

the work of Bannach (reviewed below), which Hamm explains he was unable to incorporate into his own study in the time available.

M. SCHRAMA O.S.A.

Klaus BANNACH, *Die Lehre von der doppelten Macht Gottes bei Wilhelm von Ockham. Problemgeschichtliche Voraussetzungen und Bedeutung* (Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für europäische Geschichte Mainz, 75). Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1975, VIII-424 S., DM 88.

In his thesis defended in 1974 in Munich, K. Bannach has demonstrated very well the dialectic relation between the *potentia absoluta* and the *potentia ordinata* of God in the context of Ockham's doctrine of creation. Among other things, suggestions made by P. Vignaux and H. Oberman encouraged him to undertake this work. It is a pity that in the title the importance of the doctrine of creation is described only formally as « *Problemgeschichtliche Voraussetzungen und Bedeutung* ». Moreover, the author speaks of the « *doppelte Macht Gottes* », a term which he certainly did not find in Ockham who precisely contests the double character of God's power (p. 273).

The work itself is thoroughly constructed. After a *status quaestionis*, the author reviews Ockham's life and works in the context of the history of ideas (Ch. I). He emphasizes the methodical-critical aspect of Ockham's work. In the second chapter he gives a historical survey, beginning with Augustine, of the doctrine of the divine ideas. This is important because the creation portrays these ideas. The creation in turn is of importance, because it is precisely in the order of creation and the order of salvation (the new creation) that the concepts *potentia absoluta* and *ordinata* are used. Augustine's doctrine of ideas was particularly useful in making the relation between divine unity and the multiplicity of creatures understandable over against the emanations of neo-Platonism. Augustine sees the multiplicity of creatures as already present in the multiplicity of divine ideas, but as ideas they maintain God's immutability and unity. From Augustine the author passes by way of Boethius, Etienne Tempier's condemnation of heterodox Aristotelianism, Alexander of Hales, and Bonaventure, to Thomas Aquinas, for whom the great question is how God can know a multitude of things without losing his unity. From the time of Henry of Ghent there is a growing tendency to limit the coerciveness of the doctrine of ideas in favour of God's contingent creative action. Duns Scotus carries on Henry's attempt. God's ideas no longer precede individual creatures but they become a divine reflexion on things already existing. His doctrine of creation has a more strongly biblical character, although there remains a certain lack of clarity on some points. These are cleared up by Ockham.

According to the Inceptor Venerabilis God's immutability must be understood in such a way that God remains identical with himself in each moment of his activity. God remains true to himself and in that sense he is not arbitrary. The divine idea is the known model of what can be brought to being in an act of creation. Ockham is distinguished from his predecessors in that he is consequent in his use of the idea as *model*: the model possesses the same individuality and determinateness as the created thing itself; this follows from his doctrine of universals. The ideas are not identical with God, for they too are created. In this way the divine ideas do not coincide with the divine act of knowing. For in God a plurality of objects of knowledge does not mean a plurality of acts of knowing. In Ockham's doctrine of creation God has an immediate relationship to every creature. The doctrine of God's knowledge brings us to the problem of divine freedom. Can God act differently than he knows? In this connection, the *potentia absoluta* appears to be a condition of possibility for the *potentia ordinata*. God's freedom consists in this: time and again making the transition from *absoluta* to *ordinata*. This is not arbitrariness or unrecognizable discontinuity, because his essence guarantees the coherence of his activity.

In the third chapter the author describes the applications evoked by the idea of *potentia absoluta* in Ockham's theology of creation: the immediate influence of God in creation and the problem of causality; the doctrine of knowledge; the Holy Spirit and human spontaneity. The fourth and final chapter summarizes and reflects upon the material presented in the first three; here B. clarifies the place and meaning of Ockham and compares him with Luther. B.'s work offers a thorough study of the texts; he is concerned to present Ockham's own assertions in order to show how the Inceptor Venerabilis tried to free the concept of God of deterministic features and to go back to the Augustinian tradition's representation of God, the chief characteristic of which is the spontaneity of divine love. The author's critique of some of the opinions of P. Boehner (p. 350, 351, 358, 359), however, does not convince us. For example, the distinction between the *intellectio* theory and the *qualitas mentis* theory does not seem to us to be correct. An index of the authors quoted would have been very useful. On p. 258 we should read: Gregorius de Arimino, and on p. 420, *Guelluy* instead of *Guelly*.

M. SCHRAMA O.S.A.