

The Dating of James of Viterbo's Quodlibet I and Godfrey of Fontaines' Quodlibet VIII

In the *Introduction* to his recent edition of James of Viterbo's first Quodlibetal Question, E. Ypma assigns the Augustinian Master's four Quodlibets to the years 1293-1296 ¹). As Ypma indicates there, he is relying for the *terminus a quo* of this dating upon the fact that James was promoted to the rank of Magister in Theology at Paris c. Easter, 1293. As he also notes, however, this dating does not square with that proposed by O. Lottin for the first two Quodlibets of James ²). Because of references to James in an interesting table prepared by an anonymous admirer of Godfrey of Fontaines, Lottin felt constrained to correct Glorieux's earlier proposal that James's first and second Quodlibets be dated in 1293 and 1294. In that table the anonymous author notes in some detail points of disagreement between Godfrey and other leading figures of the time. According to this table, in Quodlibets 7 and 8 Godfrey would have refuted James's Quodlibet 1, and in Quodlibet 11 Godfrey would have done the same with respect to James's Quodlibet 2. But Godfrey's Quodlibets 7 and 8 have been dated by Glorieux in 1290 and 1291, with Quodlibet 11 falling in 1294. Consequently, Lottin concluded that because the dates assigned to Godfrey's Quodlibets appear to be more surely established than those of James's Quodlibets, it would be better to redate the latter's first two Quodlibets as of 1291 and 1292 respectively ³).

¹) *Jacobi de Viterbio O.E.S.A. disputatio prima de quolibet* (Würzburg, 1968), p. vi and n. 10. Also, see YPMA, *La formation des professeurs chez les Ermites de Saint-Augustin de 1256 à 1354* (Paris, 1956), pp. 92, 96. In the note referred to above, Ypma cites Gutiérrez, «De vita et scriptis Beati Jacobi de Viterbio», *Analecta Augustiniana* 16 (1937/38), pp. 290-94. Gutiérrez's study on James has also appeared with slight modification as an independent monograph, *De B. Jacobi Viterbiensis O.E.S.A. vita, operibus et doctrina* (Rome, 1939). In the latter see pp. 15, 33.

²) *Jacobi de Viterbio O.E.S.A., Disputatio prima de quolibet*, pp. v and vi, n. 10.

³) For LOTTIN see his *Psychologie et morale au XII^e et XIII^e siècles*, T. 3, 2

Certain problems remain to be resolved. First of all, as Ypma has noted, this earlier dating of James's first two Quodlibets can hardly be reconciled with 1293 as the date for his promotion as Magister. At the same time, if it is indeed the case that Godfrey was referring to James's Quodlibet 1 in his own Quodlibets 7 and 8, and if it is also true that the latter are to be dated in 1290 and 1291, it would seem that the Augustinian's first Quodlibet should be placed in 1290, at the latest. Yet, for some reason, Lottin suggests 1291 as the date of Quodlibet 1. (As even he remarks, the 1294 date for Quodlibet 2 could be reconciled with a 1294 dating of Godfrey's Quodlibet 11, if one assumes that James's Quodlibet 2 was conducted before Godfrey's Quodlibet 11)⁴). We remain puzzled, therefore, by Lottin's proposal of 1291 instead of 1290, if Godfrey does refer to James's Quodlibet 1 in his own Quodlibet 7. Again, if it can be shown that Godfrey refers to James's Quodlibet 1 either in his Quodlibet 7 or in his Quodlibet 8, then it would seem that Ypma and Glorieux are incorrect in assigning the former to 1293, or else that Godfrey's Quodlibets 7 and/or 8 will have to be redated from 1290 and 1291 until 1293 or later. This second alternative would raise further complications, since Godfrey's subsequent Quodlibets have been dated as follows: Quodlibet 9, 1292; Q 10, 1293; Q 11, 1294; Q 12, 1295; Q 13, 1296; Q 14, 1297⁵). The date of 1303 or 1304 for Godfrey's Q 15 would not be affected by such redating⁶). Of course, if Godfrey does not cite James's Quodlibet 1 either in his own Quodlibet 7 or in Quodlibet 8 (or in Quodlibet 9), then there will be no difficulty. Thus, in the *Introduction* to his edition of James's second Quodlibet, Ypma appeals to James's promotion in 1293 to suggest that the interrelationships established (apparently by Lottin) between James and his critics should be called into question⁷). Our first task, therefore, will be to test the claim of our anonymous table that in Quod-

(Louvain, 1949), p. 731, n. 2; T. 4, 2 (Louvain, 1954), p. 869, n. 2. For GLORIEUX see his *La littérature quodlibétique*, T. 1 (Le Saulchoir, 1925), pp. 158-59, 162, 214. For the table see J. Hoffmans, «La table des divergences et innovations doctrinales de Godefroid de Fontaines», *Revue néoscholastique de philosophie* 36 (1934), pp. 412-36.

⁴) LOTTIN, as cited in n. 3 above.

⁵) GLORIEUX, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-66.

⁶) On the date of Quodlibet 15 see our «Godfrey of Fontaines: the Date of Quodlibet 15», *Franciscan Studies* 31 (1971), pp. 300-69.

⁷) *Jacobi de Viterbio O.E.S.A. disputatio secunda de quolibet* (Würzburg, 1969), p. vi.

libets 7 and 8 Godfrey did indeed refer to James's Quodlibet 1. If such should prove to be the case, possible resolutions of this difficulty will then be considered.

Godfrey, Quodlibet 7, and James, Quodlibet 1

According to the doctrinal table, in Quodlibet 7, q. 7, Godfrey is writing against James on the question of genus and difference in angels. More specifically, the table states that Godfrey distinguishes between a physical and logical genus in a way different from that proposed by James in his Quodlibet 1, q. 6⁸). Godfrey's Q 7, q. 7 is directed to the question: *Utrum essentia angeli sit composita ex genere et differentia*⁹). James's Quodlibet 1, q. 6 considers the issue: *Utrum potentia quam dicit genus sumatur per comparisonem ad esse essentiae vel ad esse actualis existentiae*¹⁰).

In turning to Godfrey's text one finds that after discussing the difference between a logical and a natural genus, he addresses himself to the question as to how the minimum prerequisites for logical genus may be said to be realized in angels. He refers to a theory advanced by some according to which, if genus is to be applied to creatures whose essence is not composed of matter and form, some other kind of composition of actuality and potentiality must be introduced to provide the required potentiality and determinability. In such simple creatures, therefore, one must appeal to a composition between the essence and something with respect to which it is in potentiality. Defenders of this view suggest that the angelic nature enters into composition with its *esse*, its properties, and its accidents. If the angelic nature itself is simple, that which possesses such a nature may be said to be composite. Such composition of its nature with its *esse*, *accidents*, and *properties* will suffice to ground composition of genus and difference in the logical order. Insofar as the nature is regarded as potential with respect to its *esse*, accidents, and properties, the notion of genus can be derived therefrom. Insofar as the

⁸) « La table ... », p. 429 : « Item, quaestio septima, contra JACOBUM, de comparatione generis et differentiae in angelis; de distinctione physici generis et logici aliter quam JACOBUS, primo quodlibet, quaestione sexta ».

⁹) *Les Philosophes Belges, T. 3 : Les quodlibet cinq, six et sept de Godefroid de Fontaines*, ed. M. De Wulf and J. Hoffmans, (Louvain, 1914), p. 349 (PB 3.349).

¹⁰) *Jacobi de Viterbio O.E.S.A. disputatio prima de quolibet*, p. 73.

nature is viewed as a particular actuality in a given degree of nature and entity, the notion of difference can be derived therefrom ¹¹).

Rather than consider Godfrey's criticism of this theory here, we will now turn to James's text. After having observed that that from which difference is derived is really identical with that from which genus is derived, although they differ logically, James notes that such is true not only in the case of corporeal creatures (whose essence is composed of matter and form), but also in the case of spirits ¹²). Just as the notion of genus and the notion of difference are taken from the same corporeal nature insofar as it is considered as something potential and then as something actual (*per modum potentialis et per modum actualis*), so too are genus and difference derived from one and the same spiritual nature insofar as it is considered under different aspects, as potential and as actual ¹³). Even so, James then singles out two points of distinction between corporeal and spiritual substances.

First of all, in corporeals, genus is derived from potency insofar as something is said to be possible with reference to its matter. In spirits, however, genus is taken from potency insofar as something is said to be possible in relation to its agent, God. Therefore, because corporeals share in matter, they are said to be in the same natural genus. Spirits, whether compared with other spirits or with corporeal things, are said to be in the same logical genus. This is not to deny that corporeals may also be described as potential or possible in relation to their agent as well, and therefore may also fall into a logical genus. But spirits are said to be potential or possible only with reference to their efficient cause, and therefore presumably fall into a logical genus alone rather than into a natural genus as well ¹⁴).

Secondly, in things corporeal that by reason of which something is said to be possible or potential, its matter, is part of the thing itself. Therefore, in this case, genus signifies something composed

¹¹) PB 3.356. Note in particular: « Quia enim natura angelica compositionem facit cum suo esse et cum suis proprietatibus et accidentibus, in angelis videtur debere poni genus ratione talis potentialitatis, quia, licet natura in eis sit simplex, habens tamen naturam, est compositum; quae compositio poterit correspondere compositioni secundum rationem ex genere et differentia ... ».

¹²) *Op. cit.*, p. 73.

¹³) *Op. cit.*, p. 74.

¹⁴) *Ibid.*

of matter and form. In spirits, that according to which something is said to be possible, its efficient cause, is not part of the thing itself. In this case, therefore, genus signifies a simple nature in relationship to God, its efficient cause¹⁵).

So far, then, there is little reason to conclude that Godfrey is referring to James's text, granted that James's manner of distinguishing between a logical and a natural genus differs somewhat from that proposed by Godfrey¹⁶). But then, somewhat farther on in this same discussion, James attempts to show that even though genus is derived primarily and *simpliciter* from *esse essentiae* or essence, still, in a secondary sense (*ex consequenti*), it may also be said to be derived from actual *esse*. In order to establish this point he recalls that while essence signifies the thing in itself, *esse* bespeaks this same essence primarily, but in a secondary way also signifies those things to which the essence is either capable of being conjoined or with which it is actually conjoined¹⁷). This is so because supposits themselves imply these things in a secondary way. Since genus and species potentially contain supposits, then by implication they also signify those things with which the essence of the supposit is or can be conjoined. Hence it can be said that genus in some secondary way signifies the *esse* itself which is known as *esse actualis existentiae*. In sum, then, although genus is taken primarily from essence insofar as it is said to be potential whether by reason of its matter or by reference to its agent, in a secondary sense it is also derived from essence insofar as it is in potency with respect to that with which it either is or can be conjoined¹⁸).

In order to appreciate James's view here, and lest it be concluded too readily that this is the theory defended by Godfrey's opponent in Quodlibet 7, q. 7, it should be noted that according to James in

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Cf. Q 7, q. 7 (PB 3.353-55).

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 75. Note in particular: « Nam, ut dictum est supra, essentia significat ipsam rem praedicabilem secundum se; esse vero dicit ipsam essentiam principaliter, et ex consequenti dicit illa quibus essentia est coniungibilis vel coniuncta » (p. 75:109-12). For more on this see Quodlibet 1, q. 4, and the references cited in n. 19.

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 75. Note especially the following: « Et ideo, licet genus principaliter sumatur ex essentia, secundum quod dicitur possibilis ratione materiae vel ratione agentis, ex consequenti tamen sumitur ex ipsa essentia, secundum quod dicitur in potentia respectu illorum quibus coniungibilis est vel coniuncta; secundum quem modum essentia dicitur esse » (1. 119-23).

Quodlibet 1, q. 4, essence and existence (*esse*) signify the same thing according to their primary meaning, but in different ways. What essence signifies in the abstract, *esse* signifies in the concrete. In a secondary meaning, however, *esse*, the concrete supposit, implies more than essence, that is, those things with which the essence is or can be conjoined in the supposit¹⁹). Hence, if according to the discussion in Quodlibet 1, q. 6, genus may be derived in a secondary way from essence insofar as it is in potency with respect to that with which it is or can be conjoined, or as James also phrases it, from that *esse* which is known as *esse actualis existentiae*, this is because *esse* so understood primarily refers to the essence taken concretely (or as realized in the supposit) and in a secondary way implies that to which the essence is conjoined. So viewed, as realized in the supposit, essence may be said to be in potency to that with which it is conjoined. In the light of certain remarks in Quodlibet 1, q. 4, one may conclude that a thing's accidents would be a prime instance of that to which the essence is conjoined in the supposit²⁰).

¹⁹) In Q 1, q. 4, James has considered different opinions as to the relationship between essence and *esse*. He then advances a view which he here describes as probable, but which appears to be his own. As he puts it: « Quare similiter esse et essentia se habent ad invicem sicut concretum et abstractum; et ideo, sicut differt concretum a suo abstracto, sic differt esse ab essentia » (p. 47:146-48). As to the relationship between the abstract and the concrete he also observes: « ... dicendum quod abstractum et concretum, quantum ad principale significatum, idem significant et idem sunt; quantum vero ad id quod concretum significat secundario, differt ab abstracto » (p. 48:166-69). See also: « Cum ... essentia et esse se habeant sicut abstractum et concretum; quantum ad principale significatum idem sunt, quantum vero ad secundarium, in Deo quidem differunt solum secundum rationem, in creaturis autem differunt etiam secundum rem, ita quod esse significat principaliter ipsam essentiam; ex consequenti autem omne quod essentiae coniunctum est et sine quo essentia non invenitur nec inveniri potest in actu » (p. 48:173-79); « Et quia id quod est dicitur ipsum suppositum, ideo etiam dici potest quod, sicut differt essentia et suppositum habens essentiam, sic differt essentia et esse. Suppositum autem, licet significet principaliter ipsam essentiam, ex consequenti tamen significat omnia alia quae sunt essentiae coniuncta » (p. 49:191-95); « Sic etiam esse et ens principaliter significant essentiam ipsam; ex consequenti autem alia quae coniunguntur vel coniungi possunt essentiae ... » (p. 49:203-05). On James and the relationship between essence and *esse* see M. Grabmann, « Doctrina S. Thomae de distinctione reali inter essentiam et esse ex documentis ineditis saeculi XIII illustratur », *Acta Hebdomadae Thomisticae Romae celebratae 19-25 Novembris 1923 in laudem S. Thomae Aquinatis* (Rome, 1924), pp. 162-76; F. Casado, « El pensamiento filosófico del beato Santiago de Viterbo », *La Ciudad de Dios* 164 (1952), pp. 314-31.

²⁰) See p. 49:188-98.

As to the relationship between this theory and that attributed by Godfrey in Quodlibet 7, q. 7 to his opponent, it is true that both James himself and Godfrey's unnamed opponent are attempting to account for the possibility of applying genus in some way to angels even though the angelic essence is not composed of matter and form. Both recognize the need to postulate some kind of potentiality within the angelic being to ground such an application. Godfrey's opponent provides for this potentiality by appealing to the composition of an angelic nature with (1) its *esse*, (2) its properties, (3) its accidents. In refuting this theory, however, Godfrey restricts himself to potentiality arising in an angel from its composition with its accidental perfections. That resulting from composition with its *esse* is not again explicitly referred to in the refutation ²¹).

James, on the other hand, has provided for the required degree of potentiality for presence in a genus by noting that the angel may be viewed as possible or potential when it is considered in relationship to God, its efficient cause. It is true that he then refers to another kind of potentiality, that which would result from the angelic nature's union with those things with which it is conjoined in the supposit. However, this latter kind of potentiality is not cited to account for angelic presence in a genus as such, but for another reason, to show that in some secondary way membership in a genus pertains to the angel by reason of its *esse* as well as by reason of its essence. As we have seen, *esse* as used in this context by James refers in its primary meaning to the essence taken concretely or as realized in the supposit, and in a secondary way implies that to which the essence or nature is conjoined.

Given these differences, therefore, and in the absence of evidence for direct textual interdependency, we are inclined to question the accuracy of the doctrinal table's suggestion that in Quodlibet 7, q. 7 Godfrey has James's Quodlibet 1, q. 6 in mind.

According to the anonymous doctrinal table, Godfrey again

²¹) PB 3.356-57. In brief, Godfrey raises two objections. First, that from which the formality of genus (and difference) derives should pertain to the essence of the thing in question. But an angel's potentiality with respect to its accidents, and for that matter, the accidents themselves, are not of this type. Secondly, if there were separate substances devoid of accidental perfections, the theory in question could not account for their presence in a genus. But freedom from presence in any kind of genus is a prerogative which should be granted to God alone.

refers to James in Quodlibet 7, q. 8. In this discussion the table simply states that Godfrey is refuting Giles of Rome on the question of a plurality of *aeva*, and that he is also here refuting James²²). No precise reference to James is given. In Quodlibet 7, q. 8, Godfrey raises the following question: Is the being (*esse*) of all sempiternal things (angels) measured by a single measure? While our doctrinal table does not refer us to a particular question in James, or even to his quodlibetal questions, for that matter, in Quodlibet 1, q. 9 he examines this issue: Is there one *aevum* for all eviternal beings²³)? Since both James and Godfrey are aware of and refer to a variety of views on this matter, we will briefly single out the different arguments and versions of the negative position as they are exposed by Godfrey and which he criticizes in considerable detail. In each of these cases we will then seek to determine whether or not one can establish direct reference to and dependence on James's Quodlibet 1, q. 9.

Godfrey's question opens, however, with an argument in favor of one measure or *aevum* for all eviternal beings, based on an analogy with time. Just as there is one time for all temporal things, so too the *esse* of all eviternals should be measured by a single *aevum*, that of the most perfect angel, the first eviternal being. James also refers to this view, both at the very beginning of his question, and again in the course of listing three major opinions on this point defended by various Masters²⁴). In the latter context, where this view is listed as the first of the three opinions, the argument in support of it bears striking similarity with one offered by Thomas Aquinas in his *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 10, art. 6²⁵). The same argumentation was well known

²²) *Op. cit.*, p. 429: « Item, quaestione octava, contra AEGIDIUM, de pluralitate aevorum. Et similiter contra JACOBUM. Et ibi nota multa bona ».

²³) For Godfrey, see PB 3.364: « Utrum esse omnium sempiternorum sive angelorum mensuretur una mensura ». For James see *op. cit.*, p. 128:1: « Nono quaeritur: utrum sit unum aevum omnium aeviternorum ».

²⁴) For Godfrey, see PB 3.364. For James, see pp. 128:2-4 and 132:160-133:165.

²⁵) Thus James writes: « Quidam enim dicunt quod, sicut est unum tempus omnium temporalium, cuius unitas accipitur ex unitate subiecti, scilicet primi motus, sic etiam est unum aevum omnium aeviternorum, cuius subiectum est primum aeviternum. Et rationem inducunt; quia unumquodque mensuratur simplicissimo sui generis. Quare et omnia aeviterna per unum primum et simplicissimum aeviternum » (pp. 132:160-133:165). Compare with the following from Thomas: « ... oportet dicere quod sit unum aevum tantum: quia, cum unumquodque mensuretur simplicissimo sui generis,

to Giles of Rome, for instance in his *De mensura angelorum*, q. 2²⁶). Since Thomas's text as well as Giles's work antedate the 1290's by many years, there is no need to refer Godfrey to James or James to Godfrey, for that matter, to account for their respective familiarity with this argument²⁷).

In the *sed contra* of his discussion James presents an argument that challenges this analogy between the *aevum* and time. The *aevum* is found in eviternal beings themselves, whereas time is not found in temporal entities but in that which transcends temporal things. That which is found in temporal things themselves is rather *quando*. Therefore, one may argue that the *aevum* is to eviternal beings as *quando* to temporal things, but not as time is to temporals. There is not a single *quando* for all temporal things, but many *quando*'s just as there are many temporal entities. Therefore, according to this view, there are as many *aeva* as there are eviternal beings²⁸). James again returns to this view in the body of his reply, listing it there as the second of the three major schools of thought on this issue. In the latter context he cites two further arguments offered in its support: (1) For something to serve as measure, it should be that which is simplest and that upon which the things measured depend both for their being and for their being known. But there

ut dicitur in X *Metaphys.*, oportet quod esse omnium aeviternorum mensuretur esse primi aeviterni, quod tanto est simplicius, quanto prius» (ST I, q. 10, a. 6c). Italics ours, to facilitate comparison. Also cf. Thomas, Quodlibet 5, q. 4, art. 1c. For further discussion of the doctrine of eviternity in Thomas see C.J. PETER, *The Doctrine of Thomas Aquinas Regarding Eviternity in the Rational Soul and Separated Substances* (Rome, 1964).

²⁶) Thus Giles writes: «Quaeritur utrum sit unum aevum omnium aeviternorum ... Et videtur quod sic. Quia omnium corporalium est una mensura quae dicitur tempus, ergo multo magis omnium spiritualium erit una mensura et unum aevum. Nam cum spiritualia sunt magis quid in actu quam corporalia, magis debent reduci in mensuram unam». See Aegidius Romanus *de esse et essentia*, *De mensura angelorum*, et *De cognitione angelorum* (Venice, 1503), fol. 38Rb-38Va. For an analysis of some other texts in Giles which touch on this matter see C.J. PETER, *Participated Eternity in the Vision of God. A Study of the Opinion of Thomas Aquinas and His Commentators on the Duration of the Acts of Glory* (Rome, 1964), pp. 110-20.

²⁷) See A. WALZ-P. NOVARINA, (*Saint Thomas d'Aquin* [Louvain/Paris, 1962] p. 142), where the *Pars prima* of the *Summa* is dated in 1266/67-1268. Glorieux places Giles's *De mensura angelorum* c. 1279. See his *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIII^e siècle II* (Paris, 1933), p. 297.

²⁸) *Op. cit.*, p. 128:5-13.

is no simplest eviternal being, since a simpler one could always be made by God. (2) Moreover, there is no eviternal being upon which others depend for their being and their being known. Therefore, no single *aevum* can serve as the measure of all eviternal beings²⁹).

In the *sed contra* of his question Godfrey cites an argument according to which one thing can serve as measure of the being of another only when the former exercises causality with respect to the latter. But since one eviternal being does not cause another, the argument concludes that the measure of the *esse* of one such being cannot serve as measure of the *esse* of another, or in other words, that the *aevum* of one eviternal entity cannot measure the being of another eviternal entity³⁰). While there is some similarity between this reasoning and the second argument cited by James in the body of his question in support of the view that no single *aevum* can serve as measure of all eviternal entities, such an argument based on lack of causation of one eviternal by another appears to have been well known by this time. For instance, one finds the same argument in Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 10, art. 6, obj. 4. There is no reason, therefore, to think that Godfrey would have had to depend on James for his knowledge of it.

In the body of his reply to this question Godfrey refers to a number of objections that might be raised against the view that there is one *aevum* for all eviternal beings. For instance, if something is to serve as measure of other things in a given class, it must virtually include in itself all perfections that might possibly be realized in that class. But if, as some hold, a more perfect separate substance could always be created by God, more perfect than any existent separate substance, it would seem that no given separate substance and therefore, no single *aevum* could serve as measure for all eviternal beings³¹). One might here be reminded of James's citation of the argument according to which that which serves as measure of others must be that which is simplest and the argument's contention that there is no simplest eviternal being, since a simpler one can always be created by God³²). Again, however, there is no need to suggest that Godfrey drew his argument from James's text. First of all, there

²⁹) *Op. cit.*, p. 133:166-75.

³⁰) PB 3.364.

³¹) PB 3.365.

³²) See p. 356 and above.

is some difference between the two. Godfrey's opponent argues for the possibility of creation of ever more perfect beings, while James's text refers to the possibility of ever simpler beings. Moreover, James's argument is presented in more extended fashion by Giles of Rome in his *De mensura angelorum*, q. 2³³). If Godfrey's version of the argument is indeed derived from one based on the possibility of creation of ever simpler beings, he could just have easily taken it from Giles as from James. (Godfrey's reply to this objection is worth noting in passing. Even if it should be true that God could always create a more perfect separate substance, this would not prevent the *aevum* of the most perfect actually existing separate substance from serving as measure of all other actually existing eviternal beings³⁴).

Immediately thereafter Godfrey replies to the objection based on the point that the being of one eviternal entity does not exercise causality on the being of another. He counters that the causality required here need not be restricted to the order of efficiency. For one thing to measure another it is sufficient that it be simpler, more perfect, and more actual than that which it measures, in that it contains within itself and as one that which the others possess in varying degrees and in distributed fashion³⁵).

³³) *Op. cit.*, fol. 40Ra-b. Note in particular : « Si ergo vellemus aliquod aeviternum ratione suae simplicitatis ponere mensuram omnium aliorum, oporteret quod non posset fieri angelus simplicior eo, quod dicimus esse falsum, licet quidam et magis hoc teneant. Nullus enim angelus posset creari ita simpliciter quid (read : quin) posset creari aliquis simplicior ... Ergo si ponimus unum aeviternum mensuram omnium aliorum aeviternorum ratione simplicitatis, oportet quod ibi sit status quantum ad simplicitatem, ut quod non possit fieri aeviternum simplicius. Et quia talem statum non est dare nisi in Deo, quia nullum aeviternum infra Deum est ita simplex, talem unam mensuram non debemus quaerere citra deum. Non est ergo unum aeviternum mensura omnium aeviternorum ».

³⁴) PB 3.365.

³⁵) PB 3.365-66 : « Sed videtur aliud ob stare, scilicet quod motus primi mobilis habet causalitatem super omnes alios motus qui in suo esse ab illo dependent; non sic autem esse unius aeviterni habet causalitatem super esse alterius. Sed hoc non videtur impedire, quia non debet intelligi causalitas dicta in genere causae efficientis proprie dictae solum; nam sufficit quod illud quod debet esse mensura aliorum sit quid simplicius et perfectius sive actualius, ita quod virtute contineat quasi unite quicquid alia continent secundum diversos gradus et divisim, ut patet in albedine respectu omnium colorum et tamen non habet causalitatem super illos dicto modo ».

³⁶) PB 3.366.

Somewhat farther on in his discussion Godfrey makes the point that what measures the *esse* of something may also measure its duration. Since there is a certain order among the angels, that which is the quasi-intrinsic measure of the being of the first angel can be the quasi-extrinsic measure of the being of all other eviternal entities. If the *esse* of one can measure that of another, then the *aevum* of the first can measure the *esse* of the others. Then he observes that if each eviternal entity should enjoy its own *aevum*, the *aevum* of one angel would be the measure of the *aeva* of other angels ³⁶).

Godfrey then refers to certain ones (*aliqui*) who concede this, namely, that each eviternal entity has its own *aevum*, and apparently also, that the *aevum* of one angel will be the measure of the *aeva* of other angels ³⁷). Nevertheless, they deny that the *aevum* of one can serve as measure of the being of another angel because the latter is not caused by the former. Here they maintain that one *aevum* measures another *aevum* in terms of truth, being, and perfection, but that an *aevum* measures an angel or angelic being rather in terms of duration. Because of the difference between measuring in terms of truth, being and perfection, on the one hand, and measuring in terms of duration, on the other, they hold that while one *aevum* measures another *aevum* and *per se*, the *aevum* which measures another *aevum* will not measure the corresponding other eviternal being, not even *per accidens* ³⁸).

Godfrey rejects this view on two counts. First of all, he maintains that one *aevum* cannot in fact measure another *aevum*. Secondly, if the nature of one angel is measure with respect to another, then the measure of the *esse* or duration of the former can serve as measure of the *esse* or duration of the latter. In his effort to establish the first point he argues that a measure is not the measure of a measure. Thus one time cannot be said to be measure of another time, since time is rather the measure of the motion of a mobile entity. So too

³⁷) PB 3.366 : « Quod concedunt aliqui, negantes tamen quod unum aevum sit mensura esse alicuius alterius angeli propter defectum causalitatis ».

³⁸) PB 3.366-67 : « Et, quia secundum aliam rationem mensurandi mensurat unum aevum [omit the comma found in the edited text] aliud scilicet secundum rationem veritatis, entitatis et perfectionis eius, aevum autem mensurat angelum sive esse eius secundum rationem durationis eius et alia est ratio mensurandi sic et sic, ideo dicitur quod, licet unum aevum mensuret aliud *per se*, non tamen sequitur etiam quod *per accidens* aevum mensurans aliud aevum mensuret aeviternum mensuratum ab aevo mensurato ».

the *aevum* can only measure the *esse* of an eviternal entity, not another *aevum* ³⁹).

Without delaying further over Godfrey's discussion of the first and second points referred to in the preceding paragraph, we must rather consider the possibility that it is James to whom Godfrey is here referring. James holds that there are many *aeva*, even though in some qualified sense we may speak of one *aevum*. Moreover, he suggests that if it can be shown that there are many times, then from this plurality of times one may conclude to plurality of *aeva* ⁴⁰). In brief, James maintains that wherever there is motion (*motus*), there too is time. This applies not only to the first motion and the first mobile entity, but to every motion in every changeable entity. Just as in every other class of measure one must distinguish between an intrinsic measure (which is the thing measured and is something absolute, belonging to the genus of quantity), and an extrinsic measure (which is outside the thing measured and is so named because of its relationship to the thing measured), so too one must apply this same distinction to time, the measure of duration. Every motion, therefore, of every changeable thing has its own time, which is its intrinsic measure. But there is also a time which is the extrinsic measure of other times ⁴¹). James argues both from reason and from authority in support of this theory of plurality of times ⁴²).

He then maintains that just as there are many times, so too there are many *aeva* in accord with the plurality of eviternal entities. Each *aevum* will be the measure of a given eviternal entity, just as intrinsic time is the intrinsic measure of a given temporal being ⁴³). However, he refuses to admit that there is a single *aevum* which serves as the extrinsic measure of other *aeva* and other eviternal beings. For something to serve as extrinsic measure in the order of duration it must surpass that which it measures in duration, either in fact as well as by nature, or at least by nature. But no eviternal being enjoys greater duration than another, at least not by nature. Their duration is equal as regards the future, and if not equal as regards the past, this is purely incidental. Hence, the only being

³⁹) PB 3.367.

⁴⁰) *Op. cit.*, p. 133:183-88.

⁴¹) Pp. 133:192-134:208.

⁴²) Pp. 134:222-136:288.

⁴³) Pp. 136:289-137:294.

that can serve as extrinsic measure of other eviternal beings is an eternal one, God himself ⁴⁴). One eviternal (and its *aevum*) may be described as measure of other eviternals in the order of duration only in a qualified sense, namely, insofar as one is simpler than the others ⁴⁵).

Comparison of James's theory with that attributed by Godfrey to his opponent reveals the following. According to each theory, every eviternal being will have its own *aevum*. This of itself, of course, would not suffice to establish interdependence between the two texts, since both Godfrey and James refer to this view and attribute it to others.

According to Godfrey's adversary, one *aevum* will measure another in terms of truth, being, and perfection. But because the eviternal being measured by the first *aevum* does not itself cause the being of other eviternals, it is denied that the *aevum* which measures the first can in any way serve as measure of the eviternal being measured by the second *aevum*. James denies that there is a single *aevum* which can serve as extrinsic measure of other *aeva* and other eviternal beings in the full sense. This is so because there is no single eviternal entity which exceeds the others in terms of duration, at least not by nature. Again, there is no single eviternal being which exercises efficient causality with respect to others ⁴⁶). It is only in a qualified sense that one eviternal being and therefore its *aevum* may be described as measure of other eviternals in the order of duration, that is, insofar as it is simpler. While there is similarity between the two theories in that Godfrey's opponent admits that one *aevum* measures another in terms of truth, being, and perfection and James concedes that one *aevum* measures other eviternals by enjoying greater simplicity, the theories differ in one important respect. Godfrey's opponent will not admit that the *aevum* of one eviternal being can in any way, even *per accidens*, serve as the measure of another eviternal *being*, while James does concede this, albeit in a qualified sense.

In refuting the notion that one *aevum* can really measure another, Godfrey attacks the view that one time can measure another. He does not explicitly attribute either this view or the thesis of plurality

⁴⁴) P. 137:294-310, 317-21.

⁴⁵) P. 138:348-51.

⁴⁶) See p. 138.

of times to the adversary in question here. But because he does take up this point in rebutting the suggestion that one *aevum* can measure another, one might think that his adversary held some such theory. James does hold for plurality of times and for the view that the first time measures all other times as well as other temporal beings. But for the differences between the two theories indicated in the preceding paragraph, one might at least suspect that Godfrey had James in mind in this discussion of plurality of times. Given the absence of stronger evidence, however, and in the light of the difference between the theories to which we have referred in the preceding paragraph, it would be difficult to prove that Godfrey was explicitly referring to James's Quodlibet 1, q. 9 either here or elsewhere in his own Quodlibet 7, q. 8.

Godfrey, Quodlibet 8, and James, Quodlibet 1

According to the same doctrinal table, in Quodlibet 8, q. 2, Godfrey argues against Henry of Ghent that one and the same thing cannot be active and passive. There Godfrey treats of the will, and also maintains that a subject is in no way the efficient cause of its accidents. According to the table, Godfrey refutes two positions here, one of which our anonymous author judges to be *bene probabilis*, and another, attributed to James in his first Quodlibet, which is styled *satis improbabilis* ⁴⁷).

In turning to Godfrey's text one does find him referring to a second theory advanced by some, according to which the will and intellect would in some way actualize themselves even with respect to their first acts. This would be so in the case of the will because certain *affectiones* are posited therein by means of which it can actualize itself in accord with the manner and condition of those dispositions (*affectus*) which it possesses. So too, certain species (*species ab obiecto*) are postulated in the possible intellect by means of which it may actualize itself with respect to a given object. Moreover, a subject may be described as efficient cause with respect to its accidents

⁴⁷) *Op. cit.*, p. 430. «Item, quaestione secunda, contra HENRICUM, quod nihil unum et idem sit activum et passivum. Et ibi multa de voluntate, ut supra de motu voluntatis significatur; et quod subiectum nullo modo est causa effectiva sui accidentis. Hoc quaestione secunda et ibi contra duas positiones, quarum prima est bene probabilis et alia est JACOBI in primo quodlibet suo, satis improbabilis, arguit».

in one sense, though not in another. If it is considered insofar as it is something in act and possessed of its form, its accidents naturally follow from it. Therefore, when it is considered in terms of its actuality, it may be said in some way to serve as the efficient cause with respect to its accidents. Not so, however, when it is viewed only insofar as it is something in potency ⁴⁸). If by efficient cause we have in mind not that which acts but that by means of which something acts, then we may regard the nature of a thing as an instrument (*organum*) of the generating and efficient cause with respect to those accidents that follow from its nature. Still such accidents are caused by their generating principle in the primary sense (*principaliter*), but derive in some way from the nature of the subject ⁴⁹). Thus, because intellect and will naturally follow upon the essence of the soul and of an angel, the essence of such entities in some way may be said to serve as efficient cause of such powers ⁵⁰).

In *Quodlibet I*, q. 7, James presents a theory according to which there are certain *affectiones* in the will whereby it may be said to move itself ⁵¹). James prefers to describe this kind of self-motion as motion in the order of formal causality rather than efficient causality ⁵²). He also notes that if such self-motion is not self-motion in the order of efficient causality strictly speaking, still, if one wishes to employ the term efficiency in a manner similar to that whereby a subject is said to be efficient cause of its proper accidents, such may be done. Such accidents are said to be caused by and to flow from their subject. It is because they are always in the subject and follow from it that they may be said to be caused by it. Nonetheless, their subject is not their efficient cause in the strict sense. Their efficient cause in the strict sense is rather that which efficiently

⁴⁸) *Les Philosophes Belges*, T. 4 : *Le huitième quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines*, ed. J. Hoffmans (Louvain, 1925), p. 25 (PB 4.25). Note in particular : « Et secundum hoc dicitur quod non est inconueniens materiam vel subiectum aliquo modo coincidere cum causa efficiente et aliquo modo non coincidere; quia si consideretur subiectum ut est in potentia, non est causa efficiens suorum accidentium ...; sed si consideretur ut est quid in actu, sic dicitur esse causa efficiens talium accidentium ... »

⁴⁹) PB 4.25.

⁵⁰) PB 4.26.

⁵¹) *Op. cit.*, pp. 95:515-96:579. For fuller discussion of these *affectiones* in the will and analogous *idoneitates* in the senses and in the intellect, see pp. 90:370-94:492. Also see Casado, *op. cit.* 165 (1953), pp. 132-40; 283-89.

⁵²) *Op. cit.*, p. 95:525-41.

produces the subject. By causing it, it also causes those accidents which necessarily follow from it ⁵³).

There is some similarity, at least, between the theory presented and rejected by Godfrey, and that defended by James. The will is said to actualize itself (Godfrey) or to move itself (James) by means of certain *affectiones* therein. According to Godfrey's adversary, certain species are postulated in the possible intellect by means of which it can actualize itself with respect to given objects. The same seems to be suggested by certain remarks in James's treatment ⁵⁴). This point is explicitly developed in Quodlibet 1, q. 12, where James appeals to the same general theory to show that the intellect moves itself by means of certain *aptitudines* found therein ⁵⁵). Both Godfrey's adversary and James admit that a subject may be described as efficient cause of its accidents in some qualified way, although not in the primary or strictest sense.

Given these similarities, one might indeed suspect that Godfrey is here referring to James's theory. We are not convinced, however, that the similarities are sufficiently great of themselves to establish beyond doubt that Godfrey had direct access to James's Quodlibet 1, q. 7 and/or q. 12. For instance, there are further precisions and nuances in James's exposition not found in Godfrey's presentation. Consider, for instance, the various ways in which the motion of the will is described by James in an important summarizing passage in Quodlibet 1, q. 7. Here he draws an analogy with the motion of a heavy body. It is moved by itself formally, by its generating principle efficiently and *per se*, and by itself efficiently but only *per accidens*, insofar as it moves the surrounding medium efficiently and *per se*,

⁵³) *Op. cit.*, p. 96:543-53.

⁵⁴) *Op. cit.*, p. 93:453-56. « Similiter autem et potentia intellectiva est idoneitas generalis respectu omnium intelligibilium, idest respectu conformationis actualis ad omnia intelligibilia. Sed super hanc generalem idoneitatem fundantur aliae speciales secundum diversitatem intelligibilium ».

⁵⁵) See pp. 166-68, and note especially 167:350-57 : « Sicut igitur voluntas movet se suis affectionibus, sic intellectus movet se suis aptitudinibus, et similiter sensus. Et sicut eadem potentia voluntatis est movens et mota, et activa et passiva, sic et eadem potentia intellectus est activa et passiva, et movens et mota. Eodem itaque modo et uniformiter ponendum est aliquid activum in omnibus huiusmodi potentiis, quia ipsa potentia cum suis aptitudinibus, secundum quod nata est perfici per ultiores actus, dicitur possibilis, secundum vero quod ad illos actus movet se, non quidem efficienter, sed formaliter, dicitur agens ».

and thus moves itself by removing an obstacle to its motion. So too, the will is moved by itself *per se* and in the order of formal causality, by God efficiently and *per se*, and finally, by itself efficiently, but only *per accidens*, insofar as it moves the intellect *per se* without which the will itself would not be moved. Or, to speak more properly, man moves himself by means of his will in these ways ⁵⁶). Again, we do not find sufficient evidence of direct *textual* interdependence here. If this were the strongest evidence that could be mustered to show that in Quodlibet 8 Godfrey had direct access to James's Quodlibet 1, the issue might still remain in doubt. Similarities of the kind that we have found here could be based on Godfrey's reference to some other works, perhaps, or even on an oral or written report as to what James (or some other thinker) had said, for instance, in one of his exercises as a Bachelor rather than as a *Magister regens*.

According to the doctrinal table, in Quodlibet 8, q. 3, Godfrey opposes Henry of Ghent's views on eternal quiddities as well as his way of distinguishing between *esse essentiae* and *esse existentiae* based on a difference between being related to God as exemplar cause and as efficient cause. There, too, according to our anonymous author, Godfrey attacks and destroys the position of James in his first Quodlibet. This refutation of James is said to take place near the end of Godfrey's discussion in q. 3 ⁵⁷).

Fairly near the end of Quodlibet 8, q. 3, Godfrey refers to another unacceptable answer to the question at issue there: whether the essence of a creature (or the creature itself) is a real thing (*vera res*) before it actually exists. As the following textual comparisons will show, there is striking similarity between Godfrey's exposition of this particular theory and certain passages in James's Quodlibet 1, q. 5.

⁵⁶) *Op. cit.*, p. 98:641-49.

⁵⁷) *Op. cit.*, p. 430. « Item, quaestione tertia, contra HENRICUM, de quidditatibus aeternis fortiter. Et contra EUNDEM similiter nono quodlibet, quaestione sexta, diffuse; et quaestione praedicta destruit illam positionem HENRICI, quia distinguit esse essentiae et esse existentiae secundum relationes ad Deum sub ratione exemplaris et efficientis. Ibi dividit suo modo ens in potentiam et actum, et respondet rationibus HENRICI omnibus multum bene. Ibi etiam contra positionem JACOBI in primo quodlibet suo arguit et eam destruit, fere in fine ».

Godfrey (PB 4.48)

James (62:1-63:42)

Per praedicta patet quod non videtur conveniens responsio ad hanc quaestionem: utrum essentia creaturae vel creatura antequam sit in actu sit vera res, quando dicitur quod res antequam sit in actu et in sua natura est in Dei scientia dupliciter: uno modo enim Deus intelligit res ut sunt in eius essentia ut essentia, et alio modo ut sunt in eius essentia ut potentia;

Quinto quaeritur: Utrum essentia creaturae antequam habeat esse in effectu sit verum ens reale ... Deus autem creaturas cognoscit, cognoscendo essentiam suam ... Non autem cognosceret alia per essentiam suam, nisi aliquo modo essent in sua essentia. Essentia vero divina potest dupliciter considerari. Uno modo ut essentia est, alio modo ut potentia et causa est. Et secundum hanc duplicem considerationem entia creata dupliciter sunt in Dei essentia. Sunt enim in ipsa ut essentia est, quia Deus illa est. Et sunt in ipsa ut est causa et potentia, quia Deus illa producere et causare potest ... Et sic etiam dupliciter sunt in Dei scientia.

In Godfrey's text we appear to have a concise summary of James's theory. As summarized by Godfrey, this view maintains that prior to its actual creation a thing may be said to be within the divine knowledge in two ways: 1) insofar as God knows the thing as within his essence and as identified with it; 2) insofar as God knows the thing as within the divine essence taken as a power.

James's text provides us with more details as to this aspect of his theory. He begins by recalling that God knows creatures by knowing his essence. But he can know things distinct from himself by means of his essence only if they are in that essence in some way. The divine essence itself can be considered in two ways: 1) insofar as it is an essence; 2) insofar as it is a power and a cause. Corresponding to this twofold way in which the divine essence can be considered, created beings are said to be therein in two ways. 1) They are in the divine essence taken as essence, because, when viewed in this way, God may be said to be these things. 2) They are in the divine essence taken as cause and power, because God can cause and produce them.

Then, in a part of his text which we have not reproduced here, James notes that God may be said to be such things in a supereminent

way, but he can also cause them. Insofar as creatures are said to be in the divine essence in the first way, taken precisely as essence, they are really identical with that essence. Viewed in this way the creature in God is nothing but the creative essence, for the essence as such does not entail any relation to something other than God. Insofar as they are viewed in the second way, as in God taken as power and cause, then they are considered as other than and distinct from God. To be a power and a cause bespeaks a relationship to something that is other and distinct⁵⁸). This is why James then notes that God knows things in both ways, that is, insofar as they are in the divine essence, and insofar as they are in the divine power. In other words, as one reads in both texts, they are in the divine science in these two ways. So far, then, Godfrey's text has presented us with a succinct summary of James's reasons for saying that something may be said to be in the divine knowledge in these two ways. Godfrey continues by giving us selected verbatim citations from James's text.

Godfrey (ibid.)

et primo modo intelligere creaturas est intelligere eas ut non distinguuntur a Deo, secundo autem modo est intelligere eas ut sunt aliae et distinctae ab Eo; si ergo accipitur creatura ut non est a Deo distincta, sic est res vera simpliciter, quia est illa divina essentia; si vero accipiat creatura ut est a Deo distincta, sic est res aliqua non simpliciter sed cum determinatione, scilicet ut obiectum cognitum.

James (63:43-61)

Et primo quidem modo intelligere creaturas, est intelligere eas ut non distinguuntur ab ipso; ... Secundo autem modo intelligere ipsas, est intelligere eas ut sunt aliae et distinctae ab ipso ... Si accipitur creatura ut non est a Deo distincta, sic manifestum est quod est vera res, quia est ipsa divina essentia ... Si vero accipiat creatura ut est a Deo distincta, sic habet difficultatem quaestio proposita ... Et videtur esse dicendum quod creatura vel essentia creaturae antequam sit in actu, est res aliqua non simpliciter sed cum determinatione, scilicet ut obiectum cognitum.

⁵⁸) *Op. cit.*, p. 63:31-41.

The close parallelism between these two passages can hardly be explained otherwise than by appealing to some kind of textual interdependency. The evidence appears to indicate that Godfrey is here citing and in part summarizing James. James is clearly presenting his own theory and Godfrey is just as clearly presenting the theory of someone else, a theory that he himself is about to criticize. Consequently, the close similarity between the two texts can hardly be accounted for by appealing to some third source, known both to Godfrey and to James, which each would have cited literally.

Given Godfrey's penchant for abbreviating the texts of others ⁵⁹), we are more inclined to believe that it is Godfrey himself who has so carefully summarized James here, rather than some unknown *abbreviator* whom Godfrey would merely be quoting. In this particular instance, Godfrey has cited James literally, but has omitted some explanatory comments that are found in James's text. For instance, after observing that for God to know creatures in the first way is for him to understand them as not distinguished from himself, James adds the comment that for God to understand creatures in this way is nothing else than for him to understand his own perfections ⁶⁰). Godfrey literally reproduces the main point, but omits the explanatory comment. Then after stating that for God to know creatures in the second way is for him to understand them as other and as distinct from himself, James again adds some explanatory remarks. He observes that to understand creatures in this second way is to understand them in the proper sense. And he then repeats the general question at issue here, before beginning to make his application ⁶¹). Godfrey

⁵⁹) See, for instance, Bruce Braswell, « Godfrey of Fontaines' Abridgement of Boetius of Dacia's 'Quaestiones supra librum Topicorum Aristotelis' », *Mediaeval Studies* 26 (1964), pp. 302-14; Paul Wilpert, « Ein Compendium des 13. Jahrhunderts », *Mittelalterliches Jahrbuch* 2 (1965), pp. 165-80 (on Godfrey's abridgement of Boetius of Dacia's *De aeternitate mundi*). For fuller discussion of Godfrey's well known student notebook see P. Glorieux, « Un recueil scolaire de Godefroid de Fontaines », *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 3 (1931), pp. 37-53; J.J. DUIN, *La doctrine de la providence dans les écrits de Siger de Brabant* (Louvain, 1954), pp. 130-35. For a description of the contents of Godfrey's philosophical library in the light of the surviving manuscripts of the same see Duin, « La bibliothèque philosophique de Godefroid de Fontaines », *Estudios Lulianos* 3 (1959), pp. 21-36; 137-60. In the present case we appear to have an interesting illustration of Godfrey's readiness to summarize carefully an opposing position before subjecting it to criticism.

⁶⁰) *Op. cit.*, p. 63:44-45.

⁶¹) *Op. cit.*, p. 63:48-49.

limits himself to a literal citation of the main point again, the statement that for God to know creatures in the second way is for him to understand them as other and as distinct from himself.

Godfrey then immediately moves to James's application of this theory to the question at issue. In short, as we read in both texts, if the creature is taken as something which is not distinct from God, then it will indeed be a real thing (*res vera* in Godfrey, *vera res* in James) because it is identical with that essence itself. This, it will be recalled, is the point under discussion here, to determine whether a creature is a real thing prior to its actual existence. But, the two texts continue, if the creature is taken as something distinct from God, then it is not a real thing without qualification, but only with this specification, insofar as it is an object of cognition. Again, Godfrey has eliminated some passages of an explanatory and repetitious nature ⁶²).

Then, although he omits a few lines in which James recalls his distinction between the two ways in which something can be in the divine knowledge, Godfrey again reproduces James's text, almost verbatim ⁶³).

Godfrey (ibid.)

si enim Deus cognoscit creaturas antequam sint et ut sunt ab illo aliae et distinctae, id autem quod intelligitur est obiectum cognitum, quod quidem oportet aliquid esse; quod enim nullo modo est, non intelligitur; manifestum est ergo quod creatura antequam sit in effectu est aliquid ut obiectum cognitum aliud a Deo cognoscente, quia ut sic cognoscitur a Deo per suam essentiam ut scilicet essentia causa est ipsius creaturae;

James (64:65-92)

Si ergo Deus cognoscit creaturas antequam sint, etiam ut sunt ab ipso aliae et distinctae, id autem quod intelligitur est obiectum cognitum, quod quidem oportet aliquid esse. Nam quod nullo modo est et omnino nihil est, non intelligitur; manifestum est quod creatura, etiam antequam sit in effectu, est aliquid ut obiectum cognitum ... Et secundum hoc dicendum quod in cognitione, qua Deus cognoscit creaturas per suam essentiam ut causa est, ipsa essentia et est obiectum cognitum et est ratio cognoscendi effectum, scilicet creaturam.

⁶²) See JAMES, *op. cit.*, p. 63:54-59.

⁶³) See JAMES, *op. cit.*, pp. 63:61-64:65.

According to both texts, if God is said to know creatures before they actually exist in distinction from him, that which is understood is still an object of knowledge (*obiectum cognitum*). For something to be an object of knowledge, however, it must be something (*aliquid*). That which is in no way at all (and is absolute nothingness, according to James's text) cannot be understood. Therefore, it will follow that a creature before its own actual existence must be something insofar as it is known by God. According to Godfrey's version, such will be true of it because it is known by God by means of his essence, insofar as his essence is viewed as cause of the creature. Here Godfrey has briefly summarized a more extended discussion by James where he explains the mode of God's knowledge of things other than himself. By knowing his essence not merely as essence but also as cause, he knows other things⁶⁴). Then, in a passage which we have reproduced in our text above, James observes that in this knowledge whereby God knows creatures by knowing his essence insofar as it is a cause, the divine essence is both the object known and the reason for knowing the effect, namely, the creature.

At this point Godfrey cites another sentence from James's text and then concludes his description of the theory with a summarizing statement.

Godfrey (pp. 48-49)

semper autem id quod est ratio cognoscendi alicuius sicut causa exigit aliquid aliud cognitum, quia sicut nihil est causa sui ipsius, sic nihil est ratio cognoscendi se ipsum sicut causa. Ergo creatura antequam sit in effectum est realis res aliqua ut obiectum; prout etiam ab aliquibus dicitur quod creaturae antequam sint in effectum sunt verae res ut exemplatae, quia oportet ideam et ideatum, exemplar et exemplatum esse distincta cum dicantur relate.

James (64:92-65:112)

Semper autem id quod est ratio cognoscendi sicut causa, exigit aliquid aliud cognitum; cuius ratio est quia, sicut nihil est causa sui ipsius, sic nihil est ratio cognoscendi seipsum sicut causa ... Quare creatura, antequam sit in effectum, est res aliqua ut obiectum cognitum, etiam ut est a Deo alia et distincta. Et hoc satis redit in idem cum eo, quod ab aliquibus dicitur; quod creaturae, antequam sint in effectum, sunt verae res ut exemplatae ... quia oportet

⁶⁴) *Op. cit.*, p. 64:70-89.

ideam et ideatum, exemplar et exemplatum esse distincta, cum dicantur relativae, manifestum est quod creaturae, antequam habeant esse in effectum, sunt verae res ut exemplatae.

According to our two texts, if something is to serve as the reason for knowing insofar as it is viewed as a cause, it demands something else to serve as that which is known. This is so because, just as nothing can cause itself, so too, nothing can serve as the reason for knowing itself as a cause. Godfrey's text immediately draws the conclusion, that the creature before its actual existence is still a real thing insofar as it is taken as an object. After some further explanations which Godfrey has omitted from his résumé, James arrives at the same conclusion. His text includes the specification that the creature, before its actual existence, is a real thing insofar as it is taken as known object (of divine knowledge), and as other than and distinct from God. This final point is here omitted by Godfrey, although it would follow from his presentation of the theory.

Interestingly enough, both James and Godfrey's summary connect this theory of James with another, according to which creatures, before their actual existence, may be described as true things insofar as they are related to the divine essence and the divine ideas as their exemplar cause. This is so because of the need to distinguish between the exemplar and that which depends on it as exemplar. Again, although Godfrey's text is more succinct, the similarity between the two versions is noteworthy in their common recognition of the compatibility of James's theory with what appears to be the view of Henry of Ghent ⁶⁵).

In the light of the close parallelism between James's presentation of his theory in Quodlibet 1, q. 5, and Godfrey's account of the same in Quodlibet 8, q. 3, it would seem this time that our anonymous

⁶⁵) For explicit identification of this view as exposed in this context by James with that of Henry of Ghent, see J. Benes, «Valor 'Possibilium' apud S. Thomam, Henricum Gandavensem, B. Iacobum de Viterbio», *Divus Thomas* 4 (1927), p. 350. For Godfrey's criticisms of James's theory, see PB 4.49-50. As the doctrinal table indicates, the major part of this Quodlibet 8, q. 3, is directed against Henry of Ghent (see n. 57 above). For more on Godfrey's criticisms of Henry on this point, see the monograph on Godfrey's metaphysics which we are presently preparing for publication.

doctrinal table is correct. In Quodlibet 8, q. 3, Godfrey does indeed appear to know James's Quodlibet 1. The textual similarity is so great that Godfrey must have had James's text before him in Quodlibet 8, q. 3, or else a very accurate summary made by someone else. As we have indicated above, we lean to the first alternative. But in either event, whether Godfrey himself summarized James's text, or whether he reproduced a summary made by another, the more important point for our present purposes remains. Godfrey, in a work which is normally dated in 1291, cites an account taken from James's first Quodlibet, a work which is generally placed by recent writers in 1293 at the earliest.

Since one can hardly remain content with the suggestion that Godfrey was citing an as yet undelivered and unwritten quodlibetal question, other alternatives must now be considered. Two possibilities immediately come to mind: 1) Perhaps James's Quodlibet was not delivered in 1293, but earlier. 2) Perhaps Godfrey's Quodlibet 8 was not presented until 1293, or later.

The Date of James's Quodlibet 1

As we have already indicated in the opening lines of this study, Ypma places James's promotion as Magister in theology at Paris c. Easter, 1293. Since only Masters in theology could conduct official quodlibetal debates there, it would follow that James's first Quodlibet could not be dated prior to 1293. Both Ypma and Gutiérrez cite the records of the chapter of the Roman province of the Augustinians, held in May, on the feast of Pentecost, 1293. According to these records a sizable grant was provided for James by the Roman province, to support him in his work and to meet the expenses arising from his recent promotion as Master in theology at Paris ⁶⁶). Gutiérrez

⁶⁶) See YPMA, *Jacobi de Viterbio O.E.S.A. disputatio prima de quolibet*, p. v and n. 1; Gutiérrez, *De B. Iacobi Viterbiensis O.E.S.A. vita, operibus et doctrina theologica* (Rome, 1939), p. 15. For the *Acta* see *Analecta Augustiniana* 2 (1907/08), pp. 345-46: «Diffinimus et ordinamus et gratiose concedimus quod frater Jacobus de Viterbio, nuper factus et licentiatu doctor in sacra theologia Parisius, habeat a provincia pro adjutorio sui principii et sui studii quinquaginta florenos auri. Ita tamen quod hoc anno praesenti habeat medietatem et aliam medietatem in anno futuro ... Haec est collecta imposita ... pro fr. Jacobo de Viterbio, magistro nostro novo, pro provisione sua annuali, viii flor auri; ... Pro fratre Jacobo de Viterbio, Magistro nostro, pro expensis promotionis Magisterii sui, hoc anno xxv flor».

specifies that this promotion did not take place near the end of 1292 but c. Easter, 1293, both because this was the time set aside for conferring such degrees, and because of the language of the *Acta* to which we have just referred: *nuper factus et licentiatuſ doctor in ſacra theologia Parisiuſ* ⁶⁷⁾. Moreover, ſhould one be inclined to interpret the term *nuper* very broadly ſo as to refer to an event in the more diſtant paſt, for inſtance, in 1291, other references in the *Acta* of the Order point to the contrary. Thus in September, 1291, and again, in October, 1292, James is referred to as a Bachelor ⁶⁸⁾. Conſequentially, unleſs theſe records are completely miſtaken on the queſtion of James's proper title during this period, it will follow that he was not promoted until after October, 1292, and before May, 1293. Or to put it more conſervatively, it will follow that news of his promotion had not reached the Roman province in October, 1292, but had done ſo by Pentecoſt, 1293.

At leaſt part of this evidence, that iſ, the 1293 reference to James as a « new Maſter », appears to have moved Glorieux to propoſe 1293 as the date for James's promotion ⁶⁹⁾. Preſumably, therefore, Lottin would have been aware of this ſame evidence when he ſuggeſted that James's firſt Quodlibet be redated in 1291. As we have already

⁶⁷⁾ *Op. cit.*, p. 15. For others who place James's promotion in 1293 and preſumably therefore his firſt Quodlibet in that ſame year ſee : F. Caſado, « El pensamiento filoſófico del beato Santiago de Viterbo », *La Ciudad de Dios* 163 (1951), p. 437; C. Scanzillo, « La prima quaestio diſputata 'De Verbo' del codice A. 971 della Biblioteca dell'Archiginasio di Bologna », *Asprenas* 19 (1972), pp. 25-26. F. Ruello follows Ypma in placing James's four quodlibetal diſputes in 1293-1296 in his « L'analogie de l'être ſelon Jacques de Viterbe, Quodlibet I, Quaestio I », *Augustiniana* 20 (1970), p. 145, n. 1.

⁶⁸⁾ For the reference of September, 1291, ſee *Analecta Augustiniana* 2 (1907/08), p. 324 : « Pro fratre Jacobo Viterbiensi, Baccellario parisiensi, pro anno praeterito et futuro, xvi florenos de auro ». For the reference of October, 1292, *op. cit.*, p. 341 : « Pro fratre Jacobo Viterbiensi, Baccellario parisiensi, pro ordinata provisione, viii flor ».

⁶⁹⁾ *La littérature quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320*, T. 1, p. 214. Note that he miſtakenly refers to the Provincial chapter of 1293 as a General chapter of the Order, and that he cites the following text from Denifle-Chatelain, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, T. II (Paris, 1891), p. 62 : « pro fratre Jacobo de Viterbio magistro nostro novo ». Then, according to Glorieux, ſtill literally citing the *Chartularium*, the chapter provided an additional 25 florins « pro expensis promotionis magisterii ſui hoc anno ». The omiſſion of the comma between *ſui* and *hoc* of the laſt citation would make even ſtronger the implication that James had been promoted in that very year. But as punctuated in the text as found in the *Analecta Augustiniana*, the *hoc anno* would refer to the time when the florins were to be granted rather than to the time of James's promotion. See n. 66.

seen, Lottin regarded the dates of Godfrey's Quodlibets as more surely established than those of James. If Godfrey did refer to James's first Quodlibet in his own Quodlibets 7 and 8, and if they truly date from 1290 and 1291, then it will follow that James's Quodlibet 1 can be no later than 1290. For some reason, Lottin was content to place it in 1291 ⁷⁰). As we have seen, the alleged references by Godfrey in his Quodlibet 7 to James's Quodlibet 1 appear to be doubtful. Given the unequivocal reference to James's Quodlibet 1 in Godfrey's Quodlibet 8, q. 3, however, our problem remains. Are we to redate James's Quodlibet 1 and place it in 1291 in spite of the evidence recorded in the *Acta* of the Augustinians for this period? Or are we to redate Godfrey's Quodlibet 8? In order to answer this, we must now attempt to evaluate the evidence for the latter. Perhaps then we will be in better position to determine which evidence is stronger: that pointing to 1291 as the date for Godfrey's Quodlibet 8, or that pointing to 1293 as the date for James's promotion and Quodlibet 1.

The Date of Godfrey's Quodlibet 8

In order to assess more accurately the evidence offered by Glorieux for the date of 1291 for Quodlibet 8, we will distinguish between that offered for the *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ante quem* respectively. As regards the *terminus a quo*, Glorieux dates Quodlibet 6 in 1289 for two reasons. In one manuscript there is a marginal note indicating that in Quodlibet 6, q. 7, Godfrey is refuting John of Murro. Since John did not receive the title of *Magister* until the beginning of 1289, Quodlibet 6 should not be dated prior to that time ⁷¹). Again, Glorieux maintains that Godfrey's Quodlibet 6 is posterior to Henry of Ghent's Quodlibet 13. Lottin has offered more detailed evidence for this same point by showing that in Quodlibet 6, q. 7, Godfrey literally cites a passage from Henry of Ghent's Quodlibet 13, q. 11. If Henry's Quodlibet 13 dates from Easter, 1289, then Godfrey's Quodlibet 6 cannot be prior to that date ⁷²). Conse-

⁷⁰) Perhaps he shared our doubts about references in Godfrey's Quodlibet 7 to James's Quodlibet 1.

⁷¹) *Op. cit.*, p. 150.

⁷²) GLORIEUX, *op. cit.*, p. 150; LOTTIN, *Psychologie et morale* ..., T. 1 (Louvain, 1942), pp. 307-08, n. 4. Lottin places Godfrey's Quodlibet 6 at Christmas, 1289.

quently, if Godfrey conducted one quodlibetal debate per year at this time, then Godfrey's Quodlibets 7 and 8 will have to be subsequent to 1289 and will fall in 1290 and 1291 respectively ⁷³). Further evidence as to the *terminus a quo* has been offered by Lottin with respect to Godfrey's Quodlibet 8. In Quodlibet 8, q. 16, he finds Godfrey citing Henry's Quodlibet 14, q. 5 ⁷⁴). Since the latter is dated in December, 1290, the implication again is that Godfrey's Quodlibet 8 should be subsequent to that date and, therefore, might well fall in 1291 ⁷⁵).

As regards our particular problem, Godfrey's citation of James's Quodlibet 1 in his Quodlibet 8, the determination of the *terminus ante quem* is more crucial. One might well agree with Glorieux and Lottin that Godfrey's Quodlibet 8 falls after 1290, but might suggest that there was an interval between Quodlibets 7 and 8, and therefore that Quodlibet 8 was not delivered until 1293 or thereafter. In attempting to determine the dates for subsequent Quodlibets, Glorieux cites an allusion to the abdication of Pope Celestine V and the controversies surrounding the same in Godfrey's Quodlibet 12, q. 4. Since the abdication dates from December 13, 1294, he suggests that Quodlibet 12 be placed in 1295 ⁷⁶). Still, one might wonder, why not place it a year or two later? In any event, he then writes that Quodlibet 13 is certainly prior to 1297. In Quodlibet 13, q. 7 there is reference to legislation in force since the time of Gregory X, which was modified by Boniface VIII in his constitution *Cum ex eo quod felicitis* of March 3, 1298. He refers to Pelzer's discussion of this same point. Here, however, it should be noted that Pelzer concludes that Quodlibet 13 can be dated no later than 1297, whereas Glorieux maintains, on the strength of the same evidence, that it must be prior to 1297 ⁷⁷). Glorieux finds further confirmation for a 1296

⁷³) GLORIEUX, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

⁷⁴) *Op. cit.*, p. 314 and n. 5.

⁷⁵) On the dates of Henry's Quodlibets see GLORIEUX, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-93; 177-99. On the date of Quodlibet 14, see p. 93. Also see J. Gómez Caffarena, «Cronología de la Suma de Enrique de Gante por relación a sus Quodlibetos», *Gregorianum* 38 (1957), p. 133.

⁷⁶) *Op. cit.*, p. 150.

⁷⁷) For GLORIEUX, see *op. cit.*, p. 150. For Pelzer see his «Godefroid de Fontaines. Les manuscrits de ses Quodlibets conservés à la Vaticane et dans quelques autres bibliothèques», *Revue Néo-Scholastique de Philosophie* 20 (1913), p. 503. Pelzer cites a marginal note in one manuscript (*Vat. lat.* 1032) which adverts to the new legislation. Hoffmans finds the same in a Paris Ms. and notes its importance in enabling Pelzer to date Quodlibet 13 no later than 1297. See *Les Philosophes Belges*, T. 14, p. 160.

dating in some manuscript marginal references in Quodlibet 13, q. 3 to James of Viterbo. Since he here holds that James was probably conducting quodlibetal debates in 1294-1295, he suggests that Godfrey's Quodlibet 13 should be placed fairly close to that time, that is, in 1296. Finally, Glorieux finds splendid confirmation for all of this if one distributes Godfrey's Quodlibets on the basis of one per year, starting from 1290 as the date of Quodlibet 7. Quodlibet 8 will therefore fall in 1291, Quodlibet 9 in 1292, Quodlibet 10 in 1293, Quodlibet 11 in 1294, Quodlibet 12 in 1295 and therefore after the abdication of Celestine V, and Quodlibet 13 will fall in 1296 ⁷⁸).

In evaluating the evidence for 1291 as the date of Quodlibet 8, we are more satisfied with that offered for the *terminus a quo* than for the *terminus ante quem*. There appear to be at least three assumptions in the case for the *terminus ante quem*. First, because Quodlibet 12, q. 4, knows of the abdication of Celestine V and because the latter dates from December 13, 1294, Godfrey's discussion of the same should be placed in 1295. Again, because Quodlibet 13, q. 7 appeals to legislation which was modified by Boniface VIII in March, 1298, Quodlibet 13 must be prior to 1297. Finally, at this point in his career, Godfrey's Quodlibets are to be distributed on the basis of one per year ⁷⁹).

As to the first point, in an earlier section of his book Glorieux discusses the value of allusions to contemporary events in determining dates of quodlibetal questions. There he proposes two rules of interpretation for the same. First, reference to a particular historical event justifies one in concluding that the quodlibet is posterior to that event. Second, such a reference permits one to conclude that this particular Quodlibet is the first to be sustained by the Master in question after the event has taken place. In support of the second rule, he comments that a given event loses its sense of *actualité* within a year, often even within six months. So long as the Master has not made a public pronouncement with respect to such an event, a question

⁷⁸) *Op. cit.*, pp. 150-51.

⁷⁹) The added point, that Quodlibet 13 should be placed in 1296 because of suggested references therein to James of Viterbo, appears to be particularly weak. There was nothing to prevent one Master from referring to views exposed by another some years earlier. Moreover, we have already presented evidence indicating that Godfrey had cited James in Quodlibet 8. This does not preclude a later reference, e.g., in Quodlibet 13.

relating to it might well be raised by someone at his first subsequent quodlibetal debate. But once this occasion has presented itself, what point would there be in neglecting to refer to it at that time and then in doing so at some later quodlibetal session? In addition to this rather a priori justification of the second rule, Glorieux appeals to empirical evidence. In every case where we have certain evidence as to the date of a particular Quodlibet and find one of its questions treating of such a known historical contemporary event, we find that this Quodlibet is indeed the first to be conducted by the Master after that event ⁸⁰).

It would seem, therefore, that Glorieux is appealing to this second rule in dating Quodlibet 12 in 1295. Because Quodlibet 12 knows of the abdication of Celestine V in December, 1294, it must be Godfrey's first quodlibetal debate after that event, and therefore will likely fall in 1295. As regards the application of Glorieux's rule to this case, one might grant the rule but suggest that Godfrey conducted no quodlibetal debate for a year or two, thereby placing Quodlibet 12 in 1296 or 1297. Even so, if the rule is valid, Quodlibet 11 could not have been conducted after December, 1294, since it does not refer to Celestine's abdication. Hence, if it falls in 1294, Quodlibet 8 can be no later than the academic year 1291-92, according to Glorieux's third assumption, namely, that Godfrey's Quodlibets are to be distributed at the rate of one per academic year ⁸¹).

On the other hand, one might question the validity of this second rule of interpretation. Granted that it is very likely that such a reference to a contemporary event would appear in a given Master's next quodlibetal intervention, must this be the case? Even if Glorieux has found no evidence of reference to a given historical event by a particular Master in any Quodlibet but his first after that event, why assume that such could not happen? In this particular case, might not some reference be made by Godfrey to Celestine's abdication

⁸⁰) *Op. cit.*, pp. 80-81. For examples of this final point, see p. 81, n. 2.

⁸¹) Granted that Glorieux has assigned Quodlibets 7 through 13 on the basis of one for each calendar year, the underlying principle applied here is really that they be assigned at the rate of one per academic year. See the references in n. 85 below and note that Glorieux himself appeals to and finds verification of the principle of one quodlibetal debate per academic year in his discussion of the dates of Henry of Ghent's Quodlibets (*op. cit.*, p. 89 and n. 2). Note also that he assigns Henry's Quodlibets 9 and 10 to different academic years, but to the same calendar year, namely, 1286 at Easter and Christmas respectively (pp. 91-92).

in 1296 or later, even though the point had not been raised in his quodlibetal dispute of 1295? It might have been raised in 1296 precisely because it was then being discussed by another Master or other Masters. Thus, on Glorieux's own testimony, the same point was discussed by Peter of Auvergne in 1296, in his first Quodlibet⁸²).

As regards Glorieux's second assumption in establishing the *terminus ante quem* for Quodlibet 8, we have already indicated one important difference between his interpretation and that of Pelzer with respect to the evidence available here. Because of reference in Quodlibet 13, q. 7 to legislation which was modified by Boniface VIII in March, 1298, Pelzer concluded that Quodlibet 13 can be no later than 1297. For some reason, Glorieux concludes that Quodlibet 13 must be prior to 1297⁸³). Here Glorieux seems to have gone beyond the evidence. The most that one can safely deduce from this is that Quodlibet 13 can be no later than December, 1297, as Pelzer suggested, or possibly that it can be no later than Lent, 1298, because of a certain period of time required for news of the legislation of March 3, 1298, to reach Paris and the fact that Easter fell on April 6 in 1298. In any event, if Quodlibet 13 falls within the academic year 1297-1298, whether in December or in March, and if one concedes Glorieux's third assumption that Godfrey conducted one quodlibetal debate per academic year at this time in his career, then Quodlibet 8 could fall in the academic year 1292-1293. Whether this would allow for Godfrey's citation of James's Quodlibet 1 in his Quodlibet 8 remains to be determined.

This leads us to Glorieux's third assumption in establishing the *terminus ante quem* for Quodlibet 8, namely, that Godfrey conducted only one quodlibetal dispute per academic year during the later years of his teaching career. Writing in 1910, Mandonnet accepted this as ordinary procedure, that is, that a Master conducted a quodlibetal dispute only once each year⁸⁴). While noting that Masters had the right to conduct two quodlibetal disputes per year, Glorieux

⁸²) *Op. cit.*, pp. 79, 80, 257-59; and T. 2 (Paris, 1935), p. 375.

⁸³) See the references in note 77 above. For Boniface's constitution see *Liber Sextus Decretalium d. Bonifacii Papae VIII*, I, 6, c. 34, in Friedberg, *Corpus Iuris Canonici* II (Leipzig, 1879), 964-65.

⁸⁴) « La carrière scolaire de Gilles de Rome », *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 4 (1910), p. 494. He cites the case of Henry of Ghent as evidence of the normal practice.

observes that according to the available evidence, very few actually did so. One quodlibetal debate per academic year was the prevailing practice. The contrary custom (of conducting two per year) which appears to have been operative at the very beginning of the institution of quodlibetal debates does not seem to have continued very long. Glorieux finds the only examples of two debates in a given year in Gerard of Abbeville, Thomas Aquinas during his Parisian period, perhaps Ranulf of Homblières, and Godfrey of Fontaines during his first academic year of teaching ⁸⁵).

In sum, therefore, one way of placing Godfrey's Quodlibet 8 in Lent, 1293, and of retaining Glorieux's third assumption that Godfrey conducted only one quodlibetal debate per academic year would be to challenge his first and second assumptions. The first, that Quodlibet 12 is to be placed in 1295 because of its reference to Celestine's abdication, might well be questioned. In the absence of other evidence one might easily allow for a reference to the abdication of December, 1294, in a quodlibetal debate as late, perhaps, as December, 1296. If Quodlibet 12 were placed in the academic year 1296-97, then Quodlibet 8 could be placed in the academic year 1292-93 and therefore in Lent, 1293. As to the second assumption, we have already observed that it is far safer to conclude that Quodlibet 13 can be no later than the academic year 1297-98 than to hold that it must be prior to 1297. Placing it in 1297-98 would also allow Quodlibet 8 to be dated in 1292-93. We have already referred to the evidence presented by Ypma and Gutiérrez for James's promotion as Master of theology in Paris c. Easter, 1293. If one were to anticipate this date by a few weeks or months and were to suggest that James conducted his first quodlibetal debate during the Lenten session of 1293, then Godfrey's Quodlibet 8 might well fall within the same general period, Lent, 1293, and still refer to James's Quodlibet. This would, of course, presuppose that it was conducted after James's quodlibetal dispute during that same Lenten period. This resolution of our problem would imply a break of one academic year in which Godfrey conducted no quodlibetal debate. Thus if Quodlibet 6 dates from the academic year 1289-90 (Christmas, 1289), and Quodlibet 8 from 1292-93, then Quodlibet 7 will fall either into 1290-91 or 1291-92,

⁸⁵) *Op. cit.*, T. 1, p. 83. According to Glorieux's table in T. 2, Nicolas du Pressoir conducted quodlibetal debates in December and again in March during the academic year 1273-74 (see p. 375 and also p. 202).

leaving the remaining academic year without a Godfridian Quodlibet. Such, of course, is quite possible.

Concluding Remarks

A more serious difficulty follows from the claim by Ypma and Gutiérrez that James's promotion dates from c. Easter, 1293. In another context Ypma writes that James became Master of theology in the spring of 1293 and succeeded Giles of Rome as *Magister regens*. But if James's promotion took place at Easter, 1293, then, continues Ypma, he could not have succeeded Giles as *Magister regens* until the beginning of the new academic year, that is, September, 1293. Ypma here offers this as a second argument in support of his contention that Giles need not have given up active teaching at the end of the academic year 1290-91, but could have continued until the end of the year 1292-93. He suggests that it is not likely that the Augustinian order would have left its single chair of theology at Paris unfilled from 1291 until 1293 ⁸⁶).

For our purposes, the important point is the contention that James, having been promoted c. Easter, 1293, could not have begun active teaching as a Master until the following September and presumably, therefore, could not have conducted his first quodlibetal debate until later in 1293. This will still not allow for citation of that same Quodlibet by Godfrey in Lent of 1293 in his Quodlibet 8. In evaluating this view, it should first be noted that the evidence marshalled by Ypma at most establishes the *possibility* that Giles continued to lecture actively as a Master during the academic year 1292-93, thereby leaving open the possibility that he did not do so ⁸⁷). If he did not actively lecture during that academic year, there would have been an empty Augustinian chair for James to fill.

⁸⁶) *La formation des professeurs chez les Ermites de Saint-Augustin* (Paris, 1956), p. 84.

⁸⁷) *Op. cit.*, pp. 83-84. Ypma's first argument rests on a document from Philip the Fair of April, 1293, wherein Giles is still referred to as *professor Sacre Pagine*, even though he had been serving as Prior General of the Order for more than a year by that time. However, Ypma's argument here appears to prove too much. For as he also notes, two documents emanating from the Bishop of Paris and dating from December, 1293, also refer to Giles as Professor in *Sacra Pagina*. Since even Ypma admits that Giles was not actively serving as *Magister* in December, 1293, the earlier reference of April, 1293, does not prove that he was actively exercising that office then either.

As to the claim that James was promoted c. Easter, 1293, it will be recalled that both Ypma and Gutiérrez cite the records of the chapter of the Roman province of the Augustinians, held in May, 1293, wherein reference is made to James's recent promotion as Master in theology at Paris. As we have also seen above, Gutiérrez maintains that this promotion did not take place near the end of 1292 but c. Easter, 1293, both because this was the time set aside for conferring such degrees, and because of the reference in the *Acta* of the Augustinians to James's recent promotion⁸⁸). Still, it would seem that the term «recent» (*nuper factus et licentiatu doctor*) or the term «new» (*Magistro novo*) could be applied in May to a Master who had been promoted somewhat earlier during the same academic year, that is, 1292-93⁸⁹). As to the other part of Gutiérrez's argument, that Easter was the time set aside for conferring such degrees, he himself offers no evidence in support of that statement. In fact, it appears that it may well be challenged.

First of all, the *Acta* of the Augustinians refer to the fact that James had recently been licensed as a doctor. But he is also referred to there as «our new Master»⁹⁰). Rashdall writes that the special time for conferring licenses in the theological faculty was on or about All Saints' Day⁹¹). If this is accurate, then James could be referred

See Ypma, *loc. cit.*, and note 6. Ypma finds further confirmation for his position in references in the capitular acts of the Roman province of Augustinians of 1292, 1293, and 1294, according to which a sum of gold florins continued to be allotted to Giles in his capacity as Master of Theology as in previous years (see n. 7). In the references cited by Ypma from *Analecta Augustiniana* 2 (1907/08), pp. 272, 324, 341, 346, and 365, Giles is respectively referred to as follows: «Doctore sacre theologiae» (May, 1288), «Magistri nostri» (September, 1291), «Venerabili Doctore fratre Egidio et priore Generali nostro» (October, 1292), «Magistro et Generali priore» (May, 1293), «Doctore nostro» (March, 1294). There does not seem to be any consistent pattern of differentiation here between the titles Master and Doctor. Thus in 1288 and again in 1292 Giles is referred to as Doctor. Consequently, since a 1294 reference to him as Doctor does not imply that he was then actively teaching at Paris, neither does the 1292 reference (as Doctor) or the 1293 reference (as Master). Again Ypma's argument appears to prove too much.

⁸⁸) See our text above, pp. 372-73 and note 66.

⁸⁹) See the text cited in note 66 above.

⁹⁰) In that same citation as found in note 66 above, cf.: «nuper factus et licentiatu doctor in sacra theologia Parisius...»; also: «pro fr. Jacobo de Viterbio, magistro nostro novo...»; also: «Pro fratre Jacobo de Viterbio, Magistro nostro, pro expensis promotionis Magisterii sui...»

⁹¹) H. RASHDALL, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, New Ed. by

to as a Bachelor in October, 1292, could have received the licentiate in November, and could have incepted as a Master at some later point in that same academic year. As to the time of inception, A. Little observes that there does not seem to have been a fixed date for this. In fact he says the same both as regards the time for receiving the licentiate and for incepting as Master ⁹²).

M. Powicke and A.B. Emden, Vol. 1 (Oxford, 1936), p. 480. Note that Rashdall also specifies that this happened in every alternate year, that is, in every Jubilee year. On this also see Glorieux, *Répertoire* ..., T. 1, p. 22. As the following notes from Denifle-Chatelain, *Chartularium* ..., suggest, the Jubilee years were the odd years. But conferring of the license was apparently not always limited to these years. «Sicut in facultate theologiae (cf. supra n° 763), sic in facultate medicinae praesentatio et collatio licentiae communiter (non semper) annis imparibus (secundum morem Gallicanum) fiebant. Ut e n° 930 liquet, jam tunc annus, quo licentiae dabantur, *annus jubilaeus* vocabatur». See Denifle-Chatelain, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, T. II (Paris, 1891) p. 360, # 923, note 5. Also see p. 220, # 763, note 2: «Sicut in facultatibus decretorum et medicinae (v. infra n° 923, nota 3 [read 5]), sic et in facultate theologiae *communiter* annis imparibus licentiae dabantur» (italics ours). As in the note cited from p. 360, here also we take the *communiter* to indicate that such was not always the case. Some of the instances cited by Little and/or referred to in n. 92 below also indicate that conferral of the license was not restricted to the Jubilee years. Hence, even though 1292 was an even year rather than an odd one, and therefore not a Jubilee year, this regulation of itself would not bar one from suggesting that James could have been licensed in 1292 rather than 1293.

⁹²) A.G. Little, «Chronological Notes on the Life of Duns Scotus», *English Historical Review* 47 (1932), p. 578, n. 3. In support of this he cites the following dates from some Dominican Masters of the period: «Romeo (of Majorca) was licensed in 1307, 'c. festum S. Johannis Baptiste' (probably the Nativity, 24 June) and incepted soon after Michaelmas; Hervé, 'licenciatus tempore paschali A.D. 1307'. (Easter in 1307 fell on 26 March); Berengarius de Landorra, licensed 26 March 1308; Laurence Brito, 'Licenciatus et inceptit A.D. 1309 Mense Februarii'; Johannes Picardi, licensed 3 November 1310». For Little's authority for this see H. Denifle, «Quellen zur Gelehrten-geschichte des Predigerordens», *Archiv für Literatur-und Kirchen-Geschichte des Mittelalters* 2 (1886), p. 213. For a more recent edition of this source see T. Kaepelli, *Stephanus de Salaniaco et Bernardus Guidonis. De Quatuor in Quibus Deus Praedicatorum Ordinem Insignivit*, *Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum Historica* 22 (Rome, 1949), pp. 132-33. According to the Kaepelli edition, Romeo of Majorca was licensed in 1306 rather than in 1307. Also, as Kaepelli indicates, the February, 1309 date for Laurence Brito would mean February, 1310 according to the modern way of beginning the year (*op. cit.*, p. 132, n. 14). According to this source, therefore, Dominican Masters of the period were licensed in June, c. Easter, in March, in February, and in November. Moreover, Laurence incepted in February. If James was licensed early in November, 1292, and incepted shortly thereafter, it would seem that he could have conducted his first Quodlibet in Lent, 1293. Granted that a certain period of time would occur between one's reception of the licentiate and his official inception as Master, apparently

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, therefore, one might propose the following as a possibility. James may have received his license in the fall of 1292, perhaps on or near All Saints' Day as Rashdall's view would have it, and then after a suitable period of time solemnly incepted as Master. Since the time period between reception of the license and inception does not appear to have been rigidly fixed, it may have been relatively short in James's case. According to this hypothesis, James would have incepted early enough in the academic year 1292-93 to conduct his first Quodlibetal debate in Lent, 1293, and therefore, for his views to have been known to Godfrey in his Quodlibet 8, which would also be placed in Lent, 1293. This, then, appears to be one possible solution for our problem, one which entails slight modifications both for the dating of Godfrey's Quodlibet 8 and James's Quodlibet 1. Godfrey's Quodlibet 8 would now be redated so as to fall in the academic year 1292-93, probably in Lent, 1293, and James's reception of the license and his inception would be early enough in the academic year 1292-93 to enable him to have conducted his first quodlibetal dispute during that same academic year, again more likely in the Lenten session.

that period did not have to be very extended. See the case of Laurence Brito. Interestingly, the references to James as Bachelor in October, 1292, and as Master in May, 1293, as recorded in the Augustinian *Acta* are interpreted in the way we are proposing here in a note in *Analecta Augustiniana* 2 (1907-08), p. 345. Rather than conclude that James was promoted c. Easter, 1293, the note reasons that he was promoted in the beginning of the academic year 1292-93, that is to say, in October or November, 1292.

For exceptions to the rule discussed in n. 91 above which would restrict the conferring of licenses to the Jubilee (odd) years see: Johannes Picardi (licensed in November, 1310) and Romeo of Majorca (licensed in 1306, according to the Kaepelli edition). Berengarius de Landorra might at first sight appear to be another (licensed March 26, 1308). However, Easter fell on April 14 in 1308. If the University of Paris then began its calendar year at Easter (see n. 91 for the first citation from Denifle-Chatelain), then March 26, 1308 by modern reckoning would fall in the year 1307 according to the University's system and therefore in a Jubilee year. Presumably, the compiler of this part of the list of Dominican Masters himself began the year with March 25, thereby placing March 26 in 1308 according to his reckoning. Thus he writes: «Fr. Berengarius de Landorra ... fuit licentiatu in crastino dominice Annuntiationis, inchoato iam anno eiusdem domini MCCCVIII» (Kaepelli, *op. cit.*, p. 132). For other apparent exceptions as indicated in this same source see pp. 131-34. Thus, according to our compiler Raymundus Romani was licensed in 1302 (possibly 1303, see p. 131, n. 9); Guillelmus Petri de Godino in 1304; John of Paris in 1304; Durandus de sancto Porciano in 1312; Petrus de Palude and Guillelmus de Lauduno in June, 1314.

A second possible resolution of our problem should also be mentioned. A Master would normally prepare a written version of his determination of a given quodlibetal debate. According to Glorieux, this would usually take place during the following year ⁹³). Consequently, Godfrey's Quodlibet 8 could have been delivered during the academic year 1292-93. If James's Quodlibet 1 was not conducted until December, 1293, Godfrey might have incorporated references to it in the final draft of the written version of his own Quodlibet 8, assuming of course that this final draft was completed after James's quodlibetal dispute. The position of the references to James in Godfrey's Quodlibet 8, q. 3 does not militate against this possibility, since they come near the end of the question and after a fuller discussion of the views of Henry of Ghent. Thus they could easily have been appended to the text at this point in the final version ⁹⁴). On the other hand, the logic of the discussion could also account for the move from a consideration of Henry's theory to that of James. Acceptance of this solution would still entail redating Godfrey's Quodlibet 8, but would permit James's promotion to be placed in the spring of 1293 and his Quodlibet 1 to have been delivered in the academic year 1293-94, preferably at the Advent session.

Finally, the possibility that Godfrey retouched some of his Quodlibets at a later point in his career cannot be completely ruled out ⁹⁵). Application of this solution to the present case would permit

⁹³) *La littérature quodlibétique ...*, T. 1, pp. 53 and 151. Referring specifically to Godfrey (p. 151) he notes that his Quodlibets were put into public circulation by Godfrey himself on an individual basis, each presumably during the year following its original disputation. Quodlibets 5-6 and 11-12 appear to be exceptions, having been released in groups of two. Glorieux here refers to Pelzer: « Godefroid de Fontaines. Les manuscrits de ses quodlibets conservés à la Vaticane ... », *Revue Néo-Scholastique de Philosophie* 20 (1913), pp. 507-08. See also p. 510. For a helpful discussion of the differences, especially in terms of organization, between the first public version of a given Quodlibet and its subsequent determination by a Master on some succeeding day (and hence its ultimate written form) see Glorieux, « Le Quodlibet et ses procédés rédactionnels », *Divus Thomas* (Piacenza) 42 (1939), pp. 61-93; also, « L'Enseignement au Moyen Âge. Techniques et méthodes en usage à la Faculté de Théologie de Paris au XIII^e siècle », *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 43 (1968), pp. 128-34.

⁹⁴) See PB 4.34-48 for a long discussion of and criticism of Henry's views. Very near the end of q. 3 Godfrey exposes and criticizes James's theory (see PB 4.48-50).

⁹⁵) This would be one way of accounting for verbatim references in Godfrey's Quodlibet 1, q. 11 to the bull of Boniface VIII, *Detestandae*, references which have

one to retain 1291 as the date for Godfrey's Quodlibet 8 and 1293 as that for James's Quodlibet 1. On the other hand, it seems to us that the rewriting theory should be accepted in a given case only when there is very strong evidence for it and only with great caution. Its universal application would seriously undermine the possibility of establishing the *terminus a quo* of any Quodlibet on the basis of reference therein to external events or to other certainly dated works. If applied to the present situation it would imply a rather substantial addition to the originally determined and published version of Quodlibet 8, q. 3.

As to our preference for any one of these three solutions, the first and second appear to be less radical as regards the relationship between our present version of Quodlibet 8, q. 3 and Godfrey's original publication of the same. According to the first solution they would be identical. According to the second, this would also be true, but there would be greater disparity between the original oral determination and the published version of the same. According to the third solution, however, there would have been a later reworking

already been noted by F. Delorme, « Autour d'un apocryphe scotiste, Le *De rerum principio* et Godefroy de Fontaines », *La France franciscaine* 8 (1925), p. 295, n. 1, and by P. Tihon, *Foi et théologie selon Godefroid de Fontaines* (Paris/Bruges, 1966), p. 202, n. 5. Delorme's suggestion that Quodlibet 1 be redated from 1285 until after the Bull of February, 1299 (1300 according to Delorme) can hardly be accepted, since it would entail a radical modification of the order of Godfrey's first 14 Quodlibets. For Godfrey see PB 2.30-3. This would also be one way of accounting for apparent references by Godfrey in Quodlibet 10, q. 12 to Peter of Auvergne's Quodlibet 1, q. 21, as pointed out by G. Cannizzo, « I 'Quodlibeta' di Pietro d'Auvergne », *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica* 56 (1964), pp. 495, 497 n. 14a; 57 (1965), p. 68 and notes 1 and 2. Because Godfrey's Quodlibet 10 is usually dated in 1293 and Peter's Quodlibet 1 dates from 1296, Cannizzo suggests the need for revision of the date of Godfrey's Quodlibet 10, so as to place its publication after 1296 (see p. 497 n. 14a). Although we will reserve extended discussion of this problem for another occasion, our proposed revision of the date of Quodlibet 8 would result in placing Quodlibet 10 in the academic year 1294-95, not late enough for Godfrey to have then cited Peter's Quodlibet 1. However, if one were to suggest that Godfrey's Quodlibet 10 dates from Lent, 1295, that Peter's Quodlibet 1 was conducted in December, 1296, and that for some reason Godfrey's definitive preparation of Quodlibet 10 for public circulation was delayed until after that date, one could thereby account for the references in question. For the moment we would prefer this explanation or possibly the theory of a later reworking to any solution which would place Godfrey's Quodlibet 10 after the academic year 1294-95, primarily because it does not seem advisable to date Quodlibet 13 later than the academic year 1297-98.

of the published version. Hence we prefer either the first or second solution. As to choosing between these two, it is difficult to decide. Since dating Godfrey's Quodlibet 8 in 1292-93 does no violence to the available evidence, and since we see no major obstacle against placing James's promotion early in that same academic year, we presently lean to the first solution as the more likely.

JOHN F. WIPPEL.