

St. Augustine's «notitia sui» related to Aristotle and the early neo-Platonists

This essay is essentially a study of the fortunes of one of the most powerful ideas produced by philosophical reflection : the νόησις νοήσεως of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* XII, 9.

To the *a fortiori* argument of the dialogue, *The Sophist*, that because they were the most noble and most real of all things the ideas themselves must live and think, Plato had pursued in the *Charmides* a related and complementary idea : that there should be a knowledge which knew itself (ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη), and which would therefore be the highest. He proposed it — only to reject it on the grounds that by definition it would be distinct from other kinds of knowledge, and its claim to oversee them would be nullified by its incompetence in their spheres. However, Aristotle's refurnishing of this conception in *Metaphysics* XII, 9 became one of the most respected metaphysical conceptions : thought thinking on thinking. Regardless of its being identified with «the divine», it was a speculative attempt to describe thought at its highest, thought in itself. The description of intellectual knowledge in *De Anima* III was a speculative proposal for how thinking in itself, also still identified with the divine, is exercised in a man.

This study will substantiate an unusual view that this is in fact the background of Saint Augustine's conception of self-knowledge.

I. FROM ARISTOTLE TO SAINT AUGUSTINE

Aristoteles Redivivus

The fate of the manuscripts of the Aristotelian corpus is a cautionary story for anyone who presupposes that there is an inevitable development in philosophic reflection as it proceeds so to speak by contagion from mind to mind. A few remained in circulation — the

published exoteric Aristotle — but with the possible exception of the *Protrepticus* these were dialogues which were Plato-like in style and content; they all taught the necessity of a philosophic contemplation in the Platonic sense. Perhaps notes taken privately at the lectures of the later more specialised non-Platonist teaching were also in circulation. At any rate there was sufficient information to compile lists of these works, but from secondary sources, not the manuscripts themselves. The manuscripts of these students' notes as well as authentic texts, which had been incorporated into the library of his successor Theophrastus, were hidden in a cave at Skepsis until the beginning of the first century B.C. ¹⁾ Two motives seem to be behind this extraordinary deed. Firstly there was a genuine fear that the kings of Pergamon might seize them for their library. Secondly later Peripatetics seems to have ignored or even attacked Aristotle, and it was felt that «the difficult treatises of the Stagirite did not correspond with the new preoccupations». ²⁾ They were then bought up and rather inexpertly repaired by Apellicon a wealthy bibliophile, to be sent after his death to Rome by Sulla as part of the booty of his Greek campaign in 84 B.C. ³⁾ There they were seen by the scholar Tyrranion (who was interested in proving that Latin was derived from a Greek dialect), and his friend Cicero — able in the last year or two of his life to devote himself to philosophy, but who seems to have derived little profit from his reading. Subsequently they were edited and published by Andronicus of Rhodes. Besides Aristotelian ideas which came to him in Stoic sources Cicero had already encountered the exoteric Aristotle, and in his *Hortensius* had drawn on the ideas about God, and the place of philosophic contemplation which he had found in the *Protrepticus*; ⁴⁾ this was later to influence Augustine so much. ⁵⁾

¹⁾ Despite the case made out by F. GRAYEFF that they could only have been conserved in a library (*Aristotle and his School*, London 1974, p. 75), the original story, whose sources were Strabo (*Γεωγραφία* 13,1,54) and Plutarch (*Σύλλας* 26), retains its prima facie plausibility: Strabo was a near-contemporary, and a pupil of Tyrranion.

²⁾ P. MORAUX, 'Les Listes anciennes des Ouvrages d'Aristote', Louvain 1951, p. 4.

³⁾ Article 'Apelikon' in: *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, ed. G. WISSOWA (Paulys-Wissowa RE) I Stuttgart 1894, col. 2694. Sulla defeated Mithridates who had insinuated himself on the Athenians through an injudicious Peripatetic philosopher, the former slave Aristion (*Cambridge Ancient History*, 1st edition IX, p. 244).

⁴⁾ See *Testimonia*, as in edition of fragments by V. ROSE (Leipzig 1886), translated by ROSS (Oxford 1952).

⁵⁾ I. DÜRING, 'Von Aristoteles bis Leibniz', in: *Aristoteles in der neueren Forschung*,

When he first read the *Hortensius* Augustine was able to set on one side the sceptical parts of this dialogue — as also when he returned to it at the time of his conversion and again when he turned to it later in life. Probably he did not realise that the depth and simplicity of the conception of the life of the search for wisdom which moved him so deeply derived from Aristotle. Communication of insight is far more important than familiarity with the words of a text of an established author.

Cicero's identification of Peripatetics with Academics ⁶⁾ (which bears all the marks of hasty reading and incomplete understanding) may be the basis of Augustine's statements in *De Civitate Dei* VIII 7) that Aristotle was a disciple of Plato, and that «the most notable philosophers of recent times have rejected the title of «Peripatetics» or «Academics», and have elected to be called «Platonists'». Yet with Cicero's interest begins not only the introduction of Aristotle into the Roman world, but the re-introduction of Aristotle back into the Greek world, from which it came.

The period of time of its disappearance from sight, and the development of philosophical reflection during this period into scepticism or systematisation must have presented the reading public with an immense task of familiarisation and assimilation. The rich subtlety of analysis of the wide ranging subject matter of Aristotle was far from the mentality of the later Peripatetics. And what happened then was what so often happens in movements of thought. In many cases perhaps not the immediate followers, but the generation after them, who are not in personal contact with the founder, see in his thought an inheritance, an achievement, of course, but also an object to reduce to its simplest forms and from which to remove anomalies and discrepancies. And so the immense task of commentary and analysis began. Whilst the richness of Aristotelian analysis was unavailable (through incomprehension, lack of interest and the hiding of the manuscripts), and the followers of Plato, concentrating their attention on the negative aspects of Socratic dialectic, drifted into scepticism, the Stoic philosophical school developed : more systematic and less stylistically

ed. P. MORAUX, Darmstadt 1968, pp. 254-5; formerly published in *Antike und Abendland*, IV, Hamburg 1954. For Cicero's little profit from his hasty reading of Aristotle v. *ib.* p. 255.

⁶⁾ *Academica*, Prius V, 15 and Post. IV, 17.

⁷⁾ See Chapter 12.

adorned, and more practically orientated than the other schools. The Roman urge to codify had rechannelled Stoicism further in the direction, and so Roman Stoicism provided a style according to which all philosophies were to be subjected. Romanitas put a special insistence on that reduction to simple principles which is the mark of an efficient teacher, and of which the doxographies which Festugière has noted in Cicero himself were the most polished examples, though they were not always very elucidating.⁸⁾

Developments of Aristotle's philosophy through later commentators meant the selection of significant parts, their reduction to simple principles and the abolition of supposed anomalies. The passing of some of its conceptions into Stoicism involved their simplification and preparation for systematisation. In Roman hands the need to re-interpret Aristotle coincided with the appearance of an intention to set about a vast task of hermeneutical transposition of Greek philosophical writers, with the aim of ultimate independence and further development in Cicero, and of philological independence from Greece in Varro.⁹⁾

It must not be overlooked that all his life Cicero had been familiar not only with Stoic and Epicurean writers but with Plato and his known translations of the dialogues span his whole life.¹⁰⁾ His brief acquaintance with the esoteric Aristotle needs to be understood with that background. He was convinced of the potential superiority of Roman speculation even in Philosophy : « not that philosophy could not be learnt from Greek writers and teachers, but that it has always been my conviction that our countrymen have shown more wisdom everywhere than the Greeks, either in making discoveries for themselves, or else in improving upon what they have received from Greece ».¹¹⁾ It would then be possible to give the Romans a philo-

⁸⁾ See A. J. FESTUGIÈRE, O.P., 'La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste', *Études Bibliques*, Paris 1944, II, p. 351.

⁹⁾ For Varro, see J. COLLART, 'Analogie et Anomalie', *Fondation Hardt, Entretiens sur l'Antiquité*, IX (September 1962), Varron. Geneva 1963, p. 130.

¹⁰⁾ T. B. DE GRAFF, 'Plato in Cicero', *Classical Philology*, XXXV, 1940, pp. 143 ff. P. BOYANCÉ ('Le Platonisme à Rome', in : *Études sur l'humanisme cicéronien*, Brussels 1970, p. 233) remarks on the absence of the Parmenides from the list and also to there not being much of Plato's teaching on the theory of ideas.

¹¹⁾ *Tusculanarum* I, I, I. A collection of dicta from Cicero asserting Roman superiority over Greek institutions and learning is in A. TONDINI, 'Problemi Linguistici

sophical literature which would take of the place the Greek philosophy : « For this reason I encourage all, who have the capacity, to wrest from the now failing grasp of Greece the renown won from this field of study and transfer it to this city... once these studies are transferred to ourselves, we shall have no need even of Greek libraries, to which there is an endless number of books due to the crowd of writers; for the same things are said by many since the day they crammed the world with books ». ¹²⁾

It was not translation alone which was intended by the Romans but rather re-embodiment of the ideas of Greek philosophy which would take place through Roman scholars reducing systematically the Greek variety, subtlety and inconsistency to dependable concepts in a language which had taken the measure of its own potentialities. In the conscious intention of re-embodiment the thought lay the unconscious presumption that the thought could be so re-embodied, and then developed. The hermeneutical significance of this intended seizure was not a completely conscious one because the Romans had not measured the values of their culture by an external standard. More sensitive modern criticism makes it clear that this enterprise was not one merely of vulgarisation and simplification, and the conclusions of R. Poncelet suggest how the simplifications imposed on the rich philosophical material in its translation into Latin « with the linguistic resources (moyens) which were equivalent to every human consciousness in its infancy » caused it to « exaggerate its own defects » ¹³⁾ as it hoisted itself up to the demands of philosophy. The result was that the Latin language became, unlike Greek, not only the form of ideas, but a form within which was the possibility of a rich intellectual experience. « The originality of the Latin mould lies in the fact that it does not give the reader the content of the ideas, but provides him with an outline of the developments which will help him to reconstruct it (des mouvements utiles à la reconstruction de l'idée). The reader of a Latin text is never the passive link in a chain; he is forced into cooperating creatively with the author. The distinctions (discriminations) of Greek, on the other hand convey within themselves the

in Cicerone', in : *Marco Tullio Cicerone, nel Bimillenario della Morte*, Florence 1961, pp. 224-5.

¹²⁾ *Tusculanarum* II, II, 5-6.

¹³⁾ 'Cicéron, traducteur de Platon', Paris 1957, p. 369. Parts II and III of his conclusion are relevant here.

meaning; it is a wonderful language for the passing on of a science, but does not necessarily communicate the spirit » (l'esprit).¹⁴⁾

After five centuries this process reached the term which Cicero and Varro had intended, but by no means in the way in which they had foreseen. The Latin speech and literature gradually prevailed against the predominant Greek. Augustine's lack of Greek is taken as significant of the decline of Greek letters in the West.¹⁵⁾ Not due to an absolute decline in culture before the barbarian invasions at least, its place was taken by Latin translations from Greek, the classical Roman literature and increasingly by Latin christian writers. Despite the set-back of the invasions amidst which he died the achievement of Augustine of having established a vocabulary and system of ideas was the real beginning of a Latin theological-philosophical culture. He, his near contemporary Saint Leo, the later Saint Gregory (who depended so much on him), to a lesser extent his own contemporary Saint Jerome — the four Latin Fathers — and a host of lesser writers gave the distinct character of Romanitas the importance which Cicero and Varro had tried to create for it: ¹⁶⁾ a quality of mind expressed through a language, prepared for by commentators on Greek philosophy and polished by the rhetor-jurist mentality and a style of education.¹⁷⁾ Yet this lapidary quality, this profound terseness aptly suited the function of passing the theological conceptions of Christian belief and thought to the west which by then equated « Romanitas » with « Catholica ».

Aristotle as known to the age of Augustine

The esoteric Aristotle passed on to the age of Augustine — or rather the Aristotle passed on with recognisable identity, not involved

¹⁴⁾ *Ib.* p. 372.

¹⁵⁾ P. COURCELLE, 'Les Lettres grecques en Occident', Paris 1948, especially p. 195. Also, H.-I. MARROU, 'Saint Augustin et la fin de la Culture Antique', 4th edition, Paris 1958, pp. 38-46.

¹⁶⁾ The difference can be seen if one sets side by side the delicate and profound insights in the individually composed treatments of the virtues in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (II, 7; III, 6 - V, 11) with the confident cursory treatment of the 'cardinal virtues' as given by the Latin Fathers in the fifth century. See brief summary by O. LOTTIN, 'Aristote et la connexion des Vertus' in : *Autour d'Aristote : Recueil d'études de philosophie ancienne et médiévale offert à Mgr A. Mansion*, Louvain 1955, p. 344.

¹⁷⁾ MARROU, *op. cit.*, chapter 3.

in eclectic combinations, would have been principally the author of the logical treatises. « Scarcely any mention is found of the other treatises or other parts of his teaching. »¹⁸⁾ Whilst Plato remained in favour, Aristotle was held in disfavour in east and west for teachings which seemed impious (particularly his exclusion of providence from the sublunary world, for his disbelief in personal immortality, and for proposing a conception of ethics which was too worldly)¹⁹⁾, as also for being the author of excessively verbose dialectic, useless from the point of view of the Christian religion or at least suspect by reason of his use by Arians.²⁰⁾ He would have been known through commentators, friendly and otherwise, who (in the west) translated him and interpreted him in terms of a coherent hermeneutical tradition. A rare reference to Aristotle in Augustine witnesses to this : « whoever thought... that the obscure and recondite works of Aristotle should be

¹⁸⁾ J. DE GHELLINCK, 'Patristique et Moyen Age', III, Brussels-Paris 1948, pp. 278-9. For a brief indication of the intensity of Aristotelian studies in the Christian East, v. F. DVORNIK, 'The Patriarch Photius in the Light of Recent Research', in : *Berichte zum XI. Internationalen Byzantinischen Kongress* III, 2, p. 8. Munich 1958. It is possible that Augustine knew Porphyry's commentaries on Aristotle which, besides the logical works, are known to include commentaries on the *Physics*, *Metaphysics* XII and the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and the one or perhaps two works relating Aristotle to Plato *Περὶ διαστάσεως Πλάτωνος καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους* (Bidez 31, Beutler 21) and *Περὶ τοῦ μίαν εἶναι τὴν Πλάτωνος καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους αἵρεσιν* ζ' (Bidez 32, Beutler 20) v. list in J. BIDEZ, 'Vie de Porphyre', Ghent 1913, nos. 1-9, 31 and 32. V. also article with list in R. BEUTLER's article 'Porphyrios', in : *Paulys-Wissowa RE* XXII, I col. 282 ff. and his judgement : 'The first neo-Platonist to show a deeper interest in Aristotle (excepting the *Organon*) is P. ... Since P. there has been true exegesis of Aristotle's writings (and not only the previous pure criticism) setting Aristotle side by side with Plato in the philosophical schools of the west, and not regarding him as subordinate.' Yet Augustine's idea of Aristotle as a disciple of Plato at the time of writing the *De Civitate Dei* (v. VIII, 12) showed that he was then either unaware of or unconvinced by this Porphyrian exegesis. Cf. COURCELLE, 'Les Lettres...', p. 166. HADOT has proposed that Augustine may have seen the commentary on the *Ethics* ('L'image de la Trinité dans l'Âme chez Victorinus et chez Augustin', *Studia Patristica* VI, Berlin 1962, p. 440).

¹⁹⁾ Cf. A. J. FESTUGIÈRE, 'L'Idéal Religieux des Grecs et l'Évangile', Paris 1932, Excursus C : 'Aristote dans la littérature grecque chrétienne jusqu'à Théodoret', especially pp. 259 and 262 : this was the Aristotle as widely known through doxographers by early Christian writers.

²⁰⁾ E. VANDENBUSSCHE, 'La Part de la Dialectique dans la Théologie d'Eunomius 'le Technologue'', *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique*, 40, 1944-4, pp. 47 ff, and DE GHELLINCK, *op. cit.* Also eod. auct. 'Quelques appréciations de la dialectique et d'Aristote durant les conflits trinitaires du IV^e siècle', *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique* 26, 1930, p. 4 ff.

explained by one who was his enemy? » ²¹⁾ Though Augustine was prepared to be critical of an intemperate valuation of dialectic, as a former rhetor he was very prepared to accept it even as a method in exegesis.²²⁾

Are we in a position to say how much of Aristotle would have been known to Augustine? The best-known of the modern historical works are short, even laconic about it. Marrou ²³⁾ thinks only of the *Categories*, known through the translation and Commentary of Victorinus and possibly the (spurious) *De Mundo*, and Courcelle has substantially the same view.²⁴⁾ One could suppose that he had information at one remove through doxographies of Cicero ²⁵⁾ and others including Varro's *Liber de Philosophia*, now unfortunately lost.²⁶⁾ While Hadot is prepared to consider that he may have seen a version of Porphyry's commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics*,²⁷⁾ the possibility that he knew Porphyry's commentary on *Metaphysics* does not seem to have been proposed.

The quality of the research of Marrou and Courcelle is not difficult to characterise. In its intention to avoid extravagant and fantastic interpretations it insists on establishing unquestionable connections : direct quotations, references to the author by name are the desiderata

²¹⁾ *De Utilitate Credendi* 6, 13. 'Fathers of the Church' translation by L. MEAGHER. P. COURCELLE does scant justice to this text (« Les Lettres... », p. 156) : 'he judges his theories to be obscure'. But 'reconditos et obscuros' need not be a pejorative judgement. The text expresses the distance he felt between the Aristotle he knew and himself, and also his personal knowledge of friendly and hostile commentators.

²²⁾ DE GHELLINCK, 'Quelques appréciations...', pp. 39-40.

²³⁾ *Op. cit.*, p. 34.

²⁴⁾ *Op. cit.*, p. 156.

²⁵⁾ G. COMBES thought that Augustine had gained all of his other knowledge of Aristotle through Cicero ('St. Augustin et la Culture Classique', Paris 1927, p. 14). For Cicero's doxographies v. FESTUGIÈRE, 'La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste' II, Paris 1944, p. 351.

²⁶⁾ The beginning of *De Civitate Dei* VIII makes one suppose that he drew on this superior kind of text book for information on the Greek philosophers. G. LANGENBERG, 'M. Terenti Varronis Liber de Philosophia', Cologne dissertation 1959. Varro's calculation that there were two hundred and eighty-eight views on the highest good, which he then reduced to twelve schools and ultimately to three sects is an outstanding example of Romanitas at work in the field of philosophy — but bereft of that inner effort which PONCELET could not claim characterised every reception into Latin.

²⁷⁾ Cf. *supra*, p. 76, n. 18 and *infra*, ch. 4.

of this style. The labour of this kind of scholarship is commendable, but is subject to certain defects.

a) The reconstruction of a relationship between two people by means of a meticulous study and the acceptance only of undoubted referential links is removed from the philosophical creative process in which the later writer, even in his conscious and semi-conscious dependence on another, probably only gives a bare minimum of references. Scholarly skill may itself harm the sympathy for its own subject matter.

b) The later thinker has almost certainly more insight into the earlier thinker than the limited range of the historical scholar can detect. Here good scholarship may set speculative thought at a discount in the cause of objectivity. But equally necessary to objectivity is a sense for continuity in the interior discipline of the subject matter, when that itself is in any sense intellectual, and with that sense must go an awareness of any transmutations. In the subject matter of this thesis we have some Aristotelian ideas coming to Augustine linked with Cicero's and others as part of neo-Platonism. In both ways Aristotelian conceptions came to him not merely as elements of a doxography but as helpful analyses to a very perceptive mind of what thinking is in itself and how self-thinking is related to it.

c) In an understandable wish to make itself more interesting than its self-imposed canons would permit within the subject matter, literal scholarship may resort to oversimplifications of conclusions, and seek to finalise itself in exaggerated contrasts. Thus a philosophy is reduced not to its essential insight as understood by a sympathetic insight, but to an interplay of contrasts, so to be made comprehensible to simpler mentalities at the expense of veracity.

d) An investigation such as this — to establish a link between Aristotle and Augustine, which is dismissed by established historical scholars in five or six lines and a footnote — ought to be an enormous one even on its own presumptive axioms. Once the initial resemblances have been made clear and a plausible linkage between them proposed ²⁸⁾ the possible mediating authors between the two turn out

²⁸⁾ This has been done in a brief but highly satisfactory way in the matter of the ontology of Aristotle and Augustine by R. SCHNEIDER.

a) 'Das Wandelbare Sein. Die Hauptthemen der Ontologie Augustins', Philosophischen Abhandlungen VIII, Frankfurt am Main 1938, which picks out numerous

to be so numerous that the conventional scholarly task of interrelating the texts has made only a beginning; and it would probably never be completed in the way in which the current work is orientated. There is no certainty that the seeming discovery of a « source » of an idea will not later be pre-empted by its discovery in an earlier one.

In point of fact there have been other scholars reflecting on the relationship between Aristotle and Augustine. Their works do not appear in the bibliographies of the modern French historical scholars, not only because they are mainly German and from a previous generation but also because they are more speculative philosophers than historians of philosophy. The proposals they put forward may be unhistorical in the sense that they are made mostly regardless of the historical distance, but the absence of an historical point of fixation is a necessity for an awareness of the continuity or discontinuity in the speculative themes which are the most important of philosophical subjects.

Among these scholars there are those who insist on the wide divergence between Aristotle and Augustine, and those who insist on a similarity if broken continuity, between them. Amongst these the former have been the better known and more widely accepted; the historical and religious difference between them seems so great and the negative conclusions of the historical literary approach seems to support them. But the other view, which has never been widely discussed, is worthy of serious examination. While it concedes the lack of certifiable references in the texts it does draw attention to the neo-Platonist themes in Augustine's thought, and is conscious of the Aristotelian element in neo-Platonism. The former stems from the conception of « Aristotle, the empiricist », to whom Augustine was supposed to be, as the advocate of « innerness », the opposite. The latter has more sympathy for a conception of « Augustine, the eclectic » than the other, which wishes to look on him as a kind of innovator : « Augustine, the first modern man ! ». ²⁹⁾ Certainly, the latter view has more to commend it in that the thinkers whom he mentions with

Aristotelian themes (cf. p. 15, n. 3 (p. 16) 'the Aristotelian element is the most weighty in Augustine's ontology').

b) 'Seele und Sein. Ontologie bei Augustin und Aristoteles', Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Geistesgeschichte IV, Stuttgart 1957.

²⁹⁾ A. HARNACK derived this expression, which he used frequently, from K. SELL. See 'Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte', 4th edition, Tübingen 1910, p. 106, note.

particular respect were all themselves eclectics — Antiochus of Ascalon, Cicero, Varro, Plotinus, Porphyry. Those for an Aristotelian link tend to look at certain details in common; those against it look at a supposed difference in outlook as exemplified in certain texts. But it is not impossible that Augustine could take an idea which occurs in Aristotle and give it a richness of content which was not in the original, or could call into question a development of an originally Aristotelian idea which had taken place after him? And is not such caution most necessary in the speculative questions about subjectivity where their presence in Aristotle has been so forgotten on the assumption that he is above all an empiricist? In other words, literary scholarship cannot be allowed to canonise its own standards as the only ones, particularly when that formlike quality of Latin words is remembered, and how, in consequence a simple expression may be filled out by a sensitive writer with allusiveness, and passed on to a sensitive reader.³⁰) A completer objectivity is gained when the textual links are seen in terms of the hermeneutical changes to Aristotelian themes that undoubtedly occurred.

Augustine as the antitype to Aristotle : a bibliographical review

Probably the view of Augustine as the antitype to Aristotle has a long back history, which must include the conflict in the scholastic period between Thomist-Aristotelian realists and Augustinian illuminists, but it is convenient to look at modern work beginning with that of H. Siebeck. In his *Geschichte der Psychologie*, he drew out some conclusions from Augustine's *De Trinitate* IX, 3 :

« As the mind itself, therefore, gathers the knowledge of corporeal things through the bodily senses, so it gains the knowledge of incorporeal things through itself. »³¹

He interprets this as meaning that

³⁰) As appreciated by R. PONCELET, *op. cit.*, p. 372 : 'The understanding of Latin demands at the same time obedience to the letter and forgetfulness of the letter, unconditional submission to the detail and going beyond the detail'.

³¹) I, II, Gotha 1880, p. 383. The text occurs frequently in this essay : 'Mens ergo ipsa sicut corporearum rerum notitias per sensus corporis colligit, sic incorporearum per semetipsum'. A better text would have been another also frequently quoted : 'item notitia qua se mens novit si esse desinat, simul et illa nosse desinat' (*ib.* IX, 4, 6).

« the soul has a direct knowledge of itself because in the condition of self-knowledge it is the nearest object of knowledge to itself. Through this it is also possible to know what becomes an object to it through its own activity. »

He thinks it was a mark of superior insight on Augustine's part to have understood that self-knowledge comes before the knowledge of objects. Basing himself on the passage from *Nicomachean Ethics* IX, 9 on self-consciousness, which will be examined in chapter two ³²), he finds Aristotle not so profound in so far as he makes the activity of self-thinking depend on object thinking, « remaining concealed under the activity of the active and passive intellect », and treats sense objects in the same way as intelligible ones.³³) He made here the mistake of assuming that all the other accounts of subjectivity in Aristotle were in accord with this one, and he is conspicuously unaware that Aristotle's transcendent structures of subjectivity merge object-thinking into self-thinking. He did not realise that the priority of self-thinking in Augustine is the consequence of accepting, in addition to the structure of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, characteristics for *mens* which derive from these transcendent structures.³⁴)

In a later article ³⁵) Siebeck developed a full-scale opposition between Augustine as an example of « spiritual reaction » and Aristotle as an example of « naturalism ». Always making the case that Augustine turned his attention inwards, thus making a true psychology possible,³⁶) he makes the following comparison :

« The inner world of soul comes to be recognised and valued (by Aristotle) only in so far as it is activated through intercourse with the outer world and to the extent to which it appears determined with relationship to this involvement. The complete and exclusive problem with Aristotle is the scientific grasp and organisation of the external world of nature and social life. Augustine has the diametrically opposed frame of mind and orientation. For him the outer world only has meaning and value to the extent that it appears to reflect the inner world. The problem with him is

³²) See *infra*, p. 126-7 : 1170 a 29 - b 11.

³³) *Op. cit.*, pp. 334-5.

³⁴) V. *infra*, p. 189.

³⁵) 'Die Anfänge der neueren Psychologie in der Scholastik', *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, 93, 1888, pp. 161 ff.

³⁶) '... the living inner object of experience as opposed to the Peripatetics' systematic ossification of psychology', *ib.*, p. 176.

not nature, the state, secular ethics, but those of the most inner needs of the mind and heart, of charity and faith, and of hope and conscience take predominance over all. Not the relationship between inner and outer but that of inner to innermost... »³⁷

In so far as this judgement depends on the structure of *Nicomachean Ethics* IX, 9 it fails to take account of the other structures with their conception of pure thinking — whose innerness, as passed on by neo-Platonist writers was to be of such significance to Augustine himself. It also is unaware of Aristotle's exoteric themes of philosophic contemplation, passed on to Augustine through Cicero. And in so far as it may allude to the structure of *De Anima* III, 4 (that mind is able to think itself when it has thought up other intelligible objects) it would be a fundamental misunderstanding, because the thinking objects which are then the occasion of its own self-knowledge are not external and part of the sensible world, but intelligible and created by itself : of a status for which inner is a usual metaphor.

This article was lengthily quoted and given the highest approval by A. Harnack, thus ensuring that its conclusions achieved the widest possible circulation. He wrote of « the process which leads out of the naive objective to the subjective objective... making the inner life the starting point of thinking about the world... the opposite picture to Aristotle's », and that Augustine « did away with all that we take to belong to the ancient classical spirit, the classical life and way of looking at the world ».³⁸ It is true that Augustine the Christian was opposed to the way of life of the pagan world, but as a thinker he undertook the task of deliberately assimilating all he could of the most tradition-conscious sect of classical philosophy : neo-Platonism. And if there is some truth in the statement that « Aristotle and Augustine are both rivals who contend with each other in the learning and mentality of the following centuries »³⁹, it was because their followers did not perceive what they had in common.

The supposed opposition between Augustine and Aristotle, expressed with the clarity of Siebeck and the power of Harnack, and their joint conclusion, will presently be seen to be historically unwarranted. Siebeck was a scholar, deeply read in Augustine and the

³⁷) *Ib.*, pp. 188-9.

³⁸) *Op. cit.*, pp. 104-106.

³⁹) *Ib.*, p. 106.

scholastics. But like many others he had failed to grasp the wide range of Aristotle's interests; he gave them the conventional characterisation of empirical; he had neither been aware of the diversity of Aristotelian subjectivity structures nor attentive to the importance of his speculation on the problems of mind. Thus has the picture of the formerly esoteric, now exoteric, Aristotle of modern times become the exact opposite of the exoteric Aristotle of classical times, with his search for wisdom and beatitude! Harnack felt that Siebeck's findings could be trusted because they coincided with his own religious pre-conceptions. The heightening of a comparison could be described by the unwary as « speculative »⁴⁰⁾; but it is almost entirely rhetoric.

The repercussions of the Siebeck article still go on. J. M. Le Blond quotes the section above in support of a frankly empty statement about Augustine: « for Physics he shows a certain disdain »; and he comments « on this point Siebeck very justly opposes Aristotle to Augustine »⁴¹⁾ (though Siebeck is not concerned here with natural sciences). Again referring to Siebeck's article J. Guitten stops short at the problem of why Aristotle uses the vocabulary of cosmology to describe the soul, and, oblivious of the activity of *νοῦς* (which is by Aristotle's own definition « separate » from this world), he asserts that it shows that for him the soul was only a part of nature.

« Psychology, in the way that Aristotle established the model for centuries, is an impersonal psychology which studies the soul as a thing. Above everything else it likes to distinguish between parts and functions. Just like logic, it is based on its idea of a hierarchy and the interlocking of genera. In such a condition how can it have any inclination to describe the intimate life of souls? The soul is a part of nature as man is a part of the city; it is made to reflect the external reality just like a mirror. And that is why the psychology of Aristotle is at its best in the analyses of the two opposed states in which the soul coincides with nature and is absorbed in it: sensations and intellection. The whole area between where the intelligence is developed, where the will is produced and where we are really ourselves only has meaning in relation to these moments of purity. Thus understood psychology is an appendix to cosmology. »⁴²⁾

⁴⁰⁾ In the sense of 'conjectural', not in the sense of bearing on the theoretical knowledge of mind as used in this essay.

⁴¹⁾ 'Les Conversions de Saint Augustin', Paris 1950, p. 32 and n. 55.

⁴²⁾ 'Le Temps et l'Éternité chez Plotin et Saint Augustin', 3rd edition, Paris 1959, p. 272.

Exception could be taken to every idea in this extract as doing injustice to Aristotle's real thoughts. What is extraordinary is that the books quoted from both authors are studies on the relationship between Augustine and neo-Platonism. They ought to have seen that the innerness of Aristotle's conception of thinking and self-knowledge, albeit hermeneutically transformed, became part of the neo-Platonist system which Augustine accepted in a modified way.

It is not difficult to demonstrate that Aristotle had made a far greater analysis of innerness than Siebeck's categorisations would allow for. There is a very probing inner reflection evident in his arrival at the positions taken up about self-knowing without an intermediary ⁴³⁾ which can be described as the heart of his teaching on epistemology, as also in his subtle and sensitive awareneses that self-consciousness accompanies every conscious act in general, and even every sensation in man and animals ⁴⁴⁾. But to spread one's attention wider in Aristotle's writings numerous examples can be found to show his analytical competence over inner processes of mind. Thus, there is the subjectively felt difference between true possession of knowledge and a superficial grasp of it ⁴⁵⁾, with a description of how knowledge roots itself in a soul to make a man an expert ⁴⁶⁾. From the *Nicomachean Ethics* there is the analysis of «state of character» ⁴⁷⁾, the nature of the human act ⁴⁸⁾ the variety of virtues ⁴⁹⁾, the qualities of different intellectual dispositions ⁵⁰⁾, the subjective assessment of pleasures and pains ⁵¹⁾, his very deliberate decision not to break up the unity of desire across the different faculties ⁵²⁾, and in general his appreciation of human character as being formed by the successful or unsuccessful association of cognition and desire, together with the reasons for this success or lack of success. There is also the innerness in the analysis of memory, and especially the process of reminiscence, in the *De Memoria et Reminiscentia*. There is certainly sufficient in quantity in Aristotle

⁴³⁾ *De Anima* III and *Metaphysics* XII.

⁴⁴⁾ *De Somno*... 2.

⁴⁵⁾ *Posterior Analytics* I, 2.

⁴⁶⁾ *Ib.* II, 19. Cf. *De Anima* II, 5.

⁴⁷⁾ ἔξις — habit, especially VI, 12.

⁴⁸⁾ *Ib.* III.

⁴⁹⁾ *Ib.* Moral virtues IV and V; intellectual virtues VI.

⁵⁰⁾ *Ib.* VI, 9.

⁵¹⁾ *Ib.* VII, 14.

⁵²⁾ *De Anima* III, 9.

to make point by point examination of the topics of innerness as raised by Augustine : in fact the possibility exists for a comparison and interrelationship between the two both with or without the hermeneutic twist which had changed the look of Aristotle since his esoterica hand left the cave at Skepsis. In the case of the latter we should find a contrast between the simplification and desire for comprehension — the Romanitas of Augustine — far removed from the variety which came about from Aristotle's rejection of the position of Plato, in which all problems were supposedly soluble by the application of the distinction between the real world of ideas and the unreal world of sense, and his deliberate tolerance of the resolution of all problems back into the stage of problematic. Yet with the reworked Aristotle, hermeneutically transformed through Roman doxographers and Greek eclectics — especially neo-Platonists, the variety had been brought into one order, and one not too far removed from Augustine's own. Yet the position in Augustine seems to involve a rejection of this later neo-Platonist systematisation with an innerness that was in part transcendent and a return to a conception which did not overdevelop what was also found in Aristotle : the structures of the *Parva Naturalia*, *Nicomachean Ethics* and *De Anima* III, 2, 4 and 7 in which the individual is unmistakably self-master and self-complete, even though it retained the conception of mind's self-immediacy as found in the transcendent structures.

The current to which Siebeck and Harnack belonged is one which believed that the classical world was essentially concerned with objectivity, not with subjectivity. Mondolfo's long study, undertaken to refute this frequently encountered presumption⁵³), has proposed what is likely in most general terms, that the current arises with Hegel. But in this particular case Hegel's opinion is worth quoting, for he had a great insight into the speculative problems which Aristotle considered. Commenting on *De Anima* III, 4 he wrote with more discernment than Siebeck and those impressed by his rhetorical contrast : « the self-conscious understanding is not merely implicit, but essentially explicit, since it is within itself all things. That is an idealistic way of expressing it; and yet they say that Aristotle was an empiricist. »⁵⁴)

⁵³) 'La Comprensione di Soggetto Umano nell'Antichità Classica, Florence 1958.

⁵⁴) Geschichte der Philosophie II, SW 18, p. 386 : 'Der *νοῦς* denkt Alles, ist so

Augustine as the Continuator of Aristotle : a further bibliographical review

We turn now to the approach which is prepared to see a likeness between them based on a far wider, if indirect, knowledge of Aristotle by Augustine. N. Kauffman collected together some of the writings which explored this approach in the last century; ⁵⁵⁾ they are mainly brief allusions in longer studies. In three cases the results are disappointing, but in the fourth (Willman) there is much matter for reflection. The interpretation is first noted in J. F. Nourrisson, in a book published in Paris in 1865.⁵⁶⁾

After giving a rather lengthy account of the place of Plato's thinking in Augustine's thought, he proposed a list of nine points where Augustine may have « borrowed, if not completely, at least in part ». These were « his conceptions on the differences between things »; his « celebrated theory of form and matter »; his views on eternity and time — in addition to those of Plato; « his definition of the soul even though he combats Aristotle whom he thought wrongly to have defined the soul as a fifth essence »; his theory on the « évolutions » (sic) of the soul : seminal life, sensible life, intellectual life; « his theory of knowledge, the internal or sixth sense, proper and common sense objects, the memory, imagination and reminiscence »; « the idea of a wisdom, a light superior to the soul, and the necessary faculty which develops in it »; « some of the most lefty maxims on behaviour »; his teaching on the sociability of man and « a number of must apt expressions about the constitution of societies ».

E. Commer used Nourrisson's book and referred readers to it for further guidance (which it hardly provided), and he declared, « (Augustine's) theory of knowledge is essentially Aristotelian ». ⁵⁷⁾ C. Baemker has only two allusions to Augustine's views on matter, but was aware of Plotinus's syncretism of Plato and Aristotle.⁵⁸⁾

But with O. Willman we get a much more knowledgeable proposal of the relationship.⁵⁹⁾ He found far wider Aristotelian elements,

bei sich, er ist bei sich Alles; das ist idealistisch gesprochen, doch soll Aristoteles Empiriker seyn'. English translation (Haldane), II, p. 196.

⁵⁵⁾ 'Éléments aristotéliens dans la cosmologie et la psychologie de Saint Augustin', *Revue Néoscholastique de Louvain*, 11, 1904, pp. 141 ff.

⁵⁶⁾ 'La Philosophie de Saint Augustin'. For the following see II, pp. 126-7.

⁵⁷⁾ 'Die immerwährende Philosophie : Apologetica Studia' I, 2, Vienna 1899.

⁵⁸⁾ 'Das Problem der Materie in der griechischen Philosophie', Münster 1890.

⁵⁹⁾ 'Geschichte der Idealismus II. Der Idealismus der Kirchenväter und der

mediated principally through neo-Platonists and later Peripatetics. He saw points of contact in Augustine's Trinitarian theory in which according to *De Civitate Dei* XI, 25 (though not *De Trinitate*) the division of sciences into physica — logica — ethica, based on the triad of being — knowing — willing, corresponded to Aristotle's division. He saw the analogy between Aristotle's statement of the need of faith before coming by knowledge from a teacher and Augustine's of the need of faith to come by knowledge of God. He also saw points of contact in a relationship between mystical knowledge in Augustine and Aristotle's teaching on the active intellect, the relation of the body to the soul, and the making of happiness as the end of life. It was altogether a collection of most perceptive suggestions. Even when the propositions were hesitantly made it is clear that the writer had an intimate sense of the nature of the speculative question and was disposed to see signs of continuity through neo-Platonism to Augustine, in the way this study takes.

The research into the connection between Aristotle and Augustine continued

In a modest dissertation written at Strasbourg in 1912, a Welsh non-conformist minister, J. H. Parry, supposed there to be a link between Aristotle and Augustine through Stoics and neo-Platonists which was evident in Augustine's treatment of the body-soul relationship and the existence of a « common sense ».⁶⁰)

M. Heidegger has revealed that he has attempted to bring Augustine's views on man into relationship with Aristotle's ontology, but he has not published the work to which he refers in a note to his « Sein und Zeit ». He speaks of « his attempt to make an interpretation of Augustinian — that is Graeco-Christian — anthropology with relation to foundation principles which were reached in Aristotle's ontology ».⁶¹)

Realismus der Scholastiker', Braunschweig 1896. Particularly 57 : Aristotelische Elemente in althristlichen Gedankbildung, in which all the allusions in the text are found.

⁶⁰) 'Augustine's Psychology during his first period of Literary Activity with special reference to his Platonism', Strasbourg dissertation 1912, pp. 9-12, 86-7. He had read SIEBECK's 'Geschichte der Philosophie' (v. p. 75), but kept a creditably open mind on its contents.

⁶¹) *Op. cit.* 7th edition, Tübingen 1953, p. 199, n. 1.

The works of R. Schneider on the ontological similarities between Aristotle and Augustine have already been referred to.⁶²⁾ The foreword to « Seele und Sein » reveals that he had seen two unpublished papers by Heidegger on the rôle of Aristotelian ontology for Augustine⁶³⁾, and presumably these embody the attempt to which he refers. But the positive qualities of this same modest, brief and unfortunately incomplete work make it of exceptional interest for this study. In a few short pages, uncluttered by references, Schneider lists and briefly comments on the sources of information about Aristotle which would have been available to Augustine⁶⁴⁾: contact with Stoic-Aristotelian popular philosophy while studying rhetoric at Carthage; contact with Stoic-Aristotelian popular philosophy through the Pelagians⁶⁵⁾; and the wider sources — Cicero and neo-Platonism. Whereas previous writers had shown themselves hesitant in going further than identifying connections at a textual level, Schneider was aware of the way in which neo-Platonism had changed the Aristotelian conceptions which it had absorbed and mediated. But he does not say in the introductory section how it did this, only that neo-Platonism was « dynamisch ».⁶⁶⁾ And the book only completes the study of the ontology at the level of vegetative and sensitive life. One wishes that he had either started with or lived to complete the section of the intellect and so worked out in detail (what is intended in the first part of this study) the remarkable insight, that

« this consideration (of how much ontology Augustine had learnt from neo-Platonism) shows again how significantly Stoic-Aristotelian popular philosophy must have influenced Augustine. This impression made on him in his youth, so affected him that Augustine did not accept neo-Platonism without reservations but gave it from the beginning a modified form — basically because of the powerful philosophical influence he had had in his youth »⁶⁷⁾.

⁶²⁾ V. p. 72, n. 28.

⁶³⁾ *Op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁶⁴⁾ *Ib.* ch. 1, pp. 20-26.

⁶⁵⁾ That Augustine was in controversy with Stoic-minded Pelagians and neo-Platonist minded Arians, as well as with pagan neo-Platonists, indicates how much of his life was taken up with philosophical matters.

⁶⁶⁾ Hermeneutical philosophy has performed the service of stimulating an awareness of the transformation in the way in which words are taken, as also of producing dissatisfaction with the historian-archivist approach of finding certifiable textual links.

⁶⁷⁾ *Op. cit.*, pp. 25-26.

The theory has to be extended, for Augustine did not make at least his final criticisms of neo-Platonism from his store of memory, but from a deeper and more up to date knowledge of at least the Cicero texts, and perhaps others.⁶⁸) More importantly, the scope of the book and its grasp of neo-Platonism do not seem to have taken in fully the scale of the hermeneutical twist which had already given Aristotle's conception of self-thinking a religious and total binding force to the whole neo-Platonic system. Nor does it take in the full significance of the philosophical eclecticism that both influenced Augustine through its exponents and was the model of the superior eclecticism in his lucid anti-neo-Platonist apologetic of the *De Trinitate*. But at least the problem as grasped by Schneider is more in sympathy with the speculative content of the subject matter of Aristotle and Augustine than the scholarly literalism of Courcelle and Marrou.

Certainly the proposal that Augustine always remained a neo-Platonist⁶⁹) *tout court* cannot stand when their writings are compared in detail, yet that Augustine may have contributed to this impression by using neo-Platonist idioms with an apologetic intent will be one of the themes of this study. But Augustine's subjectivity structure has features very much like the common-sense centred structure of Aristotle; his view of the memory has something in common with Aristotle's; the conception of time as a subjective medium of experience also has something in common. Through the examination of the subjectivity structure in Aristotle we can draw the two Aristotelian parts of Schneider's perceptive hypothesis into a closer relationship and justifiable contrast. It was in terms of the unequivocally individual-centred structure that Augustine criticised the transcendent structure of thought in itself. Whilst he himself had derived some valuable insights into the human mind from the legacy of νόησις νόησεως,, without necessarily being aware of it he was applying himself to the

⁶⁸) Cf. I. DÜRING, «Von Aristoteles bis Leibniz», in : *Aristoteles in der neueren Forschung*, Darmstadt 1968, p. 270. 'What is known to him of Aristotelian thought in addition (to the *Categories*) comes principally from Cicero, Apuleius and the Latin commentary on the *Timaeus* by Chalcidius.'

⁶⁹) Expressed in its most unqualified form in : P. ALFARIC, «L'évolution intellectuelle de Saint Augustin», Paris 1918 v. especially its final words «his first works have been interpreted according to the later and it has been falsely believed that his neo-Platonism was simply a cover to his Catholic faith» (p. 527). The proposal in a less extreme form has a long history.

reconciliation of the divided inheritance which Aristotle had bequeathed to philosophy. The issues involved and their consequences were greater than the busy bishop could have conceived, for in so far as such metaphors are meaningful, Aristotle, rather than Plato, was the real « Father » of idealism as well as of empiricism.

To demonstrate this paradoxical proposal — that the hermeneutically transformed Aristotelianism of the neo-Platonic synthesis was acceptable to Augustine only as modified in accordance with a position that has some similarities to the original Aristotle, we have to undertake two investigations : to examine the intervening period of philosophy; and to look even more closely at the hermeneutical transformation of the ideas.

Eclectic Philosophies between Aristotle and Augustine

The principal philosophies which were found in Greece in the third and second centuries B.C. were Academy-derived (early Platonist) scepticism, Stoicism (against which the scepticism was often directed) and Epicureanism. For the moment authentic Aristotelianism had disappeared. Particularly from the headship of the Academy of Antiochus of Ascalon (c. 132-20 - c. 68), who brought back a return to dogmatism of Plato, and who also thought that the consensus of men should produce the same philosophical wisdom, an eclectic development began which provided a further option, and in time the majority option. Neo-Platonism was a later eclecticism,⁷⁰ but it was not the last.

The negative attitude to this eclecticism which E. Zeller took ⁷¹

⁷⁰) According to Professor A. H. Armstrong's view neo-Platonism is not an eclecticism, if by that is meant a compilation of ideas without inner unity. He insists that Plotinus's structure of the cosmos 'though it is static and eternal is no dead mechanical pattern, but living and organic'. 'An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy', 4th ed., London 1965, p. 178.

⁷¹) 'Scepticism forms the bridge from the one-sided dogmatism of the Stoics and the Epicurean philosophy to Eclecticism', *Die Philosophie des Griechen*, III, I, 3rd edition, Leipzig 1880, p. 531. Also, 'Justifiable, however, as the renewal of scepticism appears in relation to the uncritical treatment of philosophy, it would no longer attain the importance which it had in the school of the new academy. The exhaustion of thought, which can be shown even in this late scepticism, made a positive conviction too necessary to allow many to return to pure doubt. If, therefore, the belief in the truth of the systems hitherto in vogue was shaken, and even if their eclectic combination could not entirely satisfy, whilst strength was wanting for the independent production of a new system, the general result was only that thought began to long more and more

is now seen to be unjust. Firstly, because there was a conscientious attempt to reconcile the different teachings at the detailed level : not just an unsystematic conflation of irreconcilables. The eclecticism was selective with a reasoned justification of what was rejected, and the amount of intellectual effort involved in this must have been very considerable. Festugière constructs a link between scepticism and eclecticism which is not a consequence of intellectual exhaustion. According to him the process followed the course : doxographic reduction of philosophical themes forming a spiritual *κοινῇ* (who were not professional philosophers) — the reawakening of philosophical reflection in an « infinitely subtle critical approach which spared no doctrine » — the arising of an eclectic dogmatism.⁷² Secondly, and particularly in the later period, there emerged from eclecticism a source of communion in a self-conscious tradition of philosophy, and here H. Dörrie shows, in a very suggestive paper to which further reference will have to be made,⁷³ a very explicit consciousness of this tradition in Porphyry.

Once the esoteric Aristotle was available it presented not an occasion of intellectual escapism but a difficult intellectual problem of how to bring it together with the newly redogmatized Platonism, with Stoicism, as also with the renewed Pythagoreanism which came forward in the same period.⁷⁴

for a source of knowledge lying outside itself and science as hitherto existing, which was sought partly in the inner revelation of the Deity, partly in religious tradition. Thus the way was entered on which neo-Platonism in the next period more definitely pursued, and so opened the last epoch of Greek philosophy' (*ib.*, p. 544-5. Translation by S. F. ALLEYNE, as in : 'A History of Eclecticism in Greek Philosophy', London 1883, pp. 5, 22-23).

However he is more indulgent in his 'Grundriss der Griechischen Philosophie', 11th edition, Leipzig 1914, p. 286, where he saw the need of the Greeks to adapt themselves to the practical needs and mentality of the Romans. This contact with a more practical mentality, a sense of the existence of humanity and of a consensus gentium were powerful conceptions in the clarification of a single philosophy (cf. p. 246 in : L. R. PALMER's translation of the 13th edition. London 1931).

⁷²) « La Révélation... » II, Paris 1949, Part 4, Ch. XII especially pp. 368-9. The movement to dogmatism is said to be evident in Cicero, the pseudo-Aristotelian *De Mundo*, Philo and Hermetism.

⁷³) 'Die Schultradition in Mittelplatonismus und Porphyrios', in : *Fondation Hardt, Entretiens XII : 'Porphyre'*, Geneva 1966, pp. 3-25.

⁷⁴) It seems appropriate here to point out the eclectic background and probable inspiration of Augustine's *cogito*. No more than Descartes' *cogito* is Augustine's absolutely

To this Greek eclectic exchange should be added the Roman contribution to the debate from Cicero and Varro (who both had known Antiochus) and later that from Plutarch. Another stream which mingled with it came from Judaism through Philo. Then increasingly came the contribution from Christian thinkers : at first the Greek-speaking, but increasingly the Latins.

without precedent. (For the prehistory of Descartes', see R. H. POPKIN, 'The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes' (Assen 1960), passim; also, B. M. BONANSEA, 'Tommasio Campanella' (Washington 1969), especially pp. 63-70).

The following are the loci in Augustine.

De Beata Vita 2, 7 : « Scisne, inquam, saltem te vivere ? Scio, inquit » (PL 32.963). *Soliloquium* II, 1, 1 : « Cogitare te scis ? Scio. Ergo verum est cogitare te. Verum » (PL 32.885). *De Vera Religione* 39, 73 : « Omnia qui se dubitantem intelligit, verum intelligit » (PL 34.154). *De Vera Religione* 39, 73 : « Omnis qui se dubitantem intelligit, verum intelligit » (PL 34.154). *De Trinitate* XV, 12, 21 : « Numquam ergo falli nec mentiri potest qui se vivere dixerit scire ». *De Civitate Dei* XI, 26 : « Si enim fallor, sum » (PL 41.340).

For these texts, cf. E. GILSON, 'Introduction à l'Étude de St. Augustin', 2nd edition, Paris 1943, pp. 53-55.

E. BICKEL has maintained that Augustine derived his version of the cogito from neo-Pythagorean literature (v. 'Inlocalitas. Zur neu-pythagoreischen Metaphysik' in : *Immanuel Kant. Festschrift zur Zweiten Jahrhundertfeier seines Geburtstages*, Leipzig 1924, p. 21 (5), n. 4).

It is an indication of the breadth of eclectic tradition that M. TESTARD can argue from reported passages in Augustine's lost work *De Bono et Apto*, that Cicero may have mediated pythagorean notions to Augustine ('Saint Augustin et Ciceron' I, Paris 1958, p. 46). But we are on more certain ground when we suppose Cicero to be the mediator of the views of Antiochus of Ascalon to Augustine, particularly the version of the *cogito* which, as also in Descartes, was based on certainty of doubting : he had certainly read Cicero's *Academica* in which it occurs : 'Hoc igitur modo potius erat ab his postulandum ut hoc unum saltem, percipi nihil posse, perceptum esse dicerent' (*Academica* II, IX, 29).

A similar argument of Antipater is also produced there : 'qui adfirmaret nihil posse percipi unum tamen illud dicere percipi posse consentaneum esse, ut alia non possent' (*ib.* II, IX, 28).

The 'Scio me scire me vivere' of *De Trinitate* XI, 12, 2, could also be based on a dictum found in the *Academica* : 'Scit se nihil se scire' (said of Socrates, II, 23, 74). The *Academica* of Cicero presented great problems to Augustine. Its conclusions are sceptical, though they do not fully plumb the depths of the later Academy itself : all that the wise man may do is to reach an opinion, not certainty (II, 48, 147), and what is probable is good enough (II, 31, 99).

Augustine is prepared — after his great crisis of doubt to which the *Academica* may have led him — to think that Cicero is speaking ironically, as the Academics had the custom of concealing their real teaching (v. *Contra Academicos* III, 20, 43 (PL 32.857). Cf. M. TESTARD, *op. cit.* I, p. 233).

So the philosophical eclecticism did not prevent the continuance of very lively discussion; the search for a complete system of thought in fact stimulated it.⁷⁵ Converts like Marius Victorinus and Augustine enthusiastically entered into the controversy, which went on to embrace philosophical and Christian writings — both orthodox and heretical, arguing against the position they had abandoned with their religious conversion and offering their reinterpretation of their former neo-Platonism as a stepping-stone to belief in a heavenly revelation.

The eclectic philosophies had significant features in common. Usually they professed a virtual monotheism, into which a pagan pantheon was, not altogether unaltered, loosely fitted. Sometimes they saw the ultimate principle or group of ultimate principles as hierarchically triadic. Thus the neo-Pythagorean Numenius of Apamea of the 2nd century A.D., possibly using the authority of a very obscure passage in Plato's second letter,⁷⁶ argues that there are three Gods :

« a first God who is in and through himself Spirit; he is pure activity of thinking (*νοῦς*) and source of being (*οὐσίας ἀρχή*) and King (*βασιλεύς*), free from all labour... The second God is good through his participation in the first; he contemplates the supra-sensible forms, acts on matter to bring about the world, since he is the principle of becoming. The world, the product of the demiurge, is the third God »⁷⁷).

If the title « King » does come from the passage in Plato's second letter (which happens to be the locus classicus for triadic emanations) we should have here, even if it is little more than verbal, a conflation of Aristotelian *νοῦς* and Platonic *βασιλεύς*..

P. Merlan notes that Plotinus was accused of plagiarising Numenius.⁷⁸ Merlan himself brings forward a passage from ps.-Archytas,

⁷⁵) Augustine speaks as if there were a large literature on the Trinity (v. *De Trinitate* III, 1, 1), but it seems that while including Christian treaties he would also have included non-Christian works which had a triad of first principles — as Plotinus's *Enneads*.

⁷⁶) *Epistle* 2, 312 E.

⁷⁷) *Überweg-Praechter*, 'Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie', 12th edition, Berlin 1926, I, p. 521.

⁷⁸) V. article 'Greek Philosophy from Plato to Plotinus' in the *Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, ed. A. H. ARMSTRONG, Cambridge 1967 ('Cambridge Philosophy'), p. 96. The question is of first importance for the development of neo-Platonism within the eclectic tradition.

also a neo-Pythagorean,⁷⁹ which shows that the syncretism at which the eclectic movement aimed did not only deal at the transcendent and remote level, but also the detailed and immediate.

« First, Ps.-Archytas introduces as two opposite principles matter, which he also calls *ousia*, and form (*morphé*). He proceeds to state that there must be, then, a third principle which is self-moved and will bring the two together, so that we have three principles. This third principle must be not merely intelligence, but something superior to intelligence — and it is obvious that that which is superior to intelligence is precisely what we call God ⁸⁰).

It is difficult to imagine a syncretistic passage in so small a compass. The two principles of form and matter are Aristotelian; to call the latter *ousia* is Stoic; to teach that form and matter must be brought together by another principle is Aristotelian again; to call this principle self-moved is Platonic; it is also Aristotelian... »

Merlan also shows that although he was familiar with (Plato's) two-opposite-principles theory Plutarch also expressed himself in the same triadic conception : « He obviously prefers to interpret Plato in terms of the triad 'artificer-ideas-matter' » ⁸¹. Not too distant is a triadic conception of Philo whose cosmology was of a transcendent God with intermediary powers between himself and the world.

These passages all have in common the solution of a problem : how it is possible to relate ontologically opposite, or at least the most disparate, factors. The same problem will be found later on in Augustine's assertion of the need of the « *intentio* » of the will to apply the cognitive faculty to its object, and also in complaisance in the object through love. Like the neo-Pythagoreans he saw the triadic principle present both at the transcendent divine level and at the level of the human mind.⁸²

⁷⁹) *Ib.*, pp. 84-5.

⁸⁰) There is no need for hesitation. In a parallel passage in his commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*, Ps.-Archytas makes this principle plainly God : *ολον εν τοις φυσικοις ποιουν μεν ο Θεός...* T. A. SZLEZAK, 'Pseudo-Archytas über die Kategorien', Berlin and New York 1972, p. 42 (Thesleff edn., p. 26, 1, 9).

⁸¹) MERLAN, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-1.

⁸²) That he realised he could not draw the analogy too closely and attribute all knowing to the Son, all loving to the Holy Spirit, and all remembering to the Father, caused him to utter a *crie de cœur* of failure in *De Trinitate* XV, 25, 45.

Whenever it was accepted that there should be a union of dissimilars there was often an instinctive search for an intermediary third factor which brought them together. This is true of knowledge as of physics. True, no third factor was necessary in the analysis of intellectual knowledge in *De Anima* III as the νοητόν was produced by νοῦς and was of an identical nature. But this was a special case : the object did not pre-exist for it. However there are examples of this instinctive triad-making in Aristotle. Hence the search for a « medium » (μεταξύ : in the midst) in the case of sensation ⁸³; and the sense powers bring opposites together.⁸⁴ For the wider division between contradictories, for example to say of something that it is at the same time white and non-white, Aristotle postulates the power of mind.⁸⁵ In *Metaphysics* XII the intelligible objects exist before they are thought, and Aristotle posited the intermediate force of desire. This proclivity to triadicity can express itself in the epistemological union of similars. Thus in his commentary on the *Timaeus*, Calcidius, while thinking that light from the eye meets light from an object in an act of vision, has to suppose a third element in which the two may come together : the light of the sun.⁸⁶ It is not surprising to discover the triadic positions of Numenius and ps.-Archytas arising in a neo-Pythagorean context, with its doctrine of the One and the infinite Dyad, the consciousness of the width of the distinction between the greatest opposites. But the implicit need to think triadically in order to bind opposites together goes back to Plato's teaching on the One and the Other in the Parmenides, and original Pythagoreanism wherein the conscious was

⁸³) *De Anima* II, 7 ff.

⁸⁴) *Ib.* II, 11 : '(the sense power) becomes an extreme to each of the extremes in turn...', it is 'actually neither but potentially both' (424 a 6-9). The sight is also concerned with visible and invisible (*ib.*).

⁸⁵) *Ib.* III, 6, 430 b 1-6 : '... for if a man calls white not-white, he has combined the notion not-white. It is equally possible to say that all these cases involve division... The principle which unifies is in every case mind. This proposition that mind allowed the most disparate to remain divided, yet united them together, was given the fullest exploitation by HEGEL as the basic conception of the dialectical process. His free translation of the passage substitutes 'everything' for 'in every case' ('... was jedes zu einem macht, ist der νοῦς 'Geschichte der Philosophie II, SW 18, p. 392). Stated thus it gives to an important conception of Hegel a support from Aristotle which is not warranted : 'Näher liegt diess darin, dass der νοῦς Alles ist; dass er an sich Totalität ist, das Wahre überhaupt...' (*ib.*, p. 391). The illegitimacy of this step will be discussed later.

⁸⁶) V. 'Timaeus, a Calcidio Translatum Commentarioque Instructum', ed. J. H. WASZINK, London and Leiden 1962, CCXLV, p. 256.

made up of the limited within the unlimited. The presence of this sense of deep diversity postulated some kind of unifier. Eclecticism would not allow any doubts in its desire for comprehensiveness and order : in those contexts which demanded it, it instinctively searched for triadicity in physics and in epistemology, as we shall have occasion to see.

Another theme of eclectic philosophy was the search for a way by which *νοῦς* might know the highest object which was possible for it. Here the contemplation of the Good as understood by Plato ⁸⁷ was relatable to Aristotle's teaching in the *Nicomachean Ethics* that contemplation was the highest and most divine activity.⁸⁸ And in the period when only the exoteric Aristotle was known his closeness to Plato in his teaching on the goal of philosophic contemplation had long been a locus for the unity of their teaching. *Metaphysics* XII gave a deeply reflected account of the nature of thought, unambiguously seen as present in the divine nature. *De Anima* III may have been ambiguous about the transcendent nature of thought as it described the creativity of the intellect in making its own objects. It did however propose that in thinking there was such a union between them that the intellect thereby became its object. And as Aristotle said that the *νοῦς* was divine, there was every persuasion to ignore the problematic that existed and to conclude that Aristotle thought it to be divine in itself. Given time for collective reflection and systematic development, not only did this lead to the commentators like Alexander of Aphrodisias deciding to interpret Aristotle's teaching without qualification in the sense of the mortality of the individual soul and the immortality of the unchangeable intelligence in itself, but to integrate it with the personal striving and living for ecstasy, acknowledged in diverse but relatable ways by Philo, Plutarch and the Hermetic literature. Stoic doctrine had extolled the state of immovability — *ἀπρόθεια*, and it could be improved on by supposing this state of fixity to be one of inward union with the divine. The world-soul in Plato's *Timaeus* ⁸⁹) could be given a similar place, related to *νοῦς* given an ambivalent one-in-manyness, and a place found in it for the *λόγοι σπερματικοὶ* of the Stoics as the principles

⁸⁷) E.g. *Republic* VI, 19. 508 E.

⁸⁸) *Op. cit.* X, 7.

⁸⁹) 41 D.

of development of the world of movement and change. These in outline are the principal elements brought together by Plotinus into the eclectic unity known as neo-Platonism.

Merlan's account of this development ⁹⁰⁾ contains a vast amount of information about the thinkers and a great amount about recent scholarly disagreements. But his method is wrongly conceived. In an attempt to simplify the story he proposed to demonstrate the joint Platonic-Aristotelian quality of neo-Platonism by trying to show that Aristotle was a neo-Platonist — 500 years ahead of his time.⁹¹⁾ He does this by demonstrating in great detail that a distinction of theoretical philosophy into theology, mathematics and physics and « an equation soul = mathematics » in Iamblichus and Proclus was originally to be found in Aristotle and attributed to Plato, and, in addition, that the neo-Platonist doctrine of not-being can be found in Aristotle. There is a presumption here typical of the kind of historical scholarship of which Merlan was so expert — that through the period of eclecticism there was no modification or development between Aristotle and the neo-Platonists : no hermeneutical twist ; a literary and literal inheritance in which the thought-content suffered no modification. That is not to say that the existence of this hermeneutical twist would have been apparent at the time. Historicism of a highly critical and sensitive kind alone would have been aware of this change. In point of fact Augustine found the philosophers whom he knew of too historically orientated : « Nor have these philosophers, who are better than others in their understanding of those sublime and eternal exemplars, gazed upon them ; otherwise they would not, like historians, be investigating whatever past events of this same kind that they could ».⁹²⁾ This historicism was not critical enough ; in its energetic ransacking of the past for the sake of the present it did not reflect on what it was making available again, and what it was changing in re-presenting. But historicism alone cannot prevent such a hermeneutical change from taking place. Not only is the effort of literal-historical research unlike the original creative process and thus produces a distinct genre of

⁹⁰⁾ 'From Platonism to Neoplatonism', 3rd ed., The Hague 1968.

⁹¹⁾ V. pp. 3, 230-1.

⁹²⁾ *De Trinitate* IV, 16, 21 : 'Nec isti philosophi caeteris meliores in illis summis aeternisque rationibus intellectu talia contemplati sunt : alioquin non eiusdem generis praeterita quae potuerunt historici inquirerent'.

writing, but the degree to which themes get reflected on and developed is proportional to their power, not to their place in the whole.

Having in mind the same end as this study — the reception by Augustine of classical Greek thought — M. Grabmann briefly summed up the change which took place between Plato and Plotinus, which must not be overlooked in treating the relationship between Aristotle and Plotinus. He took a minimalist view of the possibility of Augustine's having read even Latin translations of Plato.⁹³ « Augustine would only have learnt these neo-Platonist versions of Plato's teaching on ideas; he would not have seen the actual texts in which Plato developed his theory. So it is understandable that he was not aware of the difference between Plato's teaching on ideas and his own ».⁹⁴

The Characteristics of the hermeneutical transformation of Aristotelianism in Neo-Platonism

But our concern is principally with Aristotle. It will be as well to describe the features of the hermeneutical twist in so far as Plotinus, not by himself alone but as the product of an eclectic tradition of three centuries, had modified the Aristotelian elements which were incorporated into his thinking.

i) In Aristotle the teaching on contemplation was a part, even if it were the sublimest part, of the assemblage of wide-ranging topics which he treated. In Plotinus it is also the sublimest activity, but it is absolutely central and dominates everything else. For man it is the only worth-while activity. In *Metaphysics* XII the divine self-contemplative thought is distinct and self-contained; in *De Anima* III thought is ambiguously divine and timeless in itself but temporarily and individually embodied. Plotinus united these positions together in an unambiguous sense: a man must strive to unite his own thought into divine self-thinking and be absorbed into it. It is appropriate that he should seek for this union in ecstasy. Thus he should make himself conform with what is noblest in him. The divergence in nature

⁹³) A knowledge limited by COURCELLE to a part of the *Timaeus* translated by Cicero, « Les Lettres... », p. 159.

⁹⁴) 'Des heiligen Augustinus Quaestio de Ideis (de Diversis Questionibus LXXXIII, Qu. 46) in ihrer inhaltlichen Bedeutung und mittelaltlicher Weiterwirkung' in: *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben, Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik* II, Munich 1936, p. 29.

between thought in itself and human thinking was thus made the basis of a moral orientation which ignored, out of a desire for consistency, all other human concerns thought to be natural by Aristotle. And just as the providence of the God of Aristotle did not extend to the sublunary world, so, correspondingly, the contemplative gaze of Gods and men was to be fixed on the One, quite oblivious to lower concerns.⁹⁵⁾

ii) In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, as in the *Enneads*, the moral virtues are seen as a precondition for the activity of contemplation; but whilst for Aristotle the other virtues still remain important because of the human involvement in non-contemplative activity, with Plotinus their importance fades away in relationship to contemplation which in the only worth-while end for man.

iii) Thus, Plotinus unites the transcendent-immanent teaching on contemplation of the *Metaphysics* and the *De Anima* together with the teaching on the moral virtues derivable from the *Nicomachean Ethics* (but not representative of it). Contemplation — in fact all thought — remain immanent in so far as it is « within » but it is really a turning to something that is higher and transcendent : to νοῦς,, which in its changelessness and full knowledge, is the beauty of ψυχή, and is « ours when we use it ».

iv) As such it is a simplification and systematisation of Aristotle. The bringing together of the contemplation of the Good and other ideas from Plato, and the conception of the ideas as the thoughts of God (anticipated by Albinus)⁹⁶⁾ together with an extension of the Stoic virtue of ἀπαθεια, gave to the Aristotelian philosophy alongside this structuring a quality of immobility which derives from the search for unity and immobility in ecstasy. The original Aristotelian conception was of a philosophy of the variety of life. Plotinus may have expressed satisfactorily in their Aristotelian re-formulation the original Platonist values, but Aristotle was nearer to Plato than he in expressing the necessary variety of interests.

v) Plotinus gave the self-knowledge of νοῦς in Aristotle a striking development. The ability of νοῦς to know itself, the fact that in knowing its objects it would also be knowing itself, the characterisation of the divine as self-thinking thought : all these ideas are in Aristotle.

⁹⁵⁾ Cf. *Ennead* III, 2, 9.

⁹⁶⁾ Who did little more than juxtapose Aristotle's ideas of divine self-thinking and the absolute unity of νοῦς and νοητά.

But with him they are not rigorously thought out as the realities that necessarily both embrace and support everything else. Plotinus made Aristotle's epistemology into an all embracing cosmology. But $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ is intermediary between two other members of a triad of ultimate hypostases: the One; derived from Pythagoras and Plato, and $\psi\nu\chi\acute{\eta}$ derived from Plato. The One is usually said to be «above knowing» but is described in one passage as having self awareness of a kind.⁹⁷⁾ $\psi\nu\chi\acute{\eta}$ also is characterised by self-knowing. Whilst $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ never fails from knowing itself transcendently in the One, in its individual embodiments $\psi\nu\chi\acute{\eta}$ is capable of an independent and false self-knowledge: it should be knowing itself in its contemplation of $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$. Thus an interconnected self-knowing is at the centre of the Plotinian conception, and this self-knowing is clearly looked upon as the basic reality and the basis for any other reality. But quā self-knowing it approximates to Aristotle's intermittent self-knowing at the human level and detached self-knowing at a transcendent level even if a contextual change has made necessary a hermeneutical alteration of the original meanings.

vi) The material world, with its time and space, is generated from the imperfect, pluralising contemplation by $\psi\nu\chi\acute{\eta}$ of $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, which has some analogies with $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$'s purer pluralising contemplation — the production by $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ of its many-in-oneness — of the One. $\Psi\nu\chi\acute{\eta}$ in turn presides over the material world, the lowest grade of reality, beyond which is non-being. Attraction to the One is therefore the bond which holds everything together from a dispersion which from some points of view comes from an overflow of creative power, but more fundamentally from an increasing cosmic fault.

vii) The resultant system was more religious in character than Aristotle's. The appetite for inclusion made a place for the pagan deities, «for Philosophers should defend the Gods»,⁹⁸⁾ who were «generated» by the contemplation by $\psi\nu\chi\acute{\eta}$ of the One.⁹⁹⁾ There is an occasional enmythologisation — for example equating Zeus or Chronos with $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ ¹⁰⁰⁾ and Ouranos with the One.¹⁰¹⁾

⁹⁷⁾ *Ennead* V, 4, 2.

⁹⁸⁾ *Ennead* IV, 4, 30.

⁹⁹⁾ *Ib.* VI, 9, 9.

¹⁰⁰⁾ For Zeus as $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, *ib.* III, 5, 8 — following Philebus 30 D. For Chronos as $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, and Zeus as $\psi\nu\chi\acute{\eta}$, v. *ib.* V, 1, 4; V, 1, 7.

¹⁰¹⁾ *Ib.* V, 8, 13 — with Chronos as $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ and Zeus as $\psi\nu\chi\acute{\eta}$.

In all there was in Plotinus :

a) A consistent critique of Aristotle. This included a rejection of his conception of potential knowledge of any kind (all cognition was active, and the effect of the material world on *ψυχή* was seen in terms of a « shock »), as also of his conception of the soul as *ἐντελέχεια*. On the positive side there was the extension of his conception of self-thinking into the fundamental principle of all reality.

b) Through the drawing out of the contemplative element in Aristotle's thought by its association with authentic Platonism, the original Aristotelian element was knowingly or unknowingly transformed. Perhaps the same words remained in use, but in Aristotle they were in the context of a busy and universal investigation of every field of study; in Plotinus they were charged with religious meaning, their content to be deeply savoured in religious meditation.

Eclecticism had considered the original teachings comparable and relatable : had not Aristotle been a Platonist ? ¹⁰²) Was there not even in his own work the beginnings of this unification in so far as he had treated the same matters as Plato — and offered a critique of him operating on the same phenomena ? Were not Stoicism and Aristotelianism able to cross-fertilise each other from the beginning, particularly in their teaching on virtue ? A greater strength was found in eclectic combination, but also a changed content — agreed to by analysis and deliberate aggregation, not by compromise and indifference. In the effort of simplification we can see the work of the Greek commentators to set in order what particularly Aristotle had left in problematic disorder, as also the effort of Romanitas to express Greek philosophy to itself not only in its own language but also in its own spirit.¹⁰³)

¹⁰²) Cf. Augustine's later testimony to this enterprise : 'non defuerunt acutissimi et solertissimi viri, qui docerent disputationibus suis Aristotelem ac Platonem ita sibi concinere, ut imperitis minusque attentis dissentire videantur; multis quidem saeculis multisque contentionibus, sed tamen eliquata est, ut opinor, una verissimae philosophiae disciplina' (*Contra Academicos* III, 19, 42) (PL 32.956). For Porphyry's works, v. *supra*, p. 76, n. 18.

¹⁰³) Despite PONCELET's appreciation of the spiritualisation of the concepts of Greek philosophy as they passed into Latin (v. *supra*, p. 74), this was not necessarily always the case. Consider Varro's reduction to a syllogism of the purpose of contemplative philosophy. One feels that he has writing about something of which he had heard, not of something which he knew intimately himself. « Quando quidem nulla est hominis causa philosophandi nisi ut beatus sit; quod autem beatum facit est finis boni; nulla

The eclectic contemplative philosophies, with their triple ultimate beings, and their doctrines of salvation, were the background against which Christian Trinitarianism entered the classical world, which contributed in turn to evoke from neo-Platonism a new triadic, and anti-Christian response. That the second of these beings was a middle link between the higher, first principle and the world, and that there was a need for salvation — purification of some kind to reach the goal of beatitude — was a conception which disposed a man to understand the Christian teachings on Christ as the Logos, Wisdom, the mind-element of the Trinity, and also the reconciler of this world with the principle from which it came. Arianism was a premature attempt to bring the two conceptions together, but it meant — against the Christian Trinitarian conception — a hierarchical sub-ordinationism within the ultimate triad. Converts from neo-Platonism — like Marius Victorinus and Augustine himself — were exercised to show the logical coherence of Christian Trinitarianism in terms of the neo-Platonist thought — world. It is possible that Plotinus — the fellow student with Origen of Ammonius Saccas, himself a lapsed Christian, « the Socrates of neo-Platonism »¹⁰⁴) — had intended to construct a system with a code of behaviour which offered a substitute for Christianity, and through it an attack on it. This was the explicit intention of Porphyry, who had very likely been a Christian for a while himself.

Hermeneutically transformed Aristotelianism and Augustine

The hermeneutically developed Aristotelian conception of self-thinking alongside the Aristotelian-Platonist notions of beatitude and contemplation and the Platonist conception of gradations of reality — the results of the mutations by style of commentary and the spirit of Romanitas — were the objects to which Augustine applied his mind particularly when he wrote his *De Trinitate*. The reflections on this area of philosophy which lie scattered through his other works are concentrated in this work which cost him so much effort and took him so much time.

Particularly in its second part it needs to be read as a strong and deep, yet not unfriendly apologetic for the Christian conception of

est igitur causa philosophandi nisi finis boni » (fr. 4 as reconstructed by G. LANGENBERG, *op. cit.*).

¹⁰⁴) See article on Ammonias Saccas by E. R. DODDS in *Oxford Classical Dictionary*.

three hypostases, which were yet One *οὐσία*, not only against Arianist subordinationism (as which it is usually taken) but more against the neo-Platonist triad of three hypostases which had provided the intellectual framework for the heresy.¹⁰⁵) Even the place of scriptural quotations can be read as having in mind Porphyry, who had claimed that the Christian scriptures were a mass of contradictions : from them was deduced a philosophical system which showed up the inade-

¹⁰⁵) P. BROWN dates the *De Trinitate* as covering the years 399-419 (v. Augustine of Hippo, London 1967, Chronological Table C).

The hypothesis that Augustine changed his principle intention in the second part from an anti-Arian work to an anti-neo-Platonist apologetic after the arrival of Roman refugees in Africa in 410 is an obvious one. If the theory advanced here is correct it will mean jettisoning the view of I. CHEVALIER, that the sources of the second part are purely speculative on Augustine's part ('Le théologien fait ici œuvre d'intelligence proprement dite, de Sagesse' in : 'St. Augustin et la Pensée Grecque. Les Relations Trinitaires', *Collectanea Friburgensia*, Fasc. 33, N.S. 24, Fribourg 1940, pp. 85-6), and that his judgement on the doctrinal question, that Aristotelian influence (in the matter of relation) takes precedence over neo-Platonism (*ib.*, p. 168), could be placed in a far wider context. Without denying at all the inspiration of Augustine, this essay proposes that he had, in the neo-Platonist texts, a more concrete object on which to work than the writer supposes. In his 'La théorie augustinienne des relations Trinitaires; analyses explicatives des textes' (*ib.*, fasc. 2 and 3, Divus Thomas 1940), Chevalier goes not further than Book VII and supposes no further relationship with neo-Platonism.

O. DU ROY ('L'Intelligence de la Foi en la Trinité selon Saint Augustin, *Genèse de sa théologie trinitaire jusqu'en 391*', Paris 1966) can see the place of Plotinus and Porphyry in Augustine's earlier speculation but sees him always under the influence of neo-Platonist structures, particularly triadic-emanation ones. Though he sees that he would have corrected the philosophical influence of neo-Platonism in a personalist sense (p. 456), eliminating any sense of difference of level between the hypostases (p. 454), his analysis of the *De Trinitate* (pp. 437 ff.) presumes the presence in it of neo-Platonist structures. The possibility that an apologist should have to adopt some of the language of his adversaries does not occur to him, and so he can conclude that 'L'Intelligence d'Augustin n'est qu'à moitié évangélisée par la foi'. As we shall see, there are numerous neo-Platonist allusions throughout the second part of the *De Trinitate*, but the mode of their utilisation indicates the intervention of a very searching critique. It is impossible to agree with the same writer's description of the work out of which the *De Trinitate* grew as Augustine's 'jaillissement original et dans sa genèse tâtonnante, riche de bien plus de virtualités que n'en développera l'avenir'.

Augustine's genius here lay so much in the originality of what he wrote but rather in his grasp and masterly displacement of neo-Platonist and other ideas, in the convincing force of his eclectic solution, and in the interrelationship of this with the data of Scripture : eclectic-apologetic rather than original (*contra eiusdem auct.* 'L'expérience de k'amour et l'intelligence de la foi trinitaire selon saint Augustin', *Recherches Augustiniennes* II, 1962, p. 415 ff.; though his book goes some way to undo this impression).

quacies of neo-Platonism, even while it used its ideas. It needs to be seen as another example of the eclectic philosophical tradition of writing, working not only at the transcendent level but also analogously, at the level of the human mind. It makes a critical re-conciliation of diverse positions in which may be seen Plotinian, Porphyrian, Platonist, Stoic, neo-Pythagorean, and probably Aristotelian in the authentic sense. Hermeneutically and contextually it is an example of Romanitas : the seeking of a pithy and adequately solid summary statement in a balanced cadence : style felicitously and instinctively joined to thought, as rhythm to melody. Greek contemplative thought had inspired Roman thought and Romanised formulations of it — as the Protrepticus-inspired *Hortensius* — had inspired Augustine and continued to inspire him. If Augustine the *mere* rhetor is spoken of it is as well to remember the full background ; he did not think in terms of style alone. The philosophical culture of his classical background, with its religious transcendence, was through numerous intermediaries translated and transmuted into a vision relatable to Christianity without excessive difficulty. Augustine, the rhetor-doctor, embodied a great amount of Christian belief in terms of a Romanitas that after him was increasingly identified as « Catholica ». The anti-neo-Platonist apologetic of the *De Trinitate*, with its persuasively established relationships within the tradition of philosophical eclecticism, was so stylistically like the rest of his writings that generations of readers have overlooked not only the difference in its contents and orientation but also the immediate significance of the distinction he frequently made in the work between faith and knowledge, and his implication that parts, at least, were written for non-believers.¹⁰⁶)

II. STRUCTURES OF SUBJECTIVITY IN ARISTOTLE

Intellectual and Sense Knowledge

Contrary to what some writers have been content to point out, Aristotle's intention in giving an account of the process of knowing was not just to assert a parallelism between intellectual knowledge

¹⁰⁶) V. XV, 27, 48. He gives a long quotation from his tractate on St. John's gospel (*In Jn. XCIX*, 8-9) and adds : 'Haec de illo sermone in hunc librum transtuli, sed fidelibus, non infidelibus loquens'.

and the more evident sensation. It is true that he does give some parallels. For example he writes in *De Anima* II, 5¹⁾ « The sentient subject, as we have said, is potentially such as the object of sense is actually. Thus during the process of being acted upon it is unlike, but at the end of the process it has become like that object, and shares its quality » (*ὁμοίωται καὶ ἐστὶν οἷον ἐκεῖνο*). This account of sensation can be seen of the same form as the account of thinking at, for example, *De Anima* III, 4 : 2) « For in the case of things without matter that which thinks and that which is thought are the same » (*τὸ αὐτό*). The difference between *ὁμοίωται* and *τὸ αὐτό* is an assurance that the analogy between sense and intellectual knowledge, which occurs between these statements 3) is not a complete account : « as the sensitive is to the sensible, so must mind be to the thinkable ». That Aristotle should draw such analogies is not surprising, given his rehabilitation of the world of matter and sensation after Plato's disdain for it. In addition his language indicates his awareness of a cosmos internally ordered and inter-related.⁴⁾

Discontinuous with the physical world, yet understood from the imagination's phantasms of it, was the intellectual world of *νοῦς* and *νοητά*; but different texts can be found showing at one place that *νοητά* were said to be created by the power of mind, at another that they seem to be eternal and primary, as Plato's world of ideas.

Within the empiricism of Aristotle was a speculative content which emphasised the difference of the intellectual nature from the sensitive. An understanding of Aristotle is directly related to the degree of importance one accords to the speculative as contrasted with the empirical.⁵⁾ The empirical interpretation in the matter of

1) 418 a 3-6 (The Loeb translation is used for classical texts).

2) 430 a 4-5.

3) *De Anima* III, 4, 429 a 17-18.

4) Cf. F. NUYENS, 'L'Évolution de la Psychologie d'Aristote', Louvain 1948, p. 182, and E. BARBOTIN, 'La Théorie Aristotélicienne de l'Intellect d'après Théophraste', Louvain-Paris 1954, p. 104 (cf. p. 118-119) on Aristotle's use of physical terminology to describe mental phenomena. But note also J. M. LE BLOND, 'Aristote, I. Parties des Animaux', Paris 1945, p. 10-11 on the use of biological analyses in Logic, and a biological definition of 'nature' in Physics.

5) How unlike the general impression of Aristotle is to the speculative thinker, analysing the nature of thought and striving to relate it to other human experience, and failing, as we shall see, to give a final account of their connection. Aristotle, elegantly though incautiously, described by David KNOWLES as possessing 'the philosophy of

epistemology arises from a concentration of the attention on the likenesses between sensation and thinking to the disregard of their differences. Yet those differences are there and demand attention — though the situation is not as simple as the interpretation of Hamelin, that Aristotle (despite himself) found himself returning to the Platonism he rejected.⁶) There is no doubt that the activity of *νοῦς* is transcendently different from that of sensation, and the study of subjectivity cannot by-pass the problems posed in the divergence between them and take refuge in a conventional Aristotelianism.

For Aristotle the differences between thinking and sensation are evident even at an observable level. « ... it lies in man's power to use his mind whenever he chooses, but it is not in his power to experience sensation. »⁷) And « ... the sense loses sensation under the stimulus of a too violent sensible object; ... but when mind thinks the highly intelligible, it is not less able to think of slighter things, but even more able; for the faculty of sense is not apart from the body, whereas the mind is separable. »⁸)

Within the *De Anima* a coherent doctrine is developed within the conception of knowledge being a movement from potentiality into actuality, and (notwithstanding the difference between identity and likeness) both intellectual and sense knowledge are analysed in that way. In sense knowledge, external objects become the activating principle of sensations. As the subject in intellectual knowledge is also in potency with regard to its object, it is necessary to establish whence comes the activation.⁹) Yet though there may be difficulties

common sense' and producing 'dazzling glimpses of the obvious' found the answers to the speculative problems he put to his undoubted common sense far from obvious (v. auct. cit., 'The Evolution of Medieval Thought', London 1962, p. 15).

⁶) « When pressed, Peripateticism comes to be absorbed into Platonism... The system of Aristotle is a hardly concealed idealism », pp. 88 and 89 of 'La Théorie de l'Intellect d'après Aristote et ses commentateurs', Paris 1953.

⁷) *De Anima* II, 5, 417 b 24-25.

⁸) *Ib.* III, 4, 429 a 31 - b 5.

⁹) The interpretation of NUYENS must be set on one side, resting on an exaggerated concentration on the analogy between intellectual and sense knowledge, that « it is essential that knowledge develops under an influence coming from outside : it consists for (Aristotle) in a use of our *power* (*puissance*) of knowing, to which no limits are placed » (*op. cit.*, p. 283). But then, forgetting the complete union of *νοητά* in *νοῦς* according to the *De Anima*, he holds the curious view that according to Aristotle '*νοητά*... universal concepts or essences... do not exist by (en) themselves, but *only* as substantial forms united to matter' (*ib.*, p. 296).

in explaining this and differences between the teaching of *De Anima* and *Metaphysics* XII, there is no doubt that Aristotle's teaching about the final state of activated intellectual knowledge is that mind and object are identified.¹⁰)

The specifically different character of intellectual knowledge, that one can exercise it when one wills, refers to knowledge already gained. The real problem, not only of interpretation of Aristotle but also the problem to which he brought no definitive explanation or solution, was how we first come by an intellectual object. And frankly we shall have to conclude that the best solution to the problem of interpretation is to accept an incompatibility between the view of the *De Anima* which makes intelligible realities the creation of νοῦς, and does not designate a place for will or desire in this creation nor have them exert an attractive force over νοῦς before νοῦς makes them, and the view of *Metaphysics* XII, 7 and 9 which makes intelligible realities initially attract νοῦς, thus putting the coming by intellectual knowledge from its beginning into a context of desire and will. Even though the account in *Metaphysics* is more designed to answer the ontological questions «what is thought?», «how does it fit into the cosmos?» and to find, in consequence, the presence of value in the goodness of its objects, than its more limited subjective account of the *De Anima*, the difference of intention will not completely explain the difference. For by making the potentiality of νοῦς actualisable by already existing νοητά rather than by νοητά created for it by itself, the *Metaphysics* account cannot be completely interrelated with the *De Anima* account, nor the place of desire and will which it raises be inserted into it.

There is no doubt that will does play an important rôle in the different accounts of knowing which Aristotle gives. And even in sensation (in man as in animals) the process is not purely passive; desire — whose human counterpart is will — comes into it. Perhaps the distinction between the primacy of the intellect and the primacy of the will — a mind or a will metaphysic — rests in a finer and more elusive distinction than is usually supposed.

¹⁰) As BARBOTIN writes (*op. cit.*, p. 99, n. 2), bringing together *De Anima* I, 3, 407 a 7-8 ἡ δὲ νόησις τὰ νοήματα and *Metaphysics* XII, 9, 1074 b 38 - 1075 a 5, noting particularly οὐχ ἑτέρου οὐν ὄντος τοῦ νοουμένου καὶ νοῦ, ὅσα μὴ ὕλην ἔχει : 'unlike the senses, the intellect is completely identified with its object, for in this case it is a question of forms without matter'.

Certainly the view of *Metaphysics* XII brings mind and will together at the final end of knowing and willing.¹¹⁾ A pure will will ultimately coincide with knowledge, because the ultimate desirable object is the ultimate intelligible.¹²⁾ In his conception of *ὄρεξις*, Aristotle took over the Plato's notion of *ἐπιθυμία*, but with him it is not isolated in the sensitive faculties (which prevented Plato from having a place for will, and therefore having to make virtue equal knowledge). *ὄρεξις* still is attracted to the apparent good, but in its intellectual extension it becomes rational desire : *βούλησις*, which is superior to simple *ὄρεξις*; and its object — *τό ὄρεκτόν* is the real and not seeming good : *τό ὄν καλόν*¹³⁾. It is through the interdependence of the faculties in the body-soul unity which he wished to maintain that Aristotle can give a place for will in intellection; and for the same reason of continuity he can (in the *De Anima*) give to the sense powers themselves a kind of judgement over their proper objects,¹⁴⁾ and suppose the existence of a power for the coordination of diverse sense experiences.

Here one must notice in the *De Anima* III the existence of a theme not in keeping with the rest, of which it remains an open question whether we have the bringing together of chronologically diverse reflections, an indecisiveness on the part of Aristotle himself or manuscript modifications made with the presumptions of a later heremeneutic. It lies around the question of the systematic centralisation of experiences. In chapter I the power of co-ordination of diverse sensations is attributed to their working together. « The senses perceive each other's proper objects incidentally, not in their own identity, but acting together as one, (*ἡ μία*) when sensations occur simul-

¹¹⁾ *Metaphysics* XII, 7, 1072 a 26-27. 'The object of desire and the object of thought move without being moved. The primary objects of desire and thought are the same.'

¹²⁾ Cf. J. TRICOT's commentary ('Aristote, la Métaphysique', new edition, Paris 1964, II, p. 676, n. 2) : 'the immaterial substance is at the same time *πρώτον νοητόν* and *πρώτον ὄρεκτόν*'. This is no doubt the origin of the position of PLOTINUS that 'if the will attains this object it becomes thought' (*Ennead* VI, 8, 6, following BRÉHIER translation).

¹³⁾ Based on *Metaphysics* XII, 7, 1072 a 27-28. In the *De Anima*, Aristotle is unwilling to divide *ὄρεξις* into different parts, and so *βούλησις* is desire in the calculative part (*το λογιστικόν*) : III, 9, 432 b 6-7.

¹⁴⁾ *De Anima* III, 2, 426 b 8-12.

taneously in the case of the same object».¹⁶⁾ In chapter II, on the grounds of avoiding an infinite regress he located self awareness in each sense power : « if there is a separate sense power perceiving sight, either the process will go on *ad infinitum* or a sense must perceive itself. »¹⁷⁾ However, scattered throughout this chapter are a number of references to a principal of unity, which conflicts with the quasi-autonomy given to sense powers. Whereas chapter I will only give the co-ordinating functions to the senses acting together, chapter II will say « That which asserts the differences must be one; for sweet differs from white. It is the same faculty then that assists this; hence as it asserts *so it thinks and perceives*. Evidently, therefore it is impossible to pass judgement on separate objects by separate faculties; and it is also obvious from the following considerations that they are not judged at separate times. »¹⁸⁾ And the faculty which makes the judgement is both divided and undivided at the same time¹⁹⁾ « ... as a point is ... both one and two » (i.e. capable of being used in a place of reference more than once) « in this sense divisible, so too in so far as the judging faculty is indivisible, it is one and simultaneous in action, but in so far as it is divisible, it uses the same symbol twice at the same time ».²⁰⁾ (The significance of simultaneity here will be taken up when the *Parva Naturalia* structures are examined.²¹⁾ The interpretation of « so it *thinks* and *perceives* », taken at its fullest meaning, would give to *νοῦς* a co-ordinating function which the transcendent structure of chapters 4 and 5 would deny. The manuscript position is that two texts read *φρονεῖ* for *νοεῖ*²²⁾, and *φρονεῖ* less precisely involves the activity of mind. But if *νοεῖ* were the correct reading it could be as in chapter 4 the cursive dianoetic activity of embodied *νοῦς*²³⁾. Yet even if in this way the difficulty over the fact

¹⁶⁾ *Ib.* 425 a 30 - b 1.

¹⁷⁾ *Ib.* 425 b 15-16.

¹⁸⁾ *Ib.* 426 b 20-24.

¹⁹⁾ *Ib.* 426 b 29, 427 a 2.

²⁰⁾ 427 a 9-12.

²¹⁾ Cf. *infra*, p. 125 ff. especially note 73.

²²⁾ D. Ross, 'Aristotle's *de Anima*', Oxford 1961, note to 426 b 22 amplifying the Bekker tally of Mss.

²³⁾ V. *De Anima* III, 4, 429 a 23 : 'by mind I mean that part by which the soul thinks and forms judgements'.

A later passage, in *De Anima* III, 7, also belongs to this aberrant structure, « now in the thinking soul (*τῇ δὲ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ*) images take the place of direct per-

of intellectual activity were resolved, there remains a further problem that the previous position that the senses need no special co-ordinating power does not coincide with what comes here. That there is a co-ordinating power is, as we shall presently see, the characteristic of the subjectivity structures of the *Parva Naturalia* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*; in the *De Anima* it is an aberrant structure,²⁴) and which of the three explanations given above would be correct cannot be said. If it were not in fact an innocent revision by later systematisers, the presence of this idea would have been interpreted by them according to their own preconceptions without the consciousness of the problematic that characterised Aristotle himself.

One side of the problematic was Aristotle's insistence on the transcendent nature of thought; the other side was the bringing together of thinking with other living processes, and in consequence his speculation about a co-ordinating power of sense and mind was the place where his difficulty most appeared. R. Mondolfo has explained the reasons which lay behind this other side of his problematic : « this faculty of distinction located in the sense powers, constitutes for Aristotle the motive and the means of passing over the division which Plato introduced among the spiritual activities when he distributed them between the different and separate parts of the soul. Thus Aristotle comes to affirm the continuity or reciprocal compenetration of the faculties necessary to the unity of the subject. »²⁵) Aristotle's psychology should be seen as an investigation which proceeds not from the philosopher's study alone, but from the anatomical-biologist's work-room. It is related, as well to the study of *νοῦς*, to Aristotle's

ceptions; and when it asserts or denies that they are good or bad, it avoids or pursues them. Hence the soul never thinks without a mental image. The process is just like that in which air affects the eye in a particular way, and the eye again affects something else; and similarly with hearing. The last thing to be affected is a single entity and a single mean, although it has more than one aspect (τό δὲ ἔσχατον ἓν, καὶ μὴ μεσότης τὸ δ' εἶναι αὐτῇ πλείω.) (431 a 14-20). Here the dianoetic activity is specified as non-transcendent. The principle at the end is not tied to the dianoetic or to sense activity. Its generality would lend it to system-building, but with its original context in Aristotle its application to pure noetic as by Porphyry, would be questionable.

²⁴) Editors of the text seem unaware of the problem. As the structure suggested in *De Anima* III, 2, 4 and 7 is an aberrant one, the transcendent one will be designated as that of *De Anima* III, 4 and 5'.

²⁵) 'L'Unité du sujet dans la gnoséologie d'Aristote', *Revue Philosophique (de la France et de l'Étranger)* 143, 1953, pp. 364-5.

interest in the way in which sensations are transmitted — whether by the blood or not — to and from the heart (which was for him the abode of the nutritive and sensitive soul). His proposal of a body-soul unity set up a problem which led to the discovery of nerves.²⁶⁾ The account of the search for a centre of unity in the personality which was also a centre of consciousness and self-consciousness will turn out to be a principle theme in this essay. Once Aristotle had proposed the existence of a co-ordinating sense, the way opened for an analogous treatment of mind without reference to the bodily aide of human nature. Except for Hegel ²⁷⁾, none of the writers covered by this essay gave a place to the body comparable to that given by Aristotle : they felt themselves absolved from probing as deeply as he the question of its relationship to mind.

a) *How thinking comes about.*

Sensation cannot be ignored, but the principle concern in the study of subjectivity is with thinking. Besides the *loci classici* for Aristotle's accounts of thinking (*De Anima* III, 4 and 5; *Metaphysics* XII, 7 and 9-10) there are shorter but significant passages elsewhere. The account in the *De Anima* is not meant in the first place to give a complete account of every aspect of thinking together. *De Anima* III poses a single dilemma ²⁸⁾ in two ways, and it is in terms of it that the account is given : firstly, if, as Anaxagoras said, the mind needs to dominate in order to know, how can there be a continuity between subject and object such that they may enter into unity with each other and thus the object be known ; secondly, if, when an intelligible object is known the interaction of subject and object demands their being like, how does mind's special property operate. The second expression of the dilemma carries with it a suggestion that if community of nature is necessary, mind will belong to the object in some way, perhaps by being mixed with it. Expressed simply, the question behind both forms of the dilemma is whether in thinking subject and object are like or unlike.

Perhaps we can see here an allusion to a passage in Plato's *Sophist*. Not only would we find a relation of likeness between subject and

²⁶⁾ V. F. SOLMSEN, 'Greek Philosophy and the Discovery of the Nerves', *Museum Helveticum* 18, 1961, pp. 150-197.

²⁷⁾ Principally in the second part of his *Encyclopedia*.

²⁸⁾ Ch. 4, 429 a 13 ff.

object if intelligible objects themselves « had mind and lived and thought »²⁹); the stranger's assertion that « to know is active, to be known must in turn be passive »³⁰) would imply that subject and object were of the same kind. In the *De Anima* Aristotle's critique of the dilemma, and through it of the position of Plato, is to agree that with intelligible objects and mind there is indeed a likeness of nature. But there is no passivity of object to subject : the mind makes its intelligible object by its own power and then is passive to it, uniting it to itself completely.

The critique of Plato in these chapters of *De Anima* goes wider and deeper still in the same direction. Aristotle sees thinking not as a reminiscence of pre-existing intelligible forms but a creative and active self-extension of mind. The process is described as the realising of a capacity instead of the reminiscence of what has always been known. True, he is, like Plato, more interested in the knowledge of a man who draws on what he already knows (though not through anamnesis), as it is through what a man already knows that thinking reaches its full significance in organised, related scientific knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) rather than in the acquiring of isolated elements of information. The conception that thinking is an activity demands that knowing be potential to an object. And this is true of different degrees of knowing : before something is learnt — like a sheet of paper ready to receive some writing ; when something is learnt, identifying thinker and *νοητόν* for the first time³¹); and when from his habit-like possession of knowledge he recalls it and uses it.

But if mind is characterised by the active production of intelligible objects and their absorption to the degree of identification is it able to know itself? For Plato the quest for self knowledge had spread itself through the limitless possibilities of inner and outer experience ; knowledge of the nature of the soul might require knowledge of the nature of the whole man³²), but it seemed possible to

²⁹) *Sophist* 248 E - 249 A.

³⁰) *Ib.* 248 D-E. 'Passive' translates *πάσχειν*.

³¹) Though 'That which produces development from potential to actual in the matter of understanding and thought ought not to be called teaching, but needs some other name' (*De Anima* II, V, 410 b 10-12). Perhaps this is because more than receptivity is involved : by his creative reception of knowledge from someone who actually knows, the learner is developing himself.

³²) *Phaedrus* 270 C.

arrive at. Aristotle turned against this conception of self-knowledge. Perhaps not without a reminiscence of the *Phaedo*, where the soul is described as « most like the divine and immortal and intellectual and uniform and indissoluble and ever unchanging »³³), he took a significantly different orientation from which so much future thinking was to derive, regardless of the difficulties, not always grasped by his followers, in which he found himself by regarding *νοῦς* as a single changeless essence. His difficulty arose from the fact that in human thinking *νοῦς* would have to be involved in mutability, and in numerous embodiments. Quite apart from the fact that *νοῦς* had lost the familiar self-evidence which it had for Plato the creativity of its active side made it a more difficult object to know in itself.

In the course of treating the dilemma of whether intellectual knowledge is through likeness or unlikeness he twice refers to the possibility of *νοῦς* knowing itself. The first of these passages³⁴) that « when mind has become the several groups of its objects... the mind is then capable of thinking itself », is a notorious aporia³⁵). The second is less difficult to understand : *νοῦς* can think itself as an object without thinking up any *νοητόν* : its immateriality and openness to itself allows this direct knowledge.³⁶) But this self-knowledge is only one case of intellectual knowledge, and the two allusions are no more than asides : for Aristotle's followers they proved tantalisingly difficult to interpret; for eclectic and neo-Platonist thinkers of the future, very pregnant suggestions.

Aristotle's resolution of the dilemma is in two parts. Firstly that there must be in intellectual knowing a continuity and identity between thinker and object of thought, which alone makes thinking of an object possible. So *νοῦς*, in knowing its proper objects, transcends the distinguishability of itself from its object. It does this by itself making the intelligibility, creating the *νοητόν*. This intelligibility, this *νοητόν*, is then « received » by a passive part of mind which then becomes the object through the unification which is made possible by their likeness; and so « speculative knowledge is the same as its

³³) *Phaedo* 80 B : Professor ARMSTRONG has translated *ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως* as 'always in the same relation to itself' ('Studies in Traditional Anthropology I Plato', *Downside Review* 201, Vol. 65, July 1947, p. 238).

³⁴) 429 b 5-10.

³⁵) Cf. BARBOTIN, *op. cit.*, p. 142 ff.

³⁶) 430 a 2-4.

object». ³⁷⁾ Secondly, in this process the dominating power of mind is also preserved : without the process of creating the νοητόν, the subsequent identification would not be possible. The dilemma is given a solution — though further dilemmas are created.

The key passage is in chapter V. Here the process of knowing is described in the languages of physics and craftsmanship. The receptivity of mind is likened to the potentiality of matter to receive form, under the influence of a cause. In this case the creativity of the agent intellect is the cause (τὸ αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικόν), which is also described as an art (τέχνη) ³⁸⁾. Here the account produced the problem which harassed future commentators, not less than Aristotle himself. He wished to develop his insight that νοῦς created its intelligible objects. That and the use of physical analogy would mean that unless mind and knowledge were identical and self-causing, there would have to be a division in νοῦς itself. νοῦς then would be imperfectly united with the rest of the human personality. He goes on to opt for this separate existence ³⁹⁾, and thereby creates a division in the personality.

Following the precedent of Plato, but with a much more scientific precision, he makes another physical analogy in terms of a composite image drawn from light. ⁴⁰⁾ Careful physicist as he was Aristotle knew that light did not reveal objects in their true colours, but was really the condition of their being any colours in the object : no light, no colour. So with the power of mind : no intellectual creativity, no intelligibility. Whatever things are in themselves, they *become intelligible* and graspable only by a thinker. And as the colour lasts only as long as the light, so the intelligibility only whilst the activity of the mind is given to the objects (or to a remembered phantasm of them). The mind has to make its object first in order to become it; there is no question here about how the intelligible object begins the process of thinking. No sense-experience is said to prompt the creativity of νοῦς.

We turn to the teaching of *Metaphysics* XII and particularly

³⁷⁾ 430 a 4-5.

³⁸⁾ 430 a 12.

³⁹⁾ « When isolated it is its true self and nothing more, and this alone is immortal and everlasting », 430 a 22-23.

⁴⁰⁾ « Mind... is a kind of positive state like light; for in a sense light makes potential into actual colours », 430 a 15-17.

chapter 9. It should be noted that the well known early dating of this work by W. Jaeger⁴¹⁾ is no longer uncritically accepted; it is even dated as late and contemporary with the *De Anima*.⁴²⁾

Some of the teaching of this book is parallel to that of the *De Anima*. In chapter 7 there is the same conception of the union of thinker and object in a passage which includes a section on self-thinking relatable to the first allusion of *De Anima* 4 : « And thought thinks on itself through participation in the object of thought; for it becomes an object of thought by the act of apprehension and thinking, so that thought and the object of thought are the same »⁴³⁾. It goes on, in different language, to make the same distinction of *De Anima* III, 5 between *νοῦς* as actualising and as potential : « that which is receptive of the objects of thought, i.e. essence, is thought (*νοῦς*). And it actually functions (*ἐνεργεῖ*) when it possesses this object. Hence it is actuality rather than potentiality that is held to be the divine possession of rational thought »⁴⁴⁾.

But *Metaphysics* sees the activity of thinking set in the context of a cosmos in which everything is moved by a desire for an eternal,

41) In 'Aristoteles, Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung', Berlin 1923, translated as 'Aristotle, Fundamentals of the History of his Development' by R. ROBINSON (Oxford 1948), pp. 220 ff. and 342 ff. (chapter XIV).

42) Chronological considerations would no doubt assist the unravelment of textual differences. On the scholarly investigation of chronology the most recent accounts are two by R. A. GAUTHIER.

i) Chapter I of volume I of 'L'Éthique à Nicomaque, Introduction, Traduction et Commentaire' by E. A. GAUTHIER and J. Y. JOLIF, Aristote : Traductions et Études, Louvain and Paris, 2nd edition 1970. Note 90 (pp. 36-7) gives the position on the dating of the *Metaphysics*, and p. 37 gives a special bibliography on the dating of Book XII 'the nerve point of the chronology of the *Metaphysics*'.

This is in some respects surpassed by

ii) the first chapter of the brief 'La Morale d'Aristote' (Paris 1973).

It would be a mistake to think that all of the discrepancies in Aristotle can be reduced to chronological considerations. Even if the texts are completely authentic there remains the possibility of a later modification of an earlier text.

I. DÜRING cautiously remarks that he is no longer certain that a chronology can be worked out for the psychological writings : 'The deeper the psychological writings are gone into, the more clearly can traces of working over (*Überarbeitung*) be seen'. ('Aristoteles, Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens', Heidelberg 1965, p. 561). However he commits himself to the view that the *De Anima* in its present version is 'the latest and most mature'.

43) XII, 7, 1072 b 20-21.

44) *Ib.* 1072 b 21-24.

first unmoved mover, and thought and human desire are no less subject to that condition. « The object of desire and the object of thought (τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητόν) move without being moved... thought (νοῦς) is moved by the intelligible (ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ) » ⁴⁵). The *De Anima* account was not interested in the arousal of thinking by desire or any application of a power of willing — except perhaps when a knowledgeable man chose to use the knowledge he already had. It is possible to read an aspect of willing into the conception of mind as dominant, but it would be sufficient to see this dominance as being an aspect of mind's transcendence.

The more ontological account of *Metaphysics* does not coincide with the subjective account of *De Anima* in the area where they overlap : the inner motivation of thinking. The *De Anima* leaves the impression that thinking was a dynamic spontaneously creative process which creates the object of thought, like itself and thereby absorbable. *Metaphysics* makes it appear that the object of the mind is already made for it, and that it moves towards the intelligible object under its desire. Commentators are therefore faced with a task of locating the desirability of the νοητόν within the *De Anima* analysis. A text in *De Anima* I which attributes the power of thought in itself to a separable and more divine mind, and « thinking, loving and hating » to the « individual which possesses the mind » does not help us, because the activity of love (φιλεῖν) does not belong to the divine, creative mind. ⁴⁶) Perhaps — though it is not explicitly said — the supra-temporal and divine transcendence of νοῦς is such that it can timelessly call the νοητά into being and yet, being also immanent in man subject to time, allow it to appear that the νοητόν attracts the νοῦς. But if we take the texts in the way in which they stand now the later dating of *Metaphysics* XII actually highlights the inconsistency.

b) *The relationship of thinking to willing.*

We see then that the question of the priority of intellect or will arises in Aristotle himself : in different works, but in the same epistemological question and in writings which modern research has supposed to be quite contemporary. But this should not be regarded as historically the first emergence of a will metaphysic. Nor is it appropriate to the age or the spirit of Aristotle to press for a complete

⁴⁵) *Ib.* 1072 a 26-27, 30.

⁴⁶) 408 b 18-30.

schematic and systematic reconciliation of the phenomena of thinking and desire. There is a much discrepancy in the two accounts as there is between the place of thinking and the more transcendent aspects of *ἐρως* in Plato : indeed the similarity is very striking. The phenomenon of will was well-known even before the time of Plato and Aristotle. Mondolfo has written on the place of the will in ancient philosophy.⁴⁷⁾ He relates the *ὀρεξις* in Aristotle to *ἐρως* in Plato ; and he finds the element of will in the presence of judging, and (a common place of Greek thought known to go back to Xenophanes) the need of a will to overcome difficulties in order to come by knowledge. Hamelin has also examined the place of the will in Aristotle in whose moral teaching he points out that to live virtuously means having a will to keep the mean.⁴⁸⁾ And he suggests that there is a radical difference with Aristotle from the position of Socrates (and Plato) that virtue was knowledge alone.⁴⁹⁾

Commentators today who try to reconcile the *De Anima* III account with the *Metaphysics* XII account are the successors of the early commentators who found the same problem. Theophrastus, Aristotle's successor, wrote that « to submit the act of *νοῦς* to a different mover is absurd (*ἄτοπον*)... unless the mover is another *νοῦς* »⁵⁰⁾, and he aligns himself with the position of the *De Anima* : « it is in the soul (*ψυχῇ*) (that these movements have) their source (*ἀρχή*), their activity and their end »⁵¹⁾. From this it appears that the difficulty of reconciling the positions was seen from the earliest times, and the tone of the first quotation suggests that Theophrastus had assumed the mantle of Aristotelian orthodoxy against Platonist deviationism. Hamelin quotes Themistius as making the will prior to the intellect in the sense that, as Aristotle himself said, thought accompanies willing.⁵²⁾

⁴⁷⁾ In the second chapter of his 'La Comprensione di Soggetto Umano nell'Antichità Classica', Florence 1958 : 'The Will as a Condition of Consciousness and the Actual Conception of the Cognitive Processes'. It is abundantly clear from this book that it is quite out of the question that a will metaphysic begins with Augustine, as is sometimes supposed.

⁴⁸⁾ 'La Morale d'Aristote', *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* 30 (1923), p.499.

⁴⁹⁾ *Ib.*, p. 503. His proposal that will is necessary so that *νοῦς παθητικός* can conform to the pure thought of the *νοῦς ποιητικός* (*ib.*) is very questionable.

⁵⁰⁾ Fragment VI in BARBOTIN, *op. cit.*, p. 258. 'Absurde' is Barbotin's translation.

⁵¹⁾ Fragment XIII, *ib.*, p. 272.

⁵²⁾ 'La Théorie de l'Intellect d'après Aristote et ses Commentateurs', Paris 1953, p. 41.

What lies behind the divergences of these two texts is more than the relative priority of *voûs* or will in coming by intellectual knowledge for the first time. Later systematisers were concerned with this question of course but with wider ones : how would will and knowledge be interrelated together in any human action ? Would this take place consecutively, or would they interpenetrate ? Aristotle gave attention to these matters but he did not draw the lines with the sharpness which eclectics, neo-Platonists and even Augustine and later Christian writers thought necessary. For the boundaries they drew with firm, though not necessarily rough, hands had little in common with those tentative but penetrating perceptions of the elusive interplay of mind and will in deliberation and choice in *Nicomachean Ethics* III, 2 and 3. Neo-Platonists derived their teaching on the relations of will and *voûs* rather from the hypothesis that ultimately they would coincide than from what they found as the supposedly illusory world of sense experiences. Augustine found it necessary to bind together coincidentally *intellectus* and *amor* or *voluntas* in the substance of the human *mens*, which neo-Platonism had bound together only in transcendent *voûs*. This was not only stylistically far from the view of Aristotle with his awareness of the problematic of their distinctness. But so great was his esteem for the sheer creative power of *voûs*, that it is difficult to be certain that it was against his spirit to pursue to the limit his insights on its nature and activity and its irradiation over everything else.

The Divisions used by Aristotle and their significance

It is impossible to describe the invisible *voûs* in words which are not primarily designed for material objects. The advantage of meaningful communication must override the disadvantage of limited application. Aristotle's position has been well expressed by Barbotin : ⁵³)

« At the bottom of all of these discussions the same fundamental difficulty is found : how to express with the help of terms borrowed from physics — passion, alteration, movement — realities of a quite different order : that of thought. Already the notions of natural science are so elaborate that they have to be severely corrected to be able to be transposed and correspond to the demands of their new objects. Of course, some such necessity

⁵³) *Op. cit.*, p. 104.

exists for whoever takes up the problem of knowledge : unless concepts are employed which belong to common experience, it is impossible to begin the metaphysics of mind (*esprit*). Aristotle's method reveals in a striking way the continuity of the real and at the same time the very strong feeling for the difference of thinking. »

The break in style with Plato in its description of the soul could not be more striking. The use of terminology from Physics, and the rejection of the resources of myth was meant to shock the readers both by the unusualness of the notions and the pureness of the resulting conceptions. Later neo-Platonists took the point of the spiritualisation of these conceptions rather than their materialisation. The choice of a new way was in every sense deliberate.

Nuyens and Mondolfo have both examined the critique of Plato implicit in this choice and offered differing judgements on its success. So Nuyens writes :

« It has been seen that (Aristotle) had adopted on his own account the Platonic theory of the parts of the soul... In the passage which concerns us he tries to combine this theory with the new conception of the soul-entelechy, even in the case of man ». ⁵⁴⁾

But to Nuyens it was impossible to have the whole soul as *ἐντελέχεια* and *νοῦς* with a transcendent function.

« If the soul is in its entirety substantial form, even in man, what then is *νοῦς*? This question arises in many places in the *De Anima*. Related to the origin of man, it brings Aristotle to a dilemma without any way out. » ⁵⁵⁾

Mondolfo sees the problem in a more sanguine way. The categories to which Aristotle turned enabled him to solve problems which Plato could not solve :

« The critique of the tri-partite division of the soul made by Plato led Aristotle to substitute the concept of faculty for that of part, that is to say, to relate it to a unitary idea of the soul, by interpreting its different activities as degrees of a progressive development ». ⁵⁶⁾

⁵⁴⁾ *Op. cit.*, p. 214.

⁵⁵⁾ *Op. cit.*, p. 236.

⁵⁶⁾ 'L'Unité...', p. 359.

A faculty of judging, found in the more empirical structure ⁵⁷⁾, is a «rudimentary form of the mediation between sense and intelligence which provides a means of surmounting the difficulties which arose in Plato's psychology, whose rigid divisions did not explain how the soul could apply to sensations the categories of existence, identity, distinction». ⁵⁸⁾

Mondolfo proposed to relate the sense-power involved in judgement with the interior sense of Augustine. ⁵⁹⁾ As we shall see, Aristotle's account of this sense, subsequently known as the «common sense», provided Porphyry in particular with a model for an integrated subjectivity structure at the level of the highest hypostases. ⁶⁰⁾

Some of the problems which go with these divisions have already been pointed out: in *De Anima* III, 5, the receptivity of νοῦς is made analogous with matter, and its certainty compared with a technique. The Platonic notion of ἔργος has been transferred into the more sense-based ὁρεξις.

Yet the distinction within νοῦς between what makes and is impassive and eternal, and what becomes its object and is mortal, does not stay as a purely formal division. As in the material world an efficient cause is distinct from that on which it operates, it is hardened into a division which is perplexing; not how the two can yet be one, but how the one νοῦς can yet be two. We have here the age-old problem of the transcendence or immanence of νοῦς; and to anticipate, it is both. ⁶¹⁾

⁵⁷⁾ I.e. the aberrant structure of *De Anima* III discussed above, p. 108 ff. and the *Parva Naturalia* structures below, p. 125 ff.

⁵⁸⁾ 'L'Unité...', p. 365.

⁵⁹⁾ These relationships are discussed later.

⁶⁰⁾ Porphyry explicitly models his noetic on the common sense. *Commentary on the Parmenides* fr. XIII, 23 ff. V. P. HADOT, *Porphyre et Victorinus* II, Paris 1968, pp. 108 and 109.

⁶¹⁾ It should be possible to distinguish between νοῦς in its human embodiments which needs to make all things, and νοῦς in its separate existence where the need to create νοητά presumably does not exist. But the content of the separate divine νοῦς is not clear: even in the *Metaphysics* XII account there is room for a divergence of views. The νοητά already exist and attract the desire of embodied νοῦς. Whilst the ultimate principle — νόησις νοήσεως νόησις (1074 b 34-35) — is normally taken as a divine thinking, intent on nothing but itself, the identification of νοητά with νοῦς (ἡ νόησις τῷ νοουμένῳ μία: 1075 a 4-5) could allow the complete incorporation of all intelligibles into the divine, which Albinus made. (Though it should be noted that PLOTINUS later made this incorporation as a critique of νοῦς's self-thinking. Cf. *Ennead*

The divisions of Aristotle serve his opposition to Plato's epistemology of reminiscence-innateness; he insists on the fact of learning anew and on the creativity of intelligence. The problems which have been discussed so far are principally concerned with the question « how is *νοῦς* prompted to produce from sense experience the means of knowing things in their intelligible universality? » While both of Aristotle's theories concur in the fact that *νοῦς* and *νοητόν* are identical in act, the Plato-like perspective of *Metaphysics* gives a place to will through the place of the desire, while *νοῦς* in *De Anima* seems to move under its own creative spontaneity. Both fall in with the view that knowledge is to be created, not to be found in the soul, innate and ready made. But the distinctions between *νοῦς* and *ψυχή*, between *νοῦς* that makes all things and *νοῦς* that becomes all things, even between *νοῦς* immanent and *νοῦς* transcendent, are only impressionistically transcended in the interest of maintaining the unity of the human personality. So we are left with divisions and unity : not out of the desire to propose a paradoxical unity in diversity, but because of the insolubility of the questions posed.

a) *Subjectivity. How the mind knows itself?*

It is now necessary to look more closely at the two ways described in *De Anima* III, 4 ⁶²) in which mind may know itself.

The first refers to the possibility of self-thinking in the context of becoming learned : « But when the mind has become the several groups of its objects... the mind is then capable of knowing itself. » ⁶³)

There is no reference here to the preceding scattered sentences to what has been described as an aberrant structure ⁶⁴) : it refers

V, 1, 9 where he proposed that Aristotle ought to have extended the noetic cosmos to embrace the lower movers and indeed everything; also *ib.* 5, 2 : the *νοητά* must not be sought for outside *νοῦς*.) The content of the divine *νοῦς* in *De Anima* III is less easy to discern. As making all intelligibles, how would it not know them? Yet, « when isolated it is its true self and nothing more », without memory (430 a 22-24). PLOTINUS's conception that in contemplating the One and itself, *νοῦς* produced the *νοητά* by a kind of overflowing is a formula of reconciliation of self-thinking with the creation of intelligibles, yet the timeless union of *νοῦς* with *νοητά* keeps the thought within Aristotelian orthodoxy.

⁶²) Cf. above, p. 113.

⁶³) 429 b 5-10. W. D. Ross does not entertain the need to consider the question of self-knowledge here : 'there would be no point here in a reference to self-knowledge' ('Aristotle de Anima', Oxford 1961, p. 292).

⁶⁴) Cf. above, p. 109.

purely to intellectual knowledge, to knowing in itself. As the passage identifies thinking with the divine activity it is certainly necessary to keep in mind its transcendence. Though the context is of the embodied *νοῦς* which comes to know « the several groups of its objects », in this at least something like, perhaps something identical with, the divine state of full self-knowing arises. That intellectual activity is always of its nature self-conscious is not exactly stated, but is the presumption. The creation of intelligibilities is the condition of mind's awakening to itself, quite apart from the fact that there are inferior forms of self-awareness, which are not properly intellectual. The general principle is given in the context of the attainment of learned knowledge as the achievement of a stable and coherent area of knowledge gives a man a sense of the extending of his own capacity and is the best experience for an understanding of the power which has made that extension possible. How far the « then » (τότε) should be taken is not clear from the text : the flow of argument as it stands is that in exercising acquired, habitual knowledge, *νοῦς* is able to think itself, because it has become its potential objects, and these have become mind itself. In thinking its *νοητά* which it has created it is in fact thinking itself because of its identity with them. It is not knowledge of itself as the contemplation of an essence. *νοῦς* is an intensely pure activity which becomes completely identified with the objects which it itself makes. But in reducing its nature to such a vanishing point, at which self-knowing and object-knowing are identified, paradoxically the spiritual transcendence of this existent is enhanced, not tainted.

The second case of self-thinking is when mind deliberately turns its attention on itself; here its timeless transcendence must to some extent be lost, because of the need of deliberation. It might be argued that the principle stated here could extend to the case of *νοῦς* thinking of another *νοῦς*, which might be the divine *νοῦς* :

« (*νοῦς*) is also itself thinkable, just like other objects of thought ».

Its objects are *νοητά*, and are known because they are made identifiable with itself. « For in the case of things without matter that which thinks and that which is thought are the same, for speculative knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη ἢ θεωρητική*) is the same as its objects. » ⁶⁵)

⁶⁵) 430 a 2-5. Again Ross's commentary has no reference to the question of self-knowledge.

The mode of identity is described a little later in a way from which exact parallels with sense knowledge are a long way away :

« The soul, then, acts like a hand ; for the hand is an instrument which employs instruments, and in the same way the mind is a form which uses forms, and the sense is a form which employs the forms of sensible objects. » (Literally, « ... the forms of forms... the form of sensible objects' » : *εἶδος εἰδῶν ... εἶδος αἰσθητῶν* ⁶⁶).

There is a substantial identity of conception between the first of these passages in the *De Anima* with a passage in *Metaphysics* : « And thought (*νοῦς*) thinks itself through participation in the object of thought (*αὐτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ*) ; for it becomes an object of thought by the act of apprehension and thinking, so that thought and the object of thought are the same, because that which is receptive of the object of thought, i.e. essence (*οὐσίας*), is thought (*νοῦς*). » ⁶⁷) The first sentence states unequivocally what we had supposed in *De Anima* III, 5 : that object-thinking is at the same time self-thinking.

And the text continues with an expression which seems nearest to the *De Anima* account : « Hence it is actuality (*ἐνεργεῖ*) rather than potentiality (*το δεκτικόν*) that is held to be the divine possession of rational thought » ⁶⁸). Activity is the characteristic of thinking in itself, but the exteriority of its object (in the *Metaphysics*) introduces the place of desire and potentiality in what is not divine.

But to return with this parallel idea to the *De Anima* account. Self-knowledge, as an activity of *νοῦς* and supposedly a perception of its unity with itself, would fall foul of the division between actualising and receptivity : though it does not create its own intelligibility anew, as it is already intelligible and open to itself, it has to be received « just like other objects of thought » ; and if so, as the neo-Platonists suggested, the unity would be lost, and the absolute unity of thought with itself in self-knowing would exist only on the divine side of a noetic divide. But let us accept the impressionistic surmounting of this divide and assume that thought and self-thinking can at least be the intermittent activities of their human embodiments. A man may

⁶⁶) III 8, 432 a 1-3.

⁶⁷) 1072 b 20-23. In his notes on lines 18-21 and 18 Ross regards this thinking as being 'of the divine *νοῦς* itself' only : Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, Oxford 1924, II, p. 379.

⁶⁸) 1072 b 23.

think of himself in two ways : as the thinker whose consciousness of intelligible objects coincides with his own consciousness — because it is his consciousness which creates them and he knows his thinking in the same creative act; and in turning his thought upon himself, and here he knows his thinking directly because his mind is an immaterial object and present to itself in a way like the unity of νοητόν with νοῦς. The first may be said to be a normal feature of subjectivity; the second a more occasional one. The first discloses the basic quality of thought's own self-reflection, the second, by being more direct is fittingly more divine, but of its human embodiment Aristotle's analysis could not reach the simple unity he sought.

The aberrant subjectivity structure of *De Anima* III, 2, 4 and 7 ⁶⁹) has qualities in it which are more fully detailed in three other texts, where they are not in conflict with other reflections on the nature of sensitive self-consciousness or, excepting the *Nicomachean Ethics* ⁷⁰), of the transcendent quality of thought in itself. Passages in the *De Sensu et Sensibilibus* 7 and *De Somno et Vigilio* 2 have a much more clearly drawn-up statement on the existence of a centre of sense self-consciousness which is also a coordinator of sensations than the scattered references in the *De Anima*. The first of these, like that in *De Anima* III, 2 involves awareness of time, though as a concomitant of continuous sensation, not in the fact of simultaneity. The other text, in *Nicomachean Ethics* IX, 9, brings thinking together with sensation in this centre of self-consciousness, inviting comparison again with the passage in *De Anima* II ⁷¹) which links thinking with sensation in the co-ordinating sense.

⁶⁹) Cf. *supra*, p. 109 and n. 23. The texts are here listed after the *De Anima* in such a way that if this arrangement were taken as chronological it would agree with the line of reasoning of I. BLOCK in his 'Order of Aristotle's Psychological Writings' for the priority of the *De Anima* against Ross and Nuyens (*American Journal of Philology*, 1961, Vol. 82, p. 50 ff.). And the text from the *Ethics* has been added as a culmination. (Though the aberrant structure in the *De Anima* adds complications which would have to be faced in a study of chronology based on the conception of the emergence of a teaching into clarity and into a systematic form.) He makes his case from a principle of supposed progressivity, and a common sense inspection of the texts. But that Aristotle did have a 'regression' in his thinking is often supposed : e.g. to his earlier Platonism (by HAMELIN throughout 'La théorie de l'Intellect d'après Aristote et ses Commentateurs', Paris 1953) and to an earlier scepticism about the immortality of the soul in his middle years (by GAUTHIER, 'Introduction...', p. 49).

⁷⁰) V. *infra*, p. 127 and the significance of 1177 b 26-28.

⁷¹) 426 b 23.

In the *De Sensu et Sensibilibus* 7 there is a continuous centre of self-consciousness, not focussed on to the simultaneous discernment of identity between diverse impressions at a point in time, but on the continuity of self-awareness through the passage of time. This text goes so far as to associate self-consciousness with time-consciousness that any objective criteria for time are for the moment forgotten. «For if, when a man perceives himself or anything else in continuous time, it is impossible for him to be unaware of his existence, and if again in continuous time there can be a time so short as to be quite imperceptible, it is clear that during that time he would be unaware of his existence, and of the fact of his seeing or perceiving»⁷²). So there is an inner sense which is together self-conscious, object-perceiving and *pari passu* time-conscious; and time is the medium, the element, without which any knowledge is impossible.⁷³) The text then goes on to make this inner sense responsible for the inter-relation of diverse simultaneous perceptions : «the general faculty of perception

⁷²) 448 a 26-30.

⁷³) Time in Aristotle is not purely 'the number of motion' (*ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως* : *De Coelo* I, 279 a 15), nor can it be completely accounted for by the fact that we explain time and uniform motion by each other (*Physics* IV, 220 b 22-24). According to A. J. FESTUGIÈRE, the *Physics* makes a distinction between the before- and afterness of time and time itself, and makes the numberability of bodies moving in time depend on the existence of a numberer ('Le Temps de l'Âme selon Aristote', in *Études de Philosophie Grecque*, Paris 1971, p. 205. This formally appeared in the *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, 1934, part I). A text of *Physics* IV would justify him in thus making a distinction between physical and psychic time : 'if nothing can count except consciousness (*ψυχή*), and consciousness only as intellect (not as sensation merely), it is impossible that time should exist if consciousness did not' (223 a 25-27). According to Aristotle, all experience under the 'first heaven' must involve place, void and time (*De Coelo* I, 279 a 11-12), and if that is related to the fact that the whole of nature so constituted, moves with the desire of God and mind tries to relate itself to all nature in order to know it and also to number it, it is possible to see that time for Aristotle involved a 'distension of the soul'. The idea of Augustine, deriving from Plotinus's conception of *ψυχή*'s government of the material world, may, in turn go back to Aristotle. The duration of time is thus exposed as the element in which human activity must take place. J. M. DUBOIS ('Le Temps et l'Instant selon Aristote', Paris 1967) more lengthily expounds a thesis near to that of Festugière : '(Aristotle's idea) puts the concept of time between movement and the soul, the balance is delicate' (p. 8). The effort of R. JORDAN to contravert Bertrand RUSSELL's view that Augustine's conception of time was subjective and solipsistic would more profitably have drawn from Aristotle than opposed him (v. 'Time and Contingency in St. Augustine', in *Review of Metaphysics* 8, 1955, p. 414).

is one and the same numerically but one in its being... So that simultaneous perceptions would be possible with a part which is one and the same, but not the same in conceptional relation (λόγω) » ⁷⁴). The text is a degree clearer and more satisfactory system-wise than the *De Anima* texts, and it goes a considerable way towards drawing up a total subjectivity structure of man in his sensitive powers. Mondolfo makes this comment on it :

« Aristotle considers self-consciousness or consciousness of one's own existence always present and continuous in the subject; and it is in the constant and indefatigable presence of self-consciousness, which is quite unique and identical, that he finds the solution to problems concerning the possibility of cognitive relations between different impressions, without having to fuse them into a unique sensation which would make comparison and distinction impossible. » ⁷⁵)

In the *De Somno et Vigilio* II Aristotle makes in stronger terms the formal identity between the inner sense which is self-conscious and the inner sense which correlates different sensations. It should be noted that though this work refers to *De Anima* III as to a work completed, its assertion of the existence of a « common » sensitive power which has the further characteristic of self-consciousness is at variance with the denial in *De Anima* III, 2 of the existence of a power distinct from the external senses in which self-consciousness arises. « There is also a common faculty associated with (all the senses) whereby one is conscious that one sees and hears (for it is not by sight that one is aware that one sees; and one judges and is capable of judging that sweet is different from white not by the taste, nor by sight, nor by a combination of the two, but by some part which is common to all the sense organs; for there is one sense faculty and one paramount sense organ...), and this is closely associated with the sense of touch » ⁷⁶).

One would like to say that a text in the *Nicomachean Ethics* IX, 9 is the logical development of Aristotle's theory of the common sense anticipated in *De Anima* III, 2, 4 and 7, as here he brings thinking specifically into a subjectivity structure much like that of the *De*

⁷⁴) 449 a 16-20.

⁷⁵) 'L'Unité...', pp. 361-2.

⁷⁶) 455 a 15-20.

De Sensu et Sensibilibus 7 and *De Somno et Vigilio* 2... « and if one who sees is conscious that he sees, one who hears that he hears, one who walks that he walks, and similarly for all the other human activities there is a faculty that is conscious of their exercises, so that whenever we perceive, we are conscious that we perceive, and whenever we think we are conscious that we think, and to be conscious that we are perceiving or thinking is to be conscious that we exist (for existence, as we say, is sense perception or thought (*αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν*)... (then)... is (a man's) friend's existence also desirable. ... Therefore a man ought also to share his friend's consciousness of his existence » ⁷⁷).

Mondolfo comments that not only does Aristotle assert here « the identity between human existence (i.e. the fact of being alive) and the consciousness of sensing and thinking... still more he identifies enjoyment and love of life with the enjoyment and love of knowledge, that is of feeling and thinking which are sensations of feeling and the intention of thinking, in other words of self-consciousness » ⁷⁸) But in the absence of indications to the contrary we are not justified in saying any more that the *Ethics* IX puts forward here a theory of human cognition unambiguously individual. One is not justified in presuming that here we have a final view of the relationship between thinking and consciousness any more of the *De Anima* III, 4 and 5 and the *Metaphysics* XII. The coincidence of the descriptions here with the subjectivity structures nucleating on the common sense merely emphasises the differences between the two series of opinions, for the question of the nature of thought does not arise at this point. It does so later and in a way which coincides with the teaching of the other series : « (the life of *Θεωρία*) will be higher than the human level : not in virtue of his humanity will a man achieve it, but in virtue of something within him which is divine. » ⁷⁹) The texts of the *De Anima* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* in their existing state, the former seeing thinking primarily from its transcendent standpoint, the latter primarily from a human standpoint, both witness through the diverse subjectivity structures they contain, to the impossibility which Aristotle found in relating the distinct quality of mind to its embodiment.

⁷⁷) 1170 a 29 - b 11.

⁷⁸) 'L'Unité...' p. 377-8.

⁷⁹) X, 8, 1177 b 26-28.

Mondolfo sees the connections between this interior common sense in Aristotle and the «sensus interior» in St. Augustine, and also the views of both on self-awareness.⁸⁰ His proposal that there is a neo-Platonist mediation of Aristotelian ideas to Augustine's is the same as that which will be examined in detail in this study; and we shall find that Augustine did achieve a coherent structure of subjectivity which critically subdued Aristotelian transcendent ideas on *voûs*, rigorously developed regardless of his empirical views by neo-Platonists, to an unequivocally individual structure which included sense and intellectual knowledge.

b) *The different structures of self-knowing in Aristotle.*

It is striking that we have here not one structure of subjectivity, but at least four. And the possibility of discovering others should not be ruled out.

i) From *De Anima* III (and *Metaphysics* XII) in which it is claimed that the thinking of intelligible objects is the condition of self-knowing in the sense that the self is thus opened up to itself. From the *Metaphysics* comes the clarification that all thinking is at the same time self-thinking. In the form in which it occurs in *De Anima* it contributes to the answering of the dilemma : how can mind have at the same time dominance over and continuity with the object of thought? If we wished to find an element of will here we would have to look at the fact of mind's dominance, though that could be seen as no more than the speculative power of mind. This structure looks upon *voûs* as having the creative power of bringing intelligible reality into existence, and a passive power of absorbing this creation completely into itself. The distinct, divine nature of *voûs* and its «return» to the separated state of its existence on the death of the person raises the problem of the unity of personality (as well as personal immortality).

⁸⁰ 'L'Unité...', pp. 365, 378. For the 'sensus interior', v. *De Libero Arbitrio* II, 3, 8 : 'ad quem ab istis quinque notissimis cuncta referantur'. As a parallel for self-awareness MONDOLFO gives *De Civitate Dei* XI, 26 : 'nam et sumus et nos esse novimus, et nostrum esse novimus, et nostrum esse ac nosse diligimus'. Better texts would have been 'se sentire sentiret' (*De Libero Arbitrio* II, 4, 10) for sense knowledge, and 'notitia qua se mens novit, si esse desinat, simul et illa nosse (aliorum) desinat' (*De Trinitate* IX, 4, 6) for intellectual knowledge. It is in terms of this last statement concerning intellectual knowledge that the mediation of Aristotelian ideas via neo-Platonists to Augustine is most evident.

ii) From *De Anima* III when *voûs* chooses deliberately to think itself. It needs no material object as an intermediary — that is from which to create its intelligibility, for this is itself an act. A will element may be seen in the choice to think of the self, perhaps even in complaisance in this self-thinking. However, the will is not made a part of a triadic or polyadic structure. This kind of self-thinking is really an answer to a subsidiary question in the *De Anima* : « how is self-thinking possible ? »

These analyses are not mutually exclusive, but they are not identical, being different approaches to the same activity.

iii) The noetic structure of *Metaphysics* XII which can not be accomodated to them. It suppose *voûs* to be moved by desire and not by its creative spontaneity. In giving this formal place to the will a loosely triadic structure of object — will — understanding is proposed.

Together, these three structures refer only to *voûs*. They are to differing degrees triadic in so far as the will plays a part in them.

iv) From the *De Sensu et Sensibilibus* 7 and *De Somno et Vigilio* 2 comes the proposal of a continuous self-consciousness, arising together with time-consciousness in the common sense. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* IX, 9 thinking is proposed as also existing within this continuous self-consciousness ; and these positions seem to be the fulfilment of themes in *De Anima* III, 2, 4 and 7. The resulting structure is complete at the cost of omitting to include the activity of thought as it is in itself. An order of systematic development of these positions can be worked out, but not much confirmed from the point of view of chronological study.

So in addition to the irreconcilability of the structures of *De Anima* and *Metaphysics*, supposed by some commentators to be approximately contemporary, we have further irreconcilabilities between them and the *Parva Naturalia* and *Nicomachean Ethics*. It would be expecting too much of chronological research to distinguish finely between the *Parva Naturalia* treatises themselves ; indeed the differences over the nature of common sense would normally be taken as the means of making out the chronological relationship between them. Quite possibly chronology does not enter into the question, but only the intractability of material being handled. On the present state of the evidence it does not seem possible to say with certainty whether Aristotle moved forwards or backwards between the positions of a separate self-consciousness for each sense and a central self-conscious-

ness. That thinking was of its nature self-conscious and timelessly transcendent (as in *De Anima* and *Metaphysics*), but that the human-embodied *voûs* was only exercised intermittently and only intermittently engaged in self-contemplation, would prevent it from being the centre of a personal self-consciousness, in which the common sense relates to each other experiences *in time* of either temporally simultaneous or successive sensations and, in the structure of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, of thinking as well. Torn between the nature of thought in itself which Aristotle supposed to be timeless⁸¹) and the need of a centre of consciousness, somehow coincident with man's essence, what suffered was the unity of mind and body. For how could timeless thought satisfactorily integrate the temporal succession of experience; how could it even necessitate — as only time could — the unity of different perceptions of the same object, which came with the different sense powers? For Aristotle saw time as the necessary medium of sense experience. True, the sight would see and the ear hear an exterior regularity by which time could be measured, and there would be no measuring — the act of *ψυχή* not *voûs* — unless an interior sense supposed the temporal instantaneity of diverse sensations. But this subjectivism of time and the timeless nature of thought itself and its declared unlikeness to sensations made the desired structure elusive.

If we may look ahead we can find that the subjectivity structure of Augustine's *De Trinitate* had a counterpart to the timeless self-thinking of pure thought in its continuity of intellectual self-consciousness (in the inner « se nosse » : always present, and having to be adverted to, rather than arising when the creativity of mind awakes). Probably Augustine's conception came from a conflation of the division thinking-sensation with a division of inner and outer⁸²), in which continuous self-knowing, self-loving and self-remembering were thought of as being at the inner centre of intellectual life. The rest of sense experience was interrelated in the *memoria*, which took over the integrating functions of the common sense, and in which, perhaps untidily but convincingly, intellectual and sense elements co-existed.

Before and after Augustine Aristotelians have tried to bring these four possible subjectivity structures into a coherent whole.

⁸¹) *De Anima* III, 5, 430 a 23.

⁸²) Known to him as found in St. Paul as well as in Plotinus, but also see below (chapter IV) on this psychology.

This is probably an impossible task. The pre-occupations of each are different. The co-presence of each gives a better, if not final, account of the human subject which, bafflingly, has some functions proper to mind itself and others which belong to body and soul together. Hylemorphism is primarily a philosophy of unities not dualities; of informed matter not of matter *and* form, and, in intention, of embodied soul, not body and soul. The incentive which led Aristotle with his theory of soul as *ἐντελέχεια* to assert such a complete unity of soul and body was his failure to relate human noetic structures with all the others. It seemed to him that nothing but the most rigorous unity would save his analysis of the human subject from dividing into two unrelatable parts, but this only heightened the incongruity between the characteristic noetic activity of *νοῦς* and its presence in a human body. As Nuyens writes :

« In the final period, the soul is considered as the entelecheia of the body and is united in this capacity in the closest way possible to matter; thence the possible consideration of it as soul or as mind (*esprit*) is brought forcibly to the attention of the philosopher, who makes this the principle problem of his psychology. The soul is inseparably united to the body; it is born with it and perishes with it, or to be precise : it is not the soul, nor the body which is born and perishes, but the living being, whose form (or soul) and matter (or body) are the principle constituents of the substantial order. But the mind itself is immaterial and eternal, that is, unengendered and imperishable. Aristotle did not reach a satisfactory synthesis of the soul and the mind in the human personality. *νοῦς* for him is a « residual phenomenon » whose reality he always recognises; but which he will not succeed in linking with the other principles of his psychology. He asked the question about *νοῦς*; he did not answer it. » ⁸³⁾

The confession of failure which Aristotle himself expressed in the *De Generatione Animalium* makes it impossible not to accept Nuyens' interpretation of the texts :

« That is why it is a very great puzzle to answer another question, concerning *νοῦς*. At what moment, and in what manner, do those creatures which have this principle of *νοῦς* acquire their share in it, and where does it come from ? This is a very difficult problem which we must endeavour to solve, so far as it may be solved, to the best of our power. » ⁸⁴⁾

⁸³⁾ *Op. cit.*, p. 58-9, cf. p. 313.

⁸⁴⁾ 736 b 5-8 : it is considered a late work.

Contrary to what is often taken for granted, Aristotle did not draw up a simple and all-embracing subjectivity structure, and in consequence not only is the self of self-knowledge a disunited subject : the ways to self-knowledge have to follow its unfortunate division.

(to be continued)

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