

The doctrine of original sin according to Augustine of Rome

(Favaroni) († 1443) *)

4. *The Theological Censure of this theory.*

In its broad outline the theory of Favaroni has shown itself to coincide somewhat with the opinion held by Catharinus ⁸⁰⁾ and Pigge ⁸¹⁾ at the time of the Council of Trent. In their controversies with the so-called Reformers, these theologians proposed a theory by which they thought to obviate more efficaciously the heretical doctrines propounded, and at the same time to explain adequately the essence of original sin. They taught that original sin in children was principally the actual sin of Adam imputed to them by reason of a Divine pact constituting Adam juridical as well as natural head of the whole human race, and for this imputation each one incurred the loss of grace and concupiscence.

Regarding the deordination in original sin, the two opinions put it in the actual act of transgression of Adam; to explain voluntareity Catharinus introduces the theory of the pact whereas Favaroni considers it sufficiently explained through Adam's position as natural head of the human race in whose will were contained all the wills of his descendents.

Perhaps no theory has ever been subjected to more disconcerting and contradictory censures than this one. Peter Lombard refers briefly to the theory which identifies original sin with the sin of

*) *Augustiniana* vii (1957), pp. 100-117; 349-366.

⁸⁰⁾ *De Peccato Originali* cc. 4-6. Cf. J. SCHWEIZER, *Ambrosius Catharinus Politus. Sein Leben und seine Schriften*, Münster 1910; J. COMELLI, *Il Peccato Originale secondo Ambrogio Catarino*, Roma 1940.

⁸¹⁾ *Controversiae*, i. Köln 1542. J. FEINER, *Die Erbsündenlehre Albert Piggess*, Roma 1940.

Adam and simply says it is pelagian ⁸²). Robert of Melun mentions different notions of original sin current in his time. In the second place we read of the opinion which makes original sin consist in the actual sin of disobedience of Adam. His extensive refutation could lead us to believe that this opinion was fairly widespread at the time ⁸³). Favaroni himself does not propose it as being entirely new though he admits it is not to be found in the Scholastics ⁸⁴). In the Council of Trent this theory was defended by Catharinus and Salmeron ⁸⁵): Toletus, Lugo and many others recorded by Vasquez ⁸⁶) also defended it. On the other hand, Bellarmine calls it heresy ⁸⁷), Gregory of Valentia thinks it repugnant to faith ⁸⁸) and Vasquez puts it down as condemned in the Council of Trent ⁸⁹). Scheeben too describes it as erroneous on the other extreme from the Lutheran doctrine ⁹⁰).

The whole question centres around the precise meaning of the words of Trent « omnibus inest unicuique proprium » ⁹¹), especially whether this must be regarded as relating to the precisely formal element in original sin or to original sin in its whole complexity.

We can observe :

a. The Council does not *define* whether this immanence of sin as to its formal constituent is a physical or moral immanence. Favaroni's theory, as does that of Catharinus, admits only a moral immanence, but a physical immanence in its effects. Objectively speaking, this moral immanence is not strengthened in any way by having recourse to a virtual pact on the part of God, because

⁸²) 3 Sent. Dist. XXX.

⁸³) *De Peccato Originali*, ms. 191 of the Municipal Library of Bruges, f. 235v sqq. Cf. MARTIN, *Les idées de Robert du Melun sur le péché originel*, *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques* 1913, p. 700 sqq.

⁸⁴) ... postmodum ingrediar ad illa que latuerunt omnes scholasticos et detegam perfectius intellectum quod latet in doctoribus sanctis. *De Peccato* V 200 rl.

⁸⁵) *Conc. Trid.* Ehsses v 162-163, where we note the names of Catharinus and Salmeron. Cf. CAVALLERA, *Le décret du Concile de Trente*, *Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique* 1913, 241 sqq. KOCK, *Trienter Konzilsdekret de peccato originali*, *Theologische Quartalschrift*, Tübingen 1913, p. 430.

⁸⁶) In 1-11, disp. CXXXII cap. 2.

⁸⁷) *De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati*, liber V, cap. XVI.

⁸⁸) In 1-11, disp. VI, q. XII, punctum 1.

⁸⁹) In 1-11, disp. CXXXII cap. 2.

⁹⁰) *Handbuch der Katholischen Dogmatik*, IV paragraph 202.

⁹¹) DENZ., *Ench. Sym.* (ed. 23) n. 790.

such a pact can never be proved to have existed, and therefore can have no foundation in the order of reality.

b. This theory on the identity of original sin in the sons of Adam with the sin of Adam was defended after the Council even by those who took part in the discussions — Catharinus and Salmeron — and who consequently should have understood the intention of the Council better than Bellarmine who was not present.

Neither does the scheme proposed by the Vatican Council for definition prejudice the doctrine of our theologian. Of this, canon four states that the personal consent of each one is not necessary to give original sin its sinful character; and canon five that the privation of sanctifying grace is necessarily connected with original sin⁹²). That in the theory of Favaroni the personal consent is not required follows from our exposition, and is explicitly declared by himself⁹³). That the privation of sanctifying grace results from it, we have already sufficiently proved. We do not simply suffer the loss of sanctifying grace but its privation, for original justice was given to all in the person of Adam so that when Adam sinned and lost it, all were made debtors of that justice⁹⁴).

Hence to say with Bellarmine that this doctrine is heretical seems exaggerated and cannot be accepted, because according to the law of the Church no doctrine is understood to be defined (or respectively heretical) unless it is plainly apparent⁹⁵). Unquestionably it is obnoxious to many difficulties as for example the confusion between *peccatum naturae* and *peccatum actuale*, how our sinning in Adam can have the *vera et propria ratio peccati* or can inexist *unicuique proprium*⁹⁶), how this act existed in us before

⁹²) *Coll. Lac.* VII, col. 566. Can. 4: Si quis negaverit peccatum originale in Adae posteris vere et proprie peccatum esse nisi ab ipsis actuali consensu peccatum comprobetur, A. S. Can. 5: Si quis dixerit peccatum originale formaliter esse ipsam concupiscentiam aut physicum seu substantialem naturae humanae morbum et negaverit privationem gratiae sanctificantis de ipsius ratione esse, A. S.

⁹³) Ideo peccatum illius transgressionis dici potest voluntarium et involuntarium secundum quod ad alium vel alium peccantem potest referri: si enim referatur ad Adam fuit voluntarium, si referatur ad nos fuit involuntarium. *De Peccato* V 208 v2.

⁹⁴) Sic per hoc quemadmodum Adam post acceptam iusticiam debitor fuit acceptae iusticie ita omnes qui in ea eandem iusticiam acceperunt eiusdem iusticie facti sunt debitores. *Ibid.* V 203 v2.

⁹⁵) *Codex Iuris Canonici*, Can. 1323 par. 3.

⁹⁶) *DENZ., Ench. Sym.* (ed. 23) nn. 792, 790.

we were born or how Adam's debt of justice is identically our debt of justice. For these reasons it is not a very acceptable doctrine, nor ever likely to command a reasonable following.

5. *The Transmission of original sin.*

Favaroni divides this question into two parts : the first is a declaration of what he considers « inrefragabiliter vera », the second is a deeper explanation of how original sin is transmitted, which he terms « aliquid humanitus autumnare » ⁹⁷⁾.

It is transmitted by seminal propagation according to the ordinary laws of nature because for those thus born and for those only did Adam receive original justice, and for those only did he lose it ⁹⁸⁾. This is the only adequate explanation of the words « per unum hominem » wherein the Apostle apodictically shows that sin entered the world, not by suggestion which would be attributed to the devil, nor by imitation which could be ascribed to Eve, but by carnal generation which is ascribed neither to the devil nor Eve but to Adam only ⁹⁹⁾.

The transmission of concupiscence is distinct from the transmission of original sin. For concupiscence does not pertain to the essence of original sin ; nay more, it can be called the material element only in sensu improprio, as the remote material ¹⁰⁰⁾. It could be better called the effect of sin, and hence it can have a different mode of transmission.

Concupiscence could be transmitted in two ways without inducing the guilt of original sin : firstly if God by direct intervention formed the body of an infant from an unclean mass without the con-

⁹⁷⁾ *De Peccato* V 206. 207 r1.

⁹⁸⁾ Septima Conclusio: Descendentes ab Adam per seminalem propagationem per originem trahunt quemdam reatum. *Ibid.* V 203 r2 and Quapropter cum acceperat Adam originalem iusticiam non solum in se accepit eam retinendam verum etiam per actum generationis in posteros transfundendam. *Ibid.* V 203 v2.

⁹⁹⁾ ... sed de propagatione peccati loquitur, que propagatio est per carnalem seminacionem que neque dyabolo neque Eve assignari potest. *In ep. ad Rom.* A 376 181 r1.

¹⁰⁰⁾ Ex quibus patet quod multi doctores scholastici non bene assignant materiale in peccato infantium dicentes quod concupiscentia carnis sit materiale in eorum peccato originali vel carentia originalis iusticie ut dicunt alii. Patet inquam, quoniam idem materiale omnino fuit infantium et Ade quoniam idem fuit actus prevaricationis, qui licet preterit tamen pro materiale debet intelligi nam et in Adam etiam preterit remanente formale. Ideo concupiscentia carnis nonnisi remote

course of man ¹⁰¹) and secondly if the infant were generated from Adam after the sin of Eve but before he himself had sinned ¹⁰²). The first case is realised in Christ, so that if He wished « consilii causa » He could have contracted concupiscence without thereby contracting original sin ¹⁰³). This would be true of any human being ¹⁰⁴).

In the transmission of original sin therefore, we must not look to cleanliness or uncleanness either in the mother or in the child, but we must consider the mode of propagation only ¹⁰⁵).

Only those who were seminally in Adam received the justice, and therefore those only are the debtors of that justice. Adam could lose his gift only for those who were seminally in him. Whoever was formed other than by the ordinary course of nature may be said to have been in Adam materially according to the flesh, but not in Adam seminally or by generative power ¹⁰⁶). Adam by his sin infected the nature and by the transmission of vitiated nature the person is infected. Obviously we can speak of TRANSMISSION of nature

potest dici materiale in peccato originali sicut humor lesivus oculi potest dici materiale in cecitate; carentia vero originalis iusticie propinquius potest dici materiale, verumtamen nec concupiscentia nec carentia originalis iusticie proprie est materiale in peccato originali plusquam fuerit in actuali peccato Ade. *De Peccato* V 211 r2.

¹⁰¹) Quod stat aliquem semper habuisse concupiscentiam carnis et tamen nunquam habuisse originale peccatum. Hoc patet quoniam stat Deum aliquem infantem se solo producere de massa infecta ex qua traheret fomitem peccati et concupiscentiam carnis, in quo casu talis non contraheret aliquem reatum nec aliquod vinculum culpe nec aliquam obligationem quod haberet per sacramentum dimitti. Sed in istis stat ratio formalis... *Ibid.* V 204 v2.

¹⁰²) Secundo stat ... patet quidem si Adam non pecasset post peccatum Eve et ex ea iam infecta peccato propagasset, in quo casu proles propagata genita fuisset de massa corrupta ... et utique cum carne corrupta per carnalem concupiscentiam sed sine peccato. *Ibid.* V 204 v2.

¹⁰³) *Ibid.* 205 r1.

¹⁰⁴) quoniam qui taliter propagatur ab Adam qualiter propagatus est Christus eciam si fuerit purus homo, ut dicit Anselmus in *De Conceptu Virginali* c. 13, non potuit trahere ad Adam talem reatum sive obligationem vel debitum. *Ibid.* V 205 r2.

¹⁰⁵) quoniam non est attendenda mundicia vel immundicia carnis sive in matre sive in prole ad concernendum si proles contraheret originale peccatum sed modus ipse propagationis est attendendus. *Ibid.* V 205 r1.

¹⁰⁶) ... quoniam proles sic propagata non fuit seminaliter in Adam sed tantum materialiter per corpulentiam carnis non autem per virtutem pullulativam. *Ibid.* V 205 r2. Cf. S. Th. I-II, 81, 4 c.

only where the active principle of transmission is employed, and hence, only in this case can we speak of transmission of vitiated nature. Our nature as it was in Adam and not just our nature as such that incurred the debt; consequently only by seminal propagation can original sin be transmitted ¹⁰⁷).

Favaroni considers all this as absolutely true, but to explain further the transmission is not humanly possible. This was the great difficulty of St. Augustine in his letters to St. Jerome: St. Anselm expresses it also in his *De Conceptu Virginali* ¹⁰⁸). Sin is an injustice, but injustice can be only where justice ought to be i. e. in the rational soul, but since the rational soul is not « ex traduce » but is created immediately by God, how comes it to have original sin?

His considerations open with the fact that matter and form are naturally i. e. by their very nature, ordained to each other. Not only matter and form in general but each specific form is ordained to its specific matter just as each specific matter is ordained to its own specific form ¹⁰⁹). And so the soul is ordained by nature to the body, as the body is to the soul. Even though the soul is not taken from the potency of the body as in inanimate creatures, but is directly created by God, nevertheless the natural order exacts that such a body be given to such a soul and such a soul to such a body: and if God were to assign them otherwise, He would depart from the order of things established. Even therefore if the soul of man is produced from nothing, the natural order still demands that it be in-

¹⁰⁷) ... nullus seminaliter propagatus ab Adam per ejus propagationem ab Adam contrahit talem reatum vel obligationem in quantum est persona distincta ab Adam sed in quantum est illa natura que seminaliter fuit in Adam et sic persona redditur pro tanto peccatrix in quantum est in peccatrice natura sive est persona in tali natura que est obligata et tenetur astricto vinculo culpe. *Ibid.* V 206 r1.

¹⁰⁸) Cap. 3. ML. 158, 436.

¹⁰⁹) Principium autem hujus considerationis hinc sumendum est quod materia et forma ad invicem naturaliter ordinantur ... rursus certa materia naturaliter ordinatur ad certam formam et e contrario certa forma naturaliter ordinatur ad certam materiam ut forma ignis ad materiam dispositam per caliditatem et siccitatem. *Ibid.* V 207 r1. Cf. St. Thomas: Alii vero... conati sunt ostendere quomodo culpa animae parentis traducitur in prolem etsi anima non traducatur per hoc quod corporis defectus traducuntur a parente in prolem ... Cum autem corpus sit proportionatum animae et defectus animae redundant in corpus et e converso, simili modo dicunt quod culpabiles defectus animae per traductionem seminis in prolem derivantur, quamvis semen actualiter non sit culpae subjectum. Sed omnes hujusmodi viae insufficientes sunt... l-11, 81, l c.

fused to such a body, and if the body is seminally propagated from Adam, it follows from the law of nature that this soul also belonged to Adam ¹¹⁰). Therefore this soul prevaricated the testimony of God in Adam.

Towards explaining the transmission of a *verum peccatum naturae* this explanation falls below that of St. Thomas : towards explaining the transmission of an actual participation in the sin of Adam — a more difficult task — it really seems to contribute nothing at all. There is nothing contradictory or falsely asserted in it, but whoever would find therein a sufficient explanation for all the data must be addicted to excessive realism or pure eclecticism.

C. — THE PUNISHMENT DUE TO ORIGINAL SIN.

The eternal sanction due to original sin alone, as prescinding from the question of punishment for actual sin, will be determined by examining the fate of children who die without baptism before the use of reason ¹).

In order to have a clear background to this question we shall sketch out concisely the different opinions on this difficult question proposed in the course of the centuries. We can reduce them all to five principal classes, beginning with the most lenient and gradually descending to the most severe.

The Pelagians attributed no punishment for original sin alone, but on the contrary a state of happiness and felicity for those who died without baptism. It is however, not easy to determine precisely in what this state of happiness consists. Certainly for Vincentius Victor it included the beatific vision ²) : whether for the rest of the Pelagians and especially for Julian ³) this state of happiness which they nominated Eternal Life in contradistinction to the Kingdom of Heaven reserved to the baptised, included the beatific vision of God or not, is not apparent. Bellarmine contends that Eternal Life did not include the beatific vision but was a state of purely natural happiness, and it is to the concession of this state of

¹¹⁰) *Ordo naturae qui facit hanc animam pertinere ad hoc corpus facit ipsam pertinere ad Adam a quo seminaliter hoc corpus descendit. Ibid. V 207 vl.*

¹) S. Th. I-II, 89, 6. 2 Sent. D. XXXIII q. 2.

²) S. AUGUSTINUS, *De Natura et Origine Animae* i IX, 10. ML. 44, 480.

³) S. AUGUSTINUS, *Contra Julianum* v 8. ML. 44, 786.

natural happiness that Augustine objects ⁴⁾. On the contrary, Mazzella ⁵⁾ and many present day theologians contend that it did include the beatific vision, and that it is the beatific vision only that Augustine wishes to exclude.

Dependent on this controversy we have the second opinion held by many theologians of the present day. They maintain that children dying without baptism are in a state of natural happiness without, of course, the enjoyment of the beatific vision: or to express it more precisely, they are in that state which would have constituted man's natural end if he had not been elevated to a supernatural state. They recur to the condemnation of the Jansenist calumnies in the Synod of Pistoia in defence of their theory ⁶⁾.

These opinions have only a negative bearing on the theory of Favaroni so we can dismiss them. The only truth we must hold on the infallible authority of the Church is that original sin entails the privation of the vision of God ⁷⁾. Accepting this fundamental assumption, the following opinions have a more immediate bearing on the doctrine of our theologian.

Next in the order of leniency is the opinion which, while it does not allow any positive happiness, denies any sorrow (*tristitia*) or pain (*poena sensus*). This was held by almost all the great Masters of the Middle Ages, by St. Thomas ⁸⁾, St. Bonaventure and Scotus as may be seen from their commentaries in 2 Sent. D. 33 — *sine tristitia et poena sensus*.

Of the prescholastics most notably Peter Lombard held that infants dying without baptism certainly incur the privation of the vision of God. Since, they argued, with this great loss sorrow is inevitably connected, therefore these infants experienced internal sorrow even though exempt from external punishment. This opinion was afterwards taken up and defended by Bellarmine ⁹⁾ and Gregory of Valentia ¹⁰⁾ — *cum tristitia, sine poena sensus*.

The severest judgement of all on the state of infants dying with-

⁴⁾ *De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati*, vi, c. 1.

⁵⁾ C. MAZZELLA, *De Deo Creante*, Prati 1908.

⁶⁾ DENZ., *Ench. Sym.* (ed. 23) n. 1526.

⁷⁾ *Ibid.* nn. 410. 464. 695. 791. Cf. J. SCHEEBEN, *Handbuch der Katholischen Dogmatik*, Freiburg 1878, iv paragraph 204.

⁸⁾ *Qq. Disp. de Malo*, q. 5 aa. 2 & 3.

⁹⁾ *De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati* vi, 6.

¹⁰⁾ In I-II, *Disp. VI*, q. 17, punctum 4.

out baptism is that they must suffer both the internal sorrow and the external pain, although their pains are the least possible. It is based on the exclusiveness of the distinction between heaven and hell; so that whoever is not in one, must necessarily be in the other. But original sin certainly induces the privation of heaven, therefore it entails the pains of hell — cum tristitia et poena sensus.

Gregory of Rimini is often quoted as the champion and defender of this opinion ¹¹⁾ but falsely. He is more justly described by Vasquez as having proposed it as probable ¹²⁾, but he himself expressly says that he does not wish to determine for either side since it has not been decided by the Church ¹³⁾.

Undoubtedly Favaroni holds this last opinion ¹⁴⁾. He censures as being more unreasonable than the Pelagians those Doctors who hold that for original sin no pain is due. The Pelagians attribute no pain to original sin because they thought that original sin did not partake of the character of guilt. But those Doctors while allowing that original sin is guilt, disjoin from it any liability to punishment. On the other hand those doctors more logically than the Pelagians exclude infants from the beatific vision on account of the guilt, while the Pelagians unwarrantly exclude them from it even without guilt. The great incoherency of this opinion is to dissociate from guilt any debt of positive punishment ¹⁵⁾.

¹¹⁾ PERRONE, *Praelectiones Theologicae* (Romae 1841) De Deo Creatore part iii, C. VI, n. 813. Bl. BERAZA, *De Peccato Originali* (Bilbao 1924) n. 908. Cf. BELLARMINE, *op. cit.* vi 1 « in hanc sententiam satis aperte propendat ».

¹²⁾ In I-II, Disp. 134, c. 2.

¹³⁾ Quia tamen hujusmodi quaestiones non vidi partem aliquam expresse determinatam ab Ecclesia, et tremendum mihi videtur negare auctoritates sanctorum e contra, et non est tutum contraire communi opinioni et consentioni magistrorum nostrorum, idcirco *neutri parti altera praeferens* diiudicationem earum lectori relinquo. GREG. ARIM. In 2 Sent. D. 30, q. 3, a. 1. Reprint 1955, f. 116 vl. (Cassiciacum, Vol. IV. American Series).

¹⁴⁾ Nona Conclusio: omnes descendentes seminaliter ab Adam per generationem contrahunt reatum pene sensitive, distinctum a reatu culpe. *De Peccato* V 209 rl.

¹⁵⁾ Quantum ad statum parvulorum (isti doctores) omnino faciunt opinioni pelagianorum, circa causam vero isti a pelagianis discrepare videntur, et partim isti melius eis, partim vero illi melius istis loquuntur. Illi namque dicunt quod parvuli non baptizati excluduntur a regno Dei non quidem propter aliquam culpam sed propter carentiam solum sacramenti baptismatis quod si ab eis requiratur causa dicti respondent quod Dominus in evangelio ait 'nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et spiritu sancto non intrabit in regno Dei'. Et ideo carentia hujusmodi sufficit

His justification for holding such a severe opinion falls into three sections. His first argument comes in the form of a censure on the assertion that children suffer no sensitive pain for original sin — this, he says, was the Pelagian heresy ¹⁶). Secondly, a refutation of the explanations given by the supporters of the opinion to texts from the Fathers brought against them ¹⁷), and lastly a refutation of their philosophico-theological reasons for the denial of any positive punishment due to original sin ¹⁸). This last section resolves itself into two parts, the first of which demolishes the reasons for denial of sorrow (*tristitia*), the second attacks the reasons for the denial of any positive punishment (*poena sensus*).

The first section censures as pelagian the position of his opponents, proved by a very cumbersome collection of texts from St. Augustine, principally from *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione* ¹⁹).

eos excludere a regno Dei ... Quantum ad hoc melius loquuntur doctores scholastici dicentes quod tales parvuli excluduntur a regno celorum propter aliquam culpam licet ... originalem. Quantum vero ad illud quod parvuli non patiantur penam sensitivam pelagiani melius loquuntur quia non eis assignant aliquam culpam; quod si non habent culpam profecto nec debent habere penam. *De Peccato* V 216 vl. Cf. also: Dicerent Pelagiani istis valentibus viris « turpis vos erratis quam nos quia non assignamus parvulis penam quia non ponimus in eis peccatum ». *In ep. ad Rom.* A 376 181 vl.

¹⁶) Primo quod oppositum ejus est heresis pelagianorum ut eruitur ex dictis Augustini. *De Peccato* V 212 vl.

¹⁷) Secundo, Doctores tenentes oppositum non bene respondent ad illa dicta Augustini que contra eorum positionem inducuntur. *Ibid.* V 212 vl.

¹⁸) Tertio, argumenta eorum contra conclusionem et illa solvantur. *Ibid.* V 212 vl.

¹⁹) For reference purposes it might be well to give the entire list of quotations.

1. *De Pecc. Mer. et Rem.* 28, 55. ML. 44, 140. Quia sicut per unum hominem... vel immutare sententiam.
2. *ibid.* 20, 26. ML. 44, 123. Habent enim videlicet quo confugient... nec ipsi habent vitam.
3. *Contra Julianum* ix, 27. ML. 44, 838. Non enim ad regnum Dei natos... qui non habent vitam.
4. *De Pecc. Mer. et Rem.* 23, 33. ML. 44, 128. This extract is given rather « ad sensum ».
5. *ibid.* 21, 30. ML. 44, 125. Nam et hi quibus videntur iniustum... quaerentes quomodo justum sit.
6. *ibid.* 12, 15. ML. 44, 117. Immo vero nos intelligamus Apostolum... quo sola Christi societas introducit.
7. *ibid.* 16, 21. ML. 44, 120. Potest proinde recte dici parvulos... judicium ex unius delicto in condemnationem.

His intent is to show that Augustine wishes to exclude any kind of intermediary state between eternal salvation in heaven and eternal damnation in hell; for it is not a question of what might have been but it is a *de facto* question — what does revelation teach on the subject. Whoever then is not in heaven must necessarily be in hell, and whoever is in hell must necessarily suffer the pains of hell, which as the Scripture teaches are pains of fire.

The possibility of such an intermediary state rests always with the will of God. When we say there is no other state we do not mean to exclude the possibility of its existence, but simply that the Scripture does not speak of its existence ²⁰).

The second section is a criticism of the solution brought by his opponents to the text of *De Fide ad Petrum* « Firme crede et nullatenus dubita etc » ²¹) quoted falsely as the work of Augustine since it was written by St. Fulgentius. In the text the Saint asserts that we must believe that even children dying without baptism endure the everlasting punishment of eternal fire. How do the adversaries explain this text? They say that under the name « ignis aeterna » can well be understood the privation of the beatific vision nor is it necessary to induce positive punishment inflicted by an external agent ²²).

Favaroni thinks this interpretation arbitrary and not in the least founded in scripture. If we interpret « ignis » here in the sense of the loss of the beatific vision, then with equal right we may interpret it in the same sense in the penalty for actual mortal sin — which is

8. *ibid.* 3, 2. 3. ML. 44, 188. Scriptura evangelica fallere non potest... christianum non sentit.

9. *ibid.* 2. 3. ML. 44, 187. Postremo ad id quod perspicacissimum intellectum assequi non valet ... qui non crediderit condemnabitur.

10. *ibid.* 4, 8. ML. 44, 190. Hiis atque hujusmodi aliis ... sacramento baptismatis imbuuntur.

11. *Hyponosticon* v 10. ML. 45, 1654. Primum locum fides catholica... ecce quales sensus impregnata a dyabolo peperit heresis vestra.

²⁰) Cum igitur dicit Augustinus quod duo sunt loca tertium autem ignoramus, non hoc dicit quod non sit ymaginabilis tertius locus medius inter tantam beatitudinem regni celorum et tantam miseriam status penarum, sed hoc dicit ex evangelio quia videlicet non dabitur de facto secundum textum evangelicum. *De Peccato* V 216 r2.

²¹) C. 27. ML. 40, 774.

²²) Cf. S. THOMAS, *Qq. Disp. de Malo*, q. 5, a. 2, ad 2.

against their own opinion ²³). This would be equivalent to the denial of the double pain of hell — the pain of loss and the pain of sense — which all without exception hold and must hold.

This is the only possible point of contact between Favaroni and Gregory of Rimini regarding this severe opinion. Gregory brings forward the same explanation of theologians to the same text of *De Fide ad Petrum* and confutes it in the same way. But reading the explanation of Gregory and that of Favaroni little else in common is to be found : it is absolutely groundless to assert an interdependence between them.

In the third section the first point raised considers the question of innate sorrow through the loss of the beatific vision in children who die with original sin. Favaroni classifies under four headings the holders of this opinion, noting in each class the reason for which they exclude sorrow notwithstanding the loss of the vision of God. Considering the historical nature of the question we reproduce the entire text, lest faulty interpretation might mislead rather than commend :

Quidam etenim dixerunt animas parvulorum sine sacramento baptismatis decedentium non dolere nec affligi quod perpetuo sint private beatifica visione divina, dicentes quod in tot jacent tenebris ignorantie quod nesciunt se ad talem beatitudinem fuisse creatas, ideo non dolent ²⁴).

Alii vero dicunt hoc non rationabiliter dici quoniam tales anime parvulorum non debent tantis tenebris obscurari sed debent fulgere lumine rationis naturalis : sed aiunt tale lumen non elevat eas ad cognoscendam talem beatitudinem quoniam, ut dicunt, in lumine fidei innotescit nobis ad talem nos beatitudinem fuisse creatos : ideo dicunt quod in lumine naturali cognoscunt anime puerorum se esse creatas ad beatitudinem que consistit in adeptione summi boni ; sed quod tale sit Deus, et Ejus facialis adeptio sit suprema beatitudo ad

²³) Si ... nomine ignis eterni et sempiterni supplicii intelligant carentiam divine visionis non autem penam aliquam sensitivam, requiram ab istis quo alio expressiori modo debuit nobis aliquis exprimere penam sensitivam illatam ab illo igne quo isti ponunt etiam scelestissimos post hanc vitam puniri ? Quapropter eque faciliter glossarent omnes auctoritates scripture loquentes de igne sempiterno affligente animas dampnatorum. *De Peccato* V 216 r2.

²⁴) This opinion is also the first quoted by St. Thomas in his 2 Sent. D. 33, q. 2, a. 2 and Qq. Disp. de Malo q. 5 a. 3 when he is enquiring if interior sorrow is to be assigned in punishment for original sin. It is sometimes cited as being the opinion of Durandus, but the reading of this author's 2 Sent. D. 33 renders the assertion very doubtful.

quam create sint, in tali lumine non cognoscunt, ideo nec dolent quod tali et tanta beatitudine sint private ²⁵⁾.

Alii vero dicunt quod ex eo prefate anime non dolent nec affliguntur quod ad talem beatitudinem non admittantur quoniam talis beatitudo est supra naturam et non est debita ipsi nature sed gratuite ei confertur. Nullus autem dolere debet de eo quod careat quod non pertinet ad iura nature, sicut stultum esset quod quis doleret quia non habet alas.

Alii autem dicunt quod huiusmodi (f. 217 rl) anime infantium non dolent de ammissione tante beatitudinis quoniam nullum habent actum inordinatum: inordinate vero dolerent cum talis beatitudo non sit eis naturalis sed supra naturam. Et ita omnes isti doctores ad hoc videntur conari quod prefate anime tranquillam vitam ducunt nullo scrupulo, nullo interiore afflictivo dolore turbante. (*De Peccato* V 216 v2).

The refutations made of these opinions are long and tedious: and while they have something to offer to anyone wishing to examine the historical position of Favaroni, they have little to contribute to our own purpose viz. the examination of his fundamental orthodoxy.

Finally he undertakes to refute the arguments excluding the pain of sense and explains how this punishment, as St. Augustine expresses it, is « mitissima omnium ». It is the least of all compared with the pains of those who have added personal sins to original sin, but it is grave if considered in itself ²⁶⁾.

Here too it is true to state that the dogmatic reasons have little value for our present purpose. But even with the possible accusation of going beyond our intent, we cannot resist the temptation of bringing forward a point of historical importance viz. that his principal opponent is St. Thomas. To indicate how closely he tracked St. Thomas we reproduce side by side the text of our theologian with the corresponding text of St. Thomas. We should remark that it is not the repetition of a difficulty, for difficulties were almost identically formulated by all theologians, but it is St. Thomas' own explana-

²⁵⁾ This is the opinion held by St. Thomas in the Qq. Disp. de Malo. The conjunction of the first and second rather seems to be the real opinion of Durandus. Cf. Vasquez, in I-II, D. 134, c. 3.

²⁶⁾ Dicendum est quod pena infantium est magna in se considerata, sed est mitissima comparata cum penis illorum qui peccato originali peccata propria addiderunt. *De Peccato* V 222 rl.

tion given in the body of the article. Also note that Favaroni indicates his departure from the text :

Fav. *De Peccato* V 222 vl

Quelibet persona est suppositum alicujus nature et ideo ad ea que sunt nature per se et immediate ordinatur. Ad ea vero que sunt supra naturam ordinatur mediante natura. Quod autem aliqua persona detrimentum patiatur in hiis que sunt supra naturam potest contingere vel ex vicio nature vel ex vicio persone. Quod autem detrimentum patiatur in hiis que sunt nature hoc non videtur posse contingere nisi ex vicio persone. Peccatum autem originale est vicium nature, ut dicunt, peccatum autem actuale est vicium persone. Gratia vero et visio divina sunt supra naturam. Ideo peccato originali debetur carentia gratie et visionis divine. Pena vero sensus opponitur integritati nature et bone habitudini ejus. Ideo talis pena solum debetur actuali et personali peccato.

Secundo arguunt sic : pena debet proportionari culpe. In culpa autem actuali est aversio et conversio ; aversio ab incommutabili bono, conversio vero ad commutabile bonum. Ratione igitur aversionis debetur ei carentia visionis divine, ratione autem conversionis debetur ei pena sensus. In peccato autem originali non

S. Th. *Qq. Disp. de Malo*
q. 5, a2

Et hoc videtur esse rationabile propter tria. Primo quidem quia persona quaelibet est alicujus naturae suppositum ; et ideo ad ea quae sunt naturae, per se et immediate ordinatur ; ad ea vero quae sunt supra naturam ordinatur mediante natura. Quod ergo detrimentum aliquod patiatur aliqua persona in hiis que sunt supra naturam potest contingere vel ex vitio naturae vel ex vitio personae ; quod autem detrimentum patiatur in hiis quae sunt naturae hoc non videtur posse contingere nisi propter vitium proprium personae. Ut autem ex praemissis patet peccatum originale est vitium naturae, peccatum autem actuale est vitium personae. Gratia autem et visio divina sunt supra naturam humanam ; et ideo privatio gratiae et carentia visionis divinae debentur alicui personae non solum propter actuale peccatum sed etiam propter originale. Poena autem sensus opponitur integritati naturae et bonae ejus habitudini et ideo poena sensus non debetur alicui nisi propter peccatum actuale.

Secundo quia poena proportionatur culpa ; et ideo peccato actuali mortali, in quo invenitur aversio ab incommutabili bono et conversio ad commutabile bonum debetur et poena damni scilicet carentia visionis divinae respondens aversioni, et poena sensus respondens conversioni. Sed in peccato originali non est

est conversio aliqua sed sola aversio ; ideo tali peccato nulla debetur pena sensus.

Alii confirmant hanc rationem dicentes quod unusquisque in eo patitur penam sensus quia glorificavit se in deliciis et tantam penam patitur quantum se glorificavit...

Tertio arguunt ipsi sic : nulli debetur pena pro sola dispositione ad malum sed pro actu ; nullus enim debet puniri ex eo quod malam dispositionem habet ad furandum sed pro actu quo quis furatur ; male tamen dispositioni debetur aliqua carentia utpote propter ignorantiam litterarum carebit promotione ad episcopalem dignitatem. In originali autem peccato non est aliquis malus actus sed sola dispositio mala, concupiscentia videlicet carnis. Igitur tali peccato sola debetur carentia dignitatis, videlicet visionis dei non autem aliqua pena sensus.

Alii conantur multiplicare rationes ad hoc idem, sed si bene considerantur ex hiis tribus sumunt originem et ideo ad istas tres reducuntur.

conversio sed solum aversio vel aliquid aversioni respondens scilicet destitutio anime a iustitia originali ; et ideo peccato non debetur poena sensus sed solum poena damni scilicet carentia visionis divinae.

Tertio quia poena sensus nunquam debetur habituali dispositioni : non enim aliquis punitur ex hoc quod est habilis ad furandum sed ex hoc quod actu furatur ; sed habituali privationi absque omni actu debetur aliquod damnum puta qui non habet scientiam litterarum ex hoc ipso indignus est promotione ad episcopalem dignitatem. In peccato autem originali invenitur quidem concupiscentia per modum habitualis dispositionis que parvulum facit habilem ad concupiscendum ut Augustinus dicit, adultum autem actu concupiscentem. Et ideo parvulo defuncto cum originali non debetur poena sensus sed solum poena damni : quia scilicet non est idoneus produci ad visionem divinam propter privationem originalis iusticiae.

Concluding, we can summarize in the following two points :

From a dogmatic point of view we know that Favaroni held the severest of all opinions on the question of the punishment due to

original sin — to original sin is due even the pain of sense. Quite openly and apodictically he professes this awe-inspiring theory.

From an historical point of view we have unmistakable evidence in two cases — both here and in the question of actual sin — that his main opponent was St. Thomas. Other similarities too which seem very probable indications of interdependence ²⁷⁾ tend to bring the two more and more in contrast. In a complete study of the sources this point would go a long way towards a really objective classification of our author's theology.

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(To be continued).

²⁷⁾ Cf. *Primum assumptum est eorum qui dicunt peccatum originale esse talem qualitatem in anima nam tractantes de malo et querentes utrum malum sit aliquid dicunt quod malum potest accipi concrete et abstracte.* — S. THOMAS, *Qq. Disp. de Malo*, q. 1 a. 1.