the one hand, has no intention to deny the traditional apophthegma that '*opera ad extra sunt communia*'; on the other hand, he finds the prismatic imagery, intuited in one's own self, that is memory-intelligence-will, very useful, nay indispensable for the breath and the width of all discussions.

We cannot understand Gregory of Rimini without Augustine the 'trinitarian' or, at least, the 'triadic' thinker. Augustine's *De trinitate* is required reading, not so much the first seven books, which contain an exposition of the christian dogma, as the books 8-15, which display, and play with triadic intuitions.

Our present-day theological situation does not appear to be very helpful when visualizing triadic possibilities, as the christian belief in a Trinity has faded into such an insignificance that children are not even taught the ancient doxology anymore. It is therefore not by chance that Augustine the trinitarian has been less and less in the foreground, because Augustine the humanist has been more and more exalted by the humanists; if proof were needed, one look into Brown's otherwise wonderful book '*Augustine of Hippo*'⁷⁾ should suffice: Brown right

⁷⁾ Cf. PETER BROWN, *Augustine of Hippo A Biography*, London, Faber & Faber, 1975.

from his first pages onward excludes deliberately Augustine the trinitarian from the scope of his biography.

Gregory, cast into the role of a triadic follower of Augustine, worships the divine Verbum, and reverences the human word, the one being said eternally, the other, the human one, timed again and again, communicable, or communicated, perhaps seen in its true objectively present meaning, by intuition, or heard perhaps in a sentence which at first might be only possibly significant, but significant after a process of reviewing in one's own mind, and more and more replenishable to its full signification.

The literary 'nominalism' according to all appearances is something of a hoax; the historical nominalism, Augustinian in origin, has by Gregory's authentication been brought back to an Augustinian zenith.

With the spiritual giant, Augustine, Gregory climbed the mountain of God's creation in order to have the great experience Augustine himself had and described in *De trinitate* 9,6 PL 42,996; *The Fathers of the Church* v 45 [1963] 279:

«Thus when I call to mind the walls of Carthage which I have seen, and form an image of those of Alexandria which I have not seen, and prefer some of these imaginary forms to others, I prefer them for good reason; the judgment of *the truth from above is strong and clear, and remains steadfast by the most incorruptible rules of its own right; and even if it is concealed by bodily images, as a kind of cloud, still it is not hidden nor confused*».

«But it does make a difference, whether, while I am under or in that darkness, I am shut off as it were from the clear heavens, or *as usually happens on the highest mountains, whether I behold the most dazzling light above and the most dense clouds below, while enjoying the free air between both*».

Two pages later, Augustine says: «Something similar takes place when I recall a beautifully and symmetrically intorted arch which I have seen, for example in Carthage. In this case a certain reality, which was made known to my mind through the eyes, and transferred to my memory, produces an imaginary view. But in my mind I behold something else, according to which that work pleases me; whence also, I should correct it if it displeased me. Therefore we pass judgment upon these particular things *according to that form of the eternal truth, and we perceive that form through the eye of the rational mind*».

«But these particular things we touch, if present, with the bodily sense, or recall them, if absent, through the image fixed in our memory, or form images of things that are similar to them, such as we ourselves would also endeavor to construct, if we

wished and were able. For we form images of bodies in our mind or see bodies through the body in one way, but we comprehend in a different way the types, and the ineffably beautiful art of such forms, as are above the eye of the mind, by simple intelligence».

Leafing through Gregory's pages one may be shocked by his predestinationism, and ask oneself whether Gregory's God was the Mexican War God. The God Gregory worships with his Master Augustine is not the Platonic God of the humanists. It is the trinitarian God of universal gravitation, of universal love, of universal truth, of universal being.

Quoting from Augustine's Confessions 13, 9 PL 32, 849 Gregory 1 Sent dist 1 q 2 art 2 fol 28N has these lines on the God of universal gravitation of love: "Sicut in naturalibus est aliquod principians motum... est aliqua inclinatio ad motum desiderii... et illa est amor... iuxta illud Augustini... 'Amor meus pondus meum, eo feror quocumque feror', quamvis nec illud semper oporteat intelligi de amore actualiter elicitum".

More intimately we meet this God of universal love in the inner experience of fraternal love. Augustine has written immortal lines in this regard for ex. De trin 8, 8 PL 42, 957-58:

"Nemo dicat: Non novi quid diligam. Diligat fratrem, et diligit eandem 'dilectionem'. Magis enim novit 'dilectionem quam diligit' quam 'fratrem quem diligit'. Ecce iam potest notioiorem deum habere quam fratrem: plane notioiorem, quia praesentioiorem; notioiorem quia interioriorem, notioiorem quia certioiorem. Amplectere 'dilectionem deum' et dilectione amplectere deum. Ipsa est dilectio quae omnes bonos angelos, et omnes dei servos consociat vinculo sanctitatis nosque et illos coniungit invicem nobis, et subiungit sibi. Quanto igitur saniores sumus a tumore superbiae, tanto sumus dilectione pleniores: et quo nisi deo plenus est qui plenus est dilectione? At enim caritatem video, et quantum possum eam mente 'conspicio et credo' Scripturae dicenti quoniam «Deus caritas est et qui manet in caritate, in deo manet» (1 Jo 4, 16): sed cum illam 'video' non in ea 'video' trinitatem? Immo vero 'vides' trinitatem, si caritatem vides".

«Sed commonebo, si potero, ut videre te videas⁸) (Adsit tantum ipsa ut moveamur caritate ad aliquod bonum). Quia cum diligimus caritatem, <caritatem> aliquid diligentem diligimus, propter hoc ipsum quia diligit aliquid. Ergo quid diligit caritas, ut

⁸) The Fathers of the Church V 45 (1963) 263 has a translation which may not do justice to the subtleties of the Augustinian forebodings of nominalism.

possit etiam ipsa caritas diligi? Caritas enim non est quae nihil diligit. Si autem se ipsam diligit [ut] diligat aliquid, oportet ut caritatem se diligat”.

“Sicut enim verbum indicat aliquid, indicat etiam seipsum, sed non se verbum indicat nisi se aliquid indicare indicet: sic et caritas diligit quidem se, sed nisi se-aliquid-diligentem diligat, non caritatem-se diligit”.

Some lines later: “Qui non diligit, non cognovit deum: quia deus dilectio est (1 Jo 4, 8). Ista contextio satis aperteque declarat eandem ipsam fraternam dilectionem (nam fraterna dilectio est qua diligimus invicem) non solum ‘ex’ deo sed etiam ‘deum esse’ tanta auctoritate praedicari... Unde colligitur duo illa praecepta non posse esse sine invicem”.

The God of eternal truth Augustine meets within the intuition of moral truths that face him just as often as the principle of causality and others face him, and there is no greater proof required. To find Gregory’s milieu described one may read the following passage, again from *De trin* 8, 7 PL 42, 995:

“Cum enim dico et sciens dico ‘Justus est animus qui scientia atque ratione in vita ac moribus sua cuique distribuit’ non aliquam rem absentem cogito sicut Carthaginem, aut fingo ut possum sicut Alexandriam, sive ita sit sive non ita, sed praesens quiddam cerno, et cerno apud me, etsi non sum ipse quod cerno. Et multi si audiant, approbabit. Et quisquis me audit atque scienter approbat, apud se et ipse hoc idem cernit, etiamsi non sit et ipse quod cernit. Justus vero cum id dicit, id quod ipse est cernit et dicit. Et ubi etiam ipse cernit nisi apud se ipsum? Sed hoc mirum non est: ubi enim se cerneret nisi apud se ipsum? Illud mirabile est ut apud se animus videat quod alibi nusquam vidit; et verbum videat, et ipsum ‘verum iustum animum’ videat, et sit ipse animus, et non sit iustus animus, quem apud se ipsum videt. Num est alius animus iustus in animo nondum iusto? Aut si non est, quem ibi videt, cum videt et dicit quid sit animus iustus, nec alibi quam in se ipso videt, cum ipse non sit animus iustus? An illud quod videt, veritas est interior praesens animo qui eam valet intueri? Neque omnes valent, hoc etiam quod intuentur, non omnes ‘sunt’, hoc est non sunt etiam ipsi iusti animi sicut possunt videre ac dicere, quid sit iustus animus. Quod unde esse poterunt nisi inhaerendo eidem ipsi formae quam intuentur ut *inde* formentur, et sint iusti animi; non tantum cernentes et dicentes ‘iustum esse animum qui scientia atque ratione in vita ac moribus sua cuique distribuit’ sed etiam ut ipsi iuste vivant iusteque morati sint sua cuique distribuendo, ut nemini quidquam debeant nisi ut invicem diligant (Rom 13, 9). Et unde inhaeretur illi formae nisi amando?»

Augustine has described the God of universal being with almost medieval terms in the *Contra Epistulam Manichaei*, or as Gregory prefers *Contra Epistulam Fundamenti*. If Gregory had not quoted the *Contra Epistulam Fundamenti* expressly, it would be an extravagant enterprise to paint Gregory's nominalistic milieu with colors from the *Contra Epistulam Fundamenti*. But Gregory does quote it right in his first lines of the *In Primum*, not as often as he quotes *De trinitate* which about fifty times accredits Gregory's nominalism while the *Contra Epistulam Fundamenti* vouchsafes for nominalism less than ten times.

The scholastic-sounding passage from the *Contra Epistulam Fundamenti* is this (PL 42, 204):

"Si quis autem non credit ex nihilo esse corruptionem, proponat sibi haec duo, ESSE et NON-ESSE, quasi ex diversis partibus; intelligendi gratia, ut cum tardis tardius ambulemus: deinde velut in medio constituat ALIQUID, ut puta corpus animantis, et quaerat hoc secum, dum formatur illud corpus et nascitur, dum augetur eius species, nutritur, convalescit, roboratur [205] decoratur, firmatur: in quantum manet, et in quantum stabilitur, in quam partem tendat, utrum ad ESSE an ad NON-ESSE: non dubitabit ESSE quidem ALIQUID in ipsis etiam primordiis; sed quanto magis forma et specie et valentia constabatur atque firmatur, tanto magis fieri ut SIT, et in eam partem tendat qua positum est ESSE. Nunc ergo incipiat corrumpi; debilitetur omnis ille status, languescant vires, marcescat robur, forma foedetur, dissiliat compago membrorum, contabescat et defluat concordia partium: quaerat etiam nunc per istam corruptionem quo tendat, utrum ad ESSE an NON-ESSE: non puto usque adeo caecum et tardum, ut dubitet quid sibi ipse respondeat, et non sentiat quanto magis quodque corrumpitur, tanto magis ad interitum tendere. Omne autem quod ad interitum tendit, ad NON-ESSE tendit. Cum ergo deum incommutabiliter et incorruptibiliter ESSE credendum sit, id autem quod dicitur NIHIL penitus NON-ESSE manifestum sit:... quid dubitas dicere in unaquaque natura corruptibili quid in ea sit ex deo, quid sit ex nihilo".

Coming down from the mountain of nominalistic transfiguration one may say prosaically that it was in Augustine's school that Gregory learned to defend massively the possibility of direct and evident contact with reality by means of the inner and outer sensibilities, that he learned to defend the possibilities of having authentic knowledge stored away in the mysterious holds of memory, learned to defend the possibilities of having the storage tapped by rational willpower in order to get the first evident insights further developed, step by step, in the light of the ratio evidens.

As said above, the books 8-15 of *De trinitate* (where the workings of the human mind are examined, its communing with other minds, and its prismatic nature) one should try to read thoroughly before one can hope to enjoy Gregory's nominalistic texts (for ex. 2 Sent dist 7, already printed) or 1 Sent dist 3 (to be published next). Augustine is the key to Gregory and to that large segment of the 14th century we call nominalism. One reading may not be enough, it isn't either in the case of Dante's *Paradiso*.

Gregory the Authenticus Augustinianus played the role of the Authenticator of an Augustinianism which on its 250-year old trail or track or road had accumulated a number of spurious elements. Gregory tried to disentangle its entanglements, and aimed at evolving a sincere and serene Augustinian radiance.

Besides the trinitarian Augustine, and besides an Aristotle as pagan as Averroes could make him, Gregory of Rimini quotes of course the scholars of Oxford and Paris, the Franciscan friars and the ones from his own OSA Order almost indiscriminately; it is not the corporative spirit but the Augustinizing spirit that distinguishes friends from foes of Gregory's. Adam Goddam OFM⁹⁾, Aureolus OFM, Ockham OFM are usually considered within the friendly context of their leader, Scotus OFM; of the friars of Gregory's own Order he quotes Aegidius Doctor noster some 20 times, Johannes de Lana OSA, Michael de Massa OSA, Jacobus de Viterbio OSA, Thomas of Strassburg OSA very rarely; an almost similar statistics results in regard to St. Thomas and his Dominicans; great secular Masters like Richard Fitzralph Hibernicus, Henry of Gand, Praepositinus, and Thomas Bradwardine are quoted more than once. It is an observable fact that one is rarely quoted on account of agreement, almost all quotations contain critique, and most critiques are voiced in the name of Augustine.

Gregory likes the Franciscans, not only Ockham, with whom, by the way, he deals more harshly than with Scotus himself. St. Thomas is often quoted as head of a school, and in regard to doctrines of grace, often approved of.

With the Franciscans, more than with the Dominicans, Gregory

⁹⁾ Cf. W.J. COURTENAY, Adam Wodeham An Introduction to his Life and Writings, in: *Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought* (Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1978) I-XIV, 1-241, a pioneering study on the glories of English nominalism, where good information on the Franciscans and Seculars is found. Information on the Augustinians OSA may be gained from my art. *Aug. Theology of the 14th c.*

shares a common theological disregard for Aristotle and Averroes, a common philosophical conviction that whatever exists has to exist as an individual, has to be unaffected by any principle of individuation, and has to be intellectualized as an individual.

A common heritage the 14th century shared with Augustine was: "Cognoscibilia cognitionem gignunt, non cognitione gignuntur" (De trin 14, 10 PL 42, 1047); common was also the Heideggerian aspiration "Back to the things": "Away from floating construction, from hot-air concepts, from phantomproblems like the one of the principle of individuation, away from parroting words and proofs of others who parroted them after other parrots". And the highest ambition: "Back to the safety zones of intuiting".

There were far too many abstracts in circulation. No wonder that Gregory never welcomed a new abstraction without the challenge of demanding proof for the allegation that this new abstraction was necessitated either by Scripture [within theology] or by experientia [within philosophy] or by evident reasoning [in everyday dealings]. This rather common attitude of the 14th century is often misunderstood as a postulate of economy.

The pseudo-reality of an abstraction is always reduced to size by the formula: *Non est aliud quam...* Thus for example "motus" non est aliud quam movens et motum; "creatio" non est aliud quam creator et creatum; "doctrina" non est aliud quam docens et discens; "relatio" non est aliud quam relatum et relatum; and you can continue this game throughout the theological terminology, and ask yourself a little maliciously, why Gregory in some cases is so loud, and in others so quiet: when he does not want to scandalize the traditionalists, he simply ignores the abstract (like *essentia divina*) without theorizing about it.

If the formula *Non est aliud quam...* remains an omnipresent moody question mark, it may create an atmosphere seemingly infested by skepticism, but appearances are deceiving. The formula is still compatible with Augustinianism, as long as you, naturally, add what is self-understood, namely, that by studying the two *real* extremes intuitively, you will be forced by the ratio evidens, to admit, to see that *motum movetur a movente*, that *creatum creatur a creante*, that *discipulus docetur a docente*, that *relatum refertur ad relatum*. Obeisance before the majestic power of intuition was generally assumed and expected; abeyance was not.

Intuition was generally assumed to be that proof than which there

could be no greater one. When the principle of causality or contradiction was proclaimed to be unprovable, as many a young Oxford professor used to do with great displays of academic fireworks, it was only half of the story: The first principles were safely protected against skepticisms by the omnipresent intuition proof *everybody believed in*.

Disagreements were legion, too. One was the common abuse of hypostasizing abstractions. A Franciscan abuse was the lighthearted jeopardizing of the Augustinianism's cornerstone, namely intuition. When Scotus and Franciscans like Ockham interjected the ominous possibility that God might give us intuitions of nonexistent things, Gregory foresaw the collapse of the whole Augustinian world. Gregory could not stomach either a miraculism¹⁰) which would endanger human certainties; nor did he allow that good works of creatures should act like a determining factor of divine sovereignty, as the whole Franciscan school seemed to teach, and also Thomas of Strassburg OSA.

With these Notes the reader of Gregory's new volume V was supposed to be given somewhat more than an a-priori Augustinian milieu, and somewhat less than an indispensable working hypothesis, to be referred to possibly whenever Gregory quotes from the *De trinitate*, and... discarded whenever it does not fit.

A.D. TRAPP, O.S.A.

¹⁰) Cf. the Tübingen Edition Tomus V (which has just appeared) 214-215: *Nam aliquando per miraculum suspendit aliquas creaturas ab operationibus suis quod tamen rarissime contingit, sicut contigit in camino ignis trium puerorum.*