

The doctrine of original sin according to Augustine of Rome

(Favaroni) († 1443) *)

A. — ORIGINAL SIN AND CONCUISCENCE.

The identification of concupiscence with original sin is the corner stone of lutheran theology : from it derives the impossibility of any internal renovation in man, the incapacity of free will for good, and the unseemly doctrine of imputed justice.

*) An examination of the alleged pro-lutheran tendencies in the works of this great Augustinian prompted the undertaking of this study. These accusations were first made by A. V. MUELLER, *Luthers theologische Quellen*, Giessen 1912; ID., *Agostino Favaroni e la teologia di Lutero*, Romae 1914, *Bilychnis* 3, 373-387; ID., G. Perez di Valencia OESA, *Vescovo di Chrysopoli e la teologia di Lutero*, Romae 1920, *Bilychnis* 9, 391-403; ID., *Una fonte ignota del sistema di Lutero; il beato Simone Fidati da Cascia e la sua teologia*, Romae 1921, *Bilychnis* 10: they were almost wholeheartedly accepted by J. PAQUIER, *Luther et l'Augustinisme*, *Revue de Philosophie*, 1923, 197 sqq: accepted, but to a less extent by E. STAKEMEIER, *Der Kampf um Augustin auf dem Tridentinum*, Paderborn 1937, 37 sqq.

Our theologian was born of a Roman family, obtained his Magisterium at Bologna in 1392, elected Provincial of the Roman Province in 1405, and General of the Order from the close of the Schism in 1418 until 1431 when he was appointed Archbishop of Nazareth in the Abruzzi. Further biographical details in G. CIOLINI, *Agostino di Roma e la sua Cristologia*, Firenze 1944, 13-34.

The works of Favaroni extensively used were: Ms. B VII, 118 of the Vatican Library (designated by V) containing *Commentarium in Apocalypsim*, ff. 1-120 v2; *De Sacramento Unitatis Christi et Ecclesiae sive de Christo Integro*, ff. 122 r1 - 130 v2; *De Christo Capite Ecclesie et Ejus Inclito Principatu*, ff. 130 v2 - 144 r1; *De Principatu Pape ex Potestate Summi Pontificis quam Christus reliquit in terra Petro et Successoribus ejus*, ff. 144r1 - 163 r1; *De Caritate Christi circa Electos et Ejus Infinito Amore*, ff. 163 r2 - 187 r2; *De Perfecta Iustitia Militantis Ecclesie in presenti*, ff. 187 v2 - 200 r1; *De Peccato per Originem Trajecto*, ff. 200 r1 - 224 r1;

Catholic theology teaches that concupiscence is the effect of original sin. Original sin itself is the loss of sanctifying grace in the soul, as a result of which a perversion of the inferior appetites was induced, which deordination we call concupiscence. By the return of grace to the soul in baptism the sin is remitted, but concupiscence remains as a source of conflict and purification to the soul ¹).

Theologians use two different modes of expression to formulate this identical doctrine. The first is that original sin is the privation of original justice, consisting principally in the lack of sanctifying grace in the soul, from which ensues the rebellion of the senses against reason which is the loss of the gift of integrity. This is the formula of the thomistic school ²). The second is that original sin consists in concupiscence, understanding by concupiscence two qualities, one in the body and the other in the soul resulting from its contact with the body: but is it from the bad quality in the soul that the guilt and culpability of original sin proceeds, and not from the quality in the body ³). This opinion is commonly attributed to Peter Lombard ⁴), Henry of Ghent ⁵) and Gregory of Rimini ⁶) to mention its principal defenders before the time of Favaroni.

For the purpose of the present study we shall examine Favaroni's doctrine under four headings: 1. Sense of the word 'con-

De Merito Christi et Condigna Satisfactione pro Electis, ff. 224 r1 - 241 v2; *De Sacerdotio Christi et Sacerdotio Electorum*, ff. 241 v2 - 250 v1. Also ms. lat. 376 membr. saec. xv of the Angelica Library, Rome (quoted as A 376) containing Favaroni's *Lectura super Epistolam b. Pauli ad Hebreos*, ff. 1-105 v2; *Lect. in ep. b. Pauli ad Romanos*, ff. 106 r1 - 249. And ms. lat. 641 membr. saec. xv of the Angelica, Rome (quoted as A. 641) has his *Lect. super ep. b. Pauli Apostoli ad Galathas*, ff. 1-40 v2; *Lect. super ep. b. Pauli Apostoli ad Ephesios*, ff. 41 r1 - 91 v1; *Lect. in ep. b. Pauli ad Philippenses*, ff. 91 v2 - 107 v2; *Lect. in ep. b. Pauli ad Colossenses*, ff. 110 r1 - 156 r1. His *Expositio super ep. primam b. Pauli ad Cor.* will be found in cod. lat. VII, A 1 in Reale Bibl. Naz. of Naples.

¹) DENZ. *Ench. Sym.* n. 792.

²) S. Th. I-II, q. 82, a. 3 c. Cf. BILLOT, *De Peccatis*, Thesis 12.

³) S. R. BELLARMINUS, *De Ammissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati*, V 15.

⁴) 2 *Sent. D.* 31, par. 2 & 3. Cf. GREGORIUS A VALENTIA, *In I-II*, Disp. VI, punc. 1, par. 8 Verum nescio quo pacto obtinuit iam apud scholae theologos ut aliter opinio Magistri intelligatur.

⁵) Cf. *Quodl.* 2, q. 11

⁶) Cf. 2 *Sent. D.* 30, a. 1.

cupiscence⁷⁾. 2. Concupiscence as a sin in itself. 3. Concupiscence as an impediment to our perfection. 4. Concupiscence as an enervation of our free will.

1. *Concupiscence, its meaning.*

Opening this Tract on Original Sin — as well as in his Commentary on ad Rom. v — he records two opinions on original sin, the first makes it consist in concupiscence and the second in the privation of original justice⁸⁾. But this concupiscence, he expressly tells us, is a quality of the soul communicated to it from the body — *quaedam qualitas in anima immissa sibi a carne*. Already we are moving in the direction of Peter Lombard and his scholastic followers.

Whatever be the disputed questions on concupiscence it is quite definite that concupiscence is not something appertaining to the substance of the soul or to the nature of man, but it is a super-added deordinaion just like the curve in a line⁹⁾. Hence it is that these Doctors who do speak of concupiscence of the flesh never understand it to be the real guilt in original sin¹⁰⁾, naturally because

⁷⁾ Besides 'Concupiscentia' it is also called «Fomes peccato» V 202 r1, A 376 193 v2; «lex peccati» V 202 r1, A 376 157 r1; «lex membrorum» V 202 r1, A 376 157 v1; «Viciū» A 376 201 r, A 641 57 v1; «Viciū nature» V 187 v2, A 376 202 v2; «Viciū infecte nature» A 376 199 r2; «Viciū inficiens naturam» A 376 200 r1; «languor nature» V 187 v2; probably the most frequent designation is «viciū nature».

⁸⁾ «Circa hoc peccatum diversi diversa senserunt; quidam namque quod sit concupiscentia carnis et quedam qualitas in anima immissa a carne ... alii vero senserunt quod hoc peccatum sit carentia originalis justitiae cum debito tamen habendi eam et in hoc certe sequuntur Anselmum in Tract. de Conceptu Virginali». *De Peccato...* V 200 r1. «Hoc autem peccatum quidam scholastici dixerunt esse quamdam carnalem concupiscentiam habitantem in carne nostra per quam carnaliter concupiscimus contra legem dei ... quidam autem alii dixerunt quod hoc peccatum quod per originem trahimus esse carentiam originalis justitiae cum debito habendi ipsam sed per sacramentum Christi absolvimur a debito habendi originalem justitiam et etiam dicimur absolvi a peccato originali. Isti proprius et magis scientificè loquuntur...» *In ep. ad Rom.* A 376 180 v2.

⁹⁾ «... quocumque modo concupiscat anima, concupiscentia tamen non dicit essentiam anime sive naturam sed qualitatem sicut curvitas dicit non naturam sed dispositionem ipsius ligni pertinentem non ad predicamentum substantie sed qualitas». *De Peccato* V 203 r1.

¹⁰⁾ «Ideo ipsam (concupiscentiam) prae ceteris criminantur cum tractant de

all before Luther held that the formal guilt in original sin was something in the soul over and above the deordination of the flesh. Even in one of his last works, his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans dating from 1422, he gives us the distinction between concupiscence as a quality of the soul and as a quality of the flesh, for in baptism the sin, that is the quality of the soul, is remitted while concupiscence of the flesh remains. Hence it is that he does not hold that concupiscence is original sin¹¹⁾. And when he is commenting on the words of St. Paul that we are by nature « children of wrath » he tells us that nature is not to be accepted here as the substance which constitutes our nature as if by original sin the substance itself were depraved and it itself the object of the wrath of God, but it is the substance with the vice of nature which is the object of God's wrath¹²⁾. Then he inquires what is the vice which renders it hateful. And he continues, by original sin we contract two vices, the first is the privation of original justice from which concupiscence arises, but it is not by this we are children of wrath. This is not a sin because sin is wiped out in baptism whereas this remains after baptism¹³⁾. Therefore it is the second vice which is our participation in the sin of Adam that renders us children of wrath¹⁴⁾.

ea, verum tamen non intendunt quod ipsa sit culpa vel illud peccatum originale quod intelligimus esse culpam ». *Ibid.* V 205 vl.

¹¹⁾ « Hoc autem peccatum quidam scholastici dixerunt esse quemdam carnalem concupiscentiam habitantem in carne ... dixerunt etiam huiusmodi quod hec concupiscentia non imputatur ad peccatum postquam per sacramentum Christi a peccato soluti sumus ». *In ep. ad Rom.* A 376 180 v2.

¹²⁾ « Natura hic non debet sumi secundum substantiam... sed natura hic accipitur cum vicio quo est vitiata: ideo videndum est quod sit illud vicium ex quo sumus filii irae ». *In ep. ad Eph.* A 641 57 vl.

¹³⁾ « Propter quod est advertendum quod duo mala contrahimus per originem que non erant in natura ante peccatum voluntarie commissum. Alia est carentia originalis iustitie cum qua natura nostra primo creata (erat) et propter peccatum ade fuit perdita et sic natura nostra fuit divisa in appetitus diversos contrarios et ad invicem repugnantes ... et hanc aliqui intellexerunt esse peccatum originale sed non ... quoniam hoc ut dictum est remanet post baptismum in quo tamen deletur peccatum originale ». *Ibid.* A 641 57 vl.

¹⁴⁾ « Est itaque attendendum aliud vicium et malum quod trahimus per peccatum et est reatus transgressionis facte per Adam cujus quidem transgressionis nos omnes qui seminaliter eramus in Adam et seminaliter derivati sumus, participes sumus et ille reatus proprie est peccatum originale quod in baptismo deletur », *Ibid.* 57 vl.

It is therefore easy to see what Favaroni understands by the term concupiscence. He understands concupiscence as that which implies a deordination of the soul as well as a deordination of the body. The deordination of the soul is wiped out in baptism. His expressions on this point are quite clear although they are given only « per transennam ». We cannot expect any more as he mentions this opinion only to reject it.

Even from this exposition alone we consider Favaroni outside the pale of the pro-lutheran accusations. His idea of concupiscence is that of Peter Lombard and his followers.

Coming now to the intimate nature of concupiscence there is one doubt in the mind of Favaroni which he declines to solve, and it is whether concupiscence is to be considered a *quality* of the soul or not. Rather than take up the question and discuss it thoroughly to arrive at some conclusion either way, he prefers always to prescind from it taking both possibilities into account. For example his first conclusion in the Tract on Original Sin speaks of concupiscence as an « *essentia qualitatis apposita animae* » ¹⁵⁾, his second speaks of it as « *de motu vitali quo tendit anima in objectum per talem eciam essentiam qualitatis* » ¹⁶⁾. And his final word on the subject is to leave it unsolved as being a futile question ¹⁷⁾. Again in his Commentary to the epistle to the Romans we find traces of the same hesitancy ¹⁸⁾. Speaking of how there is no damnation to

¹⁵⁾ *De Peccato...* V 201 r1.

¹⁶⁾ *Ibid.* V 201 r1.

¹⁷⁾ « Sive concupiscat anima per essentiam qualitatis sibi appositam sicut ignis calet per caliditatem sibi appositam sive concupiscat anima sine tali essentia sibi apposita que realiter distinguatur ab ea ... non curat Augustinus nec curandum est et quocumque modo concupiscat anima concupiscentia tamen non dicit essentiam anime sive naturam sed qualitatem sicut curvitas ». *Ibid.* V 203 r1.

¹⁸⁾ « Ad habendam igitur intelligentiam Augustini circa hanc materiam tria considerata sunt per ordinem in homine aliquo; primo namque considerare debemus in homine vicium nature cum quo omnes nascuntur propter ammissam originalem iustitiam et illud est seminarium quoddam viciorum et dicitur fomes peccati ... Secundo considerare debemus motum factum in carne actualis concupiscentie quo actu concupiscimus et hec actualis concupiscentia est lex peccati de qua Apostolus dicit 'carne servio legi peccati' ... Tercio fragiles imbecilles vel omnino mali ... qui consenciant et obediunt eis ad executionem operis ... et in isto consensu stat damnatio. ... Illi vero qui motus concupiscentiarum sentiunt quidem sed non eis consenciant quin ymo militant, resistunt et victoriam obtinent non dicendi sunt vivere secundum carnem neque secundum carnem militare neque desideria carnis perficere ... et isti intelliguntur esse in Christo Jesu in

those who are in Christ Jesus.¹⁹⁾ he tells us that we must distinguish three things, first the *viciū* nature which is the fount and source of evil, secondly the prods of *actual* concupiscence felt in the flesh and thirdly, the consent of the wicked to these feelings. « Actual » is put in the second place to distinguish it from the habitual character which the « *seminarium* » evidently entails.

Probably he declines to answer this question out of respect for the Master of the Sentences who holds that concupiscence is a habit of the soul. From his general dubious attitude to the question of habits we would expect him to deny it, and it seems from his own words that he would like to²⁰⁾. It is indeed as he remarks himself, absolutely unnecessary as far as his own doctrine is concerned, because in reality the question of concupiscence enters little into Favaroni's consideration of man's justice and justification.

2. Concupiscence is no sin whatever in the justified.

This point is absolutely conclusive from the Tract on Original Sin. The first conclusion states that concupiscence as a quality cannot be original sin²¹⁾. The truth of this assertion is proved by four brief syllogisms: firstly that no quality of itself is any fault or guilt²²⁾; secondly no quality is an injustice²³⁾; thirdly, every quality is a « something » in the formal sense²⁴⁾; and fourthly that

quibus habitat Christus per fidem et per gratiam iustificantem et vincentem in certamine inter carnem et spiritum ». *In ep. ad Rom.* A 376 202 v2.

¹⁹⁾ *Rom.* 8, 1.

²⁰⁾ « Pro intellectu hujus (secundae) conclusionis notandum quod quemadmodum tactum fuit superius loquendo de caritate in affectionibus anime, aliud est considerare ipsas essentias qualitatum quas Deus posset etiam extra subjectum creare vel etiam in quocumque subjecto ponere et in ipsa anima subjective absque hoc quod aliqua affectio anime sequeretur et aliud est considerare ipsas affectiones anime ». *De Peccato...* V 201 r1.

²¹⁾ « Prima Conclusio: Nulla essentia qualitatis in quocumque subjecto existat est complete peccatum originale ». *Ibid.* V 200 r2.

²²⁾ « Nulla essentia qualitatis est de sua natura aliqua culpa sed peccatum originale est culpa, igitur nulla talis essentia qualitatis est essentialiter peccatum originale ». *Ibid.* V 200 r2.

²³⁾ « Nulla essentia qualitatis est essentialiter injustitia, originale peccatum est formaliter injustitia; igitur nulla essentia qualitatis in quocumque subjecto existat est complete originale peccatum ». *Ibid.* V 200 r2.

²⁴⁾ « Essentia qualitatis est aliquid formaliter sumptum; sed peccatum originale formaliter sumptum non est aliquid... ». *Ibid.*

no quality is a malice in the formal sense of the word ²⁵). No quality can have these attributes so that neither can concupiscence, if it be a quality, have them : but all these attributes are necessary to constitute the formal characteristics of sin and therefore to constitute original sin. Hence concupiscence as a quality cannot be original sin.

The second conclusion is similar to the first, only as we have already pointed out, it speaks of the actual movements of concupiscence prescinding from the fact whether these movements proceed from a habit or not ²⁶). It is similarly impossible that these movements of the flesh constitute adequately original sin, first of all because a movement of the soul inasmuch as it is a tendency to some object is something positive, it is some action of the soul. But sin, on the contrary is not a tendency to the acquisition of some good, it is the debitum justitiae and therefore a privation ²⁷). Obviously, a positive and a privation are not identical. Secondly, every movement of the soul is a vital act of man. It therefore comes under the general rule of Providence and requires the concurrence of God — operative a Deo. It is impossible that a vital act of man which must have God for its author can be of itself malice or guilt ²⁸). Neither therefore can the actual movements of concupiscence be considered as original sin.

Only after we have seen the true opinion of Favaroni on original

²⁵) « Nulla essentia qualitatis est formaliter malicia qua aliquis dicitur malus sed peccatum originale est malicia qua aliquis dicitur malus ergo... ». *Ibid.*

²⁶) « Secunda Conclusio: Ipsa affectio anime que dicitur concupiscentia carnis sive fomes peccati non est formaliter ipsum originale peccatum ». *Ibid.* V 200 v2.

²⁷) « Quelibet affectio [prout] in se considerata est, dicit merum positivum et puram affirmationem ... sed omne peccatum formaliter sumptum, sub ratione videlicet qua peccatum est, dicit privacionem et negacionem in subjecto; propter quod dicunt Doctores quod peccatum non est aliquid sed nihil et est etiam illud malum abstractivum sumptum quo quis dicitur malus, de quo Augustinus et Anselmus dicunt quod est nihil i. e. non est aliquid positivum sed privativum ». *Ibid.* V 201 r1.

²⁸) « Quilibet affectus anime est quidam actus vitalis ipsius anime et ipsius actus secundus vite: nullus actus secunde vite est aliquod peccatum quod dicit iniustitiam et maliciam atque culpam. *Ibid.* V 201 r1. In the third conclusion he shows that these movements of the flesh are not carentia originalis justitiae — quoniam talis affectio dicit quid positivum et puram affirmationem quoniam est motus quidam anime et aliqua operatio ejus sive actio ejus cujus Deus est per se causa sicut omnium motuum et actionum omnium rerum ». *Ibid.* V 202 r1.

sin shall we be able to realise how little a part concupiscence has in its concept. It cannot even be called the material element. Briefly, original sin in man is his participation in the sin of Adam. Now in the actual sin of Adam it was not concupiscence that formed the material element, but the act itself. So also is original sin in his descendents — it is the act of Adam that is the material element and not concupiscence. Only remotely can concupiscence be called the material element ²⁹).

It is not surprising to find that the fourth conclusion denies absolutely that concupiscence is any guilt at all in man ³⁰). According to him this ought to be evident, for if concupiscence were guilt then it would be an injustice; in the justified therefore, justice and injustice would simultaneously co-exist, which is impossible ³¹). As we know, the Protestant line of argument is just the contrary.

Undoubtedly though, concupiscence is often called a sin. Does it follow that it is a sin in the strict sense of the word, as the Protestants interpret it? St. Paul himself was the first to call concupiscence a sin ³²) and from St. Paul the term passed into Catholic tradition. For this reason the Council of Trent deemed it opportune to declare in what sense concupiscence is called a sin — because it proceeds from sin and it induces to sin ³³). Favaroni's explanation is exactly the same. Concupiscence is not a sin propria ratione pec-

²⁹) «Ex quibus patet quod multi Doctores Scholastici non bene assignant materiale in peccato infantium dicentes quod concupiscentia carnis sit materiale in eorum peccato originali vel carentia originalis iustitie ut dicunt alii. Patet inquam quoniam idem materiale omnino fuit infantium et Adam quoniam idem fuit actus prevaricationis qui licet preterit tamen pro materiale debet intelligi, nam et in Adam eciam preterit remanente formale. Ideo concupiscentia carnis nonisi remote potest dici materiale in peccato originale sicut humor lesivus oculi potest dici materiale in cecitate; carentia vero originalis iustitie propinquius potest dici materiale in peccato, verumtamen nec concupiscentia nec carentia originalis iustitie proprie est materiale in peccato originali plusquam fuerit in peccato actuali Ade ». *De Peccato...* V 211 r2.

³⁰) «Quarta Conclusio: Carnalis affectio anime que dicitur concupiscentia carnis per se considerata non est aliqua culpa, ideo non est culpa originalis ». *Ibid.* V 202 r1.

³¹) Secundo vero satis patet de se, alias staret aliquem habere aliquam culpam et non habere iniustitiam; preterea ad conclusionem, omnis culpa sub propria ratione culpe deletur in sacramento baptismatis sed affectio anime que est concupiscentia carnis non aufertur per sacramentum baptismatis ». *Ibid.* V 202 r1.

³²) *Rom. c. 7.*

³³) *DENZ. Ench. Sym. n. 792.*

cati³⁴⁾, but it is called sin by a double metaphor. First by that figure of speech by which the effect receives the name of its cause i. e. because it was caused by the sin of Adam. Secondly by that figure of speech by which the cause receives the name of its effect i. e. because concupiscence incites to sin³⁵⁾. We find the very same reason expounded in his Commentary on the epistle to the Romans³⁶⁾. Perhaps if Mueller had known these texts he would not have been so generous in recommending Favaroni to Catholic theologians to prove that concupiscence is a sin not because it proceeds from sin nor because it leads to sin, but because of itself it is sin³⁷⁾.

³⁴⁾ « Ergo debemus duo discernere (205 v2) peccatum quod per sacramentum remittitur ab ipsa concupiscentia que remanet in regenerato et quod ipsa concupiscentia per se considerata non est peccatum propria ratione peccati ». *Ibid.* V 205 v1.

³⁵⁾ Originale igitur peccatum proprie dicit reatum sive obligationem debiti quod per sacramentum solvitur et deletur et hoc est culpa in originali peccato. Et per hoc melius potest videri quod concupiscentia carnis per se considerata non est ipsa culpa originalis sed est quedam incommoditas originalis sicut famis ... sicut sitis ... Est quidem ipsa concupiscentia peccatum sicut patuit superius distinguendo de triplici peccato in primo dubio non tamen est peccatum quod est culpa sed dicitur peccatum tropica locutione et certe duplici: ex eo quidem quod factum est ex peccato ... et est tropica locutio qua effectus sortitur vocabulum sue cause, dicitur etiam peccatum ipsa concupiscentia quia est causa peccati alliciens videlicet et inducens et alia est tropica locutio qua causa sortitur nomen sui effectus ... sicut ignis est piger vel frigus est piger. Ideo qui non attendunt istos modos locutionum et legunt in doctoribus sanctis ipsam concupiscentiam esse peccatum putant concupiscentiam carnis propria locutione dici peccatum ideo putant ipsam esse culpam et illud peccatum quod dicitur originale peccatum sed falluntur. *De Peccato...* V 205 v1.

³⁶⁾ Unde viciū illud inficiens naturam dicitur peccatum ex duplici metaphorica locutione secundum Augustinum: prima illa locutione qua effectus nominatur nomine sue cause ut cum dicimus hanc scripturam esse manum talis vel talis scriptoris ... sic viciū inficiens naturam de quo loquimur dicitur peccatum: dicitur peccatum quia ex peccato primo Ade factum est sive processit. Alia metaphorica locutione hoc ipsum viciū dicitur peccatum consequenter, unde causa nominatur nomine sui effectus ut cum dicimus ignis est piger ... sic illud viciū dicitur peccatum quia facit peccare et incitat ad peccatum. *In ep. ad Rom.* A 376 200 r1.

³⁷⁾ A. V. MUELLER, *Agostino Favaroni e la teologia di Lutero*, Rome 1914 (pamphlet extract p. 7 footnote 2). Raccomando questo passo a quei teologi che credono che la concupiscenza si chiami « peccatum » soltanto e principalmente perchè proviene dal peccato o conduce eventualmente al peccato e non perchè sia una vera transgressione della legge.

Terminating now our point for consideration on the sense of the word 'concupiscence' we can unhesitatingly assert that there is no similarity of concept whatsoever between our theologian and the so-called Reformers of the sixteenth century. When Favaroni quotes the opinion that concupiscence is original sin he understands it as the Catholic scholastic doctors understood it.

3. *Concupiscence is not an impediment to Perfect Justice.*

A. V. Mueller in his first point of accusation on perfect justice devotes practically all his energies to proving that Favaroni taught that concupiscence is invincible and therefore impedes our coming to a perfect justice just as Luther taught. His proofs rest ultimately on the use of a few patently equivocal terms such as « peccatum » « ruga » « macula ». Invincible in the sense of Luther means that we have not efficacious liberty for a good act and therefore as a result of concupiscence all our works are vitiated and are sins — mortal in themselves but imputed as venial³⁸). Obviously this is the invincibility that he pretends to see in Favaroni ; and indeed he tries to prove that for Favaroni concupiscence is a sin in the real sense of the word. But with a strange incoherence he tells us that for our theologian the movements of concupiscence are not sins at all — not even venial sins !

For this reason then we propose first of all to examine our author's concept of perfection or perfect justice. When we have discovered this we shall then be in a position to estimate properly the part played by concupiscence in the works of the just. And we shall see that precisely with concupiscence a perfection is attainable — that perfection which consists in absolute freedom from sin. That it is a special grace or to whom it has been given does not directly interest us — we wish only to elucidate the *possibility* of a perfect justice here in this life.

The question of perfection is discussed by our theologian usually in regard to the question of the perfection of St. Paul and to the dissention between Augustine and Origen on this matter³⁹). Origen

³⁸) J. PAQUIER, *Luther* in DTC. ix 1214. Cf. *Assertio Omnium Articulorum*, art. 36 E. W. vii 142, *In ep. S. Pauli ad Gal.* Opera Omnia E. W. 40, 2. 95. DENZ., *Ench. Sym.* nn. 771, 772, 775.

³⁹) *De Perfecta Iustitia* V 189 v2 - 191 v1; *In ep. ad Eph.* A 641 60 v1; *In ep. ad Philipp.* A 641 104 r2 sqq.

holds that when St. Paul wrote the epistle to the Romans he was at the highest perfection possible although he arrived at it gradually : for he was more perfect when he wrote the second epistle to the Corinthians than when he wrote the epistle to the Philippians, and he was more perfect still when he wrote the epistle to the Romans than when he wrote the second to the Corinthians ⁴⁰). Nay more when he wrote the epistle to the Romans he was in the highest grade of perfection possible without concupiscence or without any obstacles at all to the love of God ⁴¹). The reason is that Origen distinguishes a double perfection in this life — one the perfect possession of all the virtues but with concupiscence, the second a similar possession without concupiscence ⁴²). Augustine on the contrary does not allow the distinction of the perfection of this life but distinguishes only between the perfection of this life and the perfection of heaven. This is the groundwork of Favaroni's distinctions.

Now putting these two together we can distinguish a triple perfection. The first perfection is perfect constancy and perfect stability in virtue so that its possessor cannot fall by sin ⁴³). It is therefore that state of perfection where one is confirmed in grace so that he can no longer sin. But this can be understood in two ways : one that he can no longer fall into mortal sin, the other that he cannot fall into venial sin ⁴⁴). Of these two perfections therefore,

⁴⁰) *De Perfecta Iustitia* V 190 v2.

⁴¹) Also *In ep. ad Rom.* A 376 199 v2.

⁴²) « Notandum autem quod aliter Origines concordat hos duos textus per distinctionem de duplici perfectione ... unam videlicet que est in expletionem virtutum, aliam vero cum ita quis proficit ut ultra detinere (decidere ?) non posset neque retrorsum respicere ». *In ep. ad Philipp.* A 641 104 r2.

⁴³) « Et sic attenta distinctione Origenis de duplici perfectione cum distinctione present possumus recolligere perfectionem trimembrem ut prima perfectio sit tanta virtutum constantia et fortitudo ad earum possessorem tuendum ut iam cadere per mortale non posset ... in qua tamen pugnant virtutes cum viciis licet vincant et non superantur. *De Perfecta Iustitia* V 191 r1. Cf. also « Unus quidem profectus et cursus est ad gradum impeccabilitatis ad quem cum pervenerint sint de cetero impeccabiles et hic dicit esse perfectionem quam in secundo loco tetigit ... aliam vero (104 v1) cum ita quis proficit ut ultra decidere non posset neque retrorsum respicere ». *In ep. ad Philipp.* A 641 104 r2.

⁴⁴) « Sed hoc posset dupliciter intelligi: aut quod non posset de cetero peccare mortaliter aut nec eciam venialiter: primo quidem modo consensendum esset (et ?) beatus Augustinus sensit nedum de Paulo sed de ceteris Apostolis post receptum

Favaroni, in the footsteps of St. Augustine, allows that St. Paul had only that confirmation in grace which excludes mortal sin. The Blessed Virgin alone, by a singular privilege of grace was preserved even from venial sin ⁴⁵⁾. Similarly she was also cleansed from concupiscence ⁴⁶⁾. St. Paul on the contrary was not: he had concupiscence and yet was in a state of perfection and freedom from sin. In this state *virtutes crescunt et pugnant* ⁴⁷⁾.

The second perfection entails not only the stable possession of all the virtues but also their perfect liberation from all the effects of concupiscence ⁴⁸⁾; this is where, according to Origen, the virtues receive their ultimate complement and stability ⁴⁹⁾. In this state man should be in a state of peace within himself, no rebellion of the inferior to the superior, nor any difficulty in fulfilling the commandments. Nevertheless, according to Origen, there would still be progress in virtue — *virtutes crescunt et non pugnant* ⁵⁰⁾ — which seems difficult to understand. According to Origen, St. Paul was in this state of perfection without any concupiscence, at least when he wrote the epistle to the Romans, but St. Augustine denies this. Favaroni decides the question solely on the authority of the Doctors of the Church ⁵¹⁾. For Favaroni this state of perfection does not exist in this life but is reserved for the next ⁵²⁾.

Spiritus Sanctum in die Pentecostes, et de Apostolo Paulo statim post acceptam revelationem evangelii. *In ep. ad Philipp.* A 641 104 v1.

⁴⁵⁾ « Si vero intelligatur impeccabilitas nedum mortaliter sed etiam venialiter non sensensit B. Augustinus nam talem ac tantam impeccabilitatem in sola posuit Matre Domini et omnes alios sanctos et sanctas ab hac impeccabilitate exclusit ». *Ibid.* 104 v1.

⁴⁶⁾ « Prima Conclusio: Mater Domini Salvatoris adeo perfecte in hac vita fuit mundata in carne ab omni languore nature quod in ea non fuit aliqua rebellio vel repugnantia contra spiritum ad aliquod opus bonum ». *De Perfecta Iustitia* V 188 r2.

⁴⁷⁾ *Ibid.* 191 r2.

⁴⁸⁾ « Secunda perfectio virtutum est perfecta earum purgatio ab omni cupiditate et vicio concupiscentie ... Augustinus autem hanc perfectionem nulli voluit tribuere in presenti ». *Ibid.* V 191 r1.

⁴⁹⁾ « Sed rursus posuit Origenes aliam quandam perfectionem in hac vita quam dixit consistere in expletionem virtutum i. e. in complemento in quo virtutes accipiunt statum ». *In ep. ad Philipp.* A 641 104 v1.

⁵⁰⁾ *De Perfecta Iustitia* V 191 r2.

⁵¹⁾ « Secundo manifestatur quod Apostolus non erat sine concupiscentia carnis ... cui opponit Origenes duo argumenta... (192 r2). Sed quoniam Augustinus in hac sua sententia patronem habet Ambrosium ut ipse dicit 1^o libro contra

The third perfection is the perfection of heaven when the virtues receive their final reward — but with this we are not concerned.

It should now be clear from this that Favaroni teaches a certain perfection of justice to be possible in this life — that perfection which Catholic tradition allows St. Paul and the rest of the Apostles — namely a state of impeccability and confirmation in grace. A further convalidation of this position and a good illustration of the Catholic spirit of his theology, contrary to what A. V. Mueller would have us believe ⁵³⁾ can be brought forward from his comment on the condemnation of the Beguards and Beguines at the Council of Vienna. He quotes literally the text accepted by Denzinger n. 471 and then explains it ⁵⁴⁾.

As has been quite obvious all through, perfection or perfect justice has not the identical signification for Favaroni as it shall later have for Luther. Luther's perfect justice is what we call the ordinary or adequately perfect justice; Favaroni's perfect justice is the charismatical or extraordinary perfection of justice. Luther's acceptation is that the justice of every human being is, by reason

Julianum et favet eciam Gregorius, 23^o libro Moraliū, Bernardus similiter in locis plurimis superius citatis ideo tucius in hac controversia tenetur sententia Augustini de cuius mente omnino est conclusio secunda posita supra universaliter, que ex aliis dictis Augustini evidenter manifestatur ». *Ibid.* V 192 r1.

⁵²⁾ « Verumptamen nullo modo existimo verum esse quod aliquis in statu citra beatificam visionem pervenerit aut pervenire posset ad tale complementum virtutum in quo virtutes accipiunt statum supra quem crescere non possent eciam citra gradum beatifice visionis ». *In ep. ad Philipp.* A 641 104 v1.

⁵³⁾ A. V. MUELLER, *Una fonte ignota del sistema di Lutero - il B. Simone Fidati da Cascia e la sua teologia*, *Bilychnis* 10, Roma 1921.

⁵⁴⁾ « Iste articulus duo dicit: primum est quod aliquis in hac vita posset tantum proficere quod redderetur penitus impeccabilis. Hoc autem non debet erroneum reputari quoniam de Beata Virgine dicimus quod ad tantum ac talem gradum perfectionis et gracie pervenit in hac vita quod fuit penitus impeccabilis secundum quod hoc quod dicitur 'penitus' debet intelligi quo ad mortale et veniale quoniam nec mortaliter nec venialiter poterit peccare. De Apostolis autem post receptionem Spiritus Sancti in die Pentecostes quod ad tantum ac talem perfectionis gradum pervenerint quod de cetero nequiverunt peccare mortaliter communiter tenent eciam Doctores sancti licet a venialibus non fuerint omnino excepti... Secundum quod ille articulus dicebat erat quod aliquis in vita presenti tantum ac talem perfectionis gradum posset acquirere quod amplius in gratia proficere non valebit; hoc autem hereticum est et ponentes hunc errorem non intelligunt que loquuntur ». *In ep. ad Eph.* A 641 60 v1. Exactly the same explanation is to be found in *De Caritate Christi circa Electos et Ejus infinito Amore*, V 176 v1.

of concupiscence which is for him original sin, necessarily defective and derated. Favaroni nowhere shows signs of taking this assumption as his starting point : when he enquires about the perfection of justice he understands this as the culminating point of the creature's justice without in the least insinuating that the justice of those who do not arrive at the culminating point is in any way inadequate for eternal life or incomplete for justification. If he denies their justice to be perfect he obviously denies its perfection in the sense accepted by himself, not in the sense accepted a hundred years later by Luther.

It is also evident that having proved that concupiscence is no bar to the attainment of the culminating point of justice, we have proved a fortiori that it is no bar to the ordinary perfection of justice, which is a justice of the same specific nature. And the fundamental reason is — and this explains to Mueller the perfect coherence and logic of Favaroni — that concupiscence in the justified is of itself no sin or guilt whatever.

4. *Concupiscence does not vitiate our acts of free will.*

From this one point alone of the possibility of arriving at the state of perfection, notwithstanding the permanence of concupiscence in the lower appetites we come to another conclusion which is of the highest importance against the Protestants and it is that by the existence of concupiscence in the justified the power of free will for good is not entirely enervated. Constantly our theologian asserts that our actions depend upon our own free will. It is our free will that makes us do good or bad actions ⁵⁵). Speaking of our good works and their capacity for merit there are two extremes to be avoided — either to exaggerate the office of grace or to exaggerate the office of free will ⁵⁶). Both combine to form a beauti-

⁵⁵) « Istorum vero doctorum fidelium certa et vera sententia est nos ex libera voluntate agere pravos vel benevolos mores et Deum non solum cuncta prescire futura sed cuncta futura disponere ». In *Apocalypsim* V 17 vl.

⁵⁶) « Cavendum est ne alterum extremum teneat duorum dogmatum extremorum circa opera nostra ... Duo namque dogmata sunt que extrema tenent; quidam enim tantum commendant adiutorium gratie Dei in omni opere virtuoso quod liberum arbitrium pro nihilo reputant ... quidam enim tantum promovent liberum arbitrium quod adiutorium gratie Dei detrahunt plus quam debent ... quomodo non excludit liberum arbitrium ab operibus bonis qui dicit quod tota bonitas iusti operis attribuitur principio totaliter extrinseco? Ita quod tantum ille enervat

ful harmony. Our good act does not lose any of its meritorious value if it is made under the inspiration of God because it remains our own action. A creature who produces of itself a work to which is attached a reward, the same reward is also due to another creature who performs the action with the concurrence of God ⁵⁷). And the reason is that God confers his gifts on the creature so that they pass into the property and dominion of the creature ⁵⁸). Just as if a king gives a hundred ducats to one of his servants, Peter, then Peter can purchase goods to the value of a hundred ducats from the king with exactly the same right as he can purchase them from anyone else ⁵⁹). The existence and activity of free will, *proprietas qua voluntas est sui actus dominus*, could hardly be expressed more clearly.

Hence it is that with good reason Favaroni rejects Origen's theory that good works are from God and bad ones from the devil ⁶⁰). On the contrary both good and bad works are the works of the human free will so that man is responsible for the bad just as he is for the good ⁶¹). It is the fight against concupiscence — between the good offered by virtue and the evil suggested by concupiscence — that constitutes the crown of the saints ⁶²).

liberum arbitrium quantum in isto sensu poneret liberum arbitrium purum passivum sicut materiam, sicut potentias passivas sensitivas et incidit in errorem ». *De Merito Christi* V 235 r1.

⁵⁷) « Sed si est, sicut est, totum a libero arbitrio cur non sibi de condigno debetur premium quod sibi debetur (235 r2) si esset solum ab ea ? Ponamus A naturam angelicam vel humanam hoc bonum quod agit totum a se habere et totaliter ita quod nec Deus nec aliud agens ad hoc cooperaretur et B hoc equale bonum quod operatur ponamus a se et a Deo habere. Si A debetur premium de condigno ex opere suo cur non eque debeatur etiam B ? Sive enim ad hoc aliud agens concurrat sive non totum tamen est a B sicut illud est ab A ». *Ibid.* V 235 r1.

⁵⁸) « Ergo attendat quod totum hoc quod Deus confert totum libere donat voluntati create ut sit suum; non mutuatur vel accomodat sed liberaliter donat ut transeat in ius voluntatis create et sit suum ». *Ibid.* 235 r2.

⁵⁹) *De Merito Christi*, V 235 r2.

⁶⁰) *In ep. ad Rom.* A 376 195 v2 sq.

⁶¹) « Licet enim ab inimico mali fructus sunt seminati in voluntate tamen ipsius voluntatis sunt fructus quemadmodum licet boni fructus a Deo sint seminati in voluntate ipsius tamen voluntatis sunt fructus; utriusque ergo sunt et voluntatis et seminantis in voluntate sive mali sive boni sint fructus ». *In ep. ad Rom.* A 376 196 r1.

⁶²) « Bonum ago quando concupiscentie male non consencio, hoc ago bonum et non perficio bonum. Rursus et hostis mea agit malum et non perficit malum

If therefore notwithstanding concupiscence our good works are really our own, and on the other hand it is *possible* for us to come to a state of impeccability or freedom from mortal sin, even though without a special privilege such as was accorded to the Blessed Virgin we cannot be entirely free from venial sin, it is evident that the existence of concupiscence does not lessen or diminish our liberty for good. This point lays the axe at the root of Mueller's pro-lutheran accusation.

As a final word therefore to the accusation that concupiscence is invincible we can reply with an appropriate distinction. If invincibility is understood in the sense of ineffaceable we concede wholeheartedly that Favaroni taught the invincibility of concupiscence. As long as we are here on earth we can never be perfectly cleansed from concupiscence, nor indeed was anyone, excepting the Blessed Virgin, entirely cleansed from it. But if we understand invincibility in the sense of insuperable then we emphatically deny that Favaroni taught the invincibility of concupiscence. The decisive proof for this is the existence and capacity of free will, which, in *sensu composito* with the ignorance and difficulties concomitant with concupiscence still retains the possibility of arriving at a state of impeccability.

Summing up now, for the sake of convenience, we can note the important points under three headings :

1. Concupiscence is not original sin nor indeed in the justified does it entail any moral guilt at all. Frequently Favaroni calls it « *ruga duplicitatis* »⁶³⁾ or even sometimes a « *macula* » but these expressions don't necessarily imply any moral guilt. They signify a defect in comparison with the perfect justice and subordination of the lower faculties to which man is destined in the next life. Consequently I have omitted the point which Mueller advances that

quia non me trahit ad malum; et in isto bello est tota vita sanctorum ». *In ep. ad Col.* A 641 140 r.

⁶³⁾ A. V. Mueller adduces three texts from *De Perfecta Iustitia* where concupiscence is called a « *ruga duplicitatis* » and as a matter of fact his first one forms the third conclusion of the work. But he unfairly omitted to note that in the explanation that followed, our theologian distinguishes « *maculum culpe* » and « *ruga duplicitatis* »: and he says that Christ cleansed the Church from the *maculum culpe* but not from the *ruga duplicitatis*. No one will take exception to our saying that concupiscence is a *ruga duplicitatis* provided we exclude from it all character of guilt.

no one can fulfill perfectly the precept of Deuteronomy ⁶⁴) « Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo et ex tota anima tua etc » ⁶⁵). The sense is evident — the soul is divided fighting against concupiscence so that it cannot give *all* its attention — *ex tota anima* — to God ⁶⁶). To conclude from *this* impossibility of loving God with our whole soul to Luther's theory of the impossibility of the fulfillment of the evangelical law seems too ridiculous for refutation.

2. Concupiscence does not impede our arriving at the highest perfection, that is to a state of freedom from sin and confirmation in grace. This certainly is the privilege of the few; what few is indifferent: the Apostles are quoted as examples. Nowhere are we authorised to accept concupiscence as an impediment to adequate justice even in the grade of common sanctity. Mueller's allegations are unknown to Favaroni and he entirely prescind from them. It is only on other points of doctrine that we can come to know his mind on these accusations.

3. Concupiscence is by no means invincible in the sense of

⁶⁴) Deut. 6, 5. Cf. Mt. 22, 37.

⁶⁵) That our impossibility to observe perfectly this precept comes only from concupiscence is not as evident as our adversaries would have us believe. And an indication comes from its collocation in the Tract on Perfect Justice. He opens the tract with the three acceptations of 'sin' viz. concupiscence, actual sin, and the debt of punishment. The tract is then divided into two parts, the first treating of the first acceptation of sin, concupiscence and the second treating of the second acceptation, actual sin. The division is clearly announced by Favaroni himself 'Nunc secundo (videndum est) principaliter de peccato secundo modo superius sumpto' (193 r1) and a new enumeration of the conclusions begins. If the impossibility of observing the commandment 'diliges etc' were to be attributed to concupiscence only, we should expect it in the first part; but it is not, it forms the third conclusion of the second part under actual sin. In his explanation of the conclusion he brings forward two reasons for the impossibility namely the existence of concupiscence and the succession of daily venial sins. However the bringing forward of concupiscence as a reason may well be explained by his basing his remarks on a quotation from St. Augustine's *De Perfectione Iustitiae* viii 19, ML. 44, 300. Elsewhere when he does not quote Augustine he attributes our imperfection solely to the succession of our daily faults: « Prima videlicet quod non est ecclesia in presenti tota subdita Christo cujus probatio est quod in omnibus membris suis concupiscitur contra Christum cum omnia membra sua habeant qualiacumque peccata pro quibus cotidie dicunt dimitte nobis debita nostra ». *De Perfecta Iustitia*, V 195 v2. Cf. also *In ep. ad Eph.*, A 641 46 r1.

⁶⁶) « Ex ea parte nondum diligit Deum qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum et per hoc non diligit Deum tota anima quoniam anima concupiscit in carne ». *De Perfecta Iustitia*, V 194 v2.

Luther. Even our adversary admits that nowhere does Favaroni use the term invincible with regard to concupiscence. But he asserts that the concept of invincible concupiscence is to be found. Even this is false. Nowhere is there any indication that concupiscence can dominate in us without the consent of our own free will — nor even can it draw us to sin against our will. Free will although it may be allured and enticed to sin by concupiscence can never be constrained, but as the God given rational faculty of choice ever remains the supreme directrix of human morality.

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(To be continued)