

1816. Du même coup la province austro-hongroise prit fin. Les augustins de Lockenhaus s'efforcèrent vainement de prolonger son existence (1820). L'A. finit son œuvre remarquable en donnant une liste des *expositi*: ce sont les augustins qui se sont faits curés diocésains en conséquence du josphinisme.

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Berndt HAMM, *Promissio, pactum, ordinatio. Freiheit und Selbstbindung Gottes in der scholastischen Gnadenlehre* (Beiträge zur historischen Theologie, 54). Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, 1977, xvi-527 S., DM 86.

B. Hamm presented this work in 1974 as a dissertation. The author was born in 1945, and is now working in Tübingen on the preparation of a critical edition of Johannes van Paltz' *Supplementum Coelifodinae*. It is his intention to show a tradition in the doctrine of grace and merit, beginning from Augustine and passing through the early-, high- and late-Scholastic periods to Luther. The point of departure of this tradition is not an ontological one based on God's unchangeable essence, but a personalistic one. The expression, « God's free pledging of himself » or « God who voluntarily obliges himself », is not a contradiction. It concerns God's relationship to the world; creation itself is already a divine choice, and the continuing creation a continuation of God's choosing. In the spacious field of his *potentia absoluta* God makes a choice, the *potentia ordinata*, which he himself is prepared to stand by. This latter order (*potentia ordinata*) is not deducible a priori, but can be seen principally in the message and promises (*promissio*) of God. The dialectic *potentia Dei absoluta-potentia Dei ordinata* is not the monopoly of late medieval Nominalism, even though this movement did indeed use it a great deal.

In this review we will concentrate especially on the position of Augustine (pp. 8-18, 491-495). According to Hamm Augustine succeeded in preserving the unity between God's transcendence (sovereignty) and his being in debt to men by means of the concepts *promissio* and *gratia*. God is *debitor* not because men have anything to offer him, but because God himself has freely made men a promise. And, being essentially unchangeable, what God promises he has to do. In this way Augustine expresses the incontrovertible certainty of future salvation. Just as God is not a debtor, so it is not the work of men he crowns through grace, but his own work begun by him in men. God is first gracious, and this grace given obliges his goodness to complete the work he has begun. God's being in debt, however, lasts only as long as man does not fall away or become unfaithful. In this way the *gratia*-argument is an unfolding of the *promissio*-argument, and Augustine succeeds in integrating God's pledging of himself in his transcendence. They are not rivals. In grace promise

is concretized. From the 12th century onwards this connection between promise and grace was lost. On the one side, the causal link between the inner worth of good works and the reward of eternal life is excluded. Hamm refers to this as the exclusive approach. On the other side, the causal link is acknowledged but limited by the idea of God's *free* pledging of himself. This Hamm calls the restrictive approach. A third approach, within which Hamm situates Thomas Aquinas, leaves the thought of God's free pledging of himself out of consideration. In Aquinas' case this comes about under the influence of his emphasis on the *gratia*-argument in an ontological framework. Scotus, on the contrary, stresses the *promissio*-argument and sees grace as the consequence of a divine order, but he is unable to sketch clearly the link between promise and grace. We might remark that Augustine's view of God's free pledging of himself could have been elaborated with the help of the idea of *desiderium naturale*: man's desire for God, because God has created man for Himself; this desire may not remain unfulfilled (H. DE LUBAC, *Surnaturel*. Paris, 1946; *id.*, *Augustinisme et théologie moderne*. Paris, 1965). Augustine's idea of the free self-pledging of God influenced the doctrine on God (*potentia Dei*), soteriology (the necessity of the incarnation and the death of Christ), the doctrine of grace (God as *debitor*) and ecclesiology (the Church as medium of salvation).

In the first part Hamm deals with the positions of the following theologians (p. 20-390): Bernard, Peter Lombard, the school of Gilbert Porretanus, Cardinal Laborans, Petrus Cantor, Stephen Langton, William of Auxerre, Hugo of St. Cher, Roland of Cremona, pseudo-Alexander of Hales, Geoffrey of Poitiers, William of Auvergne, Odo Rigaldi, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, William Ockham, Gabriel Biel, and Martin Luther. In the second part the positions of these theologians are presented thematically, (p. 391-466) in such a way that the influence of Roman and canon law on the terminology of the self-pledging tradition is made clear.

The names of the following Augustinians appear in passing: Giles of Rome, Alphonsus Vargas, Bartholomeus Arnoldi of Usingen, Augustinus Favaroni, Gregory of Rimini, Hugolin of Orvieto, John of Retz, John of Paltz, John Staupitz, Thomas of Strasbourg, Gregory of Bellano-Feltre, John Paynhota, and Dionysius de Montina. Hamm discerns two currents in their attitude to the self-pledging of God, the one beginning with Giles of Rome, and the other with Gregory of Rimini who was much influenced on this point by Scotus and Ockham.

A comprehensive bibliography, an index of biblical citations, and an index of the medieval theologians quoted enhance Hamm's work. It appears to us to make an excellent contribution to the knowledge of Augustinism in the Middle Ages, especially with regard to the doctrine of grace and merit. It provides a good complement to

the work of Bannach (reviewed below), which Hamm explains he was unable to incorporate into his own study in the time available.

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Klaus BANNACH, *Die Lehre von der doppelten Macht Gottes bei Wilhelm von Ockham. Problemgeschichtliche Voraussetzungen und Bedeutung* (Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für europäische Geschichte Mainz, 75). Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1975, VIII-424 S., DM 88.

In his thesis defended in 1974 in Munich, K. Bannach has demonstrated very well the dialectic relation between the *potentia absoluta* and the *potentia ordinata* of God in the context of Ockham's doctrine of creation. Among other things, suggestions made by P. Vignaux and H. Oberman encouraged him to undertake this work. It is a pity that in the title the importance of the doctrine of creation is described only formally as « *Problemgeschichtliche Voraussetzungen und Bedeutung* ». Moreover, the author speaks of the « *doppelte Macht Gottes* », a term which he certainly did not find in Ockham who precisely contests the double character of God's power (p. 273).

The work itself is thoroughly constructed. After a *status quaestionis*, the author reviews Ockham's life and works in the context of the history of ideas (Ch. I). He emphasizes the methodical-critical aspect of Ockham's work. In the second chapter he gives a historical survey, beginning with Augustine, of the doctrine of the divine ideas. This is important because the creation portrays these ideas. The creation in turn is of importance, because it is precisely in the order of creation and the order of salvation (the new creation) that the concepts *potentia absoluta* and *ordinata* are used. Augustine's doctrine of ideas was particularly useful in making the relation between divine unity and the multiplicity of creatures understandable over against the emanations of neo-Platonism. Augustine sees the multiplicity of creatures as already present in the multiplicity of divine ideas, but as ideas they maintain God's immutability and unity. From Augustine the author passes by way of Boethius, Etienne Tempier's condemnation of heterodox Aristotelianism, Alexander of Hales, and Bonaventure, to Thomas Aquinas, for whom the great question is how God can know a multitude of things without losing his unity. From the time of Henry of Ghent there is a growing tendency to limit the coerciveness of the doctrine of ideas in favour of God's contingent creative action. Duns Scotus carries on Henry's attempt. God's ideas no longer precede individual creatures but they become a divine reflexion on things already existing. His doctrine of creation has a more strongly biblical character, although there remains a certain lack of clarity on some points. These are cleared up by Ockham.