

Themistius and the Agent Intellect in James of Viterbo and Other Thirteenth Century Philosophers (Saint Thomas, Siger of Brabant and Henry Bate)

Although the editing of texts of medieval and Renaissance philosophers might appear to some to be an unnecessary labor, given the large number of printed volumes available for study, it is precisely this activity during the last several decades that has enriched our knowledge of the development of medieval and Renaissance philosophy. The appearance in print of an edited text makes the work of a thinker available to a wide audience and it also makes it much more likely that an individual scholar may by chance light upon a passage or doctrine of interest to himself and to his researches which he can then set into a broader context.

Students of medieval philosophy are thus greatly indebted to Father Elcko Ypma, O.E.S.A., for his recent edition of the first two quodlibetal disputations of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century thinker, James of Viterbo (*b. Viterbo, ca. 1255; d. Naples, February, 1308*)¹). The latter's doctrine on innate *aptitudines* of the intellect represents an interesting and important chapter in the development of medieval discussions on the theory of knowledge

¹) *Jacobi De Viterbio O. E. S. A. Disputatio Prima De Quolibet*, edited by Elecko Ypma (*Cassiciacum*, Supplementband I; Würzburg, 1968); and *Jacobi De Viterbio O. E. S. A. Disputatio Secunda De Quobilet (Cassiciacum, II; Würzburg, 1969)*. For details on James's life, see below section III. Father Ypma's own statement concerning the purpose of an edition of the text of a medieval author deserves quotation: « Le but principal d'une édition d'un texte d'un auteur du Moyen Age, n'est-il pas de mettre entre les mains des théologiens et philosophes médiévistes et des historiens des idées un instrument de travail, un texte bien établi, où il peut étudier plus facilement et plus sûrement les idées de l'auteur ? Les éditions de textes sont les outils dont les historiens des idées ont besoin avant tout, afin que ce vaste terrain encore inexploré devienne de plus en plus accessible. Au fur et à mesure que les historiens disposeront de textes ils seront mieux équipés non seulement pour étudier, mais aussi pour comparer les doctrines des différents auteurs, et peut-être pour établir les rapports entre les différents maîtres et bacheliers ». See his introduction to *Disputatio Prima*, p. xxvi.

and should be further studied ²). In like fashion, his discussions regarding the question of the distinction of essence and existence reveal a sensitivity and sophistication that will attract the renewed interest of scholars ³). Both of these doctrines are set forth in the first two *Quodlibeta* and can now be studied by a wide variety of scholars, some of whom will surely add to the literature on James. Indeed, the publication of Father Ypma's edition has already provoked the interest of one established scholar and resulted in the publication of an article on James's doctrine on the analogy of being ⁴). We can confidently

²) See Barthelemy Hauréau, *Histoire de la philosophie scolastique*, Part II, Tome II (Paris, 1880), pp. 162-165; idem., « Jacques de Viterbe, théologien », in *Histoire littéraire de la France* XXVII (Paris, 1900), p. 56 and p. 59. Cf. also Fidel Casado, « El pensamiento filosófico del Beato Santiago de Viterbo », *La Ciudad de Dios* 165 (1953), pp. 117-144, for a general discussion of James's psychology. For James's doctrine regarding the divine ideas, see Heinrich Rüssmann, *Zur Ideenlehre der Hochscholastik unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Heinrich von Gent, Gottfried von Fontaines und Jakob von Viterbio* (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1938).

³) Some of James's metaphysical ideas have already been studied by Martin Grabmann, « Die Lehre des Jakob von Viterbo († 1308) von der Wirklichkeit des göttlichen Seins; Beitrag zum Streit über das Sein Gottes zur Zeit Meister Eckharts », in *Philosophia Perennis: Festgabe Joseph Geysers zum 60. Geburtstag* I (Regensburg, 1930), pp. 209-232, which was reprinted in his *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben* II (Munich, 1936), pp. 490-511. It also appeared in an Italian version, « La dottrina di Jacopo Capocci da Viterbo (m. 1308) a proposito della realtà dell'essere divino: Contributo alla disputa sull'essere di Dio al tempo del Maestro Eckhart », *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica* 22 (1930), pp. 13-30. Grabmann studied James's doctrine on the distinction between essence and existence and edited part of *Quodlibet* I, q. 4 in his « Doctrina S. Thomae de distinctione reali inter essentiam et esse ex documentis ineditis saeculi xiii illustratur », *Acta Hebdomadae Thomisticae Romae* (Rome, 1924), pp. 131-190, especially pp. 162-176. Other of James's metaphysical ideas were studied by Iaroslau Benes, who edited all of *Quodlibet* I, q. 4, in his article, « Valor 'Possibilium' apud S. Thomas, Henricum Gandavensem et B. Iacobum de Viterbio », *Divus Thomas* (Piacenza) 30 (1927), pp. 333-335. For a general discussion of James's philosophy, see Fidel Casado, « El pensamiento filosófico del Beato Santiago de Chile », *La Ciudad de Dios* 163 (1951), pp. 437-454; 164 (1952), pp. 301-331; 165 (1953), pp. 103-144, 233-302 and 489-500. Among the topics Casado treats are the seminal reasons (1952: pp. 301-314), the distinction of essence and existence (1952: pp. 314-331) and psychology (1953: 117-144). He has more recently written a review article of Ypma's edition of the first *Quodlibet* or *Disputatio*, emphasizing the Augustinian aspect of James's doctrine. See his « El primer Quodlibeto de Santiago de Viterbo, O. S. A. », *Estudio agustiniano* 4 (1969), pp. 557-565.

⁴) Francis Ruello, « L'analogie de l'être selon Jacques de Viterbe, *Quodlibet* I, Quaestio 1 », *Augustiniana* 20 (1970), pp. 145-180. Ruello pays some attention to the twelfth question and the problem of the agent intellect. See pp. 157-168. Casado also comments on James's doctrines concerning analogy and the distinction between essence and existence in his review article (pp. 559-561).

look forward to other articles by historians of medieval philosophy on aspects of James's epistemology, psychology and metaphysics which will be written only because of this new edition.

The present essay is also a result of the appearance of Father Ypma's edition. It will attempt to examine James's understanding of Themistius's doctrine of the agent intellect, to underscore his importance in the early history of use of the Moerbeke translation, and to evaluate James's general interest in the Greek commentators on Aristotle, particularly Themistius and John Philoponus.

Themistius (317-388 A.D.) was one of the most important and influential of the late ancient commentators on Aristotle⁵). His paraphrases on the works of the Stagirite had a profound influence on the development of Islamic philosophy, rivalling to some degree that of Alexander of Aphrodisias⁶). Averroes makes such heavy use of both Alexander and Themistius in his own "long" commentary on the *De anima* that one scholar has characterized his psychological doctrines as « a compromise between the theses of these two commentators »⁷). It should be no surprise then that some of the medieval philosophers of the Christian West were interested in studying Themistius himself, especially when the Averroist doctrine of the intellect

⁵) On the life and works of Themistius, see Willy Stegemann, « Themistios », in Paulys-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, V (Stuttgart, 1934), cols. 1642-1680; Louis Meridier, *Le philosophe Thémistios devant l'opinion de ses contemporains* (Rennes, 1906); Heinrich Scholze, *De temporibus librorum Themistii* (Gottingen, 1911); Aimé Puech, *Histoire de la littérature grecque chrétienne depuis les origines jusqu'à la fin du IV^e siècle*, III (Paris, 1930), pp. 14-19; Fritz von Schemmel, « Die Hochschule von Konstantinopel im IV. Jahrhundert p. Ch. N. », *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum* 22 (1908), pp. 152-168; and Glanville Downey, « Themistius and the Defense of Hellenism in the Fourth Century », *Harvard Theological Review* 50 (1947), pp. 259-274.

⁶) Cf. 'Abdurrahman Badawi, *La transmission de la philosophie grecque au monde arabe* (Paris, 1968), pp. 100-102. On Alexander, see A. Giercke, « A. von Aphrodisias », in Paulys-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, I (Stuttgart, 1894), cols. 1453-1455; Paul Moraux, *Alexandre d'Aphrodise, Exégète de la noétique d'Aristote* (Liège and Paris, 1942); F. Edward Cranz, « Alexander Aphrodisiensis », in *Catalogus Translationum et Commentariorum: Medieval and Renaissance Latin Translations and Commentaries*, I, ed. Paul O. Kristeller (Washington, 1960), pp. 77-135; II (Washington, 1971), pp. 411-422; Giancarlo Movia, *Alessandro di Afrodisia: Tra naturalismo e misticismo* (Padua, 1970).

⁷) Gabriel Théry, *Autour du décret de 1210; IIA: Alexandre d'Aphrodise aperçu sur l'influence de sa noétique* (*Bibliothèque thomiste*, VII; Kain, 1926), p. 41. See also Paul S. Christ, *The Psychology of the Active Intellect of Averroes* (Philadelphia, 1926), pp. 62-63.

became a subject of vehement dispute at the University of Paris during the late thirteenth century ⁸). What was at stake in the dispute, of course, was not simply the correct exegesis of the text of Aristotle, but also the role that philosophy was to be accorded in the University, its relation to the teaching of theology and the place of the Arts Faculty in philosophical instruction ⁹). The text of Themistius entered into the dispute over the question of the unity of the intellect because Averroes appeared to claim the authority of Themistius for that position ¹⁰).

As we shall see, Saint Thomas Aquinas used the newly available translation which his Dominican colleague, William of Moerbeke, had made of Themistius's paraphrases on the *De anima* to discredit Averroes's reliability as an interpreter of earlier thinkers ¹¹). However, it is important to note that Thomas uses this work of Themistius not only in his polemic against the Averroists in general and Siger of Brabant in particular, but also in his own commentary on the *De anima* and in other works. Thomas thus appears to have had an interest in

⁸) For a good general analysis of the controversy, see Fernand Van Steenberghen, *La philosophie au XIII^e siècle* (Louvain and Paris, 1966), especially pp. 357-456 and 472-488. Also very helpful is Bruno Nardi, *S. Tommaso D'Aquino: Trattato sull'unità dell'intelletto contro gli averroisti* (Florence, 1947), pp. 7-81.

⁹) Van Steenberghen, *op. cit.*, pp. 357-373, 426-430, 472-488 and 513-527. On the role of the Franciscans in the dispute, see H. A. Krizovljan, « Controversia doctrinalis inter magistros franciscanos et Sigerum de Brabant », *Collectanea Franciscana* 27 (1957), pp. 121-165. For an intriguing discussion on the conception that the Averroists had of themselves within the structure of the university, see Jacques Le Goff, « Quelle conscience l'université médiévale a-t-elle d'elle-même? », in *Beiträge zum Berufsbewusstsein des mittelalterlichen Menschen* (*Miscellanea Mediaevalia*, III; Berlin, 1964), pp. 15-29, at pp. 24-27.

¹⁰) See Averroes, *Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis de anima libros*, ed. F. Stuart Crawford (*Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem*, VI, 1; Cambridge, Mass., 1953), III, comm. 5, pp. 389-390. Cf. Léon Gauthier, *Ibn Rochd (Averroès)* (Paris, 1948), p. 242.

¹¹) « Traducendo il Commento di Temestio al *De anima*, Guglielmo di Moerbeke ha messo in mano al suo amico Tommaso d'Aquino un'arma di primo ordine contro il Monopsichismo di Averroè e gli Averroisti latini ». Martin Grahmann, *I Papi del duecento e l'Aristotelismo; II: Guglielmo di Moerbeke O. P. il traduttore delle opere di Aristotele* (Rome, 1946), pp. 139-140. Cf. Nardi, pp. 65-66 and 75-76. See also Gérard Verbeke's article, « Themistius et le 'De unitate intellectus' de Saint Thomas », *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 53 (1955), pp. 141-164, which was reprinted in his edition, *Thémistius: Commentaire sur le traité De l'âme d'Aristote*, Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke (Louvain and Paris, 1957), pp. xxxix-lxii.

Themistius himself as a guide to the thought of the Philosopher ¹²). In like fashion, while Siger also makes use of the Moerbeke translation of Themistius's paraphrases on the *De anima* in his own *De anima intellectiva*, his interest in the ancient commentators on Aristotle extends beyond the boundaries of the dispute with Thomas ¹³). He too appears to be genuinely interested in the thought of Themistius as a key to better understanding Aristotle himself. Indeed, there seems to be a move from Averroes to Themistius as the most reliable guide to Aristotle ¹⁴). If there was in fact such a shift in his thought, the importance of the Moerbeke translation is increased even more. Finally, we must note the interest in Themistius exhibited by the unusual thinker, Henry Bate of Malines. While his *Speculum divinorum et quorundam naturalium* has recently begun to appear in a new printed edition, the section on Themistius and the question of whether the agent intellect is one or many has not yet been published ¹⁵). Fortunately, Verbeke has given a crucial quotation from the passage and we shall examine it below.

The particular topic in the psychology of Themistius which especially interested both Thomas and Siger was the nature of the agent intellect and whether it was one or many. As we shall see, a rather difficult and ambiguous passage in Themistius's paraphrases on the *De anima* can be interpreted in a variety of ways. Nor were Thomas and Siger the last to be fascinated with the passage and to debate what the ancient commentator had in mind. During the Renaissance, the paraphrases of Themistius on Aristotle were translated

¹²) See Verbeke, *Thémistius*, pp. xv-xxxviii. These remarks of Verbeke appeared in an earlier, less developed form in *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 45 (1947), pp. 314-338, under the title: « Les sources et la chronologie du Commentaire de S. Thomas d'Aquin au *De anima* d'Aristote ».

¹³) See Siger of Brabant, *Queastiones de anima intellectiva*, edited by Pierre Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant et l'averroïsme latin au XIII^{me} siècle; II^{me} Partie: Textes inédits*, Second edition (Louvain, 1908), pp. 143-171.

¹⁴) See Franz Bruckmüller, *Untersuchungen über Sigers (von Brabant) Anima Intellectiva* (Munich, 1908), pp. 13 and 17-18. The authority which Siger attributes to Themistius in the *De anima intellectiva* was recognized by Bruno Nardi, « L'averroïsme di Sigieri e Dante », *Studi danteschi* 22 (1938), pp. 93-98 and 111; *idem.*, *S. Tommaso D'Aquino*, pp. 77-78.

¹⁵) The passage occurs in Part VI, chapter 7. Parts I-III have been edited and published by E. Van De Vyver, *Henricus Bate: Speculum divinorum et quorundam naturalium* I (*Philosophes médiévaux*, IV; Louvain and Paris, 1960); II (*Philosophes médiévaux*, X; Louvain and Paris, 1967). Tome II contains Parts II and III.

anew by the famous humanist, Ermolao Barbaro, and this translation was printed several times ¹⁶). Nor was Ermolao's the last translation to be made ¹⁷). In the sixteenth century, various philosophers discussed and debated what was the true interpretation of Themistius's doctrine on the soul and the intellect. They include Agostino Nifo and Pier Nicola Castellani ¹⁸), as well as others like Pietro Pomponazzi ¹⁹ and Cristoforo Marcello ²⁰). Themistius's paraphrases on Aristotle played a major role in the development of Aristotelianism in Italy during the sixteenth century ²¹). But what has gone unnoticed up to now is that another medieval philosopher had studied the Moerbeke translation of Themistius's paraphrases on the *De anima* and had incorporated an original interpretation of the celebrated passage on the intellect in a work written before 1300. That philosopher was James of Viterbo and the work was his *Quodlibeta*.

¹⁶) For the first edition, see Themistius, *Paraphrasis in Aristotelem*, trans. Ermolao Barbaro (Treviso, 1481). It was reprinted at Venice in 1499, 1500, 1502, 1520, 1542, 1549, 1559, 1560 and 1570. There are also editions of individual books from Ermolao's translation of the paraphrases. Cf. the catalogues of the British Museum and the Bibliothèque Nationale.

¹⁷) Both Ludovico Nogarola and Federico Bonaventura translated Themistius's paraphrases on Book III of the *De anima*. The former's translation was published as an appendix to the Venice, 1559-1560 edition of Ermolao's translation, while the latter's was published as an appendix to his *Opuscula* in 1627 at Urbino. There is a copy of each in the British Museum, and one of the former in the Columbia University Library. See also the remarks of Bruno Nardi, *Saggi sull'aristotelismo padovano dal secolo XIV al XVI* (Florence, 1958), pp. 367-368.

¹⁸) For discussions specifically on Themistius's doctrine of the agent intellect, see Agostino Nifo, *Liber de intellectu* (Venice, 1503), I, tr. 4, ch. 14, f. 41v, l; Pier Nicola Castellani, *Opus de immortalitate animorum secundum Platonem et Aristotelem* (Faenza, 1525), IV, ch. 7, f. 15v; V, ch. 2, f. 32-32v and ch. 6, f. 34-34v. See my article, « Pier Nicola Castellani and Agostino Nifo on Averroes' Doctrine of the Agent Intellect », *Rivista critica di storia della filosofia* 25 (1970), pp. 387-409, especially pp. 393-396.

¹⁹) Pietro Pomponazzi, *Corsi inediti dell'insegnamento padovano*; II: « *Quaestiones physicae et animasticae decem* » (1499-1500; 1503-1504), ed. Antonino Poppi (Padua, 1970), pp. 195-200; idem., *Tractatus de immortalitate animae* (Bologna, 1516), ch. 3, sig. A2v; ch. 9, sig. B2v.

²⁰) For discussions specifically on Themistius and the agent intellect, see Cristoforo Marcello, *Universalis de anima traditionis opus* (Venice, 1508), V, ch. 6, f. 210; ch. 28, f. 232v-233; ch. 29, f. 233-233v.

²¹) See Bruno Nardi, *Saggi sull'aristotelismo padovano*, passim.

1. THEMISTUIS ON THE AGENT INTELLECT — THE PROBLEM

The modern reader who takes up Themistius's paraphrases on the *De anima* may be baffled by some of the doctrines which are contained in the work unless he is made to realize that it is Themistius's tendency to reconcile «divine Plato» (ὁ θεῖος Πλάτων) with Aristotle and also with Theophrastus²²). And while it may be debatable whether or not he can be classified simply as a neo-Platonist,²³) there are definite traces of neo-Platonic doctrines in his views on the soul and the intellect²⁴). Unfortunately, modern scholars have not always recognized the neo-Platonic influence and have thus misunderstood Themistius's doctrine on the intellect²⁵). We can only sketch its most salient features in the following paragraphs²⁶).

In discussing the soul, Themistius tries not to relate it directly to matter: there appear to be in man a plurality of hierarchically arranged souls, each of which serves as «matter» or subject to the one superior to it²⁷). The sensitive soul is the matter of the imaginative

²²) See Oscar Hamelin, *La théorie de l'intellect d'après Aristote et ses commentateurs*, edited by Edmond Barbotin (Paris, 1953), p. 38. For the appellation «divine Plato», see Themistius, *In libros de anima paraphrasis*, ed. Richard Heinze (*Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca*, V, 3; Berlin, 1899), p. 4, line 15, and p. 107, line 23.

²³) See Stegemann, *op. cit.*, cols. 1648-1649.

²⁴) Pierre Duhem, *Le système du monde* IV (Paris, 1916), pp. 379-389, 395-397; Paul O. Kristeller, review of Philip Merlan's *Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness* (The Hague, 1963), in *The Journal of Philosophy* 64 (1967), pp. 124-125.

²⁵) See Stuart B. Martin, «The Nature of the Human Intellect as it is expounded in Themistius' *Paraphrasis in Libros Aristotelis de anima*», in *The Quest for the Absolute* (*Boston College Studies in Philosophy*, I; Boston, 1966), pp. 1-21. Martin omits all reference to Plotinus and neo-Platonism in his paper.

²⁶) On Themistius's life and works, see Willy Stegemann, «Themistios», in Paulys-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* V (Stuttgart, 1934), cols. 1642-1680. On his psychology, see Hans Kurfess, *Zur Geschichte der Erklärung der aristotelischen Lehre vom sog. NOΥΣ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟΣ und ΠΑΘΗΤΙΚΟΣ* (Tübingen, 1911), pp. 19-24; O. Hamelin, *La théorie de l'intellect d'après Aristote et ses commentateurs*, ed. E. Barbotin (Paris, 1953), pp. 38-43; Pierre Duhem, *Le système du monde* IV (Paris, 1916), pp. 380-389, 395-398, 408, 531, 563 and 568. Stuart B. Martin (p. 1) mistakenly attributes Stegemann's article to W. Ensslin.

²⁷) The notion that each level in the hierarchy of being is related to the level immediately above it as matter to form is Plotinian. See A. H. Armstrong, *The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus* (Cambridge, 1940), p. 76 and p. 86. See Plotinus, *Enneads*, II, 4, 3, and III, 9, 5. See also III, 4, 1, which was drawn to my attention by Professor Paul O. Kristeller.

soul and the latter in turn serves as matter to the potential intellect: all three are both forms (in regard to what is below them) and matter or subjects (in regard to what is above them). Only the agent intellect (ὁ ποιητικὸς νοῦς), the form of the potential intellect, is form in the highest sense since, as the « form of forms », it does not serve as matter or subject to anything more perfect than itself. For Themistius, we are the agent intellect²⁸). That is to say, while man's « ego » (τὸ ἐγώ) is the composite of the active and potential intellects, the ego's « existence » (τὸ ἐμοὶ εἶναι) is other than the ego itself and comes completely from the active intellect²⁹). The potential intellect exists wholly in the human soul as a part of the soul³⁰). It requires another intellect, also present in the soul, but already actual and perfect, to be brought to perfection³¹). The latter intellect, which is called the active intellect (νοῦς ενεργεῖα) or the agent intellect (νοῦς ποιητικός), both renders the potential intelligibles actually intelligible and also operates directly on the potential intellect in order to activate it³²). Insofar as the agent intellect is the « leader of concepts » (ἀρχηγὸς τῶν νοημάτων), it is like God in his relation to existing things³³). Nevertheless, Themistius explicitly rejects the view, such as that of Alexander of Aphrodisias, which would identify the agent intellect with God³⁴). Themistius points out that whoever holds such a position is overlooking Aristotle's clear statement that the distinctions of « matter » and of what perfects it are present in the soul itself — « For [Aristotle] says that this intellect [namely, the agent intellect] is in the soul and as some most honorable part of the soul »³⁵). But it still remains to note what Themistius said regarding the question of the immanence or transcendence of the agent or active intellect.

²⁸) Themistius, *In libros de anima paraphrasis* (Heinze), p. 100, 31-p. 101, l. 1. At p. 103, 36-38, Themistius offers the possibility that the existence of each person is from one active intellect.

²⁹) *Ibid.*, p. 100, 16-20 and 28.

³⁰) *Ibid.*, p. 93, 32-33 and p. 97, 32.

³¹) *Ibid.*, p. 98, 18-24. Cf. Kurfess, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

³²) *Ibid.*, p. 99, 1-5.

³³) *Ibid.*, p. 99, 23-25.

³⁴) See Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De anima*, in *Alexandri Aphrodisiensis praefer commentaria scripta minora: De anima liber cum mantissa*, ed. Ivo Bruns (*Supplementum Aristotelicum*, II, 1; Berlin, 1887), p. 88, 17-p. 89, 19. Cf. Théry, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

³⁵) Themistius, *In libros de anima paraphrasis* (Heinze), p. 102, 30-p. 103, 6. Cf. François Nuyens, *L'évolution de la psychologie d'Aristote* (Louvain and Paris, 1948), pp. 298-299.

In commenting on the celebrated fifth chapter of Book III of the *De anima*, Themistius proposes a question « worthy of a great deal of inquiry — whether this agent intellect is one or many ». Inasmuch as this intellect is compared to light (430a15), which is in some way one, it would also seem to be one ³⁶). Themistius then makes some seemingly ambiguous remarks that appear to throw into doubt whether in fact the agent intellect is one or many and which were to be the occasion of sharply divergent interpretations of his doctrine on the agent intellect:

The intellect which primarily illuminates is one, while those which are illuminated and illuminate are many, just like light. For the sun is one, but light you may say is in some way divided in the powers of sight. For this reason, Aristotle did not compare [the single intellect] to the sun, but to light. On the other hand, Plato compared it to the sun, for he makes it similar to the Good ³⁷).

Themistius gives no further explanation of the nature of the agent intellect, but proceeds to say that all of us, composed as we are of the potential and active intellects, have our being (*τὸ εἶναι*) from this one intellect. This explains not only the equal and unlearned « common notions » (*κοινὰ ἔννοιαι*) which all men have of first definitions and axioms, but also our ability to understand one another ³⁸). Furthermore, teacher and student must have the same concept (*τὸ νόημα*) if they are to have any sort of relationship : this means that their intellects must be identical ³⁹).

What has been presented so far in this sketch of Themistius's psychology might incline the modern reader to conclude that there can only be one intellect for all men and that it is impossible to reconcile this conclusion with Themistius's remarks about « many » intellects « which are illuminated and illuminate ». The problem has in fact driven some modern scholars to the rather extreme suggestion that the text, at least as we presently have it, contains interpolations by

³⁶) *Ibid.*, p. 103, 20-32.

³⁷) ἡ ὁ μὲν πρῶτως ἐλλάμπων εἷς, οἱ δὲ ἐλλαμπόμενοι καὶ ἐλλάμποντες πλείους ὥσπερ τὸ φῶς. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἥλιος εἷς, τὸ δὲ φῶς εἴποις ἂν τρόπον τινὰ μερίζεσθαι εἰς τὰς ὀψεις. διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ τον ἥλιον παραβέβληκεν ἀλλὰ τὸ φῶς, Πλάτων δὲ τὸν ἥλιον. τῷ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ ἀνάλογον αὐτὸν ποιεῖ.

Ibid., p. 103, 32-36. For the Latin text of this passage in Moerbeke's translation, see note 162 *infra*.

³⁸) *Ibid.*, p. 103,36-p. 104,4.

³⁹) *Ibid.*, p. 104, 6-12.

a later commentator ⁴⁰). However, a good case can be made against this suggestion and a reasonable explanation can be given of the passage about the one intellect which primarily illuminates and the many which are illuminated and illuminate, provided of course that some attention is paid to the neo-Platonic overtones of the passage. But such a discussion would take us beyond the bounds of the present article ⁴¹). All that needs be observed at this point is that the passage was in fact taken by the medieval thinkers to whom we shall address ourselves as the genuine expression of the thought of Themistius himself.

II. THEMISTIUS IN SAINT THOMAS, SIGER OF BRABANT AND HENRY BATE OF MALINES

As has already been noted, Averroes (*b.* 1126) ⁴² takes Themistius to hold that the intellect is one for all men. In Averroes's reading of the late ancient commentator, both the potential and the agent intellects are completely separate from the body as a substance which can neither be generated nor corrupted ⁴³). Averroes uses Themistius in arguing that the potential intellect is one for all men, that it contains the first principles of knowledge which all men require to think, and that the human species is eternal ⁴⁴).

Although it does not seem possible to pinpoint the exact year that

⁴⁰) See Kurfess, *op. cit.*, p. 23, n. 26, who is followed by Philip Merlan, *Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metacosciousness: Problems of the Soul in the Neoplatonist and Neoplatonic Tradition* (*Archives internationales d'histoire des idées*, II; The Hague, 1963), pp. 50-51, n. 3.

⁴¹) I hope to write a separate article on Themistius's psychology, paying special attention to the agent intellect and its unicity or multiplicity. The neo-Platonic background will be emphasized.

⁴²) For basic information on Averroes's life, works and thought, see Salomon Munk, *Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe* (Paris, 1927: reprint of 1859 edition); Léon Gauthier, *Ibn Rochd (Averroès)* (Paris, 1948); Goffredo Quadri, *La filosofia degli arabi nel suo fiore, II: Il pensiero filosofico di Averroè* (Florence, 1939); Carlo Nallino, «Averroè,» in *Enciclopedia italiana* V (Milan and Rome, 1930), pp. 624-627, reprinted in his *Raccolta di scritti editi e inediti*, VI (Rome, 1948), pp. 274-281; Manuel Alonso, *Teología de Averroes (Estudios y documentos)* (Madrid, 1947), especially pp. 51-98; Miguel Cruz Hernández, *Historia de la filosofía española: Filosofía hispano-musulmana*, II (Madrid, 1957), pp. 7-245; *idem.*, *La filosofía árabe* (Madrid, 1963), pp. 251-351.

⁴³) See note 10 *supra*.

⁴⁴) Averroes, *Commentarium magnum*, III, comm. 5, pp. 406-407.

Averroes was first known and read by medieval christians, it would seem that the first reliable indication that we have of his being known by them does not predate 1230. Brief references are found in William of Auvergne's *De universo* and *De anima*, which were written most probably between 1231 and 1236, and in Philip the Chancellor's *Summa de bono*, which was written between 1228 and 1236. On the other hand, there are about 80 references to Averroes (and to more of his works) in the first two parts of Albert the Great's *Summa de creaturis*, which was written around 1240 ⁴⁵). In this work, Albert betrays no suspicion that Averroes believed there was only one intellect for all men. He appears, on the contrary, to believe that Averroes held to a multiplicity of human intellects, both agent and potential intellects ⁴⁶). Only later did he come to recognize what must have seemed to him a remarkable doctrine, namely that the potential intellect and the agent intellect are one for all men according to Averroes ⁴⁷).

The most important of the thirteenth century philosophers who took Averroes to be the most accurate guide to the thought of Aristotle, including his psychology, was Siger of Brabant (*b. ca.* 1240; *d.* Orvieto, 1281-1284) ⁴⁸). When Saint Bonaventure gave up university teaching in 1257 and Saint Thomas left Paris for Italy in 1259 or 1260, there was as yet no evident movement in the Arts Faculty concerning philosophy which alarmed them. Van Steenberghen argues that their absence favored the development of what he would term « heterodox Aristotelianism », rather than « Averroism » ⁴⁹), and which he believes first arose sometime between 1260 and 1265 ⁴⁹). It is during this period that

⁴⁵) Van Steenberghen, *La philosophie au XIII^e siècle*, pp. 110-112.

⁴⁶) *Ibid.*, pp. 279-281.

⁴⁷) Dominique Salman, « Note sur la première influence d'Averroès », *Revue néoscholastique de philosophie* 40 (1937), pp. 208-209; Gonçalves de Mattos, « L'intellect agent personnel dans les premiers écrits d'Albert le Grand et de Thomas d'Aquinas », *Revue néoscholastique de philosophie* 43 (1940), pp. 145-150; Robert Miller, « An Aspect of Averroes' Influence on St. Albert », *Mediaeval Studies* 16 (1954), pp. 57-71; Leonard A. Kennedy, « The Nature of the Human Intellect according to St. Albert the Great », *The Modern Schoolman* 37 (1959-1960), pp. 121-137.

⁴⁸) For a brief sketch of his life, see Palemon Glorieux, « Siger de Brabant », in *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* XIV (Paris, 1941), cols. 2041-2042. See also Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant*, pp. 64-83 and 252-286; Fernand Van Steenberghen, « Siger of Brabant », *The Modern Schoolman* 29 (1951), pp. 11-27; *idem.*, *Aristotle in the West: The Origins of Latin Aristotelianism*, trans. Leonard Johnston (Louvain, 1955), pp. 204-213; *idem.*, *La philosophie au XIII^e siècle*, especially pp. 373-394 and 585-587.

⁴⁹) Van Steenberghen, *La philosophie au XIII^e siècle*, pp. 362-364 and 394-400.

Siger had become a master, and we find him mentioned in a document of August 27, 1266, in connection with the factional disputes in the Arts Faculty ⁵⁰). By the time of his Lenten sermons of 1267, the *Collationes de decem praeceptis*, Bonaventure is denouncing as a real danger at the University the doctrines of the eternity of the world, the unity of the intellect and the denial of the resurrection of the body ⁵¹). The following year, in his *Collationes de donis Spiritus sancti*, he emphatically rejects the eternity of the world, fatalism and the unity of the intellect ⁵²). The growth in strength and influence of Siger and his allies in the Faculty of Arts during the period while he was away from Paris in Italy (1260-1268) was most likely one of the major reasons for Thomas's return to Paris in 1269 ⁵³). Siger had taught in his *Quaestiones in librum tertium de anima*, probably written sometime between 1265 and 1270 ⁵⁴), that according to Aristotle the human intellect is one for all men and not multiplied according to the number of individual men. He argues that only if the intellect were united by its substance with the body could it be multiplied, and in that case the intellect would be corruptible ⁵⁵). On December 10, 1270, the Bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, issued a condemnation of thirteen propositions which can be divided into four main errors: the eternity of the world, the denial of universal divine Providence, the unicity of the intellectual soul, and determinism ⁵⁶). But that same year, probably ear-

⁵⁰) *Ibid.*, p. 374. See H. Denifle and A. Chatelain, *Chartularius Universitatis Parisiensis*, I (Paris, 1889), No. 409, pp. 450-451, for mention of « magister Sygerus de nacione Picardorum ».

⁵¹) Van Steenberghen, *La philosophie au XIII^e siècle*, p. 375 and p. 428.

⁵²) *Ibid.*, p. 428.

⁵³) Angelus Walz, *Saint Thomas d'Aquin*, trans. Paul Novarina (*Philosophes médiévaux*, V; Louvain and Paris, 1962), p. 149. Cf. Mandonnet, pp. 85-89.

⁵⁴) Van Steenberghen, *La philosophie au XIII^e siècle*, pp. 375, 381 and 587. On the work, see also Van Steenberghen, *Siger de Brabant d'après ses œuvres inédites*, I, pp. 164-177; II: *Siger dans l'histoire de l'aristotélisme (Les philosophes belges, XXI*; Louvain, 1942), pp. 360-632; Bruno Nardi, *Studi di filosofia medievale* (Rome, 1960), pp. 151-161; J. J. Duin, *La doctrine de la providence dans les écrits de Siger de Brabant (Philosophes médiévaux, III*; Louvain, 1954), especially pp. 57-60; and Giambattista Da Palma, *La dottrina sull'unità dell'intelletto in Sigieri di Brabante* (Padua, 1955).

⁵⁵) Siger of Brabant, *Quaestiones in librum tertium de anima*, q. 2, f. 358a, Merton College Codex 292 (as edited by Duin, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-59; cf. Van Steenberghen, *Siger de Brabant*, I, pp. 165-166), q. 8-9, ff. 395vb-360ra (Da Palma, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-43; cf. Van Steenberghen, pp. 168-170.)

⁵⁶) Mandonnet, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-112; M. M. Gorce, « La lutte 'Contra Gentiles' a

lier, Siger had been the object of a critique that was more telling, one that would cause him to modify his position on the soul and intellect. It was Saint Thomas's opusculum against the Averroists (*averroistae*), which limited its attack to psychological issues ⁵⁷).

A. Saint Thomas

In his *De unitate intellectus contra averroistas*, Thomas launches his frontal attack on the position of Siger ⁵⁸). Thomas concentrates on what he takes to be the two fundamental errors of the Averroist interpretation of Aristotle, namely that the rational or intellective soul is not the substantial form of the body and that it is one for all mankind since it is not multiplied by matter ⁵⁹). The first part of the opusculum (chapters 1-3) is devoted to the first error and the second part (chapter 4 and 5) is devoted to the latter error ⁶⁰). In the first chapter, Thomas presents and analyzes a battery of texts from Aristotle which contradict the Averroist position, while in the second chapter he attempts to show that both the Greeks (namely Themistius, Theophrastus and Alexander of Aphrodisias) and the Arabs (namely Avicenna and Algazel) considered the intellect to be part of the soul and not a single, separate substance ⁶¹). What is of particular interest for us is Thomas's presentation in chapter 2 of passages taken from William of Moerbeke's newly

Paris au XIII^e siècle », in *Mélanges Mandonnet, I* (Bibliothèque thomiste, XIII; Paris, 1930), pp. 233-241; *idem.*, « Averroïsme », in *Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastique*, V (Paris, 1931), cols. 1054-1058; Van Steenberghen, *La philosophie au XIII^e siècle*, pp. 375 and 472-474. For the text of the condemnation, see also H. Denifle and A. Chatelain, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis I* (Paris, 1889), No. 432, pp. 486-487.

⁵⁷) The opusculum is probably not aimed at a specific work of Siger, but at the oral teaching of Siger and his allies as reflected in students' notes. It would also be difficult to state categorically that Thomas is specifically attacking the *Quaestiones in tertium de anima*, though many of its doctrines are criticized. See Van Steenberghen, *La philosophie au XIII^e siècle*, p. 435.

⁵⁸) For an analysis of Thomas's critique of Averroes as found in his various works, see Bruno Nardi, *S. Tommaso d'Aquino*, pp. 56-67.

⁵⁹) See Van Steenberghen, *Siger de Brabant*, II, pp. 633-634; *idem.*, *La philosophie au XIII^e siècle*, pp. 435-437.

⁶⁰) *Ibid.*, p. 436.

⁶¹) Saint Thomas Aquinas, *Tractatus de unitate intellectus contra averroistas*, Second edition, ed. Leo W. Keeler (Rome, 1957), ch. 1-2, pp. 3-38.

available translation of Themistius's paraphrases on the *De anima* ⁶²). He uses these passages to establish the true mind of both Themistius and Theophrastus ⁶³). From three separate passages which he quotes, Thomas concludes that Themistius holds that according to Aristotle not only the possible intellect but also the agent intellect are parts of the human soul and that man is man through his intellectual part ⁶⁴). Thomas cuttingly observes: « Not only the Latins, whose words have no flavor for some, but also the Greeks and the Arabs thought this, that the intellect is a part or potency or power of the soul which is the form of the body ». He then goes on to express his wonder at those who would prefer to err with Averroes, « who was not so much a Peripatetic as a depraver of peripatetic philosophy » ⁶⁵). There can be little question that Saint Thomas has Siger and his colleagues in mind.

Thomas returns to Themistius later in the *De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas*. Among the arguments given to show that the possible intellect is one for all men is that it is a principle of all philosophers, both the Arabs and Peripatetics (presumably Thomas means by « Peri-

⁶²) See Verbeke, *op. cit.*, pp. xxxiv-xxxviii. For earlier discussions, see Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant*, pp. 177-178; Martin Grabmann, *Mittelalterliche lateinische Übersetzungen von Schriften der Aristoteles-Kommentatoren Johannes Philoponus, Alexander von Aphrodisias und Themistios* (Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophische-historische Abteilung, 1929, Heft 7), pp. 61-68; Marcel De Corte, « Thémistius et Saint Thomas d'Aquin », in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 7 (1932), pp. 65-83; Paul Wilpert, « Die Ausgestaltung der aristotelischen Lehre vom Intellectus agens bei den griechischen Kommentatoren und in der Scholastik des 13. Jahrhunderts », in *Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters*, 1 Halbband (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Supplementband III, 1 Halbband; Münster, 1935), pp. 459-461; Grabmann, *Guglielmo di Moerbeke* p.p. 135-140.

⁶³) Themistius is of course our major source of information on the psychology of Theophrastus. On Theophrastus, see E. Barbotin, *La théorie aristotélécienne de l'intellect d'après Théophraste* (Louvain and Paris, 1954); *idem.*, « Autour de la noétique aristotélécienne, l'interprétation du témoignage de Théophraste par Averroès », in *Mélanges de philosophie grecque, offerts à Mgr. Diès* (Paris, 1956), pp. 27-40; Gérard Verbeke, « La théorie aristotélécienne de l'intellect d'après Théophrastes », *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 53 (1955), pp. 368-382.

⁶⁴) Thomas Aquinas, *De unitate intellectus*, ch. 2, par. 51-53, pp. 33-34. See Themistius, *Commentaire sur le traité De l'âme d'Aristote*, Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke, ed. G. Verbeke, p. 225, 2-p. 226, 24; p. 228, 68-p. 229, 91; and p. 233, 73-p. 234-90. There are some breaks in the texts quoted. For the Greek original, see Themistius, *In libros de anima paraphrasis* (Heinze), p. 98, 33-p. 99, 18; p. 100, 16-p. 101, 1; and p. 102, 37-p. 103, 17.

⁶⁵) Thomas Aquinas, *De unitate intellectus*, par. 59, p. 38.

patetics» the ancient Greek commentators on Aristotle), and only with the exception of the Latins, that the intellect is not multiplied. To discredit this argument, Thomas gives the counterexamples of Algazel and Avicenna (both of whom held to a multiplicity of souls), pointing out that they were Arabs ⁶⁶) In order that the Greeks not be left out of the discussion, he now proposes to present Themistius's own words in his paraphrases on the *De anima*. ⁶⁷)

What Saint Thomas offers in order to show that Themistius did maintain the multiplicity of potential intellects is the difficult passage about «illuminating» and «illuminated» intellects presented above. He reads the passage to mean that neither the agent intellect which Aristotle discusses nor the possible intellect is one for all men: there are both many agent intellects and also many potential or possible intellects. When Themistius speaks of many «illuminated» (*illustrati*) and «illuminating» (*illustrantes*) intellects, Thomas takes him to mean that the «illuminated» are the many potential intellects and the «illuminating» are the many agent intellects. On the other hand, when Themistius speaks of a first illuminating intellect which is one (*primus quidem illustrans est unus*), Thomas takes this to refer to some ultimate source of illumination (*principium illustrationis*), namely some separate substance. It is very important to note that he makes no attempt to specify what substance this was for Themistius, but merely indicates that according to some Catholics God plays such a role, just as according to Avicenna the lowest of the Intelligences is the ultimate source of illumination ⁶⁸). Thomas has thus solved the problem of whether the

⁶⁶) *Ibid.*, ch. 5, par. 119, p. 76.

⁶⁷) «Et ut Graecos non omittamus, ponenda sunt circa hoc verba Themistii in Commento». *Ibid.*, par. 120, p. 77.

⁶⁸) Cum enim quaesivisset de intellectu agente, utrum sit unus aut plures, subiungit solvens: 'Aut primus quidem illustrans est unus, illustrati autem et illustrantes sunt plures. Sol quidem enim est unus, lumen autem dices modo aliquo partiri ad visus. Propter hoc enim non solem in comparatione posuit (scil. Aristoteles), sed lumen; Plato autem solem'. Ergo patet per verba Themistii quod nec intellectus agens, de quo Aristoteles loquitur, est unus qui est illustrans, nec etiam possibilis qui est illustratus. Sed verum est quod principium illustrationis est unum, scil. aliqua substantia separata, — vel Deus secundum Catholicos, vel intelligentia ultima secundum Avicennam». *Ibid.*, par. 120, p. 77. In his early work, the commentary on the *Sentences* (probably finished around 1256: cf. I. T. Eschmann, «A Catalogue of St. Thomas's Works», in Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* [New York. 1956], p. 384), Saint Thomas explicitly mentions those «Catholic doctors» (*Catholici doctores*) who have identified

agent intellect is one or many, transcendent or immanent in man according to Themistius by holding that there is both a single transcendent agent intellect and also many individual agent intellects which are immanent in individual men. He thus takes Themistius's remarks about the teacher and the student having the same concept and therefore the same intellect to be a proof for the unity of the separate

God as the agent intellect: « His ergo visis, sciendum est, quod in hoc fere omnes philosophi concordant post Aristotelem (3 de Anima, text. 19 et 20), quod intellectus agens et possibilis differunt secundum substantiam; et quod intellectus agens sit substantia quaedam separata, et postrema in substantiis separatis, et ita se habet ad intellectum possibilem quo intelligimus, sicut intelligentiae superiores ad animas orbium. Sed hoc secundum fidem non potest sustineri ... et ideo uniri cum intelligentia agente ponunt praedicti philosophi ultimam felicitatem hominis. Et ideo quidam catholici doctores corrigentes hanc opinionem, et partem sequentes, satis probabiliter posuerunt, ipsum Deum esse intellectum agentem; quia per applicationem ad ipsum, anima nostra beata est; et hoc confirmant per hoc quod dicitur Joan. 1, 9: *Erat lux vera, quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum* ». *Commentum in secundum librum Sententiarum*, d. 17, q. 2, a. 1 (*Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia*, VI; Parma, 1856), p. 533. A little further in the same article he remarks: « ... et superaddo etiam intellectum agentem esse in diversis diversum: non enim videtur probabile quod in anima rationali non sit principium aliquod quod naturalem operationem explere possit; quod sequitur, si ponatur unus intellectus agens, sive dicatur Deus, vel intelligentia ». *Ibid.*, p. 555. For discussion of Thomas's attitude toward considering God as the agent intellect, see Étienne Gilson, « Pourquoi Saint Thomas a critiqué Saint Augustin », *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 1 (1926-1927), pp. 5-127, especially p. 124; Wilpert, *op. cit.*, pp. 459-460; de Mattos, *op. cit.*, pp. 153-159. One of the most famous philosophers before Thomas who held God is the agent intellect was Roger Bacon. On his adoption and use of this doctrine, see Karl Werner, « Die Psychologie, Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftslehre des Roger Baco », in *Sitzungsberichte der philosophisch-historischen Classe der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Vienna, 1879), pp. 488-489; Pierre Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant*, pp. 239-244; Otto Keicher, « Der Intellectus agens bei Roger Baco » in *Festgabe zum 60. Geburtstag Clemens Baeumker (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Supplementband I; Münster, 1913)*, pp. 299-300, 303 and 306; Raoul Carton, *L'expérience mystique de l'illumination intérieure chez Roger Bacon* (Paris, 1924), pp. 188-192; Gilson, « Pourquoi Saint Thomas ... », pp. 104-110. Albert the Great also spoke on occasion of God as the (or an) agent intellect. See his *De intellectu et intelligibili*, II, tr. 1, ch. 2-3 (*Opera omnia*, IX; Paris, 1890), pp. 506-507. Cf. Louis De Raeymaeker, « Albert le Grand, philosophe », *Revue neo-scholastique de philosophie* 35 (1933), pp. 14-15; de Mattos, *op. cit.*, pp. 150-152. Siger of Brabant taught in his *De intellectu* that God is the agent intellect. See note 148 *infra*. William of Auvergne, Robert Grosseteste and Adam Marsh also appear to have taught such a doctrine and to have influenced Roger Bacon. See Theodore Crowley, *Roger Bacon: The Problem of the Soul in His Philosophical Commentaries* (Louvain and Dublin, 1950), pp. 187-188.

illuminating principle and not to concern the individual agent intellects ⁶⁹).

As to the argument which is here at issue, namely that it is a principle of all philosophers that the possible intellect is one for all men, Thomas denies that Aristotle, Theophrastus, Plato or Themistius himself held this as a principle. Given Averroes has obviously presented the doctrine of Themistius and Theophrastus in a perverse way, Thomas recalls his earlier judgment that Averroes is a « perverter of peripatetic philosophy » (*philosophiae peripateticae perversorem*). He continues: « Whence it is astonishing how some, seeing only the commentary on Averroes, presume to proclaim, since he said it, that all the Greek and Arab philosophers, with the exception of the Latins, thought this [namely, that the possible intellect is one for all men]. » ⁷⁰) There can be little doubt that Saint Thomas has made full use of William of Moerbeke's recent translation of Themistius to undercut Averroes's reliability as a commentator and that the challenge which he has presented to the Averroist camp was a grave one.

B. Siger of Brabant

Siger of Brabant's initial response to Thomas's *De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas* is to be found in his now lost *De intellectu* and not, as was once held, in his *Quaestiones de anima intellectiva*. This was demonstrated by the late Bruno Nardi in the course of his long controversy with Fernand Van Steenberghen: it would appear that Canon Van Steenberghen now accepts this part of Nardi's thesis ⁷¹). Siger's *De anima intellectiva* represents a slightly later phase in the evolution of his psychological ideas: the work is of particular interest here

⁶⁹) « Unitatem autem huius separati principii probat Themistius per hoc, quod docens et addiscens idem intelligit, quod non esset nisi esset idem principium illustrans ». *Ibid.*, par. 120, p. 77.

⁷⁰) « Ergo patet quod Aristoteles et Theophrastus et Themistius et ipse Plato non habuerunt pro principio, quod intellectus possibilis sit unus in omnibus. Patet etiam quod Averroes perverse refert sententiam Themistii et Theophrasti de intellectu possibili et agente. Unde merito supradiximus eum philosophiae peripateticae perversorem. Unde mirum est quomodo aliqui, solum commentum Averrois videntes, pronuntiare praesumunt, quod ipse dicit, hoc sensisse omnes philosophos Graecos et Arabes, praeter Latinos ». *Ibid.*, par. 120, pp. 77-78.

⁷¹) Van Steenberghen, *La philosophie au XIII^e siècle*, p. 444. Cf. Bruno Nardi, *Sigieri di Brabante nel pensiero del Rinascimento italiano* (Rome, 1945), p. 33.

since he discusses in it the thought of Themistius ⁷²). The center of focus has shifted from Averroes to Aristotle, and the author mentioned most frequently after Aristotle is Themistius ⁷³). The major aim of the work is to determine the true mind of Aristotle regarding the nature of the soul, and not necessarily to arrive at the truth ⁷⁴). What is noteworthy is that we find Siger using Themistius in chapter 8 of the *De anima intellectiva* to determine the true mind of Aristotle — he gives citations from Moerbeke's translation ⁷⁵). But what is even more important for us is his discussion in chapter 7 of the question whether the intellective soul is multiplied according to the multiplication of human bodies, since Themistius's doctrine on the agent intellect is discussed in passing.

Siger first sets forth arguments against the multiplication of the intellect which are reminiscent of those to be found in his earlier work, the *Quaestiones in librum tertium de anima*. They include the following: that the intellective soul is separated from matter and therefore lacks a principle of individuation; that it is self-subsistent and individuated in itself and so cannot be common to many individuals; that plurality results only from quantified being, whereas the nature of the intellect is to be separate from quantity; and that there would then be an infinity of souls for Aristotle ⁷⁶). But in sharp contrast to the *Quaestiones in librum tertium de anima*, Siger now admits that there are both very difficult arguments and also authorities for the multiplicity of intellective human souls. Siger names in particular Avicenna, Algazel and Themistius, those three philosophers who had been singled out by Saint Thomas as upholders of the multiplicity of the potential or possible intellect. Siger says that Themistius thinks that the agent intellect as well as the intellective soul is multiplied and that he especially believed that the possible intellect is multiplied. However, Siger is careful to make a distinction between two kinds of agent intellect for Themistius and it is here that he presents his interpretation of the

⁷²) See Siger of Brabant, *Quaestiones de anima intellectiva*, ch. 3, p. 143 and 155-156; ch. 7, p. 168; and ch. 8, p. 170. In ch. 3 (p. 153), Siger relies on Themistius to determine the true mind of Aristotle and refers to him as Aristotle's *expositor*.

⁷³) Cf. Bruckmüller, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

⁷⁴) Siger, *De anima intellectiva*, ch. 6, p. 163.

⁷⁵) *Ibid.*, ch. 8, p. 170. Lines 18-19 are taken word for word from Themistius, *Commentaire*, p. 108, lines 45-47. The other citation (lines 9-12) is not a quotation. Cf. *Commentaire*, p. 114, lines 80-83.

⁷⁶) *Ibid.*, ch. 7, pp. 164-167.

difficult passage about «illuminated» and «illuminating» intellects. In contrast to Saint Thomas, and perhaps more in accord with the actual thought of Themistius ⁷⁷⁾, Siger takes the phrase «illuminated and illuminating» to refer solely to the agent intellect which is multiplied and to have nothing to do with the possible intellect. The one agent intellect that only illuminates (and is not apparently illuminated in any way) is evidently another substance, but Siger never specifies its identity: he even refrains from making an aside like that of Thomas about God or the lowest Intelligence ⁷⁸⁾. The scheme that Siger discerns in Themistius would thus appear to be the following: the one agent intellect illuminates the many agent intellects in the souls of men and is in no way illuminated by anything more ultimate; the many agent intellects in the souls of men are illuminated by the one agent intellect and in turn illuminate the potential or possible intellects which are also part of the human soul ⁷⁹⁾.

In the remaining part of chapter 7 of the *De anima intellectiva*, Siger presents forceful arguments against the thesis of the unity of the intellect and confesses that because of the difficulty of these and other arguments he has for some time had doubts (*mihi dubium fuit a longo tempore*) as to what is to be held according to natural reason and what Aristotle thought about the multiplicity of the intellectual soul. He adds that in the case of such a doubt one must follow the teaching of faith, namely that the soul is multiplied ⁸⁰⁾. This statement would certainly appear to indicate that Siger has abandoned the Averroist teaching of the unity of the intellect, and some of his best historians have concluded this from their study of the *De anima intellecti-*

⁷⁷⁾ This is the judgement of Verbeke, *Thémistius*, pp. xlvii-xlviii.

⁷⁸⁾ «Sed et sunt rationes multum difficiles quibus necesse sit animam intellectivam multiplicatione corporum humanorum multiplicari, et etiam ad hoc sunt auctoritates. Hoc enim vult Avicenna, et Algazel, et Themistius, et etiam vult de intellectu agente, illustrante et illustrato, quod multiplicetur, licet illustrans tantum sit unus, et multo magis intellectum possibilem intendebat multiplicari». Siger, *De anima intellectiva*, ch. 7, p. 168.

⁷⁹⁾ Cf. Verbeke, *Thémistius*, pp. xlvii-xlviii.

⁸⁰⁾ «Et ideo dico propter difficultatem praemissorum et quorundam aliorum, quod mihi dubium fuit a longo tempore, quid via rationis naturalis in praedicto problemate sit tenendum, et quid senserit Philosophus de dicta quaestione; et in tali dubio fidei adhaerendum est, quae omnem rationem humanam superat». Siger, *De anima intellectiva*, ch. 7, p. 169. On the disagreement of historians regarding the phrase «mihi dubium fuit a longo tempore», see Van Steenberghen, *La philosophie au XIII^e siècle*, p. 453, n. 79.

va⁸¹). While much of the credit for Siger's change of heart may very well be attributable to the philosophical arguments of Saint Thomas, some of which are quite penetrating⁸²), the role that William of Moerbeke's translation of Themistius played in Thomas's case against Averroes should not be forgotten. Nor should we forget that Siger himself shows great interest in Themistius in his *De anima intellectiva* and even appears to prefer him over Averroes as a commentator on Aristotle⁸³).

C. Henry Bate of Malines

The paraphrases of Themistius in the Moerbeke translation also exercised an influence on Henry Bate of Malines (b. Malines, ca. 1246; d. Liège, after 1310), who was a younger contemporary of Thomas and Siger)⁸⁴. A master of arts, and probably a master in theology as well,

⁸¹) See Bruckmüller, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-33, 105-111, 114-119 and 168-170; Nardi, « L'averroismo di Sigieri e Dante », pp. 93-98 and 110-111; *idem.*, *S. Tommaso D'Aquino*, pp. 77-78; Van Steenberghen, *La philosophie au XIII^e siècle*, pp. 452-455. There is no indication of any change in Siger's attitude toward Averroes and the unity of the intellect in the accounts of Siger given by Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1955), pp. 389-399 and 718-725; and Armand A. Maurer, *Medieval Philosophy* (New York, 1962), pp. 192-199.

⁸²) For analysis of Thomas's arguments, see Mandonnet, *op. cit.*, pp. 175-181; Van Steenberghen, *Siger de Brabant*, II, pp. 633-642; *idem.*, *La philosophie au XIII^e siècle*, pp. 432-443. Two recent articles discuss the *De unitate intellectus*. See Howard P. Kainz, « The Multiplicity and Individuality of Intellects: A Re-examination of St. Thomas' Reaction to Averroes », *Divus Thomas* (Piacenza) 74 (1971), pp. 155-179; and Ruth Reyna, « On the Soul: A Philosophical Exploration of the Active Intellect in Averroes, Aristotle and Aquinas », *The Thomist* 36 (1972), pp. 131-149.

⁸³) We should recall that Siger even calls Themistius Aristotle's *expositor*. See Siger, *De anima intellectiva*, ch. 3, p. 153. See notes 14, 72 and 73 *supra*.

⁸⁴) On Henry's life and works, see Maurice De Wulf, « Henri Bate de Malines », in *Bulletins de l'Académie Royale de Belgique. Classe des Lettres et des Sciences Morales et Politiques*, Serie 4, XI (1909), pp. 465-481; Gaston Wallerand, « Bate, Henri », in *Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastique* VI (Paris, 1932), cols. 1313-1314; Bruno Nardi, « Bate, Enrico », in *Enciclopedia filosofica*, Second edition, I (Florence, 1967), cols. 761-762. For discussion of Henry's interest in astronomy and astrology, see Duhem, *Le système du monde*, IV, pp. 24-28; Alexander Birkenmajer, « Henri Bate de Malines, astronome et philosophe du XIII^e siècle », in *La Pologne au Ve Congrès International des Sciences Historiques, Bruxelles 1923* (Warsaw, 1924), pp. 1-11, now reprinted in the collection of his studies, *Etudes d'histoire des sciences et de la philosophie du Moyen Age* (*Studia Copernicana*, I; Warsaw, 1970), pp. 103-115; and Lynn Thorndike, « Henry Bate on the Occult and Spiritualism », *Archives internationales d'histoire des sciences* 7 (1954), pp. 133-140.

Henry did not pursue a university teaching career at Paris, but rather led a life of scholarship, first while serving as secretary and tutor of Guy de Hainaut, who was the brother of Jean II, count of Tainaut, Holland and Zealand, and later while holding various ecclesiastical offices. He was at different times a canon of Saint-Lambert at Liège, bishop of Liège and bishop of Utrecht ⁸⁵). Henry studied at Paris from around 1266 to 1270 and he was therefore well acquainted with the various doctrinal disputes that rocked the university during that period, especially that between Thomas and the Averroists; much of his writing took place after the condemnation of 1277 ⁸⁶).

Henry met William of Moerbeke for the first time in 1274 and he appears to have had close relations with him until Moerbeke's death in 1286 ⁸⁷). Although the extent of Moerbeke's personal influence on the philosophical ideas of Henry cannot be decided here ⁸⁸), it is beyond question that his translations of Themistius's paraphrases on the *De anima*, John Philoponus's *De Intellectu*, which is a commentary on part of the third book of the *De anima*, Simplicius's commentaries on the *Categories* and *De caelo*, and Proclus's *Institutio Theologica* and other treatises did have their effect. Henry's basic philosophical outlook is that of a « concordist », that is, he believes that Plato and Aristotle really hold the same thing, and he therefore attempts to reconcile their seemingly conflicting views ⁸⁹). The works which Moerbeke had

⁸⁵) Wallerand, « Bate, Henri », col. 1313.

⁸⁶) Gaston Wallerand, « Henri Bate de Malines et saint Thomas d'Aquin », *Revue neoscholastique de philosophie* 36 (1934), pp. 389-390. On Henry's use of Saint Thomas's *De unitate intellectus*, see E. Van De Vyver, « Une utilisation peu commune de textes de S. Thomas: Henri Bate, Speculum III, 16 », *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 23 (1956), pp. 122-126. Henry shows no caution or reserve because of the condemnation of 1277, no doubt because he worked outside Paris and the University scene. See Van De Vyver's remarks in his introduction to *Henricus Bate: Speculum Divinorum*, I, p. xx.

⁸⁷) De Wulf, « Henri Bate de Malines », pp. 466-469; Nardi, « Bate, Enrico », col. 761. According to Henry himself, William of Moerbeke had promised to translate the *Parmenides* of Plato, but died before he could do so. See Wallerand « Henri Bate de Malines et Saint Thomas d'Aquin », p. 383, n. 17.

⁸⁸) On William of Moerbeke's tendencies toward neo-Platonism, see Maurice De Wulf, *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale*, 5th ed., II (Paris and Louvain, 1925), pp. 110-111. De Wulf remarks of Moerbeke: « ses sympathies pour le néo-platonisme sont profondes » (p. 110). Cf. Grabmann, *I Papi del duecento e l'Aristotelismo*; II: *Guglielmo di Moerbeke O. P.*, pp. 57-61 and 147-160.

⁸⁹) Inter haec autem quamplures alias quaestiones ac dubitabilia tangendo partium quidem philosophiae solemniora, dissonantes quoque superficialiter sermones

translated would in general foster such a conciliating approach to Aristotle, but the explicit « concordism » pursued by Themistius and Simplicius and its influence on Henry have been especially underscored by one recent scholar ⁹⁰).

Henry Bate's major philosophical work, the *Speculum divinarum et quorundam naturalium*, written between 1281 and 1302/1303, is a sweeping treatise which primarily studies the *entia divina*, that is, all the immaterial and intellectual beings which form a hierarchy at whose base is the human soul; it considers *naturalia* only in passing ⁹¹). Consequently, there is a great emphasis in the work on problems concerning the nature of the soul and the intellect. There are many references to Plotinus, Proclus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Philoponus, Themistius, the *Liber de causis*, the pseudo-Dionysius, Augustine, Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas among others ⁹²). This encyclopedic work is in the main a compilation of quotations from most of these authors and it thus has a special importance for determining both the sources available to masters in arts toward the end of the thirteenth century and also the date of the Latin translation of various Greek and Arab works ⁹³). Of the twenty-three parts of the *Speculum*, only three have been published so far by Van De Vyver, but the heavy use of Moerbeke's translations of Themistius and Philoponus, both of whom we shall meet again in James of Viterbo, is evident ⁹⁴). Although Henry does dedicate Part III of the work to the question of the necessity of postulating an agent intellect and presents

inter se Platonis et Aristotelis, in unam realem seu concordem quodammodo sententiam redactos ... » Henry Bate, *Speculum*, Prooemium, I, p. 47. Cf. Wallerand, « Henri Bate de Malines et saint Thomas d'Aquin », p. 391. In the fifteenth and sixteenth century a strong tradition arose comparing and conciliating Plato and Aristotle. It is now being studied by Dr. Frederick Purnell, Jr. (Queens College, City University of New York). See his *Jacopo Mazzoni and His Comparison of Plato and Aristotle* (Unpublished dissertation, Columbia University, 1971), especially Ch. II: « The Comparatio Tradition », pp. 30-92, for a survey of the tradition from antiquity onwards.

⁹⁰) See Tullio Gregory, « Platone e Aristotele nello *Speculum* di Enrico Bate di Malines : Note in margine di una recente edizione », *Studi medioevali* 2 (1961), pp. 315-316.

⁹¹) See Van De Vyver's introduction to *Henricus Bate: Speculum Divinarum*, I, pp. xiii-xiv and xvii-xviii.

⁹²) Wallerand, « Henri Bate de Malines et saint Thomas d'Aquin » p. 393. Cf. Gérard Verbeke, « Guillaume de Moerbeke traducteur de Proclus », *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 51 (1953), pp. 350-351 and 357.

⁹³) Van De Vyver, p. xxi; Wallerand, p. 388.

⁹⁴) See the « Table de sources » at the end of the first two volumes of Van De Vyver's edition. Cf. Nardi « Bate, Enrico », col. 761.

long quotations on the topic from Moerbeke's translation of Themistius, he does not take up the issue of whether the agent intellect is one or many for Themistius, nor does he refer to the troublesome passage on illuminating and illuminated intellects ⁹⁵). Fortunately, Verbeke does provide us with some information on the topic and gives us a crucial quote from Part VI, chapter 7 of the *Speculum*, which is concerned with Themistius's position on the problem of the plurality of the human intellect.

Apparently Henry believes that while Themistius seems to uphold the unity of the agent intellect, given he emphasizes that all men share the same intellectual principles and that the teacher and the student must have the same intellect if learning is to take place, one cannot necessarily conclude from this that there is only one agent intellect ⁹⁶). He also appears to believe that he can overcome Themistius's denial that the agent intellect is God. His solution would seem to be that there is one agent intellect which illumines all men, namely God, and a plurality of individual agent intellects in the souls of men. He thus reads the passage on illuminating and illuminated intellects to mean that the first illuminating intellect is God, the universal and creating intellect, whereas the many «illuminated and illuminating» intellects are the potential and agent intellects in the individual souls of men ⁹⁷). Henry thus agrees with Saint Thomas on the interpretation of the phrase «illuminated and illuminating», but goes beyond him by identifying the first illuminating intellect with a definite separate substance, namely God ⁹⁸).

Having examined the use that Saint Thomas, Siger of Brabant and Henry Bate made of William of Moerbeke's translation of Themistius's paraphrases on the *De anima*, and having detailed their inter-

⁹⁵) Henry Bate, *Speculum*, Part III, ch. 1-12, in Tome II, pp. 155-202.

⁹⁶) Verbeke, *Thémistius*, p. xlviii.

⁹⁷) «Ex hoc igitur sermone Themistii manifestum est intentionem eius satis concordem hiis esse, quae dicta sunt prius de universali et conditore intellectu, qualiter videlicet nostrum perficit intellectum unus utique primus existens illustrans et activus intellectus, ad quem omnes reducimur compositi ex eo qui potentia et actu, illustrati et illustrantes plures quidem existentes». Henry Bate, *Speculum*, Part VI, ch. 7, as quoted by Verbeke, p. xlviii, n. 30 from Van De Vyver's doctoral dissertation at Louvain (1953), p. 28.

⁹⁸) Verbeke (xlviii-xlix) takes Henry Bate to hold that Themistius is a partisan of the unity of the active intellect. This does not seem to agree completely with the text which he himself gives and which we have presented in full in the previous note.

pretations of the intriguing passage concerning the single « illuminating » agent intellect and the « illuminated » and « illuminating » intellects, we are now in a position to turn to James of Viterbo's discussion of Themistius and the agent intellect.

III. THEMISTIUS IN JAMES OF VITERBO

James of Viterbo was born at Viterbo around 1255 and he joined the Order of the Hermits of Saint Augustine in his native city around 1272. After a few years of study in the Augustinian convent there, he left for Paris, where he studied from 1275 until 1281 or 1282, when he returned to Italy for a three year period and served in high posts of the Roman province of his order. He went back to Paris in time for the academic year 1285-1286 in order to resume his studies and he became a bachelor in theology in 1288 and a doctor in theology at Easter, 1293 ⁹⁹). He succeeded Giles of Rome, his teacher, as *Magister regens* at the beginning of the new academic year, that is in September, 1293 ¹⁰⁰). At a general chapter meeting of the order in 1295, he was granted an annual subvention for books and any other needed items as an encouragement to write. James remained at Paris until the end of 1299 or the beginning of 1300, when he traveled to Naples to become the Master Regent or *lector principalis* of the Augustinian *Studium generale* recently established in that city. He taught there until he was named Archbishop of Benevento on September 3, 1302. Only two months later, on December 12, 1302, he was named Archbishop of Naples, a post he held until his death in February, 1308 ¹⁰¹). Al-

⁹⁹) See David Gutiérrez, « De vita et scriptis Jacobi de Viterbio (ca. 1255-1307) », *Analecta Augustiniana* 16 (1937-38), pp. 216-218. Gutiérrez's five part article (*ibid.*, pp. 216-224, 282-305, 358-381, 432-466 and 523-552) reappeared with almost no modifications as a monograph: *De B. Jacobis Viterbiensis O. E. S. A. Vita, operibus et doctrina theologica* (Rome, 1939), a copy of which I have examined in the Vatican Library. See also B. Hauréau, « Jacques de Viterbe, théologien », in *Histoire littéraire de la France* XVII (Paris, 1900), pp. 45-63; Palemon Glorieux, *Repertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIII^e siècle*, II (Paris, 1933), p. 309; *idem.*, « James of Viberto », in *New Catholic Encyclopedia* VII (New York, 1966), p. 813.

¹⁰⁰) Eelco Ypma, *La formation des professeurs chez Les Ermites de Saint-Augustin de 1256 à 1354* (Paris, 1956), p. 84.

¹⁰¹) Gutiérrez, *op. cit.*, pp. 218-220 and 223. See also Biagio Canterà, *Documenti riguardanti il B. Giacomo da Viterbo Arcivescovo di Napoli* (Naples, 1888), a copy of which I have examined in the Vatican Library.

though James was permitted by the order to keep his evidently large and important personal library even after he had become a bishop, he was asked by the general chapter of 1306 to give the order 90 florins of gold for the use of the books and to leave them to the Augustinian convent at Viterbo after his death. However, they do not seem to have arrived there and no list of the works that he possessed appears to be extant ¹⁰²).

Among the works which James wrote are a commentary on the *Sentences*, an *Abbreviatio Sententiarum Egidii Romani, Quaestiones Parisius disputatae de predicamentis in divinis*, and *Quaestiones disputatae de Verbo* ¹⁰³). He is probably most celebrated for his ecclesiological treatise, the *De regimine christiano* (1301-1302), which provided a theoretical justification for Boniface VIII in his conflict with Philip the Fair and which is dedicated to that pope ¹⁰⁴). However, the work that is of interest to us here is the series of quodlibetal disputations

¹⁰²) Gutiérrez, *op. cit.*, p. 222. See also the unsigned article, «Antiquiores quae extant definitiones capitulorum generalium ordinis», *Analecta Augustiniana* 3 (1909-1910), p. 56, especially note 4. Cf. Ypma, *La formation*, pp. 126-128, who gives no listing of James's books, though he does reproduce (pp. 157-158) a list of books possessed by the Paris convent of the Augustinians around 1300. No philosophical works appear to be mentioned.

¹⁰³) On James's writings, see B. Canterà, «De scriptis b. Iacobi Viterbiensis, O. N.», *Analecta Augustiniana* 4 (1912), pp. 346-355; Glorieux, *Repertoire*, II, pp. 309-312; Gutiérrez, *op. cit.*, pp. 282-305; F. Stegmüller, *Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi* (Würzburg, 1947), pp. 187-188; Domenico Ambrasi, «La Summa de peccatorum distinctione del b. Giacomo da Viterbo dal ms. VII G 101 della Biblioteca Nazionale di Napoli», *Asprenas* 6 (1959), pp. 47-78, 189-218 and 288-308, but especially pp. 47-62. Also of interest are two textual studies by Ciriaco Scanzillo: «Il 'De episcopali officio' del codice 793 O. di Montecassino», *Asprenas* 15 (1968), pp. 158-199 (edition = pp. 185-199); «La Prima Quaestio disputata 'De Verbo' del codice A. 917 della Biblioteca dell' Archiginnasio di Bologna», *Asprenas* 19 (1972), pp. 25-61 (edition = pp. 41-61).

¹⁰⁴) H. X. Arquillière, *Le plus ancien traité de l'Eglise: Jacques de Viterbo 'De regimine christiano' (1301-1302)* (Paris, 1926); *idem.*, «Jacques de Viterbe» in *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* VIII (Paris, 1947), cols. 305-309; Adhémar D'Alès, «Jacques de Viterbe, théologien de l'Eglise», *Gregorianum* 7 (1926), pp. 339-353; J. Madoz, «? Una nueva redacción de los textos pseudo-patristicos sobre el Primado, en Jacob de Viterbo?», *Gregorianum* 17 (1936), pp. 262-283; Ugo Mariani, *Scrittori politici agostiniani del secolo XIV* (Florence, 1927), pp. 64-99; *idem.*, *Chiesa e stato nei teologi agostiniani del secolo XIV* (Rome, 1957), pp. 75-88 and 151-174; and Richard Scholz, *Die Publizistik zur Zeit Philipps des Schönen und Bonifaz VIII* (Stuttgart, 1903), pp. 129-152. It must be noted that it was Boniface who made James a bishop.

which James held during the years 1293 to 1296 while he was *Magister regens* at Paris, namely the *Quaestiones Quodlibeta* or *Disputationes de quolibet*. The first was given in 1293-1294, the second in 1294-1295, and the third in 1295-1296. These three *Disputationes de quolibet*, each of which is composed of some twenty odd questions, are accepted as genuine and as having been composed directly by James. On the other hand, the fourth quodlibet, which exists in only one manuscript at Bordeaux, appears to be a defective *reportatio* ¹⁰⁵). The first two quodlibets had a notable circulation at the University of Paris, being mentioned in the list of works available at the official book sellers, the *stationarii*, which was issued on February 25, 1304. Moreover, various masters at Paris who were contemporaries of James, such as Godfrey of Fontaines, owned copies of these two quodlibets ¹⁰⁶). Since they provide us with much valuable information on topics debated at Paris toward the end of the thirteenth century, their publication is of importance for making more precise our conception of the philosophical scene during that period.

In his introduction to James's first *Quodlibet*, Father Ypma singles out the seventh and twelfth questions as the most important and the most elaborate ¹⁰⁷). The former deals with the question whether the motion of the will towards its end is an act of the will or of the intellect ¹⁰⁸), while the latter concerns itself with the problem whether the agent intellect is a part of the soul ¹⁰⁹). Ypma observes that in these two questions above all James pursues his own path and seeks

¹⁰⁵) See Glorieux, *Repertoire*, II, pp. 309-310; *idem.*, *La littérature quodlibétique*, II (Paris, 1935), pp. 144-147; Gutiérrez, *op. cit.*, pp. 290-294. Lottin has assigned *Quodlibeta* I and II to 1291-1292 in his *Psychologie et morale au XII^e et XIII^e siècles*, III, 2 (Louvain and Gembloux, 1949), pp. 731-732, and IV (Louvain and Gembloux, 1954), pp. 869-870, n. 2. However, Ypma (*Disputatio Prima De Quolibet*, p. vi, n. 10) rejects this proposal because the date 1291-1292 does not agree with the date of James's promotion to *Magister regens*. A Polish scholar has recently questioned whether the fourth quodlibet should be ascribed to James. See J. B. Korolec, « Les questions quodlibétique de Jacques de Viterbe dans les manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Jagellonne », *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum* 12 (1966), pp. 107-116, at pp. 109-110.

¹⁰⁶) See Ypma, introduction to *Disputatio Prima*, pp. vii, ix and xiv-xv, and H. Denifle and E. Chatelain, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, II (Paris, 1891), p. 109.

¹⁰⁷) « A en juger par la longueur des différentes questions, les plus importantes et les plus élaborées sont les questions VII et XII ... » Ypma, p. xxi.

¹⁰⁸) See James of Viterbo, *Prima Disputatio*, q. 7 (« Utrum motus voluntatis in finem sit actus voluntatis vel intellectus »), pp. 79-111.

¹⁰⁹) *Ibid.*, q. 12 (« Utrum intellectus agens sit aliquid animae »), pp. 157-182.

to resolve problems in a novel way ¹¹⁰). Ypma also points out that in the twelfth question James bases himself on the ideas of Augustine and Boethius, but attempts to reconcile his position with Aristotle, or at least to interpret him according to that solution, recognizing at the same time that he is resolving the problem in a fashion that is not the usual one ¹¹¹).

James's practise in his *Quodlibeta* is to give precise references to the « authorities » whom he cites, a practise also found in other masters of his day, such as Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines. But while he thus followed common practise, he took the further trouble of strengthening his argument by giving word for word quotations from many of these authorities ¹¹²). The authorities whose works he cites and quotes are Aristotle, Averroes, Algazel, Simplicius, John Philoponus, Proclus, Augustine, Boethius, the pseudo-Dionysius, Anselm, John Damascene, Hugh of Saint Victor, Robert Grosseteste, Gilbert of La Porrée and Bernard of Clairvaux ¹¹³). However, other authorities are discussed without reference to their works, namely Plato, Avicenna, Anaxagoras and Alexander ¹¹⁴). (The large number of authors whom James can cite may well reflect the richness of the important personal library that he possessed and took to Naples after he left Paris and that he even retained after he had become the archbishop of Naples) ¹¹⁵).

¹¹⁰) « C'est surtout dans les questions VII et XII que le Maître va son propre chemin et qu'il cherche à résoudre les problèmes d'une façon nouvelle ». Ypma, p. xxi.

¹¹¹) « L'entendement, et spécialement la nature de l'intelligence agent, ont été étudiés dans la question XII. Une fois de plus Jacques cherche une nouvelle solution du problème, en s'appuyant sur les idées de S. Augustin et de Boèce. Mais en même temps il essaye de le réconcilier avec Aristote, ou plutôt de l'interpréter dans le sens de sa propre solution. Il sait qu'il résout le problème d'une manière peu commune ». Ypma, pp. xxi-xxii.

¹¹²) « En ce qui concerne les philosophes, Aristote et Averroès, Jacques de Viterbe précise toujours, et presque sans exception, dans quel livre exactement on trouve le passage auquel il se réfère Il revoie ainsi également aux ouvrages d'Algazel, Joannes Grammaticus et une fois à Themistius, tandis qu'il se réfère constamment à Simplicius en ajoutant 'in Praedicamentis' Il est vrai que les Maîtres de son temps, comme Gilles de Rome, Henri de Gand, Godefroid de Fontaines, Thomas Bailly avaient la même façon de citer leurs auteurs. Dans leurs *Quodlibets* les références sont parfois un peu plus précises, parfois un peu moins. Jacques de Viterbe a donc appliqué le système en usage. Cependant, il avait le souci de renforcer son argumentation par des citations littérales ». Ypma, pp. xxiii-xxiv.

¹¹³) *Ibid.*, xxii-xxiii.

¹¹⁴) *Ibid.*, p. xxiv.

¹¹⁵) *Ibid.*, p. xxiv. See also Ypma, *La formation*, pp. 124-128 and n. 102 *supra*.

According to Ypma, while James gives exact references and accurate quotations for most of his « authorities », he gives no name, let alone a precise reference, when he is simply presenting a view of a contemporary or a recent writer. Nonetheless, he does speak respectfully when presenting views that can be identified as those of Giles of Rome, Saint Thomas or Henry of Ghent ¹¹⁵). When giving recent views of those who lack reputation of importance, he speaks of « *alii* » or « *quidam* ». On the other hand, he appears to reserve for writers of some importance like Giles or Thomas such terms as « *magni doctores* » ¹¹⁷), « *doctores moderni* » ¹¹⁸), « *doctores* » ¹¹⁹), « *sancti doctores* », ¹²⁰), « *doctores catholici* » ¹²¹), « *expositores noviores* » ¹²²), « *excellentes doctores* » ¹²³), and « *solemnnes doctores* » ¹²⁴). However, he does not always have recent Latin medievals in mind when he uses the term « *expositores* », since he clearly speaks of « *expositores antiqui* », who include John Philoponus and Themistius ¹²⁵), and he explicitly refers to Alexander and Averroes as « *praecipui expositores* » ¹²⁶).

Father Ypma makes some important observations about James's procedure in the individual questions that make up his *Quodlibeta* which deserve consideration here. He underscores the fact that before broaching the true problem presented by the question which the « opponent » poses, James often gives a rather concise survey of the various opinions on the question. Although he does not give a precise indication as to which of his contemporaries held these opinions, James does relate these views of his contemporaries to the views of ancient thinkers. James recapitulates various opinions on a subject for didactic purposes, that is, so that the problem broached by the

¹¹⁶) *Ibid.*, pp. xxiv-xxv. This is especially noticeable in *Quodlibet* I, q. 4 (« *Utrum salvari posset creatio si non differret realiter esse et essentia in creaturis* »), pp. 43-61.

¹¹⁷) James of Viterbo, *Disputatio Prima*, q. 3, p. 38; q. 7, p. 100; and q. 12, p. 159.

¹¹⁸) *Ibid.*, q. 4, p. 46; q. 9, pp. 132 and 134; q. 12, p. 162; q. 13, p. 184; *Disputatio Secunda*, q. 3, p. 36.

¹¹⁹) James of Viterbo, *Disputatio Prima*, q. 7, pp. 102 and 105.

¹²⁰) *Ibid.*, q. 8, p. 115.

¹²¹) *Ibid.*, q. 10, p. 150; q. 12, p. 158; *Disputatio Secunda*, q. 1, p. 5.

¹²²) *Ibid.*, q. 12, p. 169. Earlier in the same question James speaks of: « *tam antiqui philosophi quam posteriores doctores* » (p. 157).

¹²³) *Ibid.*, q. 4, p. 54.

¹²⁴) James of Viterbo, *Disputatio Secunda*, q. 12, p. 144.

¹²⁵) James of Viterbo, *Disputatio Prima*, q. 12, p. 169.

¹²⁶) *Ibid.*, p. 182.

« opponent » can be better understood and the argument of the master more easily followed ¹²⁷). Ypma discerns greater use of this procedure in those questions which are devoted to topics vigorously debated in James's own day and he singles out the fourth and twelfth questions of the first *Quodlibet* as noticeable cases of this ¹²⁸).

While Father Ypma is no doubt correct in discerning a didactic element in James's procedure of summarizing other positions on a given topic, it would also seem quite likely that there is a dialectical purpose at work here, namely to present various positions and then to eliminate those which are weak or false in order to capture the true, or at least the strongest, position. However, there also appears to be a rather special purpose involved in the twelfth question's review of various positions.

James announces that he proposes to see both what ancient philosophers (*antiqui philosophi*) as well as later teachers (*posteriores doctores*) thought about the agent intellect and also what is doubtful in their views ¹²⁹). After presenting five opinions on the agent intellect culled from John Philoponus and *doctores moderni*, with some ideas taken from Averroes and Themistius ¹³⁰), James presents the conception of the agent intellect which seems to him to be more rational, one which agrees with the doctrine of many ancients, especially Augustine and Boethius ¹³¹). What is of interest to us at this point is not the conception

¹²⁷) « Avant d'entamer le vrai problème, abordé par la question posée par l' 'opponens', ou le problème tel qu'il le conçoit, Jacques donne souvent un aperçu, plus ou moins concis, des opinions sur le problème en question. Sans préciser par qui ces opinions sont soutenues ou ces interprétations sont défendues de son temps, il les met parfois en rapport avec les opinions des Antiques. C'est pour des raisons didactiques qu'il résume différentes opinions. Pour qu'on puisse mieux saisir le problème entamé par l' 'opponens', et suivre le raisonnement du Maître ». Ypma, introduction to *Disputatio Prima*, p. xxv.

¹²⁸) « Ceci est spécialement le cas, quand il s'agit de sujets fort discutés de son temps, comme nous le voyons dans les questions IV et XII, où il consacre la deuxième partie de la question à un résumé des différentes opinions ». *Ibid.*, p. xxv.

¹²⁹) « Secundo, videndum est quid de intellectu agente opinati sunt, tam antiqui philosophi quam posteriores doctores, et quid sit in eorum opinionibus dubitabile ». James of Viterbo, *Disputatio Prima*, q. 12, p. 157, lines 13-15.

¹³⁰) *Ibid.*, pp. 158-164. The fifth position (pp. 162-163), that of the *doctores moderni*, seems Thomistic.

¹³¹) « Narratis igitur summarie diversis opinionibus de intellectu agente, tertio tangendus est quidam alius modus dicendi de ipso, qui mihi apparet inter ceteros esse rationabilior; et est multorum antiquorum doctrinae, et maxime beati Augustini et Boetii, satis consonus ». *Ibid.*, p. 165, lines 265-268.

of the intellect which he elaborates based on Augustine and Boethius, but rather his subsequent attack on the five positions which he had sketched previously ¹³²). The conclusion that he draws from the disagreement of the various expositors on Aristotle, both ancient and modern, is that it is not clear what Aristotle meant by the agent intellect in particular and the intellective part in general. He argues that since Aristotle's mind on the matter remains hidden because of the brevity and obscurity of his discussion, there is not much force in arguing against his own conception of the agent intellect from anything that Aristotle said, especially since statements of Aristotle can appropriately (*non incongrue*) be interpreted in accord with his position ¹³³). Indeed, James then attempts to show that his own position takes care of the objections which he had raised against the five other theories of the agent intellect ¹³⁴).

The special tactic which James has thus used in the twelfth question is first to have shown the discrepancy among the various expositors of Aristotle, both ancient and «modern», on the nature of the agent intellect, then to have argued from this discrepancy to the uncertainty of Aristotle's position, and finally to have concluded that, since Aristotle's position is not certain, his own conception of the agent intellect has as much (if not more) basis in the text of Aristotle as any of the others which he has presented. Indeed, the uncertainty of Aristotle's position is reemphasized near the end of the twelfth question, where James states that what has been said about the agent intellect is to be taken not as determining (*determinando*) the issue but rather as investigating in a probable fashion (*probabiliter inqui-*

¹³²) *Ibid.*, pp. 168-169.

¹³³) « Et quia pro magna parte videntur accipi ex verbis Aristotelis, ideo est considerandum, quod intentio Aristotelis de intellectu agente, immo et universaliter de parte intellectiva, non est manifesta. Cuius signum est diversitas expositionum. Nam inter expositores antiquos et inter expositores noviores, invenitur controversia in exponendo Aristotelis verba. Unde et quaelibet supradictarum opinionum nititur verba Aristotelis ad suam intentionem confirmandam trahere. Cum igitur intentio Aristotelis circa istam materiam adeo sit occulta, quod ad plenum et praecise comprehendere non potest quid de hoc ipse senserit, propter sui sermonis brevitatem et obscuritatem, arguere contra praedictam positionem ex verbis Aristotelis non est multum efficax via. Praesertim cum verba ipsius non incongrue trahi possent ad hanc positionem, si quis vellet diligenter intendere. Ad praesens tamen sufficiat ostendere, quod verba Aristotelis inducta non repugnant praedicto modo ponendi ». *Ibid.*, pp. 169-170, lines 426-439.

¹³⁴) *Ibid.*, pp. 170-181.

rendo), especially since the matter is difficult and unclear and men of great genius have wavered about it ¹³⁵).

At this point, James returns to a text which had been presented at the beginning of the twelfth question in behalf of the position which denied that the agent intellect is part of the soul: it is that the agent intellect is « a thing essentially in act » (*substantia actu ens*), as Aristotle says in *De anima*, III (ch. 5, 430a18). It can consequently be argued that the agent intellect could not be a potential part of the soul ¹³⁶). James's reply is simply to repeat what he had emphasized previously, namely that it is not completely clear what Aristotle thought about the agent intellect. He adds that outstanding expositors of Aristotle (*praecipui expositores ipsius*), namely Alexander and Averroes, said that Aristotle's mind was that the agent intellect is some immaterial substance different from the soul that is the form of the body, whereas others say that Aristotle's mind was that it is some potency of the soul. From this succinct contrast of views, James concludes once again that one cannot argue very effectively in this matter from Aristotle's own words ¹³⁷). However, he then attempts to show that the passage in question best fits his own conception of the nature of the agent intellect.

James's position is that the agent and potential intellects are not really distinct powers but rather the rational soul itself taken either actively or passively. Only as the soul is considered in the latter fashion does it have « powers », « aptitudes », or « incomplete actualities » ¹³⁸). He therefore explains that it is the very essence of the soul itself, as perfected by the intellective potency, which is called « the agent intellect ». The agent intellect is a certain actuality which is

¹³⁵) « Quaecumque autem dicta sunt, ad declarationem ultimi modi loquendi de intellectu agente, sine praedudico cuiuscumque opinionis, accipiantur non tam determinando quam probabiliter inquirendo dicta. Praecipue cum sit res occulta et ardua, circa quam etiam magna ingenia vacillasse inveniuntur ». *Ibid.*, p. 181, lines 820-824.

¹³⁶) *Ibid.*, p. 157, lines 1-5.

¹³⁷) « Ad illud ergo quod obicitur in contrarium, quod intellectus non est aliquid animae, quia secundum Philosophum, in *III De Anima*, est 'substantia actu ens', dicendum est quod, sicut supra dictum est, non ad plenum patet quid Aristoteles de intellectu agente opinatus fuerit. Nam praecipui expositores ipsius, scilicet Alexander et Averroes, dixerunt fuisse de intentione eius quod intellectus agens sit aliqua substantia immaterialis, alia ab anima quae est humani corporis forma. Alii vero dicunt, quod intentio Aristotelis fuit, quod sit potentia quaedam animae. Et ideo ex verbis Aristotelis non potest multum efficaciter argui in hac materia ». *Ibid.*, pp. 181-182, lines 825-834.

¹³⁸) See *ibid.*, especially pp. 165-168 and 171.

naturally present in the soul and which is perfectible by a further more complete act. It is the substance of the soul itself, which is perfected through this sort of a potency, that is more properly called an « agent » than is the power ¹³⁹). James thus ends the twelfth question having established the fundamental uncertainty of Aristotle on the question of the agent intellect and yet having argued that his own conception of the agent intellect best fits the text of the Philosopher !

Let us now turn to the various positions on the agent intellect which James presents in the twelfth question of the first *Quodlibet* in order that we may understand the context in which the views of Themistius are introduced. In the first part of the question, that given over to understanding what the question is all about, James presents two possible meanings of the term « agent intellect ». The first meaning would take the term to refer to any intellect which is productive, including both the first cause of all things and also the intellect of any artisan or maker. The second meaning, on the other hand, limits the term to the intellect through whose power intellection takes place in human beings. James then restricts the present question to the second meaning of « agent intellect » and spells out the topic of the *quaestio* as the following ; « Whether the agent intellect, that is the intellect which brings about and causes intellectual activity in us, is something belonging to the soul as its potential part or some other intellectual substance existing per se » ¹⁴⁰).

The second part of the question presents the five conceptions of the agent intellect which James uses to show the fundamental uncertainty of Aristotle and which he rejects in favor of his own doctrine on the matter. The first four views are taken from John Philoponus's *De intellectu*, which is extant today only in the Latin translation of William of Moerbeke ¹⁴¹). The first position is that the agent intellect

¹³⁹) « Sustinendo tamen modum ultimo tactum supra de intellectu agente, postet dici, quantum ad auctoritatem Philosophi praeinductam, quod intellectus agens dicitur 'substantia actu ens', quia est ipsa essentia animae, ut perfecta per potentiam intellectivam, quae intellectus agens dicitur. Et est quaedam actualitas animae naturaliter indita, quamvis perfectibilis per actum completiorem. Magis enim proprie dicitur agens, ipsa animae substantia perfecta per huiusmodi potentiam, quam ipsa potentia ». *Ibid.*, p. 182, lines 835-841.

¹⁴⁰) *Ibid.*, pp. 157-158, lines 20-42.

¹⁴¹) Although James gives for the most part only summaries from Philoponus and not literal quotations, there are a few phrases and expressions which closely follow the Moerbeke translation of Philoponus.

is a universal intellect, the maker of all things, namely God; the second is that the agent intellect is some intellect below the divine intellect and immediately above our intellect which brings about our thinking; the third is that the potential and agent intellects are both present in the soul, but while the potential intellect is always existent in the soul, the agent or active intellect ¹⁴² comes from without and is present only when it perfects the potential intellect; and the fourth, which is Philoponus's own position, is that the agent and potential intellects are really one and the same intellect which is at times in potency and at times in act ¹⁴³). While the original sources of the four positions are not identified in the Moerbeke translation of the *De intellectu* nor by James of Viterbo, they are mentioned in the Greek text of Philoponus's commentary on the *De anima*, which is found in the Berlin Academy edition of the Greek Commentators on Aristotle. The first position is that of Alexander of Aphrodisias and the second is that of Marinus ¹⁴⁴) While the third position is identified in the Moerbeke translation of the *De intellectu* as that of some Platonists (*quidam qui videbantur esse Platonici*), in the Greek text of the commentary on the *De anima* it is attributed to Plotinus. The fourth position, which Philoponus himself adopts, is attributed in the Greek text to Plutarch ¹⁴⁵). James adds a fifth position, which seems in its basic outline to be an accurate summary of fundamental points in the philosophical psychology of Saint Thomas, namely that the agent intellect is a power of the soul which is really distinct from the possible intellect and which perfects the possible intellect by causing the intelligibles in potency to become intelligibles in act through abstraction from material conditions ¹⁴⁶).

¹⁴²) James adds the embellishment « et agens vocatur » (p. 159, lines 89-90) when giving this view which, in Philoponus, is only about an « intellect in act ».

¹⁴³) See James of Viterbo, *Disputatio Prima*, q. 12, pp. 158-161. Cf. Jean Philopon: *Commentaire sur le De anima d'Aristote*, Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke, ed. G. Verbeke (Louvain and Paris, 1966), pp. 43-45 and 48, as well as Verbeke's remarks in the introduction, pp. lxiv-lxvi.

¹⁴⁴) Marinus held that the agent intellect is a demonic or angelic intellect; he thereby mediated between the positions of Alexander and Plotinus. Cf. O. Schissel von Fleschenburg, « Marinos », in Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* XIV (Stuttgart, 1930), cols. 1759-1767, especially 1764.

¹⁴⁵) See John Philoponus, *In Aristotelis de anima libros commentaria*, ed. Michael Hayduck (*Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca*, XV; Berlin, 1897), p. 534, line 19-p. 539, line 39. On Plutarch, see Rudolf Beutler, « Plutarchos von Athen », in Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* XXI (Stuttgart, 1951), cols. 962-975, especially 963-969.

¹⁴⁶) See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 79, a. 3-4; q. 84, a. 2 and a. 6,

In his presentation of the first three positions on the agent intellect, James first restates in his own words Philoponus's presentation of the position and then adds some explanatory comments of his own. Regarding the first position, that the agent intellect is God, he remarks that Plato is said to have held this and for that reason to have compared the agent intellect to the sun ¹⁴⁷). This comment seems rather puzzling since, not long after, during his presentation of what appears to be Thomas's position, James states (perhaps inspired by Thomas himself) that Plato postulated universals separate in reality and did not need to postulate an agent intellect ¹⁴⁸). In any case, James also identifies « some Catholic doctors » (*quidam doctores Catholici*) with the position that God is the agent intellect, adding that they were perhaps moved to say this by reason of the many statements of Saint Augustine which seem to insinuate this ¹⁴⁹). Although James of course agrees that God operates in the soul and in all things as a universal agent, this is not sufficient, since his activity does not exclude special agents. In the case of the soul, then, there must be posited, in addition to God, some special created power which causes intellectual activity ¹⁵⁰).

The second position, that the agent intellect is some intellect below the divine intellect and immediately above the human, James appears to identify (erroneously) with Alexander of Aphrodisias and also (correctly) with Averroes and Anicenna ¹⁵¹). He objects that this position, which involves that the agent intellect does not belong to the human

¹⁴⁷) « Et hoc dicitur sensisse Plato; propter quod intellectum agentem assimilavit soli. » *Ibid.*, p. 158, lines 48-49. One possible explanation for James's apparent ascription to Plato of the doctrine of an agent intellect is that he read and misunderstood the following remark: « ... quamvis etiam hoc non sit secundum intentionem Aristotelis, qui posuit intellectum agentem esse aliquid in anima, unde comparavit ipsum lumini. Plato autem ponens intellectum unum separatum, comparavit ipsum soli, ut Themistius dicit ». Thomas Aquinas, *De unitate intellectus*, par. 86, p. 55. See also *Quaestiones disputatae de malo*, q. 16, a. 12, ad 1, cited by Verbeke, (*Thémistius*, pp. xxxv-xxxvi), where Thomas says that « [Plato] ponebat intellectum agentem esse substantiam separatam ».

¹⁴⁸) « Et ideo, Plato, qui posuit universalia separata secundum rem, non indiguit ponere intellectum agentem ». James of Viterbo, *Prima Disputatio*, q. 12, p. 162, lines 185-187. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, II, ch. 77, par. 5; *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 79, a. 3; *Quaes. disp. de anima*, a. 4.

¹⁴⁹) Among those holding that God is the agent intellect was Siger in his now lost *De intellectu*. See Nardi, *Sigieri di Brabante*, pp. 21-29, 35-38 and 47.

¹⁵⁰) James of Viterbo, *Disputatio Prima*, q. 12, pp. 158-159, lines 54-63.

¹⁵¹) *Ibid.*, p. 159, lines 64-70. This is of course an error, since Alexander identifies the agent intellect with God. See note 34 *supra*.

soul as a potential part of it, does not seem to be either sufficient or fitting. It is not sufficient for the same reason that the first position was not sufficient: all intellectual substances above the human soul are universal causes and a special agent power must be posited in the human soul to explain intellection. Nor is it fitting, since the union of a separate intellect to us (as postulated by Alexander and Averroes) and the influx of intelligible forms from such an intellect (as postulated by Avicenna) have been sufficiently proven by « great doctors » (*a magnis doctoribus*) to be contrary to sound teaching¹⁵²). James is quite willing to concede, however, that the separate Intelligences can be said to operate (*agentes*) in some way in us as regards our intellect, namely by teaching us, but they do so as auxiliary agents (*coadiuvando*) and not as the principal agent. This auxiliary sort of activity again requires some intellectual power which produces in us in a primary fashion (*principaliter*) the actual activity of thinking, and it is this power which should properly be called the agent intellect¹⁵³).

¹⁵²) « Et ideo, est alia opinio quorundam, dicentium intellectum agentem esse intellectum quemdam, inferiorem quidem divino intellectui, superiorem autem intellectui nostro et ei secundum gradum naturae immediate supra positum, cuius virtute fit in nobis intellectualis operatio; et hoc, vel secundum quamdam unionem ad nos, sicut posuit Alexander et Averroes, vel secundum influxum formarum intelligibilium formarum intelligibilium ab ipso in nos, sicut posuit Avicenna. Et secundum hanc etiam opinionem, intellectus agens non est aliquis animae humanae tamquam eius pars potentialis. Sed et haec opinio neque sufficiens neque conveniens esse videtur. Sufficiens quidem enim non est, quia, cum omnes intellectuales substantiae, quae sunt supra animam humanam, inter causas universales numerantur, praeter ipsas oportet ponere in anima specialem virtutem agentem in intelligendo, sicut et supra dictum est de Deo. Conveniens etiam non est, eo quod talis unio illius intellectus ad nos, vel influxus ipsius in nos, qualem posuerunt praedicti philosophi, sanae doctrinae repugnat, sicut a magnis doctoribus est sufficienter ostensum ». *Ibid.*, p. 159, lines 64-80. Cf. John Philoponus, *Commentaire*, p. 44 lines 25-29. (Note James's use of the phrase « intellectum quemdam »). The *magni doctores* may very well be Saint Thomas and Giles of Rome, James's fellow Augustinian. See in particular Giles of Rome (Egidio Romano), *Errores Philosophorum*, ed. Josef Koch (Milwaukee, 1944), and *De plurificatione intellectus possibilis*, ed. H. B. Barracco (Rome, 1957). However, the latter edition must be used with caution. On Giles as a critic of Averroes, see Gerardo Bruni, « Egidio Romano antiaverroista », *Sophia* 1 (1933), pp. 208-219; Bruno Nardi, « Note per una storia dell'averroismo latino. III: Egidio Romano e l'averroismo », *Rivista di storia della filosofia* 3 (1948), pp. 8-29. Other than Nardi's article, the best analysis of Giles's *De plurificatione* is to be found in Charles J. Ermatinger, *The Coalescent Soul in Post-Thomistic Debate* (Unpublished dissertation, Saint Louis University, 1963), Ch. III-IV, pp. 41-109. For Ermatinger's criticism of the Barracco edition, see p. 5, n. 6 and pp. 42-43.

¹⁵³) « Possunt tamen dici substantiae intellectuales agentes in nos aliquo modo,

James apparently sees this consideration as leading somehow to the third position, that the agent intellect is not separate from the soul but comes from without and is present only when it is perfecting the potential intellect ¹⁵⁴). And it is here that he introduces as identical to the third position, or as very close to it, the opinion of Themistius as found in his exposition on Aristotle's *De anima* ¹⁵⁵). The presentation which James then gives is clearly based on William of Moerbeke's translation of Themistius's paraphrases on the *De anima*, which was also used, as we have seen above, by Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant and Henry Bate of Malines ¹⁵⁶).

According to James, Themistius held that there is a twofold intellect in the soul, namely the possible (*possibilis*) and the agent (*factivus*) ¹⁵⁷), each of which is a potential part (*potentialis pars*) of the soul itself and each of which is separate, immortal and perpetual, although the agent is the more noble. From which it is possible that both belong to man ¹⁵⁸). James adds that Themistius said that the

quantum ad intellectum, in quantum nos de aliquibus docent, non quidem principaliter operando, sed coadiuvando. Iste autem secundus modus agendi praeexigit virtutem aliquam intellectualem, in nobis agentem principaliter actionem actualem; et hoc proprie debet dici intellectus agens". *Ibid.*, p. 159, lines 81-85.

¹⁵⁴) « Et propter hoc est alia opinio vel positio aliquorum, qui posuerunt, intellectum agentem non esse aliquid ab anima separatum, sed in ipsa existens ». *Ibid.*, p. 159, lines 86-88. The statement of the position, including some of the phraseology, is dependent on Philoponus, *Commentaire*, p. 45, lines 39-50. The last sentence of the paragraph (p. 160, lines 95-96), in which James is presumably appealing to experience (« Cuius tamen oppositum experimur ... ») is taken from Philoponus, p. 46, lines 94-95 and pp. 47-48, lines 22-23.

¹⁵⁵) « Huic autem opinioni videtur esse vel eadem vel propinqua, opinio Themistii, sicut patet in expositione sua super librum *De Anima* Aristotelis ». *Ibid.*, p. 160, lines 97-98.

¹⁵⁶) Some of the passages from Themistius on which James has based his summary are also to be found in Thomas's *De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas*, but it would appear that James could not have culled all the details simply from that opusculum. on this issue, see n. 172 *infra*.

¹⁵⁷) While the Moerbeke translation of Themistius does not to the best of my knowledge contain the term *intellectus possibilis*, the term *intellectus factivus* is used. See Themistius, *Commentaire*, p. 225, line 17.

¹⁵⁸) « Posuit enim in anima esse duplicem intellectum, scilicet possibilem et factivum, et utrumque potentialem partem ipsius animae, utrumque separatum, utrumque immortalem et perpetuum, factivum tamen honorabiliorem, et a quo possibile est homini esse utrumque ». James of Viterbo, *Disputatio Prima*, q. 12, p. 160, lines 99-102. For Themistius's discussion of the potential and agent intellects as separate, immortal and perpetual, see Themistius, *Commentaire*, pp. 224-225, lines 1-2 (Heinze: p. 98, lines

twofold intellect thinks; but while the agent intellect is always in act, the possible intellect is not ¹⁵⁹). Furthermore, while the many intelligibles in the possible intellect are present there in a divided and varied way, those in the agent intellect are present there simultaneously and in an undivided fashion. In the agent intellect, on the one hand, essence and act are the same, while in the possible intellect, on the other hand, essence is different from act ¹⁶⁰).

James now comes to the crucial question of whether the agent and the possible intellects are multiplied for Themistius and he answers in the affirmative that Themistius held each is multiplied according to the multiplicity of human beings. However, James then adds that all intellects (presumably he means the individual possible and agent intellects found in human beings) are reduced to the one first intellect from which they are drawn, that is from the divine intellect ¹⁶¹). At

32-33); pp. 233-234, lines 65-93 (Heinze: p. 102, lines 30-p. 103, line 19; and pp. 238-239, lines 64-96 (Heinze: p. 105, line 13-p. 106, line 10). The *intellectus factivus* is called *honorabilior* at p. 226, line 33. James's unclear remark « possibile est homini esse utrumque » seems to reflect an imprecise understanding of p. 228, lines 68-72. Themistius does call the agent intellect a *pars* of the human soul at p. 233, line 78 (Heinze: p. 103, line 5).

¹⁵⁹) « Etiam dixit esse intelligentem, sed factivum semper actu, possibilem autem non semper ». James of Viterbo, *Disputatio Prima*, q. 12, p. 160, lines 102-103. This statement seems to be based on Themistius, *Commentaire*, p. 227, lines 43-47: « Essentia autem factivi intellectus idem est actui, et non ex potentia procedit, sed ipsius natura homogenea actui, et ita intellectus, quod iam et prius dictum est, separatus est et impassibilis et immixtus vere, non quandoque quidem intelligens, quandoque non intelligens ».

¹⁶⁰) « Et quod in possibili plurima sunt intellecta multipliciter et divisim, in factivo autem simul et unitive. Et in factivo idem est essentia et actus; in possibili vero dissimilis essentia ab actu ». James of Viterbo, *Disputatio Prima*, q. 12, p. 160, lines 103-106. Cf. Themistius, *Commentaire*, p. 227, line 55-p. 228, line 67: « In intellectu quidem igitur qui potentia divisa sunt noemata, idest intellecta, in quo sunt et artes et scientiae, in eo autem qui secundum actum, magis autem in ipso actu, siquidem idem in ipso essentia cum actu, alio modo erit utique gravius divisibili et divinius, non transmutante ex hoc in hoc, neque componente, neque dividente, neque transitu utente ad intelligentias, sed omnes species habente in simul et omnes simul praemittente. Sic enim solummodo erit utique, secundum quod ait Aristoteles, idem substantia ipsius et actus; si enim transitionem facit quemadmodum scientes, necesse quidem permanere substantiam, alterari autem actum. Hoc autem est in ipso differre essentiam ab actu, quod evidenter Aristoteles non concedit. Sic igitur et in primis ait: 'meditari autem et amare et odire non sunt illius passionēs' » It is not obvious that Themistius does state so precisely a distinction in the possible intellect between essence and act.

¹⁶¹) « Et utrumque ipsorum posuit multiplicari secundum multiplicationem hominum, licet reducantur omnes in unum primum intellectum, scilicet divinum, a quo omnes derivantur ». James of Viterbo, *Disputatio Prima*, q. 12, p. 160, lines 106-108. James seems

this point he makes use of the thorny passage in Themistius regarding « illuminating » and « illuminated » intellects: the first illuminating intellect (*unus illustrans primus*) is taken to be God, while the many « illuminated » (*illustrati*) and « illuminating » (*illustrantes*) intellects appear to be taken to be the individual agent intellects in the souls of men — we shall return to the problem of the many intellects below ¹⁶²).

Following the Moerbeke translation closely, James now attempts to explain how the agent and the possible intellects in the soul are connected in regard to illumination. He relates that Themistius held that, while each of these intellects exists in the soul as a part of it, the possible intellect is more connatural to the soul ¹⁶³). Themistius also held, James continues, that since the possible intellect is of itself only potentially thinking, it is perfected and rendered actually thinking by the agent intellect. It is the agent intellect which illuminates the possible intellect and which is compared to the possible intellect as art to the material on which it works. A single and united thing thus arises from the possible and agent intellects, as if in some way from matter and form ¹⁶⁴).

to be taking his terminology from the following text: « Si autem ad unum activum intellectum omnes reducimur compositi ex eo qui potentia et actu, et unicuique nostrum esse ab illo uno est, non oportet mirari ». Themistius, *Commentaire*, p. 235, lines 12-14. Themistius speaks of a *primus intellectus* which is *unus* at p. 235, lines 7-8: « Unde autem et potentia intellectus omnia intelligit, si primus non omnia intelligit qui producit ipsum in actum ? » However, I have been unable to find the word *derivare* in Moerbeke.

¹⁶²) « Unde ait quod est unus illustrans primus; illustrati autem et illustrantes sunt plures, sicut sol quidem unus est, lumen autem ab ipso derivatum dividitur et multiplicatur ». James of Viterbo, *Disputatio Prima*, q. 12, p. 160, lines 109-111. The dependence on the Moerbeke translation is clear: « Aut primus quidem illustrans est unus, illustrati autem et illustrantes plures, sicut lumen; sol quidem enim est unus, lumen autem dices utique modo aliquo partiri ad visus; propter hoc enim non solem in comparatione proposuit sed lumen, Plato autem solem: bono enim proportionalem ipsum facit ». Themistius, *Commentaire*, p. 235, lines 7-12. For the Greek text, see note 37 *supra*,

¹⁶³) « Posuit etiam quod, licet uterque intellectus sit in ipsa anima et pars ipsius. possibilis tamen magis est animae connaturalis ... » James of Viterbo, *Disputatio Prima*, q. 12, p. 160, lines 111-113. Cf. Themistius, *Commentaire*, p. 225, lines 2-4: « ... quem autem dicimus potentia intellectum, et si maxime sibi eadem intitulaverimus, tamen magis est animae connaturalis, dico autem non omni animae sed soli humanae ».

¹⁶⁴) « ... et quod possibilis, cum de se sit in potentia intelligens, perficitur et fit actu intelligens a factivo illustrante sibi, qui comparatur ad ipsum sicut ars ad materiam. Non tamen est ars materiae exterioris, sicut aedificativa respectu lignorum, sed investitur intellectus factivus toti potentiae intellectivae (?), ac si ars aedificativa esset in lignis. Et sic fit unum ex possibili et factivo, sicut ex materia et forma aliquo modo ». James

James immediately criticizes the position of Themistius. His main line of attack is to argue that since the soul actually understands all things through the agent intellect, as Themistius says ¹⁶⁵), it seems both unnecessary and superfluous to introduce another intellect, the « possible intellect », unless one should want to say that the possible intellect is placed in the soul so that the soul can be united to the body and acquire intellectual perfection in regard to the possible intellect, at least while the agent intellect is illuminating it (*illustrante factivo*) ¹⁶⁶). James rejects this suggestion as unreasonable since there would then be by nature and at the same time two different modes of thinking or understanding in the soul, both of which would concern the same objects: one would take place through the agent intellect and the other through the possible intellect. Besides, when the soul would be separated from the body, the possible intellect would then seem to lack any function and to be without purpose, given it is only perfected by the agent intellect in regard to phantasms. And even if it could be perfected without regard to phantasms, positing a possible intellect is still super-

of Viterbo, *Disputatio Prima*, q. 12, p. 160, lines 113-118. Cf. Themistius, *Commentaire*, p. 225, lines 5-8 and p. 225, line 13-p. 226, line 25: « Et sicut lumen potentia visui et potentia coloribus adveniens actu quidem visum fecit et actu colores, ita et intellectus iste qui actu produciens potentia intellectum non solum ipsum actu intellectum fecit, sed et potentia intelligibilia actu intelligibilia ipsi instituit.... Superveniente autem ipsi factivo intellectu et materiam hanc noematum deprehendente factus unus cum illo transire potens fit et componere et dividere et circumspicere alia ex aliis. Quam igitur rationem habet ars ad materiam, hanc et intellectus factivus ad eum qui potentia, et sic hic quidem omnia fit, hic autem omnia fecit; propter quod et in nobis est intelligere quando volumus. Non enim est ars materiae exterioris, sicut aeraria [non] est aeris et aedificativa lignorum, sed investitur toti potentia intellectui qui factivus, ac si utique aedificator lignis et aerarius aeri non ab extrinseco assisteret, per totum autem ipsum penetrare potens erat. Sic enim et qui secundum actum intellectus intellectui potentia superveniens unus fit cum ipso; unum enim quod ex materia et forma ... »

¹⁶⁵) James may have in mind the following passage: « Quam igitur rationem habet ars ad materiam, hanc et intellectus factivus ad eum qui potentia, et sic hic quidem omnia fit, hic autem omnia facit; propter quod et in nobis est intelligere quando volumus. Themistius, *Commentaire*, p. 225, lines 16-19.

¹⁶⁶) « Sed haec etiam opinio dubitalis est. Cum enim anima per intellectum factivum omnia intelligat actu, ut dicit, praeter necessarium videtur, et superfluum, inducere alium qui dicatur possibilis, nisi quis dicere velit quod possibilis intellectus, in anima est positus, propter hoc quod est unibilis corpori, in quo acquirit perfectionem intelligibilem, secundum possibilem intellectum, illustrante factivo ». James of Viterbo, *Disputatio Prima*, q. 12, p. 160, lines 119-124.

fluous ¹⁶⁷). James's second line of attack, which is directed against Themistius's statement that the agent intellect is always in act, is to testify that we are aware that we are not always thinking; this would not be the case if the intellect in the soul were always in act. Then, following John Philoponus almost to the word, he adds that if anyone should say that we do so think, but without doing any weighing or considering, this would be to speak irrationally, for no one can think who does not also weigh or consider ¹⁶⁸).

Some problems concerning James's presentation of Themistius remain to be examined. First of all, although James clearly identifies God as the one and first illuminating intellect, it is not immediately obvious what he takes to be the many intellects which are illuminated and illuminate and we must therefore defend the interpretation which we gave above. It should be recalled that Saint Thomas took the many illuminated intellects to be the individual possible or potential intellects and the many illuminating intellects to be the individual agent intellects in the souls of men. He also took the first illuminating intellect to be some transcendent principle of illumination, and while he does not himself identify it with any particular separate substance, he relates that it is God according to some Catholics and the lowest Intelligence according to Avicenna ¹⁶⁹). Siger of Brabant, on the other hand, took the phrase about the many illuminated and illuminating intellects to refer solely to the agent intellects in the souls of men: they are illuminated by the one transcendent agent intellect and they in turn illumi-

¹⁶⁷) « Sed hoc etiam non videtur rationalibiter dici, quia tunc in anima esset duplex intelligendi modus, simul et respectu eorundem obiectorum; et hoc naturaliter. Et praeterea, cum anima separatur a corpore, tunc saltem videtur intellectus possibilis esse otiosus et frustra cum non perficiatur a factivo qui est in actu, nisi secundum ordinem ad fantasmata, ut videtur, quia sine fantasmate nihil intelligit, vel, si possit ab ipso perfici sine habitudine ad fantasmata, nihil minus videtur supervacue poni ». *Ibid.*, pp. 160-161, lines 124-131.

¹⁶⁸) Amplius, sicut dictum est, experimus nos non semper intelligere; quod non esset, si semper esset in anima intellectus in actu. Si autem aliquis dicat quod intelligimus quidem, non perpendimus autem, irrationabiliter dicitur. Non enim contingit intelligere aliquem non perpendentem. Sunt autem et alia multa, quae induci possent contra praedictum modum ponendi ». *Ibid.*, p. 161, lines 132-137. « Si quis autem dicat quod intelligimus quidem semper, non perpendimus autem hoc ipsum, primo quidem impossibile hoc dicere; non contingit enim intelligere non perpendentem quia intelligit ... » John Philoponus, *Commentaire*, p. 47, lines 96-98. The omission of *semper*, however, is noteworthy.

¹⁶⁹) See note 63 *supra*.

nate the possible or potential intellects in human souls. Like Saint Thomas, however, Siger also avoids indentifying the transcendent agent intellect with any particular separate substance, despite the fact that in his earlier *De intellectu* he had taken God to be the agent intellect ¹⁷⁰). James's remarks about Themistius in the twelfth question of the first *Quodlibet* do not allow us to state unequivocally, and without any danger that another interpretation is possible, that by the illuminated and illuminating intellects he meant the agent intellects only: that is to say, the agent intellect in the individual soul is illuminated by God and then in turn illuminates the possible intellect. Nonetheless, given the general direction of James's discussion, it surely seems more plausible to take that to be his understanding of Themistius rather than to believe that he thought, like Thomas, that the illuminated and illuminating intellects were respectively the possible intellect and the agent intellect in the human soul. James thus appears to hold the same interpretation as Siger and to differ with Thomas, at least on this detail of the doctrine of Themistius. Where he differs with both Siger and Thomas, of course, and where he appears to be in agreement with Henry Bate of Malines (though I do not mean to suggest that he knew Henry's work) is in identifying the first illuminating intellect with God. And this leads us to our second and perhaps most interesting problem regarding James's account of Themistius.

As we noted earlier in our own presentation of his key psychological ideas, Themistius explicitly rejects the view, which had been put forth by Alexander of Aphrodisias, that the agent intellect is God ¹⁷¹). Consequently, it is puzzling, to say the least, that James of Viterbo has ascribed to Themistius the view that God is the first illuminating intellect. While someone might reply that perhaps James did not in fact have direct access to Moerbeke, but merely based himself on the quotations and discussions regarding Themistius to be found in Thomas's *De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas*, which do not contain reference to Themistius's rejection of the concept of God as the agent intellect, this suggestion will not do. We find in James phrases and ideas from the Moerbeke translation that do not appear at all in the opusculum of Thomas ¹⁷²). For that reason, there

¹⁷⁰) See notes 78 and 149 *supra*.

¹⁷¹) See notes 34 and 35 *supra*. Cf. Themistius, *Commentaire*, p. 233, lines 65-79.

¹⁷²) A good example of this is the use of the terms *divisim*, *simul* and *unitive* (p. 160, lines 104-105) which reflects Themistius, *Commentaire*, pp. 227-228, lines 55-61,

seems little doubt that James did in fact have direct access to the Moerbeke translation and that he actually read the passage in which Themistius rejects the proposal that God is the agent intellect according to Aristotle.

How can we explain in James's account of Themistius his identification of God as the first illuminating intellect? I believe that there are two possible explanations and that they do not exclude one another. First of all, in the passage in question, Themistius argues against those who think that God is the agent intellect that they are overlooking Aristotle's own statement that since there is in all nature that which is matter and that which moves or perfects matter, there must be these differences in the soul, namely an intellect which becomes all things and an intellect which makes all things ¹⁷³). James may very well have thought that all that Themistius intends to exclude here is that there is only one agent intellect for all men, namely God, and that his activity alone explains human cognition. This would of course be in line with James's critique of the first and second positions on the agent intellect, namely that the causality of God or of some other separate substance is not sufficient of itself to explain the occurrence of human thinking. James would thus be taking Themistius to agree with his own critique of that position. Furthermore, it is only after this passage that Themistius raises the question whether this active intellect is one or many and sets forth his remark about the first illuminating intellect which is one and the many illuminated and illuminating intellects. James may have seen Themistius as at this point attempting to connect the agent intellect which he had already proven must be present in the individual human soul (against those who held that there was only one agent intellect, God, for all men) with the first illuminating intellect. And this leads us to the second possible explanation. James's own theory of knowledge, in which he admittedly attempts to reconcile Aristotle with Augustine, involves the joint activity of the individual agent intellect in the soul and of God, whom James at one point calls an « agent intellect » ¹⁷⁴). It does not seem implausible, then, that James

especially lines 55-56 (« *divisa sunt noemata, idest intellecta* »: Italics added) and line 61 (« *habente in simul et omnes simul* »: Italics added). None of these terms appear in what Thomas attributes to Themistius.

¹⁷³) Themistius, *Commentaire*, p. 233, lines 65-79. See note 35 *supra*.

¹⁷⁴) « Apparet igitur ex dictis, unde causatur scientia in nobis. Quia principaliter, sicut a movente per modum efficientis, causatur a Deo; et ideo ipse dicitur intellectus

would have been predisposed to find a similar position in one of the *philosophi antiqui*.

Another factor that may have led James to identify Themistius's first illuminating intellect with God is the terminology of «light» and «illuminating». James himself had rather acutely observed in his brief presentation of the first position on the agent intellect, namely that the agent intellect is God, that Catholic doctors (*doctores catholici*) who hold this position were perhaps moved to do so by the many statements of Saint Augustine which seem to suggest this¹⁷⁵). Since James was accustomed to and sympathetic with Augustine's doctrine of God as the light illuminating the mind of every human being, he may very well have been predisposed to read Themistius's reference to the one first illuminating intellect as a reference to God and not, like Thomas and Siger, as a reference to an unspecified separate substance above the intellect of man.

IV. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we should point out the results of our examination of James and underscore the significance of certain aspects of *Quodlibet* I, question 12. First of all, we have drawn attention to a previously unnoticed early use of William of Moerbeke's translation of Themistius's paraphrases on the *De anima*¹⁷⁶). A review of the three previously

agens, in quo, sicut in cognitionis causa et principio, omnia cognoscuntur». James of Viterbo, *Disputatio prima*, q. 12, p. 176, lines 646-648. For the heavy emphasis on God as a major cause of human cognition, see p. 165, lines 265-268; p. 167, line 360-p. 168, line 370; p. 175, lines 610-623; p. 176, lines 630-656; p. 177, lines 680-685; p. 179, line 755-p. 180, line 764.

¹⁷⁵) «Nam, ut ait, quidam dixerunt intellectum agentem esse intellectum universalem et omnium conditorem, scilicet Deum ipsum. Et hoc dicitur sensisse Plato; propter quod intellectum agentem assimilavit soli. Hoc etiam et quidam doctores catholici posuerunt, dicentes intellectum agentem esse Deum, qui est 'lux vera, quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum', moti fortassis ad hoc dicendum ex pluribus verbis beati Augustini, quae hoc insinuare videntur». *Ibid.*, p. 158, lines 47-53. See *Evangelium secundum Iohannem*, I, 9-10: «Erat lux vera, quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum», in *Novum Testamentum graece et latine*, ed. A. Merk (Rome, 1948), p. 306. See notes 68 and 149.

¹⁷⁶) It is quite surprising that Grabmann failed to take note of James's use of the Moerbeke translation. See in particular Martin Grabmann, *Mittelalterliche Deutung und Umbildung der aristotelischen Lehre vom ΝΟΥΣ ΠΡΩΤΗΤΙΚΟΣ nach einer Zusammenstellung im Cod. B III 22 der Universitätsbibliothek Basel* (*Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen*

known uses of that translation during the late thirteenth century will better enable us to appreciate the identification of James's dependence on it is his quodlibetal disputations.

William of Moerbeke completed his translation at the Papal court at Viterbo on November 22, 1267, while James himself, then only about twelve years old, was presumably still living with his family in the same city ¹⁷⁷). Saint Thomas almost immediately made heavy use of the translation in his commentary on the *De anima*, which was composed in 1268 and 1269: the first book was composed at Viterbo, while the second and third books were written at Paris ¹⁷⁸). We also find references to Themistius which are clearly based on the Moerbeke translation, and not culled from Averroes, in Thomas's *De spiritualibus creaturis*, *De malo* and *Prima Pars* of the *Summa theologiae*, all of which were written in the same general period ¹⁷⁹). As we have already noted above, Thomas made full use of Moerbeke's translation in the *De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas*, written in 1270, to discredit Averroes as a reliable commentator on other philosophers ¹⁸⁰). About two years later, probably in 1272 or 1273, Siger of Brabant, one of Thomas's major targets in the *De unitate intellectus*, made use of the Moerbeke translation in his *De anima intellectiva* ¹⁸¹). The third use of the translation which has been established by modern scholarship occurs, as we have seen, in the *Speculum divinarum et quorundam naturalium* of

Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophische-historische Abteilung, 1936, Heft 4), which has also appeared in an Italian translation, *Interpretazioni medioevali del ΝΟΥΣ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟΣ* ed. Carlo Giacon (Padua, 1965). We shall cite the German original. In this work, Grabmann discusses Themistius and Moerbeke's translation (pp. 18-21 and 56), as well as James of Viterbo and his *Quodlibet* I, q. 12 (pp. 30-32 and 70). However, he does not quote, let alone examine, James's account of Themistius and he makes no mention of James's use of the Moerbeke translation. The treatise that Grabmann edited has been translated by John F. Wippel. See John F. Wippel and Allan B. Wolter, *Medieval Philosophy From St. Augustine to Nicholas of Cusa* (New York and London, pp. 421-444.

¹⁷⁷) This date is given by Verbeke (*Thémistius*, p. xii), who bases himself on a reference contained in a manuscript in the cathedral Library of Toledo, Codex 47-12.

¹⁷⁸) See Verbeke, *Thémistius*, p. xxxiv and p. xxxvii.

¹⁷⁹) *Ibid.*, pp. ix-xxxviii.

¹⁸⁰) See above pp. 119-121 and notes 11-12.

¹⁸¹) On the dating of the *Da anima intellectiva*, see Van Steenberghen, *La philosophie au XIII^e siècle*, p. 376. See also notes 72-73 and 77-78.

Henry Bate of Malines, which was written between 1281 and 1302/1303¹⁸²).

Since James's own use of the Moerbeke translation of Themistius comes not long after Henry's, namely in a work written between 1293 and 1296¹⁸³), it is among the very earliest analyses of the psychology of Themistius to be written in the West and therefore deserves the studied attention of historians of medieval philosophy. For that reason, we have taken pains to establish James's interpretation of what Themistius meant by the «illuminated» and «illuminating» intellects, arguing that he appears to have held that this phrase refers to the agent intellects in the individual human souls: they are illuminated by a higher intellect and in turn illuminate the possible intellects in the souls of men. This interpretation, as we have seen, is the same as that of Siger of Brabant and at variance with that of Thomas Aquinas and Henry Bate of Malines. On the other hand, we saw that James differs with both Siger and Thomas and is thus apparently one with Henry in identifying the first illuminating intellect with God — neither Siger nor Thomas had specified what separate substance Themistius had in mind.

A second result of our study of *Quodlibet* I, question 12 has been to show how seriously James takes Themistius and John Philoponus in his attempt to determine Aristotle's mind on the nature of the agent intellect. It should also be added that there are references to Simplicius's commentary on the *Categories* in both the first and second quodlibetal disputations¹⁸⁴). Evidently James considered the ancient commentators on Aristotle to be valuable philosophical sources and felt free to use them when the topic in question demanded it. We thus have in the case of James an important indication of the impact that the Greek commentators had on the philosophical scene at Paris in the late thirteenth century as a result of the translating activities of William of Moerbeke. On the other hand, James's interest in studying these relatively «new» philosophical sources is a testimony to his own wide interests and scholarly pursuits.

¹⁸²) Verbeke, *Thémistius*, pp. xlviii-xlix. On the dating, see Van De Vyver, introduction to *Henricus Bate: Speculum Divinorum*, I, pp. xiii-xiv.

¹⁸³) See Ypma, introduction to *Disputatio Prima*, p. vi, and also note 105 supra.

¹⁸⁴) See the references to Simplicius in the indices of authors cited, *Disputatio Prima*, p. 237 and *Disputatio Secunda*, p. 243. On Moerbeke's translation, see Grabmann, *I Papi del duecento ... Guglielmo di Moerbeke O. P.*, pp. 128-129.

It would be an exaggeration, of course, to suggest that James took his own conception of the agent intellect from the Greek commentators. On the contrary, we have seen his criticism of the views which he has culled both from John Philoponus and also from Themistius. Nevertheless, he does take them to be important *philosophi antiqui* or *expositores antiqui* and he uses their disagreement with other thinkers as an indication that Aristotle's own view on the nature of the agent intellect is not clear. This enables him, he appears to believe, to argue that his theory regarding the agent intellect has as much plausibility as these other theories. The ideas of Themistius and John Philoponus have thus been woven into *Quodlibet* I, question 12 and play an integral role in the overall argument of that question.

By investigating in some depth James of Viterbo's discussion concerning Themistius's doctrine on the agent intellect, we hope that we have placed him better in the intellectual context of his time and have brought out and illuminated a side of his philosophical thought not sufficiently emphasized by his previous historians. James's investigation of the ideas of Themistius represents another chapter in the history of the influence of the Greek commentators on medieval and Renaissance philosophy ¹⁸⁵).

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¹⁸⁵ I am indebted to Rev. John F. Wippel (Catholic University of America) for his careful reading of this article in an earlier form and for several valuable suggestions for its improvement. My first examination of James's first quodlibet took place during the academic year 1968-1969 while I held a fellowship from the National Foundation for the Humanities. I am indebted to that foundation for support during that period and also to the Duke University Research Council for grants over a period of years for travel and microfilms.