

St.-Augustine's «notitia sui» related to Aristotle and the Early Neo-Platonists*)

V. SELF-KNOWLEDGE IN AUGUSTINE

b) *Triadic Structures.*

The textual analysis in the last chapter has shown that it is quite possible to make an analysis of Augustine's epistemology that is dyadic. Whether in the mind, the memory or the senses, the knower may have been active in grasping the object, but the fact remains that it was the object, and not himself, which produced the knowledge. However Augustine's *De Trinitate* is characterised by a number of triadic structures of knowing, whose third element is that of will or desire; their separation from the dyadic ones is not entirely rigid as will appear. The source, the modification and the application of triadic and occasional enneadic structures is the subject of this chapter.

Augustine's method with the neo-Platonist legacy of triadic conceptions.

The simple answer to the question, 'Why did Augustine make so much of a triadic analysis of human cognition in the *De Trinitate*?' is that he was looking for analogies of the Godhead in the inner personality: not just purely apologetics for a readership that had no preconceptions, but, as has been repeatedly said, as a work which both had in mind and belonged to the Graeco-Roman philosophical tradition as he found it. And here he was more eirenic than polemic: the literature of this tradition abounded in triads of different kinds. Whether noetic or creational the general principal which lay behind all of them was that for two extremes — two *termini* — to be brought together, an intermediary was needed to bind them together in their state of difference.

However it may still be asked, in addition, philosophically why Augustine should cast around for triadic structures, when he had answered the questions 'what initiates knowledge?' and 'how is self-knowledge possible?' dyadically; for a dyadic structure is sufficient in

*) Continuation of *Augustiniana* 27 (1977), pp. 70-132, 364-401 and 28 (1978), pp. 183-221.

itself. The presence of the dyadic and triadic as two alternative analyses makes the metaphysical character of the work stand out. A psychological investigation would be more tied to an examination of vital functions, potentialities, the activity of knowing which would all have to be fairly strictly delimited; a metaphysical analysis on the other hand is pursued not entirely regardless of the existence of these factors, but more freely and a degree more abstractly. It asks 'how shall we best describe knowing?', and 'what principles are involved in knowing?', and 'how is willing related to knowing?', not 'how does this particular faculty of knowing function?' nor 'has the soul different parts?'. It attempts to discern the principles which are presupposed in the psychological descriptions; for, if they did not have them the psychological investigation of mind could not exist. Augustine's deliberate use of the category of *mens* particularly equips him for such an analysis. It embraces intellectual and sense activity, and keeps in mind their unification. Aristotle's notion of abstraction was proposed as a consequence of his awareness of the distinction between sensation and thought; Augustine took for granted the distinctness of each and felt no need to dwell on the mode of formation of intelligible realities. His conception of memory also embraces the sense and intellectual memories as one, and it is impossible to make a distinction between what comes from sense and what comes from spirit in the nature of the interior word which the again undistinguished *cogitatio* demands. Similarly, Augustine's notion of will can arise, as in the *De Quantitate Animae*, in an embodied context — directly linked to the panoply of nerves and other powers:

"if what we call strength, therefore, is made up of an impulse from the soul, the mechanism of nerve sinews and the weight of the body, it is the will that supplies the impulse which is considerably stimulated by hope or courage, but retarded through fear and much more through desperation (for fear, provided there be some hope, usually increases strength)"¹).

And it can arise as a principle seen quite apart from bodily powers, indentifiable with love, in his cognitional triads. And in this more spiritual domain, the interpenetration of the memory, intellect and will in

¹) *De Quantitate Animae* 22, 38 (PL 32, 1057): "Si igitur et nutu animae, et nervorum quodam machinamento, et pondere corporis confiunt hae quae vires vocantur; voluntas nutum exhibet, qui pronior fit spe vel audacia, retunditur autem timore, sed multo magis desperatione (nam in metu cum aliqua spes subest, vehementiores vires assolent)". Translation by J.J. McMahon, S.J., *The Fathers of the Church*, vol. 4, New York 1947.

their continuous selfknowing and loving, and the decreasing mere aggregation of their cognitional acts which goes with increasing intensity, involves a union of what psychological analysis normally separates.

Very apt is the comment of E. Benz²⁾, clearly intended as a criticism of at least the title of the earlier book by M. Schmaus³⁾:

“It is not the case that Augustine invented a ‘psychological teaching on the Trinity’; rather the basis of this psychology is a development of a metaphysical law, derived from the analysis of the process of thinking which two hundred years before, Plotinus had found to be a general universal law of the development of mind, i.e. a law which presides over the objectification of absolute mind within the process of self-knowledge, and likewise is thought of as bringing the human mind to be the image of pure mind”.

He describes this law as found in Plotinus as follows:

“The self-thinking of absolute mind necessarily leads to a triadic expression in so far as the intellect as a hypostasis bears within it the trinity of the power of knowing (Erkennen) (as potency), understanding (Erkenntnis) (as act), and the known (die Erkannten) (as τύπος, form and pattern).

... The most important ideas are: the separation of absolute being for the production of a dialectical tension; the regarding of this separation as an alienation in which the (potential) intellect objectifies, forms and limits itself; the return of the objectified mind upon itself (as to its model), with ἐπιστροφή, ἐφάψις, ἐπιβολή, the basing of ἐπιστροφή upon the dynamic being of mind that has a will directed to itself — ἔρως, πόθος, ὁρμή, θέλησις”⁴⁾.

Here, Benz's usually reasonable interpretation lapses in a major detail and a minor detail. In the first part of the second quotation he does not note that Plotinus is describing in the first text, on which he bases his reflection⁵⁾, not a self-production of νοῦς, but the production of νοῦς out of the One, in accordance with the epistemic principle which Plotinus shares with Augustine, that knowledge begins with the object — even in intelligibles. So the τύπος which starts off the production of νοῦς here is the One itself; and this whole triadic process therefore is not contained within νοῦς, but is partly external to it. And further, Benz has overlooked Plotinus's basic criticism of Aristotle's noetic, that intellectual knowledge

²⁾ E. BENZ, Marius Victorinus und die Entwicklung der abendlandischen Willen-metaphysik. Stuttgart 1932, p. 368.

³⁾ M. SCHMAUS, Die psychologische Trinitätslehre des Hl. Augustins, Münster 1927.

⁴⁾ Op. cit. pp. 223-5.

⁵⁾ Ennead V, 4, 2.

cannot be a passage from potency to act⁶): νοῦς is unchanging and any variability, such as an arriving at knowledge, must be located in ψυχή.

Benz's contention that Augustine based himself on a law of thinking which was derived from Plotinus needs highly critical qualification. It must be agreed that Augustine would have been interested in radically structured acts of self-knowing in the hypostases as sources of material for analogies with the Trinity, and as also providing material which would be common ground with neo-Platonism, over the structuring of human mental processes (though any agreement would have been critically conceded agreement whose apologetic tenour may easily and inaccurately be taken for 'influence'). Benz had noted that Augustine had said of the love of external things *id amare alienari est*⁷). But this cannot be taken as a persistence of the plotinian concept of πρόοδος: it concerns the love of external things. And in any case self-knowledge in Augustine is a complete exception to this law, for the self is immediately and always self-knowing. Again, whilst Augustine's position is that at all levels, including the knowledge of God, cognition remains triadic with a place for will, Plotinus considers that with knowledge at its "highest and purest", that is in νοῦς, "if will (βούλησις) attains (the Good) it becomes thought (νόησις);⁸) and thus a triad, whose elements are νοῦς, an act of will, and itself as object within the Good, always becomes a dyad. Though νοῦς would here be satisfied, another text of its being turned to the good in desire⁹), and in this the structure of its "loving intelligence" remains triadic. There is clearly a resemblance with Augustine in the presence of will or love in this triad, but the parallelism disappears if at the highest degree of union, will or love is absorbed into knowing.

Benz seems to have merged together what Hadot has pointed out Plotinus does not seem to have clearly distinguished and defined: the relation between the conversion of intelligence towards the One and its conversion towards itself¹⁰). It should be remembered that the triadic

⁶) *Ib.* V, 9, 5: 'If one takes the word 'mind' in its true sense, what must be understood by it is not a mind in potentiality which passes from a state of non-understanding to a state of understanding ... but mind in act and eternally existent'.

⁷) *De Trinitate* IX, 5, 9. cf. *op. cit.* p. 369: 'Augustine has grasped well the plotinian idea of alienation of mind, and certainly of an alienation of his own being: however he would not allow the conception to be applies to the divine being'.

⁸) *Ennead* VI, 8, 6.

⁹) *Ib.* VI, 7, 35: '... carried out of itself and inebriated with nectar, (νοῦς) becomes a loving intelligence in simplifying itself to reach this state of happy fullness'.

¹⁰) Cf. P. HADOT, *Porphyre et Victorinus*, Paris 1968, I, p. 320. 'Επιστρέφειν can mean in fact a return of νοῦς to itself or to its source. *Ennead* VI, 7, 37 brings the two

movement of outgoing and return is both the structure of the noetic cosmos as well as epistemic. Porphyry took the movement further in the direction of systematisation by distinguishing¹¹⁾ between intellectual beings which were capable of this return, and sense powers, bound to a body, which were not, and equating the movement with the triad being thinking — life, the last element being constituted of the state self-regarding¹²⁾. Proclus went further and constituted it into a law of the constitution of all reality¹³⁾.

The complete rôle of Porphyry's thought in Augustine's thinking is evidently large, though much remains unclear and is likely to remain so. We have every justification, however, in presuming that there was a great deal of allusion in Augustine's Trinitarian teaching to Porphyrian triads, though the loss of so much of his work makes confirmation of this presumption impossible¹⁴⁾. Following Hadot, A. Ziegenaus¹⁵⁾ has proposed that Victorinus's trinitarian speculations came out of Porphyry's modifications to Plotinus's thought by giving the second One its own inner dynamism, Porphyry's position differed from the unqualified subordination of Plotinus's hypostases making them more equal, approximating more to the Christian Trinity.

movements together: 'it looks for itself and its author, it turns itself to contemplate and it knows' (ζητεῖν... καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ποιῆσαν αὐτό, καὶ ἐπιστραφὲν ἐν τῇ θεᾷ καὶ γνωρίσαν, following Bréhier).

¹¹⁾ *Sententia* XLII. Cf. HADOT, Porphyre ... I, p. 322.

¹²⁾ See *fr. XIV of Commentary on the Parmenides* (HADOT, *ib.* II, p. 111) lines 16-21. But notice lines 15-16 give the order being — life — thought. Cf. H. LEWY, Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy, Cairo 1956, p. 455: 'Plotinus... frequently designated ζῶη as coordinate with ὄν and νοῦς; with (tacit) reference to this teaching Porphyry introduced the noetic triad ὄν-ζῶη-νοῦς in his commentary on the Timaeus'. LEWY refers (*op. cit.* p. 456, n. 57) to a text in PROCLUS's commentary on the Timaeus (ed. E. DIEHL, III, p. 64 line 8 to p. 65 line 7, Leipzig 1906) quoting PORPHYRY (and THEODORUS (OF ASINE)) as explaining the apparent difference of speed in the movement of the stars (= Star-gods) by the variations of οὐσία-νοῦς-ζῶη in their constitutions and between themselves and their end (mediations) (cf. PROCLUS, *Commentaire sur le Timée*, translated and annotated by A. J. FESTUGIÈRE, O.P., IV, pp. 88-9, Paris 1968).

¹³⁾ See: *The Elements of Theology*, proposition 35 (translation, Introduction and Commentary, by E. R. DODDS, 2nd edition, Oxford 1963, p. 39): 'Every effect remains in its cause, proceeds from it and reverts upon it'. But by propositions 39 and 45, this is restricted to what is 'self-constituted' (i.e. what necessarily exists).

¹⁴⁾ PÉPIN's suggestion that the mode of union of the triad *mens — notitia sui — amor sui* is described in a form which comes from PORPHYRY is the single solid suggestion to date. J. PÉPIN Une nouvelle source de Saint Augustin, in: *Revue des Etudes Anciennes* 66, 1964, pp. 53-107.

¹⁵⁾ A. ZIEGENAUS, Die trinitarische Ausprägung der göttlichen Seinsfülle nach Marius Victorinus, Munich 1972, pp. 91, 93.

Porphry's eclectic identification of the Plotinian triad, derived from Plato's *Sophist*, of ὕπαρξις-ζωή-νοῦς with the *Chaldaean Oracles'* triad of πατήρ-δύναμις-νοῦς¹⁶) gave an incentive and a precedent to Augustine to make assimilation and appropriations from neo-Platonism's store of examples. That he knew of Porphyry's *Commentary on the Chaldaean Oracles* is clear from the *De Civitate Dei*¹⁷). From Lewy's work on the *Chaldaean Oracles* it becomes clear that they contained a wealth of triadic structures, some more valuable (because more unitive) than others. Augustine had no need to propose the existence of a triadic Godhead: what was necessary was to make clear the superior nature of the Christian conception derivable from the Scriptures which Porphyry belittled, and capable of formulation in the profoundest and most subtly distinguished of neo-Platonist terms. What more likely than that Augustine would have heard of the theory that the third person of the Trinity has been likened to a woman, through a knowledge of the Hecate-triads as they appeared in the *Oracles*? He objected vigorously to the crude assimilation of the divine powers to a human image of father, son and mother.

"I do not speak of this parallel which makes the Holy Spirit the Mother of the Son of God and the husband of the Father. Perhaps it will be sufficiently answered by saying that this has an offensiveness in its carnal allusion, through having to think about corporeal conceptions and births"¹⁸).

Augustine then has a considerable discussion on the appropriateness of applying sexual imagery to the Trinity, which takes up about half of Book XII. That it should arise out of the original allusion to a known triad of which the third member was feminine indicates the importance which Augustine attached to it. It would be consonant with the respectful attention which he gave to Porphyry in the *De Civitate Dei*; and

¹⁶) HADOT, Porphyre ..., p. 260 ff.

¹⁷) Explicitly mentioned in XIX, 23: for other places see J. J. O'MEARA, Porphyry's Philosophy from Oracles in Augustine, Paris 1953, p. 63 ff.

¹⁸) *De Trinitate* XII, 5, 5: "Omitto enim quale sit Spiritum Sanctum matrem Filii Dei putare et conjugem Patris: fortassis quippe respondeatur haec in carnalibus habere offensionem, dum corporis conceptus partusque cogitantur". cf. LEWY, *op. cit.*, p. 8 ff for a triad in a hymn of PORPHYRY which derives from the *Chaldaean oracles*: 'Father of the God's — feminine principle — intellect creator of the world. 'The feminine principle "suckles" the world-forming intellect by means of the "eternally flowing rays" ... the forms which spring from her' (*op. cit.* p. 13). On Hecate-Psyche, the cosmic soul in the *Oracles*, see *ib.* pp. 83 ff.

should the hypothesis of the presence of a refugee group of Roman neo-Platonists being the destination recipients of the treatise be correct, the style and matter would be appropriate for the rejection of an eclectic identification of a Porphyrian triad which the Trinity made in such a circle, which Augustine eirenicly consented to examine at some length. Here indirect evidence, in addition to the direct evidence of the *De Civitate Dei* XIX, that Augustine knew of the *Chaldaean Oracles*, either through Porphyry's early *Commentary* or as commented later again in his *De Regressu Animae*¹⁹).

If he found the significance of this Hecate-triad so great, is it not likely that, had he found it in the *Commentary*, he would have been interested in the Chaldaean triad δύναμις-πατρικὸς νοῦς-βουλή²⁰) as providing a model for the triadic constitution of *mens*, *notitia* and *voluntas*, though not applicable as he saw to the Trinity²¹)? Possibly he was also thinking of the *Oracles'* erection of ἔρωϛ into a binding cosmic form when he wrote that everything had its cause in three respects: *qua sit, qua hoc sit, qua sibi amica sit*²²). Augustine did not follow Porphyry in his use of the triad οὐσία-ζωή-νοῦς in self-consciousness as a form of circular thinking²³) of outgoing and return upon the self, in his *Commentary on the Parmenides*. A text in the *Confessiones* may bring them together as three in one: "quam sit inseparabilis vita et una vita et una mens et una essentia, quam denique inseparabilis distinctio et tamen distinctio"²⁴); in the *De Trinitate* the triad is attributed to the separate personality of the Son²⁵), and also made to correspond with the hierarchy of being — sentient life — intelligence²⁶).

Probable as is the importance of Porphyry's notions for understanding Augustine's apologetic, the disappearance of so much of his work, no doubt by burning according to the decree of the Em-

¹⁹) For the relation of the works to the *Oracles* see P. HADOT, Citations de Porphyre chez Augustin, in: *Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes* 6, 1960, especially pp. 205-7, as complementary to LEWY, *op. cit.*, pp. 449ff. LEWY opines that AUGUSTINE would have known a Latin translation, *ib.* p. 451 and n. 10.

²⁰) See LEWY, pp. 78ff.

²¹) *De Trinitate* XV, 25, 45: 'Tria unius personae, non sicut humana poscit intentio, tribus illis personis convenire potuerunt'.

²²) *De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII*, 18 (PL 40. 15). The theme of self-coincidence here very much resembles PORPHYRY's *Sententia* XLI on self-knowledge where it is expressed in terms of φιλία.

²³) As proposed by L. SCHEGLMANN and J. MADER, see *infra* pp. 113.

²⁴) *Op. cit.* XIII, 11, 12: the condition is that *mens* is equivalent to *intelligere*.

²⁵) *Op. cit.* VI, 10, 11.

²⁶) *Ib.* X, 13-16.

peror Theodosius II and Valentinian III of 448²⁷), prevents us from confirming that Augustine alluded to him. Yet there is sufficient evidence to show²⁸) that Augustine was systematically making a comprehensive simplification of triadic and dyadic descriptions of self-loving and self-knowing which may be found in the *Enneads*. In *De Trinitate* IX he conflated a triad of self-love, which he reduced to a dyad, with a dyad of self-knowledge, and following the logical law that two things which are each equal to a third are equal to each other, he postulated the existence of a triad of *mens* (later self-remembering), self-knowledge and self-love. The reduction of triad to dyad is always possible provided the elements include only two terms. And if νοῦς and νοητόν are identical, the activity of νόησις can be included or disregarded according to context. Here we should be aware of a great difference between the triads of Plotinus and those of Augustine. Even though Augustine's cognitional triads become decreasingly aggregates to the degree to which they are more interior, the interior triads (and the divine triad) do not lose their three elements as Augustine postulates their increasingly complete overlapping unity²⁹. By contrast, the triads of Plotinus become increasingly unified the closer they are found to the One. In the One, νοῦς, νόησις, νοητόν come to absolute unity, effacing each other in each other³⁰). This same triad is said to exist also in itself, where, whether in triadic form or dyadic reduction³¹), this absolute unity cannot exist. In so far as it is turned to the One, there is a place for its virtual triplicity to show itself, for in this case the subject (νοῦς) is *in* but not identical with the Good, its object; and therefore the will (βούλησις) of νοῦς is revealed as a third element in its constitution in the desire for the Good³²). This will for the One can also

²⁷) *Codex Iustiniani* I, 1, 3: 'We wish that all his writings, which provoke the wrath of God and are offensive to souls, should not come to the hearing of men'. The writings of NESTORIUS were condemned in the same decree.

²⁸) See *infra*, n. 33.

²⁹) That this unity is more paradoxical and the resultant triads are not dialectical in the Hegelian sense will be explained in an article on Hegel and Augustine, to be published in this review.

³⁰) See *Ennead* VI, 7, 41.

³¹) *Ib.* V, 3, 5. In its triadic form, said by A. DAHL (*Augustin und Plotin, Philosophische Untersuchungen zum Trinitätsproblem und zur Nuslehre*, Lund 1945, pp. 70-71) to have an 'unmistakable resemblance' to AUGUSTINE's triads. This essay demonstrates how limited that resemblance is.

³²) *Ennead* VI, 8, 6: 'For the will tends to the Good; but νοῦς is truly in the Good; it thus possesses the object towards the will tends'.

be described as 'love';³³⁾ the near equivalence between willing and loving is in this way held by Plotinus, as it is by Augustine³⁴⁾. The third element, will, is so called 'because it is in conformity with the activity of νοῦς', attaining to the Good, and 'becomes thought'³⁵⁾. Whatever we make of this highest activity of νοῦς in the contemplation of the One being both νόησις and βούλησις, and, βούλησις though timeless, *becoming* νόησις we have to say that there is a step to unity and purely formal triadicity in going from the true triad of νοῦς to the One, whilst in νοῦς the occurrence of will is more triplicative than triune, and precisely because the original unity is lost this triplicity is aggregated. Below νοῦς aggregation and triplicity should increase more.

Augustine would have rejected a purely formal triadicity in the Godhead: his Trinity was truly triadic, as it was also in consequence enneadic; for the three Persons cannot be merged into a supreme single Godhead. The occurrence of will in self-knowing does not disappear in the union of knower and object; it is present in all the cognitional triads as the dispositive cause of the union of knower and object known. This form of triadic epistemology goes back at least to the place of love and desire for intelligibles, found in the thought of both Plato and Aristotle. But to give such a significant place to the will enabled Augustine to integrate

³³⁾ Cf. *ib.* VI, 7, 35. Knowing and willing are more obscurely brought together in the One in VI, 8, 16: 'As for him, transporting himself into himself, he loves himself, he loves his pure clarity (αἰγὴν καθάραν), since that which he loves in himself is a motionless act and a kind of intelligence (οἶον νοῦς)... he is as he wishes to be (ἐθέλει)'. Two remarks of HADOT reach nearest to the heart of the subject-matter:

i) 'the schemas of the neo-Platonist schools which can be discerned through the Augustinian trinities undergo a kind of metamorphosis' (L'Image de la Trinité dans l'âme chez Victorinus et chez Augustin, in: *Studia Patristica* VI, Berlin 1962, p. 440). But disconcertingly he goes on to ask 'are there psychological, historical or mystical reasons which explain why renouncing ontological dogmatism, Augustine only admits the evidence of interior experience to possess certitude ...?' (*ib.* pp. 441-2).

ii) '(it is desirable to have) a study of the genesis of the Augustinian schemas, those complexes of thought in which memories of Plotinus and Porphyry, scriptural quotations and theological reflection make up a block which it is almost impossible to break down' (Citations de Porphyre chez Augustin, in: *Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes* 6 (1960), p. 244).

As for the first, it is the proposal of this essay that Augustine retained some of the certainties and analyses made by neo-Platonist dogmatism, and did not limit himself to personal 'experience' (presumably of a non-metaphysical kind, which he used to construct a different subjectivity structure). As for the second, this essay undertakes an initial 'decomposition' of Augustine's schemas.

³⁴⁾ Cf. *De Trinitate* XI, 2, 5: 'Et si (voluntas) tam violenta est, ut possit vocari amor, aut cupiditas, aut libido ...'

³⁵⁾ *Ennead* VI, 8, 6: ὅπερ ἡ βούλησις θέλει καὶ οὐ τυχοῦσα ἂν ταύτῃ νόησις γίνεται.

into his structure of subjectivity the attentiveness (*intentio*) which characterised Stoic epistemology: an integration which to some extent Plotinus had already made. Besides the need of the Stoic virtue of ἀπάθεια, he wrote of the need 'to turn our perceptions towards the interior of ourselves and fix our attention there'³⁶). The comprehension together of an ultimately Platonist doctrine of ἔρως and an ultimately Aristotelian doctrine of self-knowledge through their re-working together in neo-Platonism with some Stoic conceptions³⁷), the garnering of these ideas from scattered places and obscure formulations, the reinterpretation of them in a radically simple but embracive idea was not only a hermeneutical *tour de force*: all the time it was as much speculative theology in its search for dependable analogies between human *mens* and Godhead. Here the assertion of triadicity, will or love joining object to knower, through every level of human cognition as also in the divine, while it may derive in part from neo-Platonism, conflicts with its general conception. Augustine knew that a triad of equal elements which were united without merging was the basic form of all noetic: not a convergence towards an unselfconscious unity. Correct though neo-Platonism's search for the innocence of oneness was, its triadicity turns out to be differing degrees of triplicity above which was the pure unity of the One: but this was wrong not only of God but also of the human *mens* with its fundamental constitutive triad.

The basic, constitutive triad of 'mens': memoria sui - se nosse - se velle; its enneadic version.

Although, according to Plotinus, with its self-knowing and self-love, the One was in a state of self-equality, νοῦς constituted as self-knowing, was not: if it were, it would be independent of the One. Plotinus explained the unity of the whole system of hypostases by an absence of self-equality in νοῦς (and ψυχῇ): their desire for union with the One from which they

³⁶) *Ib.* V, 1, 12 (following Bréhier): καὶ τὸ ἀντιλαμβανόμενον εἰς τὸ εἶσω ἐπιστρέφειν, κακεῖ ποιεῖν τὴν προσοχὴν ἔχειν.

The Stoic occurrences of προσοχή (= attention) noted in the dictionaries of H. STEPHANUS and LIDDELL and SCOTT are significant. It is not surprising to find a considerably developed Roman use of this conception in CICERO's employment of *intendere*, and at the same time its association with a teaching on *acies mentis* (= point of attention). *Intendere* and *acies* are brought together by CICERO (*Academica* (*Priora*) II, 25, 80)) and also QUINTILIAN (*Institutio Oratoria* XI, 2, 10: the context is of memory). This is undoubtedly the background to Augustine's own conceptions.

³⁷) See in particular *infra*: p. 118 and nn. 79 and 80.

came, a return to their source in which they would find self-equality, was reason why the whole noetic (and its dependent cosmos) held together. They emulated the self-equality which could only be found in the One. Against this view Augustine held that man had his god-like independence, and was so constituted that he could find his self-equality. For Plotinus the universe was held together by the self-equality within the One, which the whole cosmos sought by desire; self-equality to a man was an impossibility while he remained a man. For Augustine man found self-equality by inhering in God³⁸), but that self-equality was his own. As the human *mens* had a true independence, it was no longer in every respect troubled by a desire for its source. Personal (including original) sin, not a cosmic flaw, explained why the image of God had lost its self-equality and needed grace to retain it, but this need not intrude into a study of its constitution. The self-love and the selfknowledge of *mens* must be immediately present to it, potentially total, and interrelated. The human essence is thus made theoretically capable of total explanation; it is no longer a series of limited, if elegantly analysed, domains as in Aristotle, or an accidental union of relevance and irrelevance, reality and unreality as with Plato and the neo-Platonists. Especially when the further substitution of *memoria* for *mens* allows an explanation to be given of the continuity of self-knowledge and self-love, an appropriately time-bound structure of great power is produced. The basic structure of the *mens* could be conceived of as a triad of self-memory, self-knowing and self-willing (or loving) always in a state of self-equality, though perhaps obscured and therefore incompletely realised; and knowledge of other things, of which it was the condition, might also be regarded as triadic: the less interior, the less triune. In its possible perfectibility, it was a model of the divine; in its possible defectibility unmistakably human.

Not only is this inner triad of *De Trinitate* IX a simplification and systematisation of Plotinian (and possibly Porphyrian) texts taking in Stoic teaching in its comprehensiveness, not only are the triadic elements necessarily articulated: Augustine thought they were discernible through an exercise partly resembling the phenomenological reduction or ἐποχή of Husserl, partly an ascetical labour. One must detach oneself from the corrupting influence of material things, a great source of mistaken imagination of what the self really was, and become aware that “there

³⁸) On ‘inherence’ and related notions in the *De Trinitate*, see XII, 3, 3: ‘subhaeremus intelligibili atque incommutabili veritati’; *ib.* 7, 12: ‘mens aeternis rationibus conspiciendis vel consulendis adhaerescit’; XVI, 14, 20: ‘ei cuius imago est valeat inhaerere’.

never was a time when it did not love itself and never a time when it did not know itself; but because it loved another thing with itself, it has confused itself with this thing, and has as it were grown together with it"³⁹).

This deep self-remembering, self-knowing and self-loving is interior and continuous, whether one is aware of it or not, though discernment of it is not excluded:

"If we betake ourselves to the inner memory of the mind by which it remembers itself, and to the inner understanding by which it understands itself, and to the inner will by which it loves itself, where these three things are always together at the same time and always have been together at the same time, from the moment when they began to be, whether one thought of them or whether one did not think of them..."⁴⁰).

Not only can they never be lost⁴¹); they were also present through the unconsciousness of childhood⁴²) (even if children lack the power of cogitation and the understanding of words⁴³): cogitation which is necessary even for the self consciously to know itself⁴⁴), and the spoken word, depending on the interior word which adds nothing however to what is thought up from the memory⁴⁵). This supposition may sound aprioristic to a later age: it was in itself a necessary corollary to apportioning to each person the attribute of self-knowing *νοῦς* in the recognisable form neo-Platonists had inherited the conception from Aristotle. If this were to be not timeless but present through time, it would necessarily involve, together with self-memory, continuous existence from the creation of *mens*. Further, continual self-complaisance, the

³⁹) *Ib.* X, 8, 11: 'Videbit quod numquam se non amaverit, numquam nescierit: sed aliud secum amando cum eo se confudit et concrevit quodam modo'. Cf. *ib.* X, 10, 16: '... quodam interiore non simulata, sed vera praesentia (non enim quidquam illi est se ipsa praesentius) sicut cogitat vivere se et meminisse, et intelligere, et velle se. Novit enim haec in se, nec imaginatur quasi extra se illa sensu tetigerit, sicut corporalia quaeque tanguntur'.

⁴⁰) *Ib.* XIV, 7, 10: 'Nam si nos referamus ad interiorem mentis memoriam qua sui meminit, et interiorem intelligentiam qua se intelligit, et interiorem voluntatem qua se diligit, ubi haec tria simul semper sunt, et semper simul fuerunt ex quo esse coeperunt, sive cogitaretur, sive non cogitarentur...'. Cf. *ib.* XIV, 6, 9.

⁴¹) *Ib.* XIV, 14, 19: 'Non tamen in his tantis infirmitatis et erroris malis amittere potuit naturalem memoriam, intellectum, et amorem sui'.

⁴²) *Ib.* XIV, 5, 7: '(Infans) se nosse ... non ignorare se potest, sed cogitare se non poteat?' The question is answered affirmatively.

⁴³) *Ib.*

⁴⁴) *Ib.* 6, 8.

⁴⁵) *Ib.* 7, 10.

aim and consequence of self-knowledge⁴⁶) in the timebounded self-memory, demonstrates the presence of self-love:

“nobody loves that which he does not remember, and that of which he is completely ignorant.... Human nature, therefore, has been so formed that never does it not remember itself, never does it not understand itself, never does it not love itself”⁴⁷).

The Aristotelian insight that mind's knowing was essentially self-knowing would necessitate in a timebound setting the concomitants of self-memory and self-love which, as timeless, it would not have. Aristotle risked the dissolution of the personality by insisting on the absolute transcendence of thought; Augustine risked an unclarity in mind's connection with transcendence by making the structure of subjectivity independent and complete.

Normally the study of Augustine's metaphysical psychology is carried out triadically; it ought to be carried out enneadically. This is an inevitable consequence of substituting the active power of memory for the entity of *mens*.

When self-knowledge and self-love are made equivalent to *mens*, the total interpenetration is the comprehension of each in the two others, or of the two others in each:⁴⁸) it is a complexity which is easy manage. But when self-memory, with its characteristic activity, takes the place of *mens* the pattern becomes enneadic: the self-reflection (through reduplication) of the three faculties and the two-way linkage of each of the other three pairs.

“For not only is each one comprehended by each one, but all are also comprehended by each one. For I remember that I have a memory, understanding and will; and I understand that I understand, will and remember; and I will that I will, remember and understand; and at the same time I remember my whole memory, understanding and will”⁴⁹).

⁴⁶) Cf. M. SCHMAUS, Die psychologische Trinitätslehre des Hl. Augustins, p. 238: ‘Mind wishes to attain to happiness. It must thereby be conscious that it is itself that strives for this end. It is recognisable as the bearer of a desire for happiness’. However, this may not be apparent before introspective analysis. The lack of immediate awareness of self-love may be due to the fact that it does not show itself because it is satisfied: cf. ‘voluntas in ipsa notitia conquiescit, quod fit in amore spiritualium’ (*De Trinitate* IX, 9, 14).

⁴⁷) *Ib.* 14, 18: ‘Nemo diligit cuius non meminit, et quod penitus nescit ... Sic itaque condita est mens humana, ut numquam sui non neminerit, nunquam se non intelligat, nunquam se non diligit’.

⁴⁸) *De Trinitate* IX, 5, 8: ‘Singula in binis ... Ac per hoc et bina in singulia, quia mens quae se novit et amat, cum sua notitia est in amore, et cum amore in notitia...’.

With a modicum of re-arrangement the enneadic structure becomes clear, together with its total containment in the unity of memory.

Memini me habere memoriam	memini me habere intelligentiam	memini me habere voluntatem	totamque meam memoriam et intelligentiam et voluntatem simul memini
intelligo me habere memoriam	intelligo me habere intelligentiam	intelligo me habere voluntatem	
volo me meminisse	volo me intelligere	volo me velle	

Not only are the powers represented vertically, bound together by their activity, represented horizontally : Augustine relates to this ennead the knowledge of other intelligibles. Significantly he treats this knowledge as an extension of self-knowledge, firstly in so far this also requires the presence of memory and will besides the intelligence as the inseparable constituents of mind : "Quidquid itaque intelligibilem memini et volo, consequenter intelligo"; secondly, by handling the concept of *intelligibilia* as if it were equivalent to *intelligentia*⁴⁹). The richly subtle argument is not halted at all for an explanation of the origin and nature of the former. That he should regard the knowledge of intelligibles to be the identity of object with knower is a further indication that he knew the content of Aristotle's noetic, perhaps through Porphyry's *Commentary on Metaphysics XII*, which may have contained allusions to the position in the *De Anima*.

⁴⁹) *Ib.* X, 11, 18 : 'Neque enim tantum a singulis singula, verum etiam a singulis omnia capiuntur. Memini enim me habere memoriam, et intelligentiam, et voluntatem; et intelligo me intelligere, et velle, atque meminisse; et volo me velle, et meminisse, et intelligere, totamque meam memoriam, et intelligentiam, et voluntatem simul memini'.

⁵⁰) *Ib.* This passage makes the much-quoted passage in IX, 4, 6 on self-knowledge as a condition of other knowledge appear in a much more Aristotelian light.

Cognitive triads and the place of the will.

The internal triad with its enneadic expansion introduces a more subtle basis to the processes of cognition. In the first place it explains why although knowledge of other things may be regarded as an extension of self-knowledge, it should not be seen only as a dyadic union of subject and object; for together with the activity of intelligence there is also that of will and memory⁵¹). Self-memory keeps the knowledge of itself present to itself through time; with the knowledge of other intelligibles the memory is necessary to sustain them in continuity of perception. Whilst it may also be the source from which past knowledge is brought to consciousness, it is necessarily involved in present reflection; it provides links with past knowledge, and contains the process of knowing through the delay in time in which the mind expresses its knowledge to itself⁵²). Self-willing, which may be regarded as the equivalent to self-loving, is the condition of loving and willing other things. An act of knowing, rooted in self-knowing, must in consequence entail an act willing — at least of willed attention, rooted in self-loving. With an act which draws on the memory there will be a triad, resembling the inner one, of memory, understanding and will; but in the case of direct knowing of intelligibles, though the memory is indirectly involved, the first element of the triad, that which begets the knowledge, will be the intelligible object itself. An analogy may further be drawn between direct sensation and intellectual knowledge triadically conceived. In this way a triadic pattern of cognition can be deduced from the inner constitutive triad of *mens* as well as observed in external circumstances: the speculative and empirical approach are bonded together.

But, in the second place, the unvarying self-equilibrium of the inner triad with the mutual co-incidence of the three powers, such that not one may be considered as always primary, is not paralleled by their equality in external knowing: a small hint, for example, may set in motion a seemingly disproportionate willed effort to acquire complete knowledge. And, thirdly, the variations of the three pairs of two-way linkages in the ennead provide the basis for more epistemic situations than those which begin with the intelligence: memory may stir the will to action, and the will may initiate a process of knowing. In so far as all external cognition

⁵¹) Triplicity ('Dreifaltigkeit') is therefore 'a necessity of thought, a metaphysical law...', E. BENZ, *op. cit.*, p. 367.

⁵²) See *Augustiniana* 28, 1978, p. 186.

depends on self-knowing, self-willing, and, by consequence self-remembering, there remain over from the enneadic constitution of self-knowledge a considerable number of starting points for analyses other than of the particular triadic type which Augustine made; his eclectic reduction of the neo-Platonist noetic and erotic had its implications for epistemology of all sorts.

Between books XI and XIV of the *De Trinitate* Augustine examines a wide range of cognitional acts on the plan of union of knower and object through a willed attention, ranging from seeing (as a representative of sensation) to thinking of God. The series is arranged in an ascending order (*quodam modo gradatim*)⁵³ of spiritualisation and interiority, which corresponds to an increasing degree of unity within the triad⁵⁴.

⁵³) *Op. cit.* XV, 2, 3.

⁵⁴) The cognitional triads are listed below. In Augustine's text they are not always given with completeness. In every case will or love keeps the attention of the percipient on the object, at the same time affixing a moral value or disvalue to the act. (cf. M. SCHMAUS, *Die psychologische Trinitätslehre des Hl. Augustinus*, p. 218: 'Its moral worth or lack of worth depends on the third element in the triad, the will').

(i) triads of external objects, with sight as an example: *ipsa res - visio - animi intentio* (XI, 2, 2). Repeated in XI, 2, 5: 'species corporis - impressa eius imago sensui - voluntas animi quae rei sensibili sensum admovet in eoque ipsam visionem tenet'.

(ii) triads of the memory: *memoria - interna visio - quae utrumque copulat voluntas* (IX, 3, 6).

(iii) triads of sensation and cogitation, with 'voluntas ... copulatrix quasi parentis et prolis' (XI, 9, 16) — partly summary, though cogitation is new.

(iv) at the margin of the 'inner man' and exterior sensation is a development of thought out of memory: 'intus corporum similitudines ... impressas memoriae, ex quibus cogitatione formaretur, tertia voluntate utrumque iungente' (XII, 15, 25).

(v) with faith (with which the consideration of inner knowledge begins — XIII, 20, 26) are

a. triads of the sounds of the words in which it is embodied: 'memoria ... verborum soni, ... inde formatur acies recordationis eius, ... et voluntas recordantis atque cogitantis utrumque (conjungens)' (XIII, 20, 26).

b. a triad of understanding the expressions of faith: 'voluntas ... quae ibi conjungit ea quae memoriae tenebantur, et ea quae inde in acie cogitationis impressa sunt' (*ib.*) Yet, to be perfect, the will must be turned into love (*ib.*).

(vi) next he considers the cognitional triad by which the *mens* needs to express itself to itself (XIV, 6, 8). After repeating that the *mens* has no need to place itself before itself (because all the time it is knowing itself), he likens the act of self-knowledge to a well-read man bringing to consciousness knowledge lying in his memory. The situation of self-knowing is like Aristotle's learned man of *De Anima* III, 429 b 5-10 (cf. *Augustiniana* 27, 1977, pp. 121-122). Augustine is emphatic that the interposition of *cogitatio* does not destroy mind's self-immediacy. He gives here two formulations of the triad.

a. 'illud unde formatur cogitantis obtutus, in memoria poneremus; ipsam vero conformationem, tanquam imaginem quae inde imprimitur; et illud quo utrumque conjungitur, amorem seu voluntatem'.

b. 'Haec autem duo, gignens et genitum, dilectione tertia copulantur, quae nihil est

Some relations are made between the different triads, but not completely systematically⁵⁵). Thus memory triads are seen to depend on sensation triads; the memory of the expressions of faith triad is related to the triad of the understanding of faith; the triad of self-knowing will lead to a triadically conceived union with God. However the overall movement in its classification and arrangement to a greater interiority is important. Initially they promise a great variety of observations; but then it turns out that they are without exception based on the same pattern: the object produces the knowledge of itself in the knower; but the will, sometimes transformed into love, has to intervene to fix the attention of the person

aliud quam voluntas fruendum aliquid appetens vel tenens’.

(vii) a wide range of triads of knowing and remembering are given in XIV, 8, 11: ‘Quae, omnia et quando discuntur, quamdam faciunt trinitatem, specie sua quae nocibilis fuit etiam antequam nosceretur, eique adjuncta cognitione discentis quae tunc esse incipit quando discitur, ac tertia voluntate quae utrumque conjungit’.

(viii) contrasted with the changeless bliss of the next world is the complaisance in good deeds, whether recognised here and now (‘cum ea praesentia tenemus, aspiciamus. amamus’), or remembered from this life in the next (‘cum illud quaecumque vestigium et memoriter retinebatur, et agnoscitur veraciter, et hoc utrumque tertia voluntate jungetur’) (XIV, 9, 12).

⁵⁵) In a posthumous article, L. SCHEGLMANN proposed a relationship between the triads: *amans - quod amat - amor* (IX, 2, 2), *mens - amor - notitia sui* (IX, 3, 6) and *memoria - intelligentia - voluntas* (X, 11, 17). (Der Subjektzirkel in der Psychologie Augustins, in: *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung* 22, 1968, pp. 327 ff.) From the first triad (which amounts to self-love in the sense of feeling (Selbstgefühl) comes the second (because self-love needs knowledge). And the third is a reflected deepening of the second. ‘In this way the basic quality of feeling of the mind’s being (Sein des Geistes) becomes reflected. From reflected knowledge comes intelligence; from reflected love comes will’. ‘Die reflektierte Kenntnis (*notitia*) ergibt die Erkenntnis (*intelligentia*), die reflektierte Liebe (*amor*) ergibt den Willen (*voluntas*)’ (p. 334). From the first triads he makes out a ‘first circle’ of self-feeling (Selbstgefühl) which is raised into self-knowing (Sichwissen). ‘I’ is thus self-knowing. Knowing is now consciousness: self-knowing is self-consciousness: ‘I’ (ib.) The interrelationship is ingenious, and the development from an unreflected *notitia sui* to *intelligentia* could be the heart of a systematisation. But it would not be Augustine’s! The three triads which SCHEGLMANN produced, of which the second is given inaccurately (in place of *amor* should be *amor sui*) are in fact all different formulations of the same fundamental triad of *mens* (or *memoria sui*) - *notitia sui* - *voluntas sui*: the triad by which *mens* remains always known to itself. Even in the act of turning to know itself (the second triad of SCHEGLMANN) it already knows itself (cf. ‘Deinde cum se quaerit ut noverit, quaerentem se jam novit. Jam se ergo novit ... Si autem se nescientem nescit non se quaerit ut sciat’ (X, 3, 5)). The *amans* of the first triad derives directly from the erotic of PLATO and PLOTINUS: feeling does not enter into it; the second triad (when complete) refers to the continuous inner self-knowledge; the third triad, according to the context, looks at separate faculties as passing into act. SCHEGLMANN did not respect the basic distinction in Augustine’s structure between *se nosse* and *cogitatio de se*. Beneath the pattern of triads and their components is the ground-swell of a normal Augustinian elevation, whose elements are strongly linked to the rising theme rather than rigidly linked to each other.

knowing on the object. The more external the object, the less spiritual the knowing and the more merely aggregated the application of the will (though its deliberate intervention is more necessary). The more interior the object, the knowing and the will producing the attention, the greater their unity. The greatest unity is when object, subject and will are united in conscious self-knowing. With faith, connatural pleasure in virtue and self-knowledge the will becomes more and more complaisance, more and more love. Hence the *mens* becomes more Godlike, without becoming divine; and Augustine's problem will be to determine their mode of continuity between God and his image in man.

Against those who imagine that Augustine initiated a will metaphysic, Benz's judgement, that Augustine is rather the thinker who interrelated mind and will, is the correct one:

"There is nothing in this metaphysics to give the will primacy over the intellect, or intellect over the will, in the way the question is usually put; but will and intellect are found undivided within a single intellectual substance"⁵⁶).

Augustine put the Platonic-Plotinian primacy of desire and love over thought⁵⁷) together with the Aristotelian usual primacy of thought over desire. Yet equal though self-knowledge and self-willing may be in themselves, the relation between exterior knowing and willing may be uneven. The desire to know something unknown has to be stirred by a foretaste of it (*breviter impressam notitiam*): as with a man who sees it is a good thing to know a foreign language from an experience of hearing it before he understands it⁵⁸); and he

"represents it in his mind by an imaginary picture by which he will be aroused to love. But whence does he picture it except from those things which he already knows?"⁵⁹)

A small hint does not necessarily produce a small desire: it may produce an enormous desire; it may cause the person to apply immense will-power

⁵⁶) *Op. cit.* p. 302.

⁵⁷) Cf. *Phaedrus* 250 D (admittedly based on reminiscence) and *Ennead* III, 5, 1.

⁵⁸) *De Trinitate* X, 1, 2.

⁵⁹) *Ib.* 2, 4. Cf. ARISTOTLE: 'But I presume that there is no reason why a man should not in one sense know, and in another not know, that which he is learning' (*Posterior Analytics* I, 1 (71 b 5-7)).

⁶⁰) *De Trinitate* XI, 6, 10. Cf. *Nicomachean Ethics*, I, 9, especially 1099 b 19-20: happiness is won by study, care and effort. Cf. also 1111 b 26: βούλησις is for an end; repeated at 1113 a 15.

to reach that of which he has only a passing glimpse. In this way the power of the will can be given an immensely important place without denying in principle the primacy of the intellect. And the whole human process of fulfilment can be expressed in terms of the will for beatitude — a state of knowledge as much as a state of love: “rectarum voluntatum connexio iter est quoddam ascendentium ad beatitudinem”⁶⁰).


*Circle or Substance*⁶¹) *Thinking.*

That Augustine's structure of thinking is triadic has led L. Scheglmann to suppose that with him self-reflection is in a tradition of circular thinking that goes back through the neo-Platonists to Plato⁶²). “I here designate this structure as a “Subjectivity circle” (“Subjektzirkel”). It is intrinsically dynamic throughout, as only through the permanent reflecting self-movement does the unmoving (identical) centre cohere and the whole is en-souled”⁶³). We have already seen that in Plotinus the return of νοῦς and ψυχή upon themselves are necessary to offset the multiplicity which their outgoing has caused⁶⁴). We have also seen in Porphyry's *Commentary on the Parmenides* that the outgoing and return are conceived as moments of the triad being — knowing — living⁶⁵), and how Victorinus incautiously followed Porphyry and saw the production of the Son as an outgoing from the Father in an act of self-knowing⁶⁶). This movement of outgoing and return becomes the circular movement of rest, procession, conversion which was found increasingly among the later neo-Platonists as a systematic structure⁶⁷).

Scheglmann notes how Aristotle set himself against the circle thinking structure of Plato⁶⁸) in *De Anima* I, 3⁶⁹). He had no doubts that

⁶¹) Cf. *De Trinitate* IX, 4, 5: ‘... non amor et cognitio tanquam in subjecto insunt menti; sed substantialiter etiam ista sunt, sicut ipsa mens’.

⁶²) *Op. cit.* The circle schema is represented thus (p. 331):



⁶³) *Ib.* p. 329.

⁶⁴) See *Augustiniana* 27, 1977, pp. 375-377.

⁶⁵) *Supra*, p. 100 and n. 12.

⁶⁶) See *Augustiniana* 28, 1978, p. 198, n. 67.

⁶⁷) See P. HADOT, *Porphyre et Victorinus*, I, pp. 318 ff.

⁶⁸) *Timaeus* 35A ff, especially 36D and E.

⁶⁹) 407 a 15-33.

the process of outgoing and return was a part of the Augustinian theory of self-knowledge, derived from neo-Platonism and Porphyry in particular. (It is true that the system of Plotinus is a hierarchy of alienation, either held in check by the drawing power of the One, so that the material world does not become absolute non-being, or, by conversion, on the way of return to its principle ⁷⁰). The whole cosmos, both noetic and material, in its multiplicity and its subjection to time, is really something that ideally speaking ought not to have been). And he supposed that for Augustine the movement of thought in self-thinking was both a return from alienation and a circular movement of which the elements were *esse* — *velle* — *nosse*, into which however he did inject an authentic Augustinian conception of alienation: the moral failing of a man overabsorbed in this world ⁷¹).

“Now it can be asked (in addition to what came from neoplatonists) what psychological discoveries (Augustine) derives from Christian ideas. Above all there is the turning inwards, the transforming of the soul from out of its alienation in the world, in which it had wandered by itself. This turning to itself implies a circle ... *nosse* and *esse* are indivisibly united There exists in relation to the self the tendency to self-preservation, the will” ⁷²).

J. Mader thinks likewise. Commenting on a sentence in *De Trinitate* X, 4, 6 — “Sed quando mens veniat in mentem, quasi possit mens in mente non esse” — he says

“in reflections on the self a circle is revealed. The human mind must be thought of as both remaining with itself and being other, so that it returns to itself (dass er zu sich selbst zurückkommt), i.e. so that it can yet be thought of in its own as a unity” ⁷³).

He continues

“The human mind is called back in its outgoing; in a certain way

⁷⁰) Cf. E. BENZ, *op. cit.* p. 265: This return of universal soul (Seele) is included in the overall reintegration of the hypostatised and alienated spirit (Geist) into its own transcendent being (An-sich-sein).

⁷¹) E.g. in the frequent injunction to ‘return to oneself’: *redire ad se*.

⁷²) L. SCHEGLMANN, *op. cit.*, pp. 330-1.

⁷³) J. MADER, *Die logische Struktur des personalen Denkens aus der Methode der Gotteserkenntnis bei Aurelius Augustinus*, Vienna 1965, p. 153. Perhaps the author was misled by the translation of *veniat in* by ‘zurückkehren’: how else can we explain his total misunderstanding of the text — which specifically denies that there is any need of *mens* to go outside itself and return to itself in order to know itself, as it is already totally present to itself!

through going away to another self of its own (zu einem anderen seiner selbst) it comes back to itself”⁷⁴),

which is precisely what it does not do! As the product of the object, self-knowledge in Augustine is precisely like any other kind of knowledge. But it is different from any other kind of knowledge, in that *mens* has no need to go ‘out’ to its object when it is already present to itself. Whilst it may be the function of the will to apply the attention of *mens* to itself — or to any other object — for the process of *cogitatio* to begin willing is not a stage of the cognitive process as such as Scheglmann’s schema makes it. It should be noted that in the triad of Mader there is no provision for the will at all.

Benz has well understood the way in which Plotinus’s assertion derived from Stoic thinking, of the need to turn within contributed to Augustine’s explanation of the disposing of the mind to know itself through the fixing of the attention of the will.

“The precondition of willing is an act of will turning from all external objects and concentrating within, i.e. the transforming of ὁρεξις into βούλησις. In this is already a pointer to Augustine’s teaching on the will”⁷⁵).

He sees clearly that there is no alienation or loss of force in the process of self-knowing as Augustine understood it : he

“had grasped well Plotinus’s ideas of hypostatizing as an alienation of mind, but had not agreed with it”⁷⁶).

“... (it is) an inner movement of the mind which takes place in the divine transcendent being. This inner development led to neither alienation nor loss of power, without its unity or existence being affected in any way”⁷⁷).

Likewise the human *mens* would have retained its unity.

Triadic accounts of epistemology in Augustine are not circular. In external cognition the object, object-produced knowledge and the *intentio* of the will are an aggregation of factors. Only in internal cognition, when they begin to be united in such a way that the will can communicate with its object as known at the same level of spiritualisation, is there a possibility of ‘circular’ thinking. Yet here, through its more flexible enneadic structure and therefore not tied to its more rigidly conceived

⁷⁴) *Ib.* p. 155.

⁷⁵) *Op. cit.* p. 308.

⁷⁶) *Ib.* p. 369.

⁷⁷) *Ib.* p. 370.

triadic process, mind can at some prompting, however alight apply the will to search the memory for what it wants to know. In self-thinking there is the greatest degree of self-equality and full interpenetration of knower and object known; and this self-equality, not circular thinking, is the true doctrine of Augustine. Otherwise the triad of self-knowledge — *memoria sui* — *notitia sui* — *voluntas sui* — would not be what it is, a triad of equivalences of all in each and each in all⁷⁸); and its enneadic formulation would be quite out of the question.

'Mens' in equality with itself.

The principle of interpretation so far in this essay has been to discern Augustine's authentic meaning through observing his re-interpretation of neo-Platonist teaching. Fully in keeping with the eclectic spirit and the search for a statement of truth that was Christian and made greater claim to reasonableness at the same time, Augustine gave his attention to Stoic teachings, and can be shown to have made a critique of neo-Platonist teachings in Stoic as well as a more authentically Aristotelian sense⁷⁹).

In the notion of self-equality with which *De Trinitate* IX begins can be seen the presence of a Stoic theme, which had been brought together with a comparable Aristotelian teaching before Augustine. According to Hadot

"There was a fusion of the Stoic notions of being in accord with oneself (οἰκειώσις) and the aristotelian notions of natural affinity (οἰκειότης). The notion of self-conservation is thus related to the notion of being happy, as is found in the *Nicomachean Ethics* This being in accord with one's self, desire, and joy in existence, are identified"⁸⁰).

⁷⁸) Cf. *De Trinitate* X, 11, 18: 'aequalia sunt tota singula totis singulis, et tota singula simul omnibus totis'.

⁷⁹) G. VERBEKE has shown how Augustine largely set on one side the neo-Platonist teaching on pneuma (according to PORPHYRY a kind of psychic envelope to the body) in favour of the earlier Aristotelian (more metaphysical) and Stoic (more physiological) teaching that it was a necessary intermediary between soul and body on whose organs the soul could not act directly. (*L'évolution de la Doctrine du Pneuma du Stoicisme à saint Augustin*, Paris-Louvain 1945, chapter I passim, pp. 334ff, and especially 504ff).

⁸⁰) P. HADOT, *Porphyre et Victorinus*, I, pp. 289-90. A. C. LLOYD points out a related Stoic teaching in *De Trinitate* X, 5, 7: 'The mind, he said, must know itself so as to live *secundum naturam suam*, that is by controlling what it ought to control and being controlled by what ought to control it. This at least was orthodox Stoicism, (Nosce Teipsum and Conscientia, in: *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 46, 1964, p. 195.

M. Zepf has written a special study of this “Oikeiosislehre” of Augustine⁸¹). Very precise on its sources (Cicero and Antiochus of Ascalon via Varro; as also Aristotle’s νόησις νοήσεως via neo-Platonism) he insists on the novelty of his teaching, and with Husserl in mind he asserts that in Augustine

“It is not a case of the being of the self asserting its substance against objective being... now the radiance of being is bound up with the subjective being of mind”⁸²).

“Augustine comes between the periods, linked to antiquity, but already pointing to the new age Tradition neither binds him nor constrains him, but stimulates his own creative power”⁸³).

Augustine is more related to tradition than Zepf allows; his creativity was exercised on elements within a self-conscious eclectic tradition with the intention of establishing Christian triadic thinking on the divine within the tradition as its culminant expression. Nevertheless there is something original in Augustine’s *De Trinitate* even if it was a work occasioned by circumstances not too difficult to reconstruct. As Zepf says Augustine leaves the question in the way in which Husserl picks it up: self-knowledge presupposes a turning away from the world, in ἐποχή;⁸⁴) but it does not lie in that alone. It is in the deliberate transposition to the human *mens* of neo-Platonist concepts of the identity of substance, self-love and self-knowledge from the One and from νοῦς, the substitution of *memoria* for *mens*, and the establishing of the equivalence and coincidence of *memoria sui*, *notitia sui* and *amor sui*, and their constitution as fundamental to all cognition. A complete account of the intrinsic nature of mind is thus made theoretically possible. But has this equivalence any more than a tautologous meaning?

M.F. Sciacca has considered this speculatively in a short contribution to a conference⁸⁵). He finds a number of suggestive epithets to describe the unity of the triad: “La circoncension et la consubstantialité des termes semblent évidentes. Compénétration, syn-

⁸¹) M. ZEPF, Augustinus und das philosophische Selbstbewusstsein der Antike, in: *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte* XI/2, 1959, pp. 105 ff.

⁸²) *Ib.* p. 130.

⁸³) *Ib.* pp. 131-2.

⁸⁴) ‘Damit stehen wir dort, wo Husserl die augustinische Problematik aufgriff: die Weltverlorenheit wird die Voraussetzung für das Selbstbewusstsein’, *ib.* p. 131.

⁸⁵) M.F. SCIACCA, Trinité et Unité de l’Esprit, in: *Augustinus Magister* I, pp. 521 ff., Paris 1955.

thèse, intrinsécisme..."⁸⁶). He envisages an order in which the acts of self-remembering, self-knowing and self-loving arise out of the deep continuing memory of the self; that is, when the mind consciously adverts to inner self-knowing and loving and their unity.

"When the mind (*l'esprit*) has self-memory and knows how to recall itself, this *scire se* is an act of intelligence, and precisely the first act which specifies it as "autoconscience", as "autovolition" is the first act of the will"⁸⁷).

Love, as a desire for self-knowledge, is, in the mind (*l'esprit*), *before* the generation of autoconscience (so it can not be an engendered love); after its generation there is self-love, that is conscious self-love⁸⁸).

Sciacca's most valuable comments concern the arising of values of truth morality when the *mens* has established a norm in finding equality with itself. "As the generation of self-knowledge is the essential act within the mind"⁸⁹), human thinking measures itself with relation to this act: "the reality (*l'actualité*) of thought receives its specification in the act of 'autoconscience'"⁹⁰). This being so, self-knowing becomes the measure of its own truthfulness: "of itself the mind engenders the truth of its autoconnaissance, the object connatural to it". Here, like Stumpf, Sciacca has to suppose the presence of the superior illuminating truth. "That is the first contact of the mind with the illumination by the truth which also constitutes it as mind"⁹¹). The consideration of this value-generation in itself is not to be excluded by the fact that the supreme measure of truth is God himself. By transferring perfect, divine characteristics to the human mind Augustine gave a source of value to it, relatable to mind's own independence and immediate self-presence. Mind itself is what mind knows best: better than God, better than material things. If its self-certainty is disturbed by the giving of too much attention to material things, it is going against the nature of its own constitution and running the danger of confusing itself with an unreal image⁹²).

⁸⁶) *Ib.* p. 527.

⁸⁷) *Ib.* p. 523. 'Autoconscience' does not exist in the most recent French dictionaries: presumably it translates 'autocoscienza' — more the awareness the spirit has of its own acts than deliberate introspection, though it is used in the latter sense (see passage referred to in n. 90).

⁸⁸) *Ib.* p. 531.

⁸⁹) *Ib.* p. 530.

⁹⁰) *Ib.* p. 524.

⁹¹) *Ib.* p. 529.

⁹²) Cf. *De Trinitate* X, 5, 7: "... ut secundum naturum suam ordinari appetat", and 6, 8: "... Errat autem mens, cum se istis imaginibus amore conjungit, ut etiam se esse aliquid huiusmodi existimet".

Correspondingly, if self-certainty by which all other certainties fall into place is reduced, it will mean that the certainty of everything else will be disturbed. For human beings, self-consciousness is pure consciousness: it is not opposed to objects which are not itself; but they could not be known without it, nor would they have any clear truthful value without it. As Sciacca says,

“Thought by the fact of being thought is self-thought; so the mind knows itself in its essence. Self-knowledge is essentially intrinsic to thought”⁹³).

This is a practical consequence of the principle of νόησις νοήσεως drawn out only by Augustine in a coherent subjectivity structure for an individual, embodied human existence.

That Augustine could construct a similar measure for loving in self-loving, interrelate them, and root them in the essence of the soul made possible a meaningful study at the religious level of dogmatic teaching and Christian morality, and at a philosophical level the interrelationship of metaphysics and ethics; as also the interrelation of revealed religious data and philosophy. It was a systematisation in order and penetration, superior to the neo-Platonist. Hitherto knowing and willing, epistemology and affectivity had remained distinguished in analysis and consequently kept apart in their treatment. With the transposition of the conceptions of perfect self-knowing and perfect self-loving from the One and νοῦς to the individual human being, and with the interrelating of these with self-remembering in the memory as the centre of consciousness and the locus in which all experience was relatable together and over time, it was possible to conceive of a total systematisation of the mind: with self-consciousness as pure consciousness, and self-love as pure love, with both equal to the subject, *mens*, and to self-memory, mutually caused and mutually contained by each other.

The Divine Prototype.

By virtue of the primary intention of his *De Trinitate* Augustine was obliged to relate his analysis of the human *mens* to the Godhead which it imaged. He needed to do so in order to complete his apologetic task: in neo-Platonism the transcendent triad was also itself the means by which the individual came to know it, for he had to become aware that his

⁹³) *Op. cit.* p. 523.

knowing and self-knowing were derived from this triad and were identical with knowing and self-knowing in the hypostases themselves. If all thinking were 'divine', all thought which leads to the divine would already be divine. Not so with Augustine, for whom the distinction between God and everything else was complete. The constitutive and cognitive human triads had shown that three powers and three acts could co-exist in the *mens* without becoming confused. But the act in which God was the object of knowledge found the Godhead only in its unity; direct continuity between the power of *mens* and the Persons of the prototype was impossible. God might be remembered in the memory, known in the mind and loved in the will, but the triadity was in the human *mens* alone; for the three powers in the human mind belonged to one person, whilst in the Godhead there were three persons. Augustine had to point out that in the Godhead it is impossible to attribute all remembering to the Father, all knowing to the Son and all loving to the Holy Spirit for all three powers must belong to each⁹⁴). Even if the presence of these three powers together in the human mind disposes a thinker to accept the possibility of a triune Godhead they do not in fact image it. Perhaps forgetting the success which he had with the ennead and its promises of further development for the trinity of three persons each with three powers⁹⁵), he expresses a sense of failure: "in ipso intellectu conatum me senserim magis habuisse quam effectum"⁹⁶), for he feels he has found an analogy which would distribute the three powers discernible in a single human person among those divine persons, apart from which the three powers in man are variable and changeable, unlike the timeless changelessness of God⁹⁷). Because of the Christian discontinuity between Creator and creature, the timeless and the time-bound, the completeness of the neo-Platonist account cannot be attained. What Augustine gives is a kind of progression from the most external knowledge to a noetic link between

⁹⁴) *De Trinitate* XV, 7, 12: 'Ergo tria illa, id est, memoria, intelligentia, dilectio sive voluntas in illa summa et immutabili essentia quod est Deus, non Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt, sed Pater solus Filius ... est et ipse memoria, sua intelligentia, sua dilectio ... Spiritus sanctus ... habet haec tria, et ea sic habet, ut haec ipsa ipse sunt'. Cf. *ib.* 17, 27 and 22, 42.

⁹⁵) Cf. *supra* p. 110. The horizontal or vertical lines of the diagram would have to be regarded as unities for application to the Trinity.

⁹⁶) *De Trinitate* XV, 25, 45.

⁹⁷) '... in una quidem persona quod est homo ... et in re mutabili tria illa ... sed tria unius personae, non sicut humana poscit intentio, tribus illis personis convenire potuerunt ...' (*ib.*).

man and God: not by neo-Platonist identity, but by gradual assimilation — in which faith and the practice of virtue have their part — which suggests the non-impossibility of a triune God, who leaves in the triadic nature of the cosmos, and particularly the noetic cosmos, vestiges of his own nature. Desire and will, aroused by what seem disproportionately small hints lead to a limited understanding of the invisible Godhead which calls all men to share its own beatitude; but desire and will are not absorbed into knowing. Yet there cannot be a link between each of the three powers of the soul and what had seemed to be their equivalents in the divine persons, for the divine essence would need expressing enneadically; and an elevation to God of an enneadically conceived human *mens* to an enneadically conceived divinity, would have presented a task at which Augustine must have despaired; and he admits he had trouble enough with the triadic approach⁹⁸).

Yet, accepting the appropriate obscurity of the divine object, worship could be thought of as providing a means of union between the *mens* and its prototype: “Let (the mind), then, remember its God, to whose image it has been made, and understand him and love him. Or to express this more briefly, let it worship the God who was not made, but by whom it was made so that it is capable of him and can be a partaker of him”⁹⁹).

Whereas Porphyry wished to demythologise cult and reduce it to philosophical contemplation which he considered it essentially was, Augustine, through his conversion from a philosophical position, had learned to discover its significance and value. Again, union with the Godhead might be found through coincidence. Paralleling the neo-Platonist self-knowing, which was at the same time a knowledge of the source from which one comes, Augustine proposed that a right kind of self-love would coincide with a love of God: “Qui ergo se diligere novit, Deum diligit”; and love of one’s fellows is nothing but a further consistency with this love¹⁰⁰). Unlike other texts of Augustine, in the *De Trinitate* charity is not developed into a mode of divine union: rather it is identified with God¹⁰¹).

⁹⁸) Cf. *Epistola* CXX, 3, 13, written about 410. (PL 33, 458-9).

⁹⁹) *De Trinitate* XIV, 12, 15: ‘Meminerit itaque Dei sui, ad cuius imaginem facta est, eumque intelligat atque diligat. Quod ut brevius dicam, colat Deum non factum, cuius ab eo capax est facta, et cuius particeps esse potest’.

¹⁰⁰) *Ib.* XIV, 14, 18.

¹⁰¹) *ib.* IX, 1, 1. XV, 17, 28.

Yet Augustin does relate the divine Trinity directly to the human triad of remembering, knowing and loving, and implies that despite their discontinuity any *commercium* is not one-way — from human *mens*: “Meminerim tui, intelligam te, diligam te. Auge in me ista, donec me reformes ad integrum”¹⁰²). When it comes to the divine object it is so vast that the acts by which the Godhead is grasped are separated out and expressed like three tremendous resolutions; but the remembering, knowing and loving which are embodied in them and reach through every level of the human *mens* in all its powers — memory, understanding and will — have an effect of bringing the servant of God into the unity he desires: “donec me reformes ad integrum”.

Edward BOOTH.

¹⁰²) *Ib.* 28, 51. Cf. *ib.* 20, 39: ‘Ad quam summam Trinitatem reminiscendam, videndam, diligendam, ut eam recordetur, eam contempletur, ea delectetur, totum debet referre quod vivit’.